Monthly Archives: April 2012

America's Solar Energy Potential

America’s Solar Energy Potential
http://www.americanenergyindependence.com/solarenergy.aspx
Every hour, the sun radiates more energy onto the earth than the entire human population uses in one whole year.

The technology required to harness the power of the sun is available now. Solar power alone could provide all of the energy Americans consume — there is no shortage of solar energy. The following paragraphs will give you the information you need to prove this to yourself and others. You do not need advanced math skills to follow and perform the arithmetic examples shown below. Anyone who can balance a checkbook or calculate the total square feet of floor space in his or her home, and understand why an area measuring 10 yards by 10 yards equals 100 square yards, can perform the following arithmetic examples and prove that American energy independence could be achieved with solar energy alone.

Science tells us that every square meter of the earth’s surface, when exposed to direct sunlight, receives about 1000 watts (1 kilowatt) of energy from the sun’s light. Depending on the angle of sunlight, which changes with the time of day, and the geographical location [see map below], the power of the sun’s light will be somewhat more or less than 1 kilowatt-hour per hour for every square meter of the earth’s surface exposed to the sun.

USA solar map On average, and particularly in the Sunbelt regions of the Southwestern United States, every square meter area exposed to direct sunlight will receive about 1 kilowatt-hour per hour of solar energy. However, scientists estimate that sunlight will provide useful solar energy for only about 6 to 7 hours per day because during the early hours and late hours of the day the angle of the sun’s light is too low. So, for example, if the sun’s light provides 6 productive hours of solar energy per day, then a square meter of land in direct sunlight will receive about 6 kilowatt-hours of solar energy during the course of a day.

Scientists like to measure things using the metric system. However, most Americans are unfamiliar with the metric system. (Europeans use the metric system.) It is easier for Americans to think in square feet and square yards because feet and yards are common lengths in the United States. So, for the sake of clarity and because this is written for an American audience, all measurements will be converted from meters to yards.

A meter is just a little longer than a yard (about 3 and ¼ feet to a meter, compared with 3 feet to a yard). There are 10.8 square feet in a square meter. There are 9 square feet in a square yard (3×3=9). A simple calculation can accomplish the conversion from square meters to square yards. A square yard is 83.33 percent of a square meter. Prove this by multiplying 10.8 (the number of square feet in a square meter) by 83.33%. The answer is nine (the number of square feet in a square yard). If you perform the calculation you will see that the answer is slightly less than the whole number 9 (but close enough for our purpose). Using this conversion, we can say that a square yard of land in direct sunlight receives 1000 x 83.33% = 833 watts of solar energy. This calculation can also be used in reverse to convert yards to meters, simply divide by .8333 (833 divided by .8333 = 1000 rounded).

Every square yard of land, if exposed to direct sunlight, receives about 833 watts of solar energy [NOTE: see the map above, and adjust the estimated amount of solar energy accordingly]. Therefore, a one square yard area exposed to continuous direct sunlight [in an optimal geographical location] for six hours will have received 6 hours x 833 watts = 4,998 watt-hours of solar energy during the course of a day. In round numbers, a one square yard area will receive about 5000 watt-hours (5 kilowatt-hours) per day of solar energy. Another way to obtain this result would be to take the 6 kilowatt-hours per meter (explained above in the third paragraph) and apply the conversion calculation (6 x 83.33% = 5 rounded).

Americans can assume, at least in the Sunbelt regions of the southwestern United States, that every square yard of land exposed to direct sunlight will receive about 5 kilowatt-hours per day of solar energy.

With the above information in mind, perform the following exercise: Measure an area ten yards long and ten yards wide. That would be thirty feet by thirty feet. Take a good look at the size of it. You are looking at an area covering 100 square yards. If that area were in direct sunlight all day it would receive about (5 x 100) 500 kilowatt-hours per day of solar energy. Now go look at your home electric bill. Your electric company calculates your home electric bill based on how many kilowatt-hours of electrical energy you use. Find the total amount of electricity that you have been billed for (given in kilowatt-hours). The amount of kilowatt-hours on your bill is for an entire month. If your home is a typical residential electric customer, you and your family consume between 500 and 1000 kilowatt-hours of electricity per month. Compare the quantity of electric energy your home consumed in one month with the quantity of energy the sun gives freely to a 100 square yard area exposed to direct sunlight. One hundred square yards of sunshine provides as much energy in 1 to 2 days as an average family uses in an entire month!

It would be great if 100% of the sunshine became electricity, but solar energy and electricity are not the same. Technology accomplishes the conversion of solar energy to electricity. Several different technologies are used; perhaps the one that most people have heard of is the solar panel, made from photovoltaic cells called PV.

For a detailed explanation of photovoltaic cells there is a very good article on the Internet located at:
http://www.howstuffworks.com/solar-cell.htm, it is well written and easy to read.

Conversion of one form of energy to another always causes a loss of energy. In other words, the new form of energy will be less than the original. Efficiency is the word scientists use to describe the difference in power resulting from the conversion of one form of energy to another. The efficiency of commercially available solar panels (PV) is about 15%. This means that when a solar panel converts the sun’s light to electricity, only about 15 percent of the energy in the sunlight becomes electricity. The same thing is true of gasoline in your car. Your car’s engine can only convert about twenty-five percent of the energy in gasoline to mechanical energy that turns the wheels.

With an average efficiency of 15 percent, a square yard of solar photovoltaic cells (PV) would produce (5 kilowatt-hours of solar energy multiplied by 15% =) .75 kilowatt-hours of electric energy per day. Solar panels (PV) covering an area ten yards by ten yards (100 square yards or 900 square feet) would produce 100 x .75 = 75 kilowatt-hours of electricity per day.

Seventy-five kilowatt-hours per day is a lot of electricity for a single-family home. If part of the electricity is stored in a home battery, or is used to electrolyze water for producing hydrogen gas, and the gas is stored for use by a fuel cell when needed, then 100 square yards covered with solar panels would provide an average family with energy independence. Most detached family homes have more than 100 square yards (900 square feet) of roof, or that much space around their homes where solar panels could be installed.

In the Southwest, if you look at any commercial or industrial park, or any typical mall or supermarket you will see that most of the buildings have flat roofs. Those roofs require insulation to lower the cost of air conditioning on hot days. If those roofs where covered with solar panels the sun would provide electricity for the air conditioning and save businesses millions of dollars per month that would otherwise be paid to the utility companies.

Another technology, Concentrated Solar Power (CSP), takes a different approach to harnessing the power of the sun. Unlike photovoltaic cells, CSP uses mirrors to concentrate the sunlight on a focal point, which magnifies the suns heat. Similar to holding a magnifying glass in the sun, focusing the light onto a piece of paper until the paper catches on fire.

CSP technology has more than one form. Troughs, dishes and towers are the different forms available today. A CSP dish or tower looks like a modern glass sculpture and contributes aesthetically to the landscape. CSP systems can achieve 30 percent efficiency, or about twice the efficiency of standard photovoltaic cells (2 x .75 = 1.5 kilowatt-hours per square yard per day).

Large Concentrating Solar Power plants create the thermal energy equivalent to conventional fossil fuel power plants. After the sun sets, CSP plants generate electricity from cost-effective thermal storage, providing 24-hour service to the power grid.

Consider the solar energy potential of one acre of land. There are 43,560 square feet in an acre. Divide the number of square feet in one acre by 9 (the number of square feet in one square yard) and you find that there are 4,840 square yards in one acre of land. A CSP dish, tower, or trough receiving an acre of sunshine would yield about (1.5 kilowatt-hours per square yard times 4,840 square yards per acre) 7,260 kilowatt-hours of electricity per day, at 30% efficiency. One acre has enough solar energy potential to yield 7.26 megawatt-hours of electricity per day, using technology that exists now. (Each thousand kilowatts is one million watts. A million watts is a megawatt.)

Consider the solar energy potential of one square mile of land. A square mile is 640 acres. One square mile of sunshine has the potential of providing (640 acres x 7.26 megawatt-hours) 4,646 megawatt-hours per day of electricity using existing CSP technology at 30% efficiency.

Ten thousand square miles is a plot of land 100 miles long by 100 miles wide. Multiply 640 acres by 10,000 square miles equals 6,400,000 acres. With a yield of 7.26 megawatt-hours of electricity per day per acre, a CSP system receiving 6,400,000 acres of sunshine would produce about 46,464,000 megawatt-hours of electricity per day.

What does this mean?

The entire State of California uses about 50,000 megawatt-hours of electricity per hour at peak time, and much less during off-peak hours: Sweltering California declares power emergency —Cal ISO expects record demand at 52,336 megawatts.
http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/2004-07-08_SUMMER_DEMAND.PDF size: 68 Kb
http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/2003-01-28_OUTLOOK.PDF size: 170 Kb
http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/peak_demand/2002-07-10_CHART.PDF size: 20 Kb

Suppose that California uses an average of 38,000 megawatt-hours of electricity per hour over a 24-hour period, then 24 hours x 38,000 megawatts = 912,000 megawatt-hours per day, multiplied by 365 = 333,880,000 megawatt-hours per year. This supposed average is too high because in 2005, California actually consumed 288,245,000 megawatt-Hours (MWh) for the entire year: http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/gross_system_power.html

A CSP farm large enough to capture the solar energy radiating on an area of land 100 miles long by 100 miles wide can produce about 50 times more electricity in a day than California consumes in a 24-hour period. For example, 50 x 912,000 = 45,600,000 megawatt-hours per day.

Imagine driving your car 100 miles along one side of the CSP farm, then turn 90 degrees right and drive 100 miles along another side, then turn 90 degrees right again and drive another 100 miles, then make another 90 degree right turn and drive another 100 miles to complete driving a 100 mile square. Inside that area is 10,000 square miles or 6,400,000 acres.

A 10,000 square mile solar energy farm that produces 46,464,000 megawatt-hours of electricity per day would produce 365 x 46,464,000 = 16,956,360,000 megawatt-hours of electricity per year or about 17 trillion kilowatt-hours, which is 17,000 terawatt-hours or 17 petawatt-hours.
Tera- (symbol: T) is a prefix in the SI system of units denoting 1012, 1 Trillion or 1,000,000,000,000 (1 million million) therefore, 1 terawatt = 1 Trillion watts.
In physics and mathematics, peta- (symbol: P) is a prefix in the SI (system of units) denoting 1015, 1 Quadrillion or 1,000,000,000,000,000 (one billion million) therefore, 1 petawatt = 1 Quadrillion watts.

The CSP examples above assume 30 percent energy conversion efficiency and 100 percent land use. In a practical application, not all of the land area will be used. This is because of unfavorable terrain and the need for service roads and land for plant facilities. And, the solar collectors must be individually positioned for optimal orientation to the angle of sunlight and given enough space between collectors to prevent a collector from casting a shadow on adjacent collectors; the result is unused space between the collectors. For these reasons, actual electricity production will be less than the numbers shown in the examples. However, the desert regions of the southwestern United States will easily produce 7 hours of productive sunlight per day, and often exceed 1 kilowatt of solar energy per square meter, so in that respect the above calculations are conservative.

All of California’s electricity can be produced from 200 square miles of sunshine; 128,000 acres of desert land. Lake Mead, behind Hoover Dam, covers more than 200 square miles. Given an area the size of Lake Mead, for the production of electricity from solar energy, California would be energy independent.

CSP plants seem to use a lot of land, but in reality, they use less land than hydroelectric dams for generating an equivalent electricity output, if the size of the lake behind the dam is considered. The same is true for coal plants. A CSP plant will not use any more land than a coal power plant if the amount of land required for mining and excavation of the coal is taken into consideration.

If the sunshine radiating on the surface of an area 100 miles wide by 100 miles long would provide all of the electricity that America needs, every day, why would Americans hesitate to use it? There are millions of open acres in the deserts of America, where the sun’s energy does nothing more than heat rocks and sand.

In 1942, General Patton established a training area in the deserts of the southwestern United States to train and prepare American soldiers to fight in the deserts of North Africa during World War II. Patton’s original training area was 18,000 square miles, and then expanded to 87,500 square miles (350 miles x 250 miles), an area stretching from Boulder City, Nevada to the Mexican border and from Phoenix, Arizona to Pomona, California. One million soldiers trained in this area using tanks, artillery and aircraft. The desert is very resilient, there is little evidence today of injury to the desert ecosystem.
http://www.militarymuseum.org/CAMA.html

The point being, the federal government can “borrow” public land from the National and State desert Parks for the purpose of building a national solar energy system. The system would only be needed until fusion energy, or something like it, is developed, then the land would be returned to nature in the care of the public parks service. Time, sand and the desert wind would gradually remove all evidence of technologies brief occupancy. In the meantime, the lizards, turtles, snakes and scorpions would hide and sleep in the shade under the giant mirrors and troughs.

The reason why solar energy has not been development on a large scale is the cost. Not the cost of sunshine, that is free. Private investors resist putting their money into solar energy projects because of the high upfront capital investment required for plant and equipment. The initial investment is what causes the price per kilowatt-hour for electricity from solar energy to be higher than the price of electricity generated from natural gas or coal. The estimated kilowatt-hour rates assigned to solar energy are not based on the cost of electricity generation, they are based on the cost of the investment capital and the requirement to earn a return on investment, or pay back the loan for the investment. Remember, the solar fuel is free.

Solar energy would not be expensive if the cost of the initial capital investment is not factored into the price per kilowatt-hour.

With the obvious enormous public benefit a national solar energy system would provide, why is the government holding back? Should solar energy be a public works project? We have a good example that may help answer that question. Southern California, as it is seen today, would not exist without Hoover Dam and the Colorado River Aqueduct, because without the Colorado River water the current population of Southern California would never have happened. Southern California does not have enough natural water to support the demand of a small fraction of its current population. The federal government funded Hoover Dam and the Colorado River Aqueduct. The economy of Southern California, having grown because of that funding and other public investments, has returned more in tax revenue than was spent building the dam and aqueduct, plus the sale of water and electricity has earned enough to pay the federal government back the amount of the original funding, with interest.

The Following is quoted from the Executive Summary of a report by Sargent & Lundy engineering, titled: Assessment of Parabolic Trough and Power Tower Solar Technology Cost and Performance Forecasts, delivered to the U.S. DOE National Renewable Energy Laboratory:

Based on this review, it is S&L’s opinion that CSP technology is a proven technology for energy production, there is a potential market for CSP technology, and that significant cost reductions are achievable assuming reasonable deployment of CSP technologies occurs. S&L independently projected capital and O&M costs, from which the levelized energy costs were derived, based on a conservative approach whereby the technology improvements are limited to current demonstrated or tested improvements and with a relatively low rate of deployment.

The projections for electrical power consumption in the United States and worldwide vary depending on the study, but there will be a significant increase in installed capacity due to increased demand through 2020. Trough and tower solar power plants can compete with technologies that provide bulk power to the electric utility transmission and distribution systems if market entry barriers are overcome:

Market expansion of trough and tower technology will require incentives to reach market acceptance (competitiveness). Both tower and trough technology currently produce electricity that is more expensive than conventional fossil-fueled technology.
Significant cost reductions will be required to reach market acceptance (competitiveness). S&L focused on the potential of cost reductions with the assumption that incentives will occur to support deployment through market expansion.

For the more technically aggressive low-cost case, S&L found the National Laboratories’ “SunLab” methodology and analysis to be credible. The projections by SunLab, developed in conjunction with industry, are considered by S&L to represent a “best-case analysis” in which the technology is optimized and a high deployment rate is achieved. The two sets of estimates, by SunLab and S&L, provide a band within which the costs can be expected to fall. The figure and table below highlight these results, with initial electricity costs in the range of 10 to 12.6 ¢/kWh and eventually achieving costs in the range of 3.5 to 6.2 ¢/kWh. The specific values will depend on total capacity of various technologies deployed and the extent of R&D program success. In the technically aggressive cases for troughs / towers, the S&L analysis found that cost reductions were due to volume production (26%/28%), plant scale-up (20%/48%), and technological advance (54%/24%).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy04osti/35060.pdf size: 589 Kb
Downloads a 47 page Adobe PDF document.

Solar Energy R&D: Solar cost decreases 10% per year

Solar Energy News:
• Solar at the cost of Coal — Welcome to the Revolution — “How can solar energy–with its reputation for high cost–compete with baseload coal, still the dominant fuel for U.S. electric power generation? … I truly believe it’s doable, … I believe it’s even doable without assigning a cost to carbon. .. Seen in that light, solar at the cost of coal may not be so far-fetched after all.”
• Artificial Photosynthesis – U.S. Department of Energy — “After nearly 3 billion years of evolution, nature can effectively convert sunlight into energy-rich chemical fuels using the abundant feedstocks of water and carbon dioxide. All fuels used today to power vehicles and create electricity, whether from fossil or biomass resources, are ultimately derived from photosynthesis… plants and photosynthetic microbes were not designed to meet human energy needs – much of the energy captured from the sun is necessarily devoted to the life processes of the plants. Imagine the potential energy benefits if we could generate fuels directly from sunlight, carbon dioxide, and water in a manner analogous to the natural system, but without the need to maintain life processes. The impact of replacing fossil fuels with fuels generated directly by sunlight would be immediate and revolutionary.”
• Turning sunlight into liquid fuels — Using the energy of sunlight to produce pure hydrogen and oxygen from water molecules without electrolysis
• Inspired by the photosynthesis performed by plants —MIT Scientists mimic essence of plants’ energy storage system
• Harnessing sunlight on the cheap —MIT student project aims to develop cost-efficient solar power
• Solar farm to rise over 3 square miles in Arizona —Spanish company to build, operate $1 billion plant based on mirrors, turbine
• Solar farms to rise on California rooftops
—Southern California Edison Co. plans to build the nation’s largest solar energy installation—an array of collector cells covering two square miles of rooftops that could power about 162,000 homes.
• The Solar America Initiative
• Silicon Nanocrystals for Superefficient Solar Cells
• Storing Solar Power Efficiently —Thermal-power plants that store heat for cloudy days could solve some of the problems with solar power
• Sunlight used to smelt zinc
• High-schoolers finish solar car race
• One man’s castle runs on hydrogen
• Solar power boom comes with pains
• Honda Entering Solar Cell Market for Homes and Vehicles
• BP, Caltech team up on solar power —Silicon in nanorods could open door to radical breakthrough
• New World Record Achieved in Solar Cell Technology •December 2006
—New Solar Cell Breaks the 40 Percent Efficient Sunlight-to-Electricity Barrier: Boeing [NYSE: BA] today announced that Spectrolab, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary, has achieved a new world record in terrestrial concentrator solar cell efficiency. Using concentrated sunlight, Spectrolab demonstrated the ability of a photovoltaic cell to convert 40.7 percent of the sun’s energy into electricity. The U.S. Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) in Golden, Colo., verified the milestone.
“This solar cell performance is the highest efficiency level any photovoltaic device has ever achieved,” said Dr. David Lillington, president of Spectrolab. “The terrestrial cell we have developed uses the same technology base as our space-based cells. So, once qualified, they can be manufactured in very high volumes with minimal impact to production flow.”
High efficiency multijunction cells have a significant advantage over conventional silicon cells in concentrator systems because fewer solar cells are required to achieve the same power output. This technology will continue to dramatically reduce the cost of generating electricity from solar energy as well as the cost of materials used in high-power space satellites and terrestrial applications.
“These results are particularly encouraging since they were achieved using a new class of metamorphic semiconductor materials, allowing much greater freedom in multijunction cell design for optimal conversion of the solar spectrum,” said Dr. Richard R. King, principal investigator of the high efficiency solar cell research and development effort. “The excellent performance of these materials hints at still higher efficiency in future solar cells.”
Spectrolab high-efficiency multijunction solar concentrator cells
—Boeing Spectrolab

• Cheap, Superefficient Solar —Solar-power modules that concentrate the power of the sun are becoming more viable.
• Cheaper, More Efficient photonic crystals —A new type of material could allow solar cells to harvest far more light.
• Solar Power at Half the Cost —A new roof-mounted system that concentrates sunlight could cut the price of photovoltaics.
• Supplying the World’s Energy Needs with Light and Water —A new roof-mounted system that concentrates sunlight could cut the price of photovoltaics. A leading chemist says that a better understanding of photosynthesis could lead to cheap ways to store solar energy as chemical fuel.

Solar Energy Storage:
Nanowire battery can hold 10 times the charge of existing lithium-ion battery December 18, 2007 “Stanford researchers have found a way to use silicon nanowires to reinvent the rechargeable lithium-ion batteries. The new technology, developed through research led by Yi Cui, assistant professor of materials science and engineering, produces 10 times the amount of electricity of existing lithium-ion, known as Li-ion, batteries. A laptop that now runs on battery for two hours could operate for 20 hours.”
Interview with Dr. Cui, Inventor of Silicon Nanowire Lithium-ion Battery Breakthrough

High-Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) Transmission:
GE HVDC technology
ABB HVDC technology
High-Voltage Transmission Lines
Superconducting Transmission Lines
Nanotechnology leads to discovery of super superconductors

High-Voltage Composite Electricity Transmission Lines:
Composite Technology Corporation
Composite-Reinforced Aluminum Conductor (CRAC)
CRAC-TelePower: Electricity and Data over the same line
Produced by the California Energy Commission
The 44 page report is a 238 KB Adobe PDF document.

Reference links:
Power from the sun
CSP – How it Works
Concentrating Solar Power
Frequently Asked Questions
Boeing Spectrolab Solar Cells
The Solar Tres power tower plant
Solar Tres Project – solarpaces.org
Thermal solar power tower – history
Solar Radiation Resource Information
The National Solar Thermal Test Facility
TroughNet – Parabolic Trough Solar Power
Thermal Storage Research and Development
The El Paso Salinity Gradient Solar Pond (SGSP)
Parabolic Trough Power Plant System Technology
Solar Two Demonstrates Clean Power for the Future
Advantages of Using Molten Salt for thermal storage
Frequently Asked Questions about Photovoltaics (PV)
Download SunLab Solar Energy Technology White Papers
Report to Congress: 1,000 megawatts of Solar power by 2006 size: 956 Kb
U.S. Department of Energy’s Solar Energy Technologies program
NREL and Research Partners Work to Trim Solar Electricity Costs
Research and Development Advances in Concentrating Solar Power
Lunar Solar Power System by Professor of Physics David Criswell
Assessment of Parabolic Trough and Power Tower Solar Technology Cost and Performance size: 589 Kb
The Centre for Sustainable Energy Systems (CSES) at the Australian National University (ANU)

FRESNEL LENS:
Green Power Science
When placed in the sun, a fresnel lens will act as a giant magnifying glass and concentrate light to a very small point. Most large fresnel lenses will concentrate several square feet of sunlight to less than an inch resulting in a hot spot over 2000 degrees Fahrenheit. This will cause wood to instantly catch on fire or zinc and copper metal to melt in a few seconds or even burn and vaporize. We have boiled 12 oz. of water in a dark glass bottle in 90 seconds and burned a hole in a stainless steel bowl.. One gallon of water was boiled in 30 minutes.

America’s Solar Energy Potential

America’s Solar Energy Potential
http://www.americanenergyindependence.com/solarenergy.aspx
Every hour, the sun radiates more energy onto the earth than the entire human population uses in one whole year.

The technology required to harness the power of the sun is available now. Solar power alone could provide all of the energy Americans consume — there is no shortage of solar energy. The following paragraphs will give you the information you need to prove this to yourself and others. You do not need advanced math skills to follow and perform the arithmetic examples shown below. Anyone who can balance a checkbook or calculate the total square feet of floor space in his or her home, and understand why an area measuring 10 yards by 10 yards equals 100 square yards, can perform the following arithmetic examples and prove that American energy independence could be achieved with solar energy alone.

Science tells us that every square meter of the earth’s surface, when exposed to direct sunlight, receives about 1000 watts (1 kilowatt) of energy from the sun’s light. Depending on the angle of sunlight, which changes with the time of day, and the geographical location [see map below], the power of the sun’s light will be somewhat more or less than 1 kilowatt-hour per hour for every square meter of the earth’s surface exposed to the sun.

USA solar map On average, and particularly in the Sunbelt regions of the Southwestern United States, every square meter area exposed to direct sunlight will receive about 1 kilowatt-hour per hour of solar energy. However, scientists estimate that sunlight will provide useful solar energy for only about 6 to 7 hours per day because during the early hours and late hours of the day the angle of the sun’s light is too low. So, for example, if the sun’s light provides 6 productive hours of solar energy per day, then a square meter of land in direct sunlight will receive about 6 kilowatt-hours of solar energy during the course of a day.

Scientists like to measure things using the metric system. However, most Americans are unfamiliar with the metric system. (Europeans use the metric system.) It is easier for Americans to think in square feet and square yards because feet and yards are common lengths in the United States. So, for the sake of clarity and because this is written for an American audience, all measurements will be converted from meters to yards.

A meter is just a little longer than a yard (about 3 and ¼ feet to a meter, compared with 3 feet to a yard). There are 10.8 square feet in a square meter. There are 9 square feet in a square yard (3×3=9). A simple calculation can accomplish the conversion from square meters to square yards. A square yard is 83.33 percent of a square meter. Prove this by multiplying 10.8 (the number of square feet in a square meter) by 83.33%. The answer is nine (the number of square feet in a square yard). If you perform the calculation you will see that the answer is slightly less than the whole number 9 (but close enough for our purpose). Using this conversion, we can say that a square yard of land in direct sunlight receives 1000 x 83.33% = 833 watts of solar energy. This calculation can also be used in reverse to convert yards to meters, simply divide by .8333 (833 divided by .8333 = 1000 rounded).

Every square yard of land, if exposed to direct sunlight, receives about 833 watts of solar energy [NOTE: see the map above, and adjust the estimated amount of solar energy accordingly]. Therefore, a one square yard area exposed to continuous direct sunlight [in an optimal geographical location] for six hours will have received 6 hours x 833 watts = 4,998 watt-hours of solar energy during the course of a day. In round numbers, a one square yard area will receive about 5000 watt-hours (5 kilowatt-hours) per day of solar energy. Another way to obtain this result would be to take the 6 kilowatt-hours per meter (explained above in the third paragraph) and apply the conversion calculation (6 x 83.33% = 5 rounded).

Americans can assume, at least in the Sunbelt regions of the southwestern United States, that every square yard of land exposed to direct sunlight will receive about 5 kilowatt-hours per day of solar energy.

With the above information in mind, perform the following exercise: Measure an area ten yards long and ten yards wide. That would be thirty feet by thirty feet. Take a good look at the size of it. You are looking at an area covering 100 square yards. If that area were in direct sunlight all day it would receive about (5 x 100) 500 kilowatt-hours per day of solar energy. Now go look at your home electric bill. Your electric company calculates your home electric bill based on how many kilowatt-hours of electrical energy you use. Find the total amount of electricity that you have been billed for (given in kilowatt-hours). The amount of kilowatt-hours on your bill is for an entire month. If your home is a typical residential electric customer, you and your family consume between 500 and 1000 kilowatt-hours of electricity per month. Compare the quantity of electric energy your home consumed in one month with the quantity of energy the sun gives freely to a 100 square yard area exposed to direct sunlight. One hundred square yards of sunshine provides as much energy in 1 to 2 days as an average family uses in an entire month!

It would be great if 100% of the sunshine became electricity, but solar energy and electricity are not the same. Technology accomplishes the conversion of solar energy to electricity. Several different technologies are used; perhaps the one that most people have heard of is the solar panel, made from photovoltaic cells called PV.

For a detailed explanation of photovoltaic cells there is a very good article on the Internet located at:
http://www.howstuffworks.com/solar-cell.htm, it is well written and easy to read.

Conversion of one form of energy to another always causes a loss of energy. In other words, the new form of energy will be less than the original. Efficiency is the word scientists use to describe the difference in power resulting from the conversion of one form of energy to another. The efficiency of commercially available solar panels (PV) is about 15%. This means that when a solar panel converts the sun’s light to electricity, only about 15 percent of the energy in the sunlight becomes electricity. The same thing is true of gasoline in your car. Your car’s engine can only convert about twenty-five percent of the energy in gasoline to mechanical energy that turns the wheels.

With an average efficiency of 15 percent, a square yard of solar photovoltaic cells (PV) would produce (5 kilowatt-hours of solar energy multiplied by 15% =) .75 kilowatt-hours of electric energy per day. Solar panels (PV) covering an area ten yards by ten yards (100 square yards or 900 square feet) would produce 100 x .75 = 75 kilowatt-hours of electricity per day.

Seventy-five kilowatt-hours per day is a lot of electricity for a single-family home. If part of the electricity is stored in a home battery, or is used to electrolyze water for producing hydrogen gas, and the gas is stored for use by a fuel cell when needed, then 100 square yards covered with solar panels would provide an average family with energy independence. Most detached family homes have more than 100 square yards (900 square feet) of roof, or that much space around their homes where solar panels could be installed.

In the Southwest, if you look at any commercial or industrial park, or any typical mall or supermarket you will see that most of the buildings have flat roofs. Those roofs require insulation to lower the cost of air conditioning on hot days. If those roofs where covered with solar panels the sun would provide electricity for the air conditioning and save businesses millions of dollars per month that would otherwise be paid to the utility companies.

Another technology, Concentrated Solar Power (CSP), takes a different approach to harnessing the power of the sun. Unlike photovoltaic cells, CSP uses mirrors to concentrate the sunlight on a focal point, which magnifies the suns heat. Similar to holding a magnifying glass in the sun, focusing the light onto a piece of paper until the paper catches on fire.

CSP technology has more than one form. Troughs, dishes and towers are the different forms available today. A CSP dish or tower looks like a modern glass sculpture and contributes aesthetically to the landscape. CSP systems can achieve 30 percent efficiency, or about twice the efficiency of standard photovoltaic cells (2 x .75 = 1.5 kilowatt-hours per square yard per day).

Large Concentrating Solar Power plants create the thermal energy equivalent to conventional fossil fuel power plants. After the sun sets, CSP plants generate electricity from cost-effective thermal storage, providing 24-hour service to the power grid.

Consider the solar energy potential of one acre of land. There are 43,560 square feet in an acre. Divide the number of square feet in one acre by 9 (the number of square feet in one square yard) and you find that there are 4,840 square yards in one acre of land. A CSP dish, tower, or trough receiving an acre of sunshine would yield about (1.5 kilowatt-hours per square yard times 4,840 square yards per acre) 7,260 kilowatt-hours of electricity per day, at 30% efficiency. One acre has enough solar energy potential to yield 7.26 megawatt-hours of electricity per day, using technology that exists now. (Each thousand kilowatts is one million watts. A million watts is a megawatt.)

Consider the solar energy potential of one square mile of land. A square mile is 640 acres. One square mile of sunshine has the potential of providing (640 acres x 7.26 megawatt-hours) 4,646 megawatt-hours per day of electricity using existing CSP technology at 30% efficiency.

Ten thousand square miles is a plot of land 100 miles long by 100 miles wide. Multiply 640 acres by 10,000 square miles equals 6,400,000 acres. With a yield of 7.26 megawatt-hours of electricity per day per acre, a CSP system receiving 6,400,000 acres of sunshine would produce about 46,464,000 megawatt-hours of electricity per day.

What does this mean?

The entire State of California uses about 50,000 megawatt-hours of electricity per hour at peak time, and much less during off-peak hours: Sweltering California declares power emergency —Cal ISO expects record demand at 52,336 megawatts.
http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/2004-07-08_SUMMER_DEMAND.PDF size: 68 Kb
http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/2003-01-28_OUTLOOK.PDF size: 170 Kb
http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/peak_demand/2002-07-10_CHART.PDF size: 20 Kb

Suppose that California uses an average of 38,000 megawatt-hours of electricity per hour over a 24-hour period, then 24 hours x 38,000 megawatts = 912,000 megawatt-hours per day, multiplied by 365 = 333,880,000 megawatt-hours per year. This supposed average is too high because in 2005, California actually consumed 288,245,000 megawatt-Hours (MWh) for the entire year: http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/gross_system_power.html

A CSP farm large enough to capture the solar energy radiating on an area of land 100 miles long by 100 miles wide can produce about 50 times more electricity in a day than California consumes in a 24-hour period. For example, 50 x 912,000 = 45,600,000 megawatt-hours per day.

Imagine driving your car 100 miles along one side of the CSP farm, then turn 90 degrees right and drive 100 miles along another side, then turn 90 degrees right again and drive another 100 miles, then make another 90 degree right turn and drive another 100 miles to complete driving a 100 mile square. Inside that area is 10,000 square miles or 6,400,000 acres.

A 10,000 square mile solar energy farm that produces 46,464,000 megawatt-hours of electricity per day would produce 365 x 46,464,000 = 16,956,360,000 megawatt-hours of electricity per year or about 17 trillion kilowatt-hours, which is 17,000 terawatt-hours or 17 petawatt-hours.
Tera- (symbol: T) is a prefix in the SI system of units denoting 1012, 1 Trillion or 1,000,000,000,000 (1 million million) therefore, 1 terawatt = 1 Trillion watts.
In physics and mathematics, peta- (symbol: P) is a prefix in the SI (system of units) denoting 1015, 1 Quadrillion or 1,000,000,000,000,000 (one billion million) therefore, 1 petawatt = 1 Quadrillion watts.

The CSP examples above assume 30 percent energy conversion efficiency and 100 percent land use. In a practical application, not all of the land area will be used. This is because of unfavorable terrain and the need for service roads and land for plant facilities. And, the solar collectors must be individually positioned for optimal orientation to the angle of sunlight and given enough space between collectors to prevent a collector from casting a shadow on adjacent collectors; the result is unused space between the collectors. For these reasons, actual electricity production will be less than the numbers shown in the examples. However, the desert regions of the southwestern United States will easily produce 7 hours of productive sunlight per day, and often exceed 1 kilowatt of solar energy per square meter, so in that respect the above calculations are conservative.

All of California’s electricity can be produced from 200 square miles of sunshine; 128,000 acres of desert land. Lake Mead, behind Hoover Dam, covers more than 200 square miles. Given an area the size of Lake Mead, for the production of electricity from solar energy, California would be energy independent.

CSP plants seem to use a lot of land, but in reality, they use less land than hydroelectric dams for generating an equivalent electricity output, if the size of the lake behind the dam is considered. The same is true for coal plants. A CSP plant will not use any more land than a coal power plant if the amount of land required for mining and excavation of the coal is taken into consideration.

If the sunshine radiating on the surface of an area 100 miles wide by 100 miles long would provide all of the electricity that America needs, every day, why would Americans hesitate to use it? There are millions of open acres in the deserts of America, where the sun’s energy does nothing more than heat rocks and sand.

In 1942, General Patton established a training area in the deserts of the southwestern United States to train and prepare American soldiers to fight in the deserts of North Africa during World War II. Patton’s original training area was 18,000 square miles, and then expanded to 87,500 square miles (350 miles x 250 miles), an area stretching from Boulder City, Nevada to the Mexican border and from Phoenix, Arizona to Pomona, California. One million soldiers trained in this area using tanks, artillery and aircraft. The desert is very resilient, there is little evidence today of injury to the desert ecosystem.
http://www.militarymuseum.org/CAMA.html

The point being, the federal government can “borrow” public land from the National and State desert Parks for the purpose of building a national solar energy system. The system would only be needed until fusion energy, or something like it, is developed, then the land would be returned to nature in the care of the public parks service. Time, sand and the desert wind would gradually remove all evidence of technologies brief occupancy. In the meantime, the lizards, turtles, snakes and scorpions would hide and sleep in the shade under the giant mirrors and troughs.

The reason why solar energy has not been development on a large scale is the cost. Not the cost of sunshine, that is free. Private investors resist putting their money into solar energy projects because of the high upfront capital investment required for plant and equipment. The initial investment is what causes the price per kilowatt-hour for electricity from solar energy to be higher than the price of electricity generated from natural gas or coal. The estimated kilowatt-hour rates assigned to solar energy are not based on the cost of electricity generation, they are based on the cost of the investment capital and the requirement to earn a return on investment, or pay back the loan for the investment. Remember, the solar fuel is free.

Solar energy would not be expensive if the cost of the initial capital investment is not factored into the price per kilowatt-hour.

With the obvious enormous public benefit a national solar energy system would provide, why is the government holding back? Should solar energy be a public works project? We have a good example that may help answer that question. Southern California, as it is seen today, would not exist without Hoover Dam and the Colorado River Aqueduct, because without the Colorado River water the current population of Southern California would never have happened. Southern California does not have enough natural water to support the demand of a small fraction of its current population. The federal government funded Hoover Dam and the Colorado River Aqueduct. The economy of Southern California, having grown because of that funding and other public investments, has returned more in tax revenue than was spent building the dam and aqueduct, plus the sale of water and electricity has earned enough to pay the federal government back the amount of the original funding, with interest.

The Following is quoted from the Executive Summary of a report by Sargent & Lundy engineering, titled: Assessment of Parabolic Trough and Power Tower Solar Technology Cost and Performance Forecasts, delivered to the U.S. DOE National Renewable Energy Laboratory:

Based on this review, it is S&L’s opinion that CSP technology is a proven technology for energy production, there is a potential market for CSP technology, and that significant cost reductions are achievable assuming reasonable deployment of CSP technologies occurs. S&L independently projected capital and O&M costs, from which the levelized energy costs were derived, based on a conservative approach whereby the technology improvements are limited to current demonstrated or tested improvements and with a relatively low rate of deployment.

The projections for electrical power consumption in the United States and worldwide vary depending on the study, but there will be a significant increase in installed capacity due to increased demand through 2020. Trough and tower solar power plants can compete with technologies that provide bulk power to the electric utility transmission and distribution systems if market entry barriers are overcome:

Market expansion of trough and tower technology will require incentives to reach market acceptance (competitiveness). Both tower and trough technology currently produce electricity that is more expensive than conventional fossil-fueled technology.
Significant cost reductions will be required to reach market acceptance (competitiveness). S&L focused on the potential of cost reductions with the assumption that incentives will occur to support deployment through market expansion.

For the more technically aggressive low-cost case, S&L found the National Laboratories’ “SunLab” methodology and analysis to be credible. The projections by SunLab, developed in conjunction with industry, are considered by S&L to represent a “best-case analysis” in which the technology is optimized and a high deployment rate is achieved. The two sets of estimates, by SunLab and S&L, provide a band within which the costs can be expected to fall. The figure and table below highlight these results, with initial electricity costs in the range of 10 to 12.6 ¢/kWh and eventually achieving costs in the range of 3.5 to 6.2 ¢/kWh. The specific values will depend on total capacity of various technologies deployed and the extent of R&D program success. In the technically aggressive cases for troughs / towers, the S&L analysis found that cost reductions were due to volume production (26%/28%), plant scale-up (20%/48%), and technological advance (54%/24%).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy04osti/35060.pdf size: 589 Kb
Downloads a 47 page Adobe PDF document.

Solar Energy R&D: Solar cost decreases 10% per year

Solar Energy News:
• Solar at the cost of Coal — Welcome to the Revolution — “How can solar energy–with its reputation for high cost–compete with baseload coal, still the dominant fuel for U.S. electric power generation? … I truly believe it’s doable, … I believe it’s even doable without assigning a cost to carbon. .. Seen in that light, solar at the cost of coal may not be so far-fetched after all.”
• Artificial Photosynthesis – U.S. Department of Energy — “After nearly 3 billion years of evolution, nature can effectively convert sunlight into energy-rich chemical fuels using the abundant feedstocks of water and carbon dioxide. All fuels used today to power vehicles and create electricity, whether from fossil or biomass resources, are ultimately derived from photosynthesis… plants and photosynthetic microbes were not designed to meet human energy needs – much of the energy captured from the sun is necessarily devoted to the life processes of the plants. Imagine the potential energy benefits if we could generate fuels directly from sunlight, carbon dioxide, and water in a manner analogous to the natural system, but without the need to maintain life processes. The impact of replacing fossil fuels with fuels generated directly by sunlight would be immediate and revolutionary.”
• Turning sunlight into liquid fuels — Using the energy of sunlight to produce pure hydrogen and oxygen from water molecules without electrolysis
• Inspired by the photosynthesis performed by plants —MIT Scientists mimic essence of plants’ energy storage system
• Harnessing sunlight on the cheap —MIT student project aims to develop cost-efficient solar power
• Solar farm to rise over 3 square miles in Arizona —Spanish company to build, operate $1 billion plant based on mirrors, turbine
• Solar farms to rise on California rooftops
—Southern California Edison Co. plans to build the nation’s largest solar energy installation—an array of collector cells covering two square miles of rooftops that could power about 162,000 homes.
• The Solar America Initiative
• Silicon Nanocrystals for Superefficient Solar Cells
• Storing Solar Power Efficiently —Thermal-power plants that store heat for cloudy days could solve some of the problems with solar power
• Sunlight used to smelt zinc
• High-schoolers finish solar car race
• One man’s castle runs on hydrogen
• Solar power boom comes with pains
• Honda Entering Solar Cell Market for Homes and Vehicles
• BP, Caltech team up on solar power —Silicon in nanorods could open door to radical breakthrough
• New World Record Achieved in Solar Cell Technology •December 2006
—New Solar Cell Breaks the 40 Percent Efficient Sunlight-to-Electricity Barrier: Boeing [NYSE: BA] today announced that Spectrolab, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary, has achieved a new world record in terrestrial concentrator solar cell efficiency. Using concentrated sunlight, Spectrolab demonstrated the ability of a photovoltaic cell to convert 40.7 percent of the sun’s energy into electricity. The U.S. Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) in Golden, Colo., verified the milestone.
“This solar cell performance is the highest efficiency level any photovoltaic device has ever achieved,” said Dr. David Lillington, president of Spectrolab. “The terrestrial cell we have developed uses the same technology base as our space-based cells. So, once qualified, they can be manufactured in very high volumes with minimal impact to production flow.”
High efficiency multijunction cells have a significant advantage over conventional silicon cells in concentrator systems because fewer solar cells are required to achieve the same power output. This technology will continue to dramatically reduce the cost of generating electricity from solar energy as well as the cost of materials used in high-power space satellites and terrestrial applications.
“These results are particularly encouraging since they were achieved using a new class of metamorphic semiconductor materials, allowing much greater freedom in multijunction cell design for optimal conversion of the solar spectrum,” said Dr. Richard R. King, principal investigator of the high efficiency solar cell research and development effort. “The excellent performance of these materials hints at still higher efficiency in future solar cells.”
Spectrolab high-efficiency multijunction solar concentrator cells
—Boeing Spectrolab

• Cheap, Superefficient Solar —Solar-power modules that concentrate the power of the sun are becoming more viable.
• Cheaper, More Efficient photonic crystals —A new type of material could allow solar cells to harvest far more light.
• Solar Power at Half the Cost —A new roof-mounted system that concentrates sunlight could cut the price of photovoltaics.
• Supplying the World’s Energy Needs with Light and Water —A new roof-mounted system that concentrates sunlight could cut the price of photovoltaics. A leading chemist says that a better understanding of photosynthesis could lead to cheap ways to store solar energy as chemical fuel.

Solar Energy Storage:
Nanowire battery can hold 10 times the charge of existing lithium-ion battery December 18, 2007 “Stanford researchers have found a way to use silicon nanowires to reinvent the rechargeable lithium-ion batteries. The new technology, developed through research led by Yi Cui, assistant professor of materials science and engineering, produces 10 times the amount of electricity of existing lithium-ion, known as Li-ion, batteries. A laptop that now runs on battery for two hours could operate for 20 hours.”
Interview with Dr. Cui, Inventor of Silicon Nanowire Lithium-ion Battery Breakthrough

High-Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) Transmission:
GE HVDC technology
ABB HVDC technology
High-Voltage Transmission Lines
Superconducting Transmission Lines
Nanotechnology leads to discovery of super superconductors

High-Voltage Composite Electricity Transmission Lines:
Composite Technology Corporation
Composite-Reinforced Aluminum Conductor (CRAC)
CRAC-TelePower: Electricity and Data over the same line
Produced by the California Energy Commission
The 44 page report is a 238 KB Adobe PDF document.

Reference links:
Power from the sun
CSP – How it Works
Concentrating Solar Power
Frequently Asked Questions
Boeing Spectrolab Solar Cells
The Solar Tres power tower plant
Solar Tres Project – solarpaces.org
Thermal solar power tower – history
Solar Radiation Resource Information
The National Solar Thermal Test Facility
TroughNet – Parabolic Trough Solar Power
Thermal Storage Research and Development
The El Paso Salinity Gradient Solar Pond (SGSP)
Parabolic Trough Power Plant System Technology
Solar Two Demonstrates Clean Power for the Future
Advantages of Using Molten Salt for thermal storage
Frequently Asked Questions about Photovoltaics (PV)
Download SunLab Solar Energy Technology White Papers
Report to Congress: 1,000 megawatts of Solar power by 2006 size: 956 Kb
U.S. Department of Energy’s Solar Energy Technologies program
NREL and Research Partners Work to Trim Solar Electricity Costs
Research and Development Advances in Concentrating Solar Power
Lunar Solar Power System by Professor of Physics David Criswell
Assessment of Parabolic Trough and Power Tower Solar Technology Cost and Performance size: 589 Kb
The Centre for Sustainable Energy Systems (CSES) at the Australian National University (ANU)

FRESNEL LENS:
Green Power Science
When placed in the sun, a fresnel lens will act as a giant magnifying glass and concentrate light to a very small point. Most large fresnel lenses will concentrate several square feet of sunlight to less than an inch resulting in a hot spot over 2000 degrees Fahrenheit. This will cause wood to instantly catch on fire or zinc and copper metal to melt in a few seconds or even burn and vaporize. We have boiled 12 oz. of water in a dark glass bottle in 90 seconds and burned a hole in a stainless steel bowl.. One gallon of water was boiled in 30 minutes.

How Much Solar Energy Can We Harvest? © 2005 Dr Ron Nielsen

How Much Solar Energy Can We Harvest?

© 2005 Dr Ron Nielsen
http://home.iprimus.com.au/nielsens/solen.html
INTRODUCTION

The sun delivers about 7000 times more energy than we currently consume globally. However, we cannot cover the whole surface of the Earth with solar energy collectors. How much of this energy can we collect? Will it be enough to replace fossil fuels?

An obvious application of solar energy is to produce electricity. Global consumption of electricity is increasing. How much electricity could we produce if we used solar energy.

I have carried out calculations for various regions of the world using various values for the time when the sky is clear. These calculations allow me to estimate the minimum and the maximum of solar energy delivered by the sun in various parts of the world.

SOLAR ENERGY POTENTIALS

We have around 4 billion hectares of land in the world, which is not used for anything. Suppose that we could use up to 10% of this land to accommodate solar cells. How much energy would we expect to harvest?

To answer this question, we have to consider the minimum and the maximum annual clear sky irradiance (the intensity of solar radiation) measured in the number of watts per square metre. We also have to correct the calculations for the minimum and maximum of the annual average sky clearance. Using tabulated data (IPCC 2001), I have calculated the minimum and maximum solar energy potentials, P, i.e. the minimum and maximum energy delivered by the Sun to various regions of the world per year and globally. Results are presented in Table 1. Using the last two values in this table we can calculate that on average 10% of the so far unused global land area receives from the sun 32,227 exajoules of energy per year [EJ/y]. The minimum value is 15,393 EJ/y. Compare it with 463 EJ/y, which was the global consumption of energy in 2005 or with 645 EJ/y, the projected global consumption of energy in 2020 (see The Little Green Handbook).

Table 1. Solar energy potentials assuming that 10% of unused land area can be covered by solar cells

A — Total surface area of the currently unused land in billion hectares (Gha).
R — Annual clear sky solar irradiance (the intensity of solar radiation in watts per square metre (W/m2)).
f — Annual fraction of time when the sky is clear.
P — Solar energy potential (the energy delivered by the Sun to the 10% of the currently unused land) expressed either in in trillion watt-hours per year (TWh/y) or in exajoules per year (EJ/y).

Example:Assuming that we can use 10% of the currently unused land area of 0.5940 Gha in North America for solar cells, the minimum solar energy available in this fraction of the total area would be 1813 exajoules per year [EJ/y] and the maximum 7418 EJ/y depending on the annual irradiance (R) and the fraction of the time the sky is clear (f). As a point of reference, our global annual consumption of energy in 2005 was 463 EJ/y.

Another way to calculate the average annual solar potential is to use the average solar radiation intensity of 342 W/m2 and consider that on average only 58% of it reaches the Earth’s surface (see Solar Radiation). If we use these figure we shall find that 10% of the so far unused land area receives on average 24,605 exajoules of energy per year [EJ/y], which is close to the previously calculated average potential. The corresponding figure expressed in units that can be compared with our global consumption of electricity is 6,834.808 TWh/y.

The amount of energy we can harvest and use depends on the efficiency of solar cells. Solar cells’ efficiency is improving but let us assume the lowest value of only 10%.

Our global consumption of electricity in 2005 was 15,182 TWh/y (see The Little Green Handbook). However, 9,541 TWh/y of electricity was produced by fossil fuels and 2,555 TWh/y by nuclear power, or the total 12,096 TWh/y. Assuming the lowest solar potential and the lowest efficiency of solar cells we can calculate that we could produce 35 times more electricity than produced by fossil fuels and nuclear power. The additional advantage is that solar power is clean and last practically forever.

Even if we used only 1% of unused land area we could produce nearly 4 times more electricity than we produce using fossil fuels and nuclear power. I should remind that this is the lowest limit. With better efficiency of solar cells and a higher average irradiance we could produce more electricity. The surplus of solar energy could be used to replace fossil fuels in transportation and reduce further our emissions of carbon dioxide.

Copyright

You may use the information contained in this article as long as you refer to it as Nielsen, R. 2005, ‘How Much Solar Energy Can We Harvest?’, http://home.iprimus.com.au/nielsens/.

For additional information and a discussion of all critical global trends shaping our future see The Little Green Handbook.

Reference

IPCC 2001, Summary for Policy Makers: Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland.

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Kitengela Housing project

MLOLONGO
I ACRE.
Cost Item

Kshs

Land

20,000,000.00

Preliminary

1,600,000.00

Construction

240,000,000.00

External Works

500,000.00

Contingency

9,600,000.00

Professional fees

24,000,000.00

Project Management fees

0.00

Transaction Advisory fees

0.00

Marketing

13,000,000.00

Financial Charges[18 % of construction cost]

0.00

Total

308,700,000.00

PROFIT
TOTAL SALES FOR 80 UNITS

520,000,000.00

TOTAL EXPENDITURE

308,700,000.00

NET PROFIT

211,300,000.00

TAKE HOME AMMOUNT

231,300,000.00

PROFIT MARGIN

68.44833171

MLOLONGO
0.5ACRE.
Cost Item

Kshs

Land

10,000,000.00

Preliminary

1,600,000.00

Construction

120,000,000.00

External Works

500,000.00

Contingency

4,800,000.00

Professional fees

12,000,000.00

Project Management fees

0.00

Transaction Advisory fees

0.00

Marketing

6,500,000.00

Financial Charges[18 % of construction cost]

0.00

Total

155,400,000.00

PROFIT
TOTAL SALES FOR 40 UNITS

260,000,000.00

TOTAL EXPENDITURE

155,400,000.00

NET PROFIT

104,600,000.00

TAKE HOME AMMOUNT

114,600,000.00

PROFIT MARGIN

67.31016731

KITENGELA
3 ACRES.
Cost Item

Kshs

Land

30,000,000.00

Preliminary

840,000.00

Construction

126,000,000.00

External Works

500,000.00

Contingency

5,040,000.00

Professional fees

12,600,000.00

Project Management fees

0.00

Transaction Advisory fees

0.00

Marketing

8,925,000.00

Financial Charges[18 % of construction cost]

0.00

Total

183,905,000.00

PROFIT
TOTAL SALES FOR 42 UNITS

260,000,000.00

TOTAL EXPENDITURE

183,905,000.00

NET PROFIT

76,095,000.00

TAKE HOME AMMOUNT

106,095,000.00

PROFIT MARGIN

41.37734156

KITENGELA
1 ACRE.
Cost Item

Kshs

Land

10,000,000.00

Preliminary

280,000.00

Construction

42,000,000.00

External Works

500,000.00

Contingency

1,680,000.00

Professional fees

4,200,000.00

Project Management fees

0.00

Transaction Advisory fees

0.00

Marketing

2,975,000.00

Financial Charges[18 % of construction cost]

0.00

Total

61,635,000.00

PROFIT
TOTAL SALES FOR 42 UNITS

91,000,000.00

TOTAL EXPENDITURE

61,635,000.00

NET PROFIT

29,365,000.00

TAKE HOME AMMOUNT

39,365,000.00

PROFIT MARGIN

47.64338444

 

Warehouses in Ruiru-To Let

We are proud to announce the opening of Butterfly Properties Ltd. Warehouses in Ruiru

Newly built 6 warehouses located in a modern business park. Affordable rents and tenant friendly leases. Contact details below.

· Each godown is ~5,300 square feet. This includes 2 story office.

1. Ground floor has a reception, strong room and men/women toilets for factory staff.

2. 2ND floor consists of an executive office with kitchenette and toilet. Has windows overlooking the warehouse floor.

· In a secure compound with borehole and 3 phase electricity

· Nice, peaceful and safe surroundings

· State of the art superior construction with added security – made of reinforced concrete. Excellent finish.

· Excellent location with no traffic headache – served by the new Thika Highway, Eastern Bypass (30 mins to airport/Mombasa Road), Northern Bypass (30 mins to Westlands) – get home quickly – rain or shine.

· New high-tech truss system which provides added security from potential pilfering through the roof.

· 24 hour security patrols

· Trouble free council people

· No congestion of building

The warehouses are located in Ruiru Town within the Ruiru Industrial Area. The godowns will benefit tremendously from the 4 transport links below. The location of the warehouses is less than a few kilometers from all the 4 links (see attached)

Ruiru is ideally located for middle income housing. The town is at the confluence of 3 major roadways and 1 major railway line:

1. The 50.4 kilometer Nairobi-Thika

2. The Eastern Bypass is now complete. This provides fast and easy access to Mombasa Road, Industrial Area and the JKIA (Airport).

3. The Northern Bypass is also complete. This provides access to Runda, United Nations/Embassies, Westlands, Windsor, Rossyln, Muthaiga and Parklands.

4. KENYA Railways Corporation (KRC) has embarked on a multi-million project to offer residents of Nairobi and its satellite towns a more comfortable means of transport by upgrading and expanding commuter rail transport within Nairobi. The rail system will link city estates and network the satellite towns; and the one heading to Thika will have stops at Makadara, Dandora, Kahawa, Ruiru and Kalimoni.

Nimeet Dodhia

Director

Spinners & Spinners Ltd

The Dodhia Group of Companies

Nairobi, Kenya

The Land Bill, 2012

The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

THE LAND BILL, 2012

ARRANGEMENT OF CLAUSES

Clause

PART-PRELINARY

1— Short title.

2—Interpretation.

3—Application.

4—Guiding values and principles.

5—Forms of Tenure.

6— Land management and administration on institutions.

7—Methods of Acquisition of title to land.

PART II-MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC LAND

General Provisions

8—Management of public land.

9—Evaluation of public land.

10—Guidelines in the management of public land.

11—Conversion of Public Land.

Reserved Public Land

12—Allocation of public land.

13— Notification requirements applicable to allocation of public land.

14—Commission may reserve public land.

15—Placing of care, control and management of reserved

public land.

16—Development plans.

17—Revocation of management orders.

18—Conservation of land based natural resources.

PART III—ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC LAND

Leases, Licenses and Agreements for Public Land

19—License for temporary purposes specified in the lease.

20—Removal of building under temporary license.

21—Penalty for unpaid rent, etc

General Conditions Relating to Leases, Licenses and Agreements for Public Land

22—Implied covenants and conditions.

23—Implied covenant and conditions by lessee or licensee.

24—Buildings on leased public lands.

25—Covenants and conditions binding on persons claiming under grant, lease or license.

26—Obligations of children.

27—Rents and other payments.

28—Unpaid rents and other payments.

29—Commission may sue for rent, etc., in arrears.

30—Forfeiture of lease if rent unpaid or for breach of covenant.

31—Forfeiture of license.

32—Debt to Commission not extinguished by forfeiture.

33—Subdivision etc., of public land subject to continuing interests etc.

34—Acceptance of purchase money or rent not to operate as waiver of forfeiture.

35—Notice of lease, licence or agreement action on public land. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

36—Annual report to Parliament and Public.

PART IV—COMMUNITY LANDS

37—Community lands.

PART V—ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT OF PRIVATE LAND

Contracts over Land

38—Regaining possession of land after concluding contract of sale of land.

39— Procedure for regaining possession.

40— Damages for breach of contract.

41—Procedure for obtaining order for possession.

42—Relief against rescission of contract for the sale of land.

43—Purchaser of right to land may seek relief against performance of contract to assign.

Transfers

44—Transfer.

45—Transfer to take effect immediately.

46—Transfer of part.

47—Transfer of leases.

48—Effect of transfer on agreement in leases.

49—Transfer subject to charge.

50—Transfer subject to lease.

Transmissions

51—Transmission on death of joint proprietor.

52—Transmission on death of a sole proprietor or proprietor in common.

53—Effect of transmission on death.

54—Transmission on bankruptcy.

55—Transmission on Company’s liquidation.

56—Transmission in other cases.

PART VI- CO-TENANCY AND PARTITION

57—Meaning and incidents of cotenancies.

58—Certificate of ownership of tenants.

59—Co-ownership and other relationships between spouses.

60—Partition.

61—Ancilary powers of Registrar in connection with partition.

62—Sale of co-owned land.

63—Partition to subject charge.

General Provisions Lease

64—Application of this Part.

65—Power to lease land.

66—Periodic leases.

67—Short-term leases.

68—Lease terminating on the occurrence of a future event.

69—Lessee remaining in possession after termination of lease without the consent of lessor.

70—Future leases.

71—Lessor’s consent to dealing with leases.

72—Notice by co-owners.

73—Sublease for a term that is the same as or longer than the term of the head lease.

74—Surrender to enable a new head lease to be entered into not to affect sublease.

75—Covenants implied in a lease on part of the lessor.

76—Conditions implied on leases on part of the lessee.

77—Consent by lessor to application by lessee under lease. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

78—Merger of lessor interest not to affect remedies.

Transfers and Assignments of Leases

79—Burden and benefit of covenants to run with the reversion.

80—Effect of payment by lessee to assignor of reversion.

81—Transferor of assignor of lease released from liability to pay rent and observe covenants thereafter.

82—Transferor or assignee as lessee.

Remedies and Relief

83—Application of determination of lease by re-entry or forfeiture.

84—Termination of lease for non-payment of rent or for breach of covenant.

85—Notice of intention to terminate a lease for breach of covenant.

86—Notice of intention to terminate a lease for breach of covenant other than to pay rent.

87—Consequential provisions relating to notice under section 85 and 86.

88—Application for relief.

89—Power of the court with respect to the order of termination or relief.

90—Remedies of lessor and lessee for breach of covenant.

91—Unlawful eviction.

92—Application of Part to charges.

93—Power to create charge.

Charges General Provisions

94—Charge of land to take effect as security only.

95—Priority.

96—Tacking.

97—Consolidation.

98—Variation of a charge.

99—Right to discharge.

100—Transfer of charge.

101—Chargee’s consent to transfer.

Discharge of Charges

Covenants, Conditions and Powers Implied in Charges

102—Implied covenants by the chargor.

103— Equity redemption.

104—Remedies of the chargee.

105—Chargee’s action for money secured by charge.

106—Appointment, powers, remuneration and duties of the receiver.

107— Chargee’s power of leasing.

108—Power of the chargee to take possession of the charged land.

109—Withdrawal of chargee from possession.

110— Chargee’s power of sale.

111—Duty of chargee exercising power of sale.

112—Powers incidental to the power of sale.

113—Protection of purchaser.

114—Purchase by chargee.

115—Application of proceeds of sale of charged land.

116—Right of chargor to discharge charge on payment of any sum due any time before sale.

117—Application for relief by chargor.

118—Power of the court in respect of remedied and reliefs.

119—Power of the court to re-open certain charges and revise terms.

120—Exercise of powers to reopen certain charges. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

PART VII—COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF

INTERESTS IN LAND

121—Preliminary notice.

122—Power of entry to inspect land.

123—Payment for damage caused by entry for survey.

124—Notice of acquisition and effect of acquisition on plant and machinery.

125—Compensation to be paid.

126—Inquiry as to compensation.

127—Award of compensation.

128—Notice of award.

129—Payment of compensation.

130—Payment in error.

131— Grant of land in lieu of award.

132 — Payment of interest.

133—Survey where part only of holding acquired.

134—Additional compensation where area found to be greater.

135—Formal taking of possession and vesting.

136—Surrender of documents of title to Commission.

137—Acquisition of other land on account of severance.

138—Withdrawal of acquisition.

139—Power to obtain temporary occupation of land.

140—Restoration of land.

141—Where land is needed for access.

142—Reference to the Environment and Land Court by the Cabinet Secretary.

143—Right of entry.

144—Penalty for obstruction.

145—Service of notices.

146—Exemption from stamp duty.

147—Rules.

PART VIII—SETTLEMENT PROGRAMMES

148—Establishment of settlement scheme.

PART IX—EASEMENTS AND ANALOGOUS RIGHTS

149—Interpretation.

150—Application of this Part.

151—Nature of easement.

152—Entry on neighbouring land where easement is refused.

153—Access order.

154— Enjoyment of easement and analogous rights.

155—Cancellation and extinguishments of easements and analogous rights.

156— Power of the Commission to create public rights of way.

157—Application for wayleave.

158—Application for communal right of way.

159—Determination on creation of public right of way.

160—Power of Registrar with respect to public right of way.

161—Compensation in respect of public right of way.

Powers of Court

162—Power of courts to enforce public rights of way.

PART X—MISCELLANEOUS

163—Jurisdiction of the Land and Environment court.

164—Substituted service.

165—Rights of entry.

166—Land Compensation Fund. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

167—Fees.

168—Unlawful occupation of land.

169—Obstruction of public rights of way.

170—Offences.

171—Corrupt transactions.

172—Land sizes.

173—General power to make regulations.

174—Repeals.

175—Savings and transitional provisions with respect to rights, actions, dispositions etc.

176—Saving and transitional provisions with respect to rules, orders etc.

SCHEDULE – REPEALS

THE LAND BILL, 2012

A BILL for

AN ACT of Parliament to give effect to Article 68 of the Constitution, to revise, consolidate and rationalize land laws; to provide for the sustainable administration and management of land and land based resources, and for connected purposes.

ENACTED by the Parliament of Kenya as follows—

PART I —PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS

Short title.

1. This Act may be cited as the Land Act, 2012.

Interpretation.

2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires—

―actual notice‖ means the notice which a person has personally of a matter or action or document or the rights and interests of another person;

―adjoining‖ in relation to parcels of public land, includes parcels of land separated by— The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(a) roads;

(b) railways;

(c) watercourses or other natural features of such a character as to be insufficient to prevent the passage of stock; or

(d) reserves or unallocated public land;

―alienation of land‖ means the sale or other disposal of the rights to land;

―allocation of land‖ means the legal process of granting rights to land;

―assignee‖ means a person to whom an assignment is made;

―building‖ means any structure or erection of any kind whatsoever whether permanent or temporary, whether movable or immovable and whether completed or uncompleted;

―Cabinet Secretary” means the Cabinet Secretary responsible for matters relating land;

―certificate of lease‖ has the meaning assigned to it in the Land Registration Act;

―certificate of title‖ has the meaning assigned to it in the Land Registration Act;

―charge‖ means an interest in land securing the payment of money or money’s worth or the fulfillment of any condition, and includes a subcharge and the instrument creating a charge, including-

(a) ―informal charge, which is a written and witnessed undertaking, the clear intention of which is to charge the chargor’s land with the repayment of money or money’s worth obtained from the chargee; and

(b) ―customary charge‖ which is a type of informal charge whose undertaking has been observed by a group of people over an indefinite period of time and considered as legal and binding to such people;

―child‖ has the meaning assigned to it in Article 260 of the Constitution;

“Commission’ means the National Land Commission established by Article 67 of the Constitution;

“community land‖ has the meaning assigned to it in Article 63 of the Constitution;

―compulsory acquisition‖ means the power of the State to deprive or acquire any title or other interest in land for a public purpose subject to prompt payment of compensation;

―corruption‖ has the meaning assigned to it under the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003 No. 3 of 2003.;

―Court‖ means the Environment and Land Court established under the Environment and Land Court Act, 2011 No. 19 of 2011;

―co-tenancy‖ means the ownership of land by two or more persons in undivided shares and includes joint tenancy or tenancy in common.

―Customary Land Rights‖ refer to rights conferred by or derived from Kenyan customary law whether formally recognized by legislation or not.

“dealing” includes disposition and transmission: The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

―deliver‖ includes to transmit by post, hand, email, fax or other prescribed medium;

―development‖ means the carrying out of any building operation, engineering operation, farming activities or mining operation in, on, under or over land or the making of any change of a substantial nature in the use of land;

―disposition‖ means any sale, charge, transfer, grant, partition, exchange, lease, assignment, surrender, or disclaimer and includes the disclaimer or the creation of an easement, a usufructuary right, or other servitude or any other interest in a land or a lease and any other act by the owner of land or under a lease where the owner’s rights over that land or lease are affected or an agreement to undertake any of the dispositions;

―dwelling house‖ means any house or part of a house or room used as a separate dwelling in any building and includes a garden or other premises within the cartilage of and used as a part of the dwelling house;

―easement‖ means a non-possessory interest in another’s land that allows the holder to use the land to a particular extent, to require the proprietor to undertake an act relating the land, or to restrict the proprietor’s use to a particular extent, and shall not include profit;

―freehold‖ means the unlimited right to use and dispose of land, subject to the rights of others and the regulatory powers of the Government of Kenya;

―geo-reference‖ means reference to an object by a specific location either on, above or below the earth’s surface;

“geo-referenced boundaries” means reference to boundaries of a parcel of land to a specific or unique location on above or below the earth surface as defined in the Survey Act Cap. 299.;

―instrument‖ means a writing, including an enactment which creates or affects legal or equitable rights and liabilities and includes any covenant or condition expressed in an instrument or implied in a instrument under this Act or any other law relating to land and, except where otherwise provided includes, any variation of an instrument;

―interest‖ means a right in or over a land;

―joint tenancy‖ means a form of ownership of land where two or more persons each owns an undivided interest in land and creates a right of survivorship.

―land‖ has the meaning assigned to it in Article 260 of the Constitution;

―land administration‖ means the process of determining, recording, updating, and disseminating of information relating to the ownership, use and value of land;

―land management‖ means the setting out of goals and methods that may be chosen to improve land use and the ways of influencing them to achieve the desired goals;

―lease‖ means a lease or sublease, whether registered or unregistered of land and includes a short-term lease and agreement to lease;

―leasehold‖ means the right to possess and use another’s land for a defined period of time in exchange for the performance of certain obligations;

―lessee‖ means a person to whom a lease is granted and includes a person who has accepted a transfer or assignment of a lease;

―lessor‖ means a person by whom a lease is granted and includes a person who has accepted the transfer or assignment of the reversion of a lease; The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

―licence‖ means a permission given by the Commission that permits the licensee to occupy, or use, or do some act in relation to the land comprised in the land or the lease which would otherwise be a trespass and shall not include an easement;

―licensee” means the person occupying land under and in accordance with the terms of a licence;

―management body‖ means a statutory body public corporation or a public agency that is authorized by the Commission to manage reserved land under section 15;

―marriage‖ means a civil, customary or religious marriage;

―matrimonial home‖ means any property that is owned or leased by one or both spouses and occupied by the spouses as their family home;

“partition” means the separation by formal legal instrument of the share in land or lease held by owners in common so that each such owner takes shares free of the rights of the others;

“peri-urban area” means an area which is within a radius of ten kilometers outside the boundaries of an urban or semi-built up area or within any large radius which may be prescribed in respect of any particular urban area by the Cabinet Secretary”;

―private land‖ has the meaning assigned by Article 64 of the Constitution;

―proprietor‖ means—

(a) in relation to land or a lease, the person named in the register as the proprietor; and

(b) in relation to a charge of land or a lease, the person named in the register of the land or lease as the person in whose favour the charge is made;

―public land‖ has the meaning assigned by Article 62 of the Constitution and includes the coast foreshore, river, dams lakes and other reserves under the Survey Act or under any other law;

“public purposes‖ means the purposes of –

(a) transportation including roads, canals, highways, railways, bridges, wharves and airports;

(b) public buildings including schools, libraries, hospitals, factories, religious institutions and public housing;

(c) public utilities for water, sewage, electricity, gas, communication, irrigation and drainage, dams and reservoirs;

(d) public parks, playgrounds, gardens, sports facilities and cemeteries;

(e) security and defence installations;

(f) settlement of squatters, the poor and landless, and the internally displaced persons; and

(g) any other analogous public purpose;

―registry‖ means land registry established under the Land Registration Act,2012;

“register of public land” means a register for public land maintained under the Land Registration Act for the recording of rights and interests in and dispositions of public land; The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

“restrictive agreement” means an agreement by one owner of land restricting the building on, or the use, or other enjoyment of land for the benefit of the owner under a land or neighbouring land and includes a restrictive covenant;

“riparian reserve” means land adjacent to the ocean, lake sea, rivers, dams, and water courses as defined by the Survey Act Cap. 299 and any other written law;

“Rules Committee” has the meaning assigned to it under the Civil Procedure Act Cap. 21;

―squatter‖ means a person who occupies land that legally belongs to another person without that persons consent;

―State‖ has the meaning assigned to it under Article 260 of the Constitution;

―State organ‖ has the meaning assigned to it under Article 260 of the Constitution;

―tenancy in common‖ means a form of concurrent ownership of land in which two or more persons possess the land simultaneously where each person holds an individual, undivided ownership interest in the property and each party has the right to alienate, or transfer the ownership of, her ownership interest.;

“transfer” means the passing of land, a lease or a charge from one party to another by an act of the parties and not by operation of the law and includes the instrument by which such passing is effected;

“transferee” means a person who receives the land, lease or charge passed by an act of transfer;

“transferor” means the person who passes the land, lease or charge by an act of transfer;

―transmission‖ means the passing of land, a lease or a charge from one person to another by operation of law on death or insolvency or otherwise howsoever, and includes the compulsory acquisition of land under any written law;

―temporary purpose‖ means the acquisition of land for a period not exceeding five years or solely as a means of access to other land by a public body;

―trustee‖ includes personal representative;

―valuable consideration‖ includes marriage, but does not include a nominal consideration; and

―valuer‖ means a valuer registered and licensed to practice as a valuer in accordance with the Valuers Act Cap. 532.;

“unexhausted improvement” means anything or any quality permanently attached to the land directly resulting from the expenditure of capital or labour by an owner or any person acting on the owner’s behalf and increasing the productive capacity, the utility, the sustainability of its environmental quality and includes trees, standing crops and growing produce whether of an agricultural or horticultural nature.

Application

3. (1) This Act shall apply to all land declared as—

(a) public land under Article 62 of the Constitution;

(b) private land under Article 64 of the Constitution; and

(c) community land under Article 63 of the Constitution and any other written law relating to community land. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

Guiding values and principles

4. (1) The guiding values and principles of land management and administration in this section bind all State organs, State officers, public officers and all persons whenever any of them—

(a) enacts, applies or interprets any provisions of this Act; and

(b) makes or implements public policy decisions.

(2) In the discharge of their functions and exercise of their powers under this Act, the Commission and any State officer or public officer shall be guided by the following values and principles—

(a) equitable access to land;

(b) security of land rights;

(c) sustainable and productive management of land resources;

(d) transparent and cost effective administration of land;

(e) conservation and protection of ecologically sensitive areas;

(f) elimination of gender discrimination in law, customs and practices related to land and property in land; and

(h) encouragement of communities to settle land disputes through recognized local community initiatives.

(i) participation, accountability and democratic decision making within communities, the public and the Government;

(j) technical and financial sustainability; and

(k) alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in land dispute handling and management.

Forms of Tenure.

5. (1) There shall be the following forms of land tenure-

(a) freehold;

(b) leasehold;

(c) co-tenancy, including-

(i) joint tenancy; and

(ii) tenancy in common;

(d) such forms of partial interest as may be defined under this Act and other law, including but not limited to easements; and

(e) customary land rights, where consistent with the Constitution.

(2) There shall be equal recognition and enforcement of land rights arising under all tenure systems and non-discrimination in ownership of, and access to land under all tenure systems. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

Land Management and Administration Institutions.

6. The Cabinet Secretary shall, in relation to the management and administration of land,-

(a) develop policies on land, upon the recommendation of the Commission;

(b) coordinate county physical planning;

(c) facilitate the implementation of land policy and reforms;

(d) coordinate the management of the National Spatial Data Infrastructure;

(e) set standards of service in the land sector;

(f) regulate service providers and professionals, including physical planners, surveyors, valuers, estate agents, and other land related professionals, to ensure quality control;

(g) monitor and evaluate land sector performance; and

(h) coordinate and oversee the statutory bodies under the land sector.

Methods of acquisition of title to land.

7. Title to land may be acquired through—

(a) allocation;

(b) land adjudication process;

(c) compulsory acquisition;

(d) prescription;

(e) settlement programs;

(f) transmissions;

(g) transfers;

(h) long term leases created out of private land; or

(i) any other manner prescribed in an Act of Parliament.

PART II— MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC LAND

General Provisions

Management of public land

8. In managing public land on behalf of the national and county governments, the Commission—

(a) shall identify public land and prepare and keep a database of all public land, which shall be geo-referenced and authenticated by the statutory body responsible for survey; and

(b) shall share data with stakeholders in order to discharge their respective functions and powers under this Act; or The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(c) may require the land to be used for specified purposes and subject to such conditions, covenants, encumbrances or reservations as are specified in the relevant order or other instrument.

Evaluation of public land.

9. The Commission shall evaluate all parcels of public land based on land capability classification, land resources mapping consideration, overall potential for use, and resource evaluation data for land use planning taking into account physical, social and economic information.

Guidelines on the management of public land.

10. (1) The Commission shall prescribe guidelines for the management of public land to be adhered to by all public agencies, statutory bodies and state corporations in actual occupation or use of public land.

(2) The guidelines prescribed under subsection (1) shall indicate management priorities and operational principles for management of public land resources for identified uses.

(3) The Commission shall, in the development of the guidelines under subsection (1), comply with Article 10(3) of the Constitution

Conservation of ecologically sensitive public land.

11. (1) The Commission shall take appropriate action to maintain those public land that have endangered or endemic species of flora and fauna, critical habitats or protected areas.

(2) The Commission shall identify ecologically sensitive areas that are within public lands, demarcate or take any other justified action on those areas and act to prevent environmental degradation of them.

(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2) the Commission shall consult existing institutions dealing conservation.

Allocation of public land.

12. (1) The Commission may, on behalf of the National or county governments, allocate public land by way of—

(a) auction to the highest bidder at prevailing market value subject to and not less than the reserved price;

(b) application confined to a targeted group of persons or groups;

(c) public notice of tenders as it may prescribe;

(d) public drawing of lots as may be prescribed;

(e) public request for proposals as may be prescribed; or

(f) public exchanges of equal value as may be prescribed.

(2) The Commission shall ensure that any public land has been identified for allocation does not fall within any of the following categories—

(a) public lands subject to erosion, floods, earth slips or water logging; The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(b) public lands that fall within forest and wild life reserves, mangroves, and wetlands or fall within the buffer zones of such reserves or within environmentally sensitive areas;

(c) public land that is along watersheds, river and stream catchments, public water reservoirs, lakes, beaches, fish landing areas riparian and the territorial sea as may be prescribed;

(d) public land reserved for security, education, research and other strategic public uses as may be prescribed; and

(e) natural features of exceptional value falling within public lands;

(f) reserved land;

(g) any other land categorized as such, by the Commission, by an order published in the Gazette.

(3) The Commission shall set aside land for investment purposes.

(4) In fulfilling the requirements of subsection (4), the Commission shall ensure that the investments in the land benefit local communities and their economies.

(5) Subject to the Constitution and any other law, the Commission may, in consultation of the National and county governments, allocate land to foreign governments on a reciprocal basis in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

(6) For the purposes of this Act, a body corporate whose shareholders or owners are non-citizens shall be deemed to be a non-citizen.

(7) At the expiry, termination or extinction of a lease granted to a non-citizen, reversion of interests or rights in and over the land shall vest in the national or county government as the case may be.

(8) Public land shall not be allocated unless it has been planned, surveyed and serviced and guidelines for its development prepared in accordance with section 16 of this Act.

(9) Public land allocated under this section shall not be sold, disposed off, sub-leased, or sub-divided unless it is developed for the purpose for which it was allocated

(10) Where the land allocated under subsection (9) is not developed in accordance with the purpose for which the land was allocated and within the stipulated in the terms of the lease, that land shall automatically revert back to the Government.

(11) In a disposition of public land under this section, the Commission may impose any terms, covenants, stipulations and reservations the Commission considers advisable, including —

(a) that the applicant shall personally occupy and reside on the land for a period set by the Commission;

(b) the applicant shall do such work and spend such money for permanent improvement of the public land within the period specified by the Commission; or

(c) the consideration that must be paid for a disposition of public land.

(12) The Commission shall make regulations prescribing the criteria for allocation and for connected matters.

(13) The regulations made under this section shall be approved by the National Assembly. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

Notification requirements applicable to allocation of public land.

13. (1) The Commission shall, before allocating any public land under this Act, issue, publish or send a notice of action, to the interested parties, at least thirty days before, offering for allocation, a tract or tracts of public land.

(2) The notice under subsection (1) shall include the terms, covenants, conditions and reservations which are to be included in the conveyance document and the method of allocation.

(3) The notice under subsection (1) shall provide a period of fifteen days from the date of its issuance, within which the public and interested parties may comment.

(4) At least thirty days prior to the allocation of public land, the Commission shall be send a notice to the governor in whose county the public land proposed for allocation is located and to the head of the governing body of any administrative subdivision having development control or other land use regulatory responsibility in the geographic area within which the public lands are located and to the head of any administrative subdivision having administrative or public services responsibility in the geographic area within which the lands are located.

(5) The notice under subsection (4) shall be sent to other known interested parties including, but not limited to, adjoining landowners, current land users, and community based organizations including-

(a) marginalised communities and groups living in the general vicinity of the public lands being proposed for allocation, and

(b) boards of cities and municipalities and town administrators, created under sections 12, 13 and 31 of the Urban Areas and Cities Act, 2011, No. 13 of 2011 in the geographic vicinity within which the public lands proposed for allocation are located.

(6) The notice under subsection (4) shall be published in the Gazette and at least once a week for a period of three weeks and thereafter shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the general vicinity of the public land being proposed to be offered for allocation.

(7) A notice under this section above shall specify the place, date, and time of allocation, the appraised value of the land, describe with particularity each parcel of land to be allocated, and specify that the terms of allocation shall be available in the Commission’s offices in Nairobi and the Commission office nearest the land being proposed for allocation.

(8) Failure to provide notice of proposed allocations as required under this section shall serve as grounds for the Commission to-

(i) require that the notification procedures outlined in this subsection be repeated;, or

(ii) void the allocation on grounds that the notification requirements of this Act were not properly conducted.

Reserved Public Land

Commission may reserve public land.

14. (1) Subject to Article 66(2), the Commission may, in consultation with national government and the county governments, by order in the Gazette, reserve public land located within—

(a) the surface of the earth and the subsurface rock;

(b) any body of water on or under the surface; The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(c) marine waters in the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone;

(d) natural resources completely contained on or under the surface; and

(e) the air space above the surface.

for one or more purposes in the public interest.

(2) Land that has been reserved by the commission shall only be used for the purpose set out by the commission in the order designating the reservation and shall not be subject to allocation or development.

(3) Upon coming into force of this Act, the Commission shall undertake an inventory of all land based natural resources.

Placing of care, control and management of reserved public land.

15. (1) The Commission may, by order in the Gazette —

(a) vest the care, control and management of any reserved land with a statutory body, public corporation or a public agency for the same purpose as that for which the relevant public land is reserved under section 15 and for purposes ancillary or beneficial to that purpose; and

(b) subject that care, control and management to such conditions as the Commission specifies.

(2) The Commission may by order in the Gazette, vary any condition to which the care, control and management of reserved land is subject.

(3) Prior to the variation under subsection (2) and where the variation affects a third party the Commission shall notify the third party of such variation.

(4) The Commission, may by order in the Gazette —

(a) confer on a management body power to grant a lease or sublease or licence over the whole or any part of the public land within the reserve in question for the purposes referred to in subsection (1); and

(b) approve the charge of any such lease.

(4) An order made under this section shall not create any interest in reserved public land in favour of the management body of that reserve.

(5) Where public land reserved under this Act for the purpose of recreation is leased or subleased under a power conferred under subsection (3), the lessee or sub-lessee shall not restrict public access to the area leased unless the terms of the management order or the lease or sublease provide otherwise.

(6) A management body with whom the care, control and management of a reserved land is placed by order under subsection (1) shall have the capacity, to hold and deal with the reserved land in a manner consistent with—

(a) the order; or

(a) any order conferring power on the management body under subsection (3) (a) and this Act to the extent that the person does not already have that capacity or those functions and powers. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(b) any laws or regulations governing the management body or the specific land that has been placed in reserve.

(7) Notwithstanding subsection (6), a management body shall not perform a function or exercise a power if another enactment expressly prevents the body from performing that function or exercising that power, or expressly authorises another person to perform that function or exercise that power.

Development Plans.

16. (1) A management body shall, on its own motion or at the request of the Commission, submit to the Commission for approval a plan for the development, management and use of the reserved public land vested in the management body.

(2) Before submitting a plan to the Commission under subsection (1) a management body shall—

(a) consider any conservation, environmental or heritage issues relevant to the development, management or use of the public land in its managed reserve for the purpose of that managed reserve; and

(b) incorporate in the plan a statement that it has considered those issues in drawing up the plan;

(c) an environmental impact assessment plan pursuant to existing law on environment; and

(d) comply with the values and principles of the Constitution.

(3) If a management body submits a plan to the Commission under subsection (1) and the Commission approves that plan and notifies the management body of that fact, the management body may develop, manage and, use the public land concerned in accordance with the plan as approved or subsequently varied as the case may be.

(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the Commission shall, in considering an application under this section, comply with the relevant law relating to development control.

Revocation of management orders.

17. (1) If a management body does not comply with guidelines or directions issued by the Commission in writing, or does not submit a development plan in compliance with a request made under section 16 (2), the Commission, by order in the Gazette, may revoke that management order.

(2) If the Commission considers that it is in the public interest to revoke a management order, the Commission may, by order in the Gazette, revoke the management order.

(3) The preparation and implementation of development plans under this Act shall be in accordance with the physical planning regulations and any other relevant law.

Conservation of land based natural resources.

18. (1) The Commission shall make rules and regulations for the sustainable conservation of land based natural resources.

(2) Without limiting what the Commission may prescribe under subsection (1), the rules and regulations may contain—

(a) measures to protect critical ecosystems and habitats; The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(b) incentives for communities and individuals to invest in income generating natural resource conservation programmes;

(c) measures to facilitate the access, use and co- management of forests, water and other resources by communities who have customary rights to these resources;

(d) procedures for the registration of natural resources in an appropriate register;

(e) procedures on the involvement of stakeholders in the management and utilization of land- based natural resources; and

(f) measures to ensure benefit sharing to the affected communities.

PART III— ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC LAND

Leases, Licences and Agreements For Public Land

License for temporary purposes specified in the lease

19. (1) The Commission may grant a person a licence to use unalienated public land for temporary purposes subject to planning principles as it may prescribe.

(2) A licence under this section shall continue for—

(a) one year, and thenceforward until the expiration of any three months notice to quit; or

(b) the period, if any, and any extension subject to notice to quit, as expressly set out in the licence.

(3) The Commission may serve a notice to quit upon the licencee at any time after the expiration of nine months from the date of the licence.

(4) The rent payable under a licence under this section, the period and the agreements and conditions of the license, shall be prescribed by the Commission.

(5) The licensee may, with the consent of the Commission, transfer the benefit of a licence under this section, and the transfer and the consent thereto shall be endorsed on the licence.

Removal of building under temporary Licence.

20. At any time before the licence expires, the occupant of any public land under a licence granted under section 19 may remove any structure or other building erected by the occupant.

Penalty for unpaid rent, etc.

21. The Commission may declare a licence granted under section 19 to be forfeited if—

(a) the rent payable under the licence is unpaid for one month after it became due;

(b) any tax or taxes imposed upon the land, or upon a structure or building erected on the land, or upon the licencee, remains unpaid for two months after becoming due; or

(c) if the occupant of the land fails to abide with the conditions of the licence.

General Conditions Relating to Leases, Licences and Agreements for Public Land

Implied covenants and conditions.

22. (1) In every grant or lease relating to public land, unless the grant or lease expressly The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

provides otherwise, there is an implied covenant by the grantor or lessor—

(a) that the grantor or lessor has full power to grant the land or lease; and

(b) that the grantee or lessee, paying the rent and fulfilling the conditions of the grant or lease, shall enjoy quiet possession of the premises without interruption by the grantor or lessor or any person claiming under the grantor or lessor, except so far as the laws for the time being in force may permit.

(2) A grant of public land shall be made in the name of the Commission on behalf of the national or county government as the case may be, and shall be sealed.

Implied covenant and conditions by lessee or licensee.

23. In every grant, lease or licence for public land under this Act, there shall be implied covenants and conditions by the grantee, lessee or licencee that the grantee, lessee or licencee shall—

(a) pay rent and royalties thereby reserved at the time and in the manner therein provided; and

(b) pay all taxes, rates, charges, duties, assessments or outgoings of whatever description that may be imposed, charged or assessed upon the land or the buildings thereon, or upon the lessor or grantor or lessee or licensee in respect thereof.

Buildings on leased public lands.

24. (1) Unless expressly stated to the contrary in a lease or license for public land under this Act, all buildings on public land leased or occupied under a license, whether erected by the lessee or licensee or not—

(a) in the case of a lease for a term exceeding thirty years, shall pass to the Government without payment of compensation, on the determination of the lease or license; or

(b) in the case of a lease for a term not exceeding thirty years, may be removed by the lessee within three months of the termination, otherwise than by forfeiture, of the lease unless the Commission elects to purchase those buildings.

(2) If the Commission elects to purchase any buildings, as contemplated in subsection (1) (b), any disagreement as to the purchase price of the buildings, shall be resolved by arbitration.

Covenants and conditions binding on persons claiming under grant, lease or license.

25. Every covenant or condition, whether expressed or implied, in a grant, lease or license under this Act which is binding on a grantee, lessee or licensee shall, unless otherwise expressly provided in the grant, lease or license, be binding upon all persons claiming an interest in the land that is the subject of the grant, lease or license, and whose title is derived through or under the grantee, lessee or licensee.

Obligations of children.

26. A child shall be capable of holding title to land either through a lease or a license through a trustee and a child who becomes a lessee or licensee under this Act shall be in the same position as an adult with regard to the child’s liability and obligations under or in respect of the lease or license.

Rents and other payments.

27. (1) The rent, royalties and payments reserved under any lease or license shall be a debt owed to the Commission, and shall be paid by the lessee or licensee at the office of The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

the Commission or at such other place as the Commission may prescribe.

(2) The annual rent reserved under any lease or license shall be payable in advance on the 1st day of January in each year of the term.

(3) The payments made under subsection (2) shall be accounted for to the respective governments.

Unpaid rents and other payments.

28. (1) If any funds due in respect of any rent, principal installment, royalty or other payment (in this section referred to as “the principal debt”) under any agreement lease or license under this Act, or under any Act repealed by this Act, remain unpaid after the due date, a late payment interest at the rate of two percent per month or part thereof, or at such other rate as may from time to time be specified by the Commission in the Gazette, shall be charged on the amount remaining unpaid for more than one month after the due date until the full amount is recovered.

(2) Any payment made under subsection (1) shall first be attributed to the payment of outstanding interest and thereafter only when such interest has been paid in full shall any payment be attributed to the reduction of the principal debt.

(3) If any interest becomes payable under subsection (1) the Commission shall serve on the debtor a notice demanding payment of that interest in addition to the other money then due.

(4) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the Commission may waive the whole or part of any late payment of interest provided for by this section, if the debtor has provided the Commission a good and sufficient reason for the late payment.

(5) The Commission shall publish and publicizes annually, any remission or waiver made under subsection (4).

(6) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the law relating to public financial management shall apply.

Commission may sue for rent, etc., in arrears.

29. Without prejudice to the Commission’s right to recover a debt in any other way, the Commission may sue in Court for any rent, principal, installment, royalty or other payment, payable under any agreement, lease or license under this Act, that is in arrears, or for any penalty payable under section 28.

Forfeiture of lease if rent unpaid or for breach of covenant.

30. (1) If any part of the rent or royalties reserved in a tease under this Act is unpaid for a period of twelve months after becoming due, or if the lessee breaches any express or implied covenant, the Commission may—

(a) serve a notice upon the lessee, specifying the rent or royalties in arrear or the covenant of which a breach has been committed; and

(b) commence an action in Court for the recovery of the land at any time at least one month after serving the notice contemplated in paragraph (a).

(2) In an action commenced under subsection (1) (b) on proof of the facts, the Court shall declare the lease forfeited, subject to relief upon such terms as may appear just.

(3) If the Court has declared a lease to be forfeited under subsection (2), the Commission may re-enter upon the land. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(4) In exercising the power of granting relief against forfeiture under this sub-section (1) the Court shall be guided by the principles of the doctrines of equity.

Forfeiture of licence.

31. (1) Subject to any other provision of this Act, where the rent or any part thereof payable under a license issued under this Act is at any time unpaid for a period of thirty days after the same has become due, or if the licensee fails to comply with, or commits any breach of, the conditions, whether express or implied, of the license, the Commission may make an application in Court to declare the license forfeited.

(2) Upon receipt of an application under subsection (1), together with a statement specifying the rent in arrears or the condition which has not been complied with or of which a breach has been committed, the Court shall cause to be served upon the licensee, a copy of the statement together with a notice of the date, not being less than fourteen days from the date of the notice, when the application will be heard.

(3) If upon the date fixed for the hearing of the application or to which the hearing is adjourned it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that rent is in arrears or that the licensee has failed to comply with or has committed a breach of any of the conditions of the license, it shall,

subject to such relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent as may seem just, declare the license forfeited.

Debt owed to Commission not extinguished by forfeiture.

32. A forfeiture shall not extinguish any debt owed to the Commission in respect of any rent, royalty or other payment to be made by a lessee or licensee under a lease or license forfeited.

Subdivision etc., of public land subject to continuing interests, etc.

33. (1) If the Commission proposes to resurvey the boundaries of any leased public land, or to subdivide land that is the subject of any interests or cautions, the Commission may, with reasonable notice to the holders of the interests, or of the relevant cautioners, by order incorporating a survey plan or revised survey plan authenticated by the office or authority responsible for survey, make such adjustments to those boundaries as—

(a) the Commission considers necessary; and

(b) according to any proposed plan of subdivision approved under the law relating to physical planning,

without any obligation to make or pay compensation.

(2) The Commission shall notify all interest holders and relevant caveators of the boundaries adjustments made under subsection (1).

(3) On the adoption by the Commission of a survey plan or revised survey plan referred to in subsection (1) and the registration of the order with reference to that survey plan or revised survey plan, the boundaries of the relevant public land are adjusted accordingly—

(a) despite the existence of any interests registered or cautions lodged in respect of that public land; and

(b) with or without the consent of the holders of those interests or of the relevant cautioners.

(4) The Commission shall ensure that an adjustment made under subsection (3) is made in conformity with sound planning and land management principles so as to cause as little detriment as possible to any interest or caveat affected by that adjustment. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(5) On the adjustment under subsection (3) of the internal or external boundaries of leased public land subject to interests or caveats, the interests or caveats apply to the relevant locations or lots within those boundaries and not to the public land referred to in the instruments which created those interests or caveats.

Acceptance of purchase money or rent not to operate as waiver of forfeiture.

34. The acceptance by or on behalf of the Commission of any purchase money or any rent or other payment under any lease or licence shall not be held to operate as a waiver by the Commission of any forfeiture accruing by reason of the breach of any covenant or condition annexed to any sale, lease or license of or respecting public land, whether the sale, lease or licence is under this Act or under any other Act relating to the disposal of public land.

Notice of lease, license or agreement action on public land.

35. (1) A notice of action indicating the availability of public land for use through lease, license, or agreement shall be published in the Gazette and in at least two daily newspapers of nationwide circulation when a determination has been made that such public land is available for a particular use.

(2) The notice under subsection (1) shall indicate the use proposed for the public land and shall notify the public that applications for a lease, license or agreement shall be considered, and specify the form of negotiation, whether by competitive or non-competitive bidding, under which the land use authorization shall be issued.

Annual report to Parliament and the public.

36. The Commission shall, on an annual basis, provide a report to Parliament, that shall be made available to the public, that identifies and evaluates the allocation of public land and the grant of use agreements made by the Commission and its assignees in the preceding year. This report should also include a summary of revenues generated through the allocation and use of public lands.

PART IV-COMMUNITY LAND

Community land.

37. The Commission shall manage community land in accordance with the law relating to community land enacted pursuant to Article 63 of the Constitution.

PART V-ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT OF PRIVATE LAND

Contracts Over Land

Regaining possession of land after concluding contract of sale of land.

38. (1) No suit shall be brought upon a contract for the disposition of an interest in land unless—

(a) the contract upon which the suit is founded—

(i) is in writing;

(ii) is signed by all the parties thereto; and

(b) the signature of each party signing has been attested by a witness who was present when the contract was signed by such party.

(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply to a contract made in the course of a public auction nor shall anything in that subsection affect the creation or operation of a resulting, implied or a constructive trust. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

Procedure for regaining possession.

39. If, under a contract for the sale of land, the purchaser has entered into possession of the land, the vendor may exercise his or her contractual right to rescind the contract by reason of a breach of the contract by the purchaser only by—

(a) resuming possession of the land peaceably; or

(b) obtaining an order for possession of the land from the court in accordance with the provisions of section 41.

Damages for breach of contract.

40. (1) Nothing in section 39 prevents a vendor from claiming damages from the purchaser for the breach of a contract for a sale, or for breach of any other duty to the vendor which the purchaser may be under independently of the contract, or affects the amount of damages that the vendor may claim.

(2) Any term express or implied in a contract or other instrument that conflicts with this section shall be inoperative.

Procedure for obtaining order for possession.

41. (1) A vendor who proposes to seek to regain possession of private land under section 39, shall serve a notice on the purchaser which shall inform the purchaser—

(a) of the nature and extent of the breach complained of by the vendor;

(b) whether the vendor considers that the breach is capable of being remedied by the payment of a stated amount of money owing under the contract;

(c) whether the vendor considers that the breach is capable of being remedied by the purchaser doing or desisting from doing anything or paying reasonable compensation or both, and of the thing that the purchaser must do or desist from doing or the amount of compensation that shall be paid or both to remedy the breach and the time, being not less than thirty days, within which the actions referred to in this paragraph must be completed;

(d) of the period within which the purchaser must remedy the breach, if the vendor considers that the breach is capable of being remedied;

(e) of the consequence where the purchaser fails to remedy the breach or if the vendor does not consider that the breach can be remedied, the vendor may seek an order from the court to possess the land and rescind the contract;

(f) of the right of the purchaser to, within not more than fifteen days,—

(i) apply to court for relief against the rescission of the contract;

(ii) tender an amount by way compensation different to that proposed by the vendor in the notice;

(iii) propose alternative remedies to those set out in the notice;

(iv) propose an alternative tithe for the completion of the actions referred to in paragraph (c).

(2) The fact that the notice served under subsection (1) does not comply in every particular with the provisions of subsection (1) shall not— The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(a) render it invalid so long as the purport of the notice is clear; or

(b) absolve the purchaser from the consequences of not responding to the notice.

Relief against rescission of contract for the sale of land.

42. (1) If the vendor, after serving on the purchaser a notice under section 41, applies to the court for an order for possession of the land or if the vendor has peaceably entered on to the land in order to regain possession under section 39, the purchaser may apply to the court for relief against the rescission of the contract either—

(a) in the proceedings for an order for possession; or

(b) in a proceedings brought by the purchaser.

(2) If the vendor has peaceably entered on to the land the purchaser shall apply for relief within ninety days after the entry on to the land.

(3) The court may grant relief on such terms as it considers appropriate, including relief for breach of any term or condition of the contract that is not capable of being remedied.

(4) An application for relief under this section shall not in itself to be taken as an admission by the purchaser that—

(a) there has been a breach of the contract by the purchaser;

(b) by reason of the breach, the vendor has the right to rescind the contract;

(c) a notice has been duly and properly served on the purchaser; or

(d) the time for remedying a breach or for paying an amount by way of compensation has expired, and the court may grant relief without determining any of those matters.

(5) Any, express or implied, term in a contract or other instrument to which this section applies that conflicts with or purports to set aside or negate this section shall be inoperative.

Purchaser of right to land may seek relief against performance of contract to assign.

43. (1) If the court will not or would not, in the exercise of its discretion, order the specific performance by a purchaser of a contract to sell land but the purchaser is not entitled to rescind or repudiate the contract, the purchaser may apply to the court for relief under this section.

(2) On any application made under subsection (1), the court may make an order—

(a) rescinding the contract;

(b) requiring the vendor to refund any deposit and other money paid to the vendor by the purchaser; or

(c) declaring that the purchaser has a lien on the land to which the contract relates to secure payment by the vendor of any amounts ordered to be refunded to the purchaser under paragraph (b).

(3) The grant of relief under this section shall not deprive the vendor of any right to claim damages from the purchaser for failure to perform his or her obligations under the contract and in awarding damages, the court shall take into account of any relief granted under this section.

(4) Any express or implied term in a contract or other instrument to which this section applies The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

that conflicts with or purports to set aside or negates this section shall be void.

Transfers

Transfer.

44. (1) In this Part, “transfer” includes a conveyance, an assignment, a transfer of land, a transfer of lease or other instrument used in the disposition of an interest in land by way of transfer.

(2) A proprietor may transfer land, a lease or a charge to any person (including himself or herself), with or without consideration, by an instrument in the prescribed form.

(3) The transfer shall be completed by the registration of the transferee as proprietor of the land, lease or charge.

(4) The transferee of a charge may require the chargor to execute the transfer for the purpose of acknowledging the amount due under the charge at the date of execution of the transfer.

Transfer to take effect immediately.

45. A transfer shall not be expressed to take effect on the happening of any event or on the fulfillment of any condition or at any future time.

Transfer of part

46. (1) A portion of the land included in a register shall not be transferred unless the proprietor has first subdivided the land and new registers have been opened in respect of each subdivision.

Transfer of leases

47. 0n the transfer of a lease, unless the contrary is expressed in the transfer, there shall be implied—

(a) a warranty on the part of the transferor that the rent, agreements and conditions on the part of the lessee to be paid, performed and observed have been so paid, performed and observed up to the date specified in the transfer or, if no such date is specified, the date of the transfer; and

(b) an agreement on the part of the transferee to pay the said rent as from the day following the date specified in the transfer or the date of the transfer, as the case may be, and to perform and observe the said agreements and conditions.

Effect of transfer on agreement in leases.

48. (1) A transfer from a lessor or from a lessee Shall possess all the rights, and be subject to all the liabilities, of the lessor or lessee, as the case may be, expressed or implied in the lease, or arising or which have arisen thereunder, and the transferor shall cease to be under any obligation or possessed of any rights in respect of the lease subject to subsection (2).

(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the rights or liabilities of the lessor or lessee, as the case may be, in respect of a breach of any of the agreements expressed or implied in a lease that occurred before the transfer.

Transfer subject to charge

49. In every transfer of land or a lease subject to a charge, there shall be an implied agreement by the transferee with the transferor to pay the interest secured by the charge. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

Transfer subject to lease.

50. A transfer of land that is subject to a lease shall be valid without the lessee acknowledging the transferee as lessor, but nothing in this section—

(a) affects the validity of any payment of rent made by the lessee to the transferor; or

(b) renders the lessee liable, for failure to pay rent to the transferee, for any breach of agreement to pay rent, before notice of the transfer is given to the lessee by the transferee.

Transmissions

Transmission on death of joint proprietor.

51. If, one of two or more joint proprietors of any land, lease or charge dies, the Registrar shall, on proof of the death, delete the name of the deceased from the register by registration of the death certificate.

Transmission on death of a sole proprietor or proprietor in common.

52. (1) If a sole proprietor or a proprietor in common dies, the proprietor’s personal representative shall, on application to the Registrar in the prescribed form and on production to the Registrar of the grant, be entitled to be registered by transmission as proprietor in the place of the deceased with the addition after the representative’s name of the words “as executor of the will of (……………………..) [deceased]” or “as administrator of the estate of (……………) [deceased]”, as the case may be.

(2) Upon production of a grant, the Registrar may, without requiring the personal representative to be registered, register by transmission—

(a) any transfer by the personal representative; and

(b) any surrender of a lease or discharge of a charge by the personal representative.

(3) In this section, “grant” means the grant of probate of the will, the grant of letters of administration of the estate or the grant of summary administration of the estate in favour of or issued by the Public Trustee, as the case may be, of the deceased proprietor.

Effect of transmission on death.

53. (1) Subject to any restriction on a person’s power of disposing of any land, lease or charge contained in an appointment, the personal representative or the person beneficially entitled on the death of the deceased proprietor, as the case may be, shall hold the land, lease or charge subject to any liabilities, rights or interests that are unregistered but are nevertheless enforceable and subject to which the deceased proprietor held the same, but for the purpose of any dealing the person shall be deemed to have been registered as proprietor thereof with all the rights conferred by this Act on a proprietor who has acquired land, a lease or a charge, as the case may be, for valuable consideration.

(2) The registration of any person as aforesaid shall relate back to and take effect from the date of the death of the proprietor.

Transmission on bankruptcy.

54. (1) Upon production to the Registrar of a certified copy of the order of court adjudging a proprietor bankrupt, or directing that the estate of a deceased proprietor shall be administered according to the law of bankruptcy—

(a) a copy of the order shall be filed with the registrar; and The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(b) the trustee in bankruptcy shall be registered as proprietor of any land lease or charge of which the bankrupt or the deceased proprietor is proprietor, in place of the bankrupt or deceased proprietor.

(2) A trustee in bankruptcy shall be described in the register as “trustee of the property of (………………………….), a bankrupt”.

Transmission upon company’s liquidation.

55. (1) If a company is being wound up, the liquidator shall—

(a) produce to the Registrar a resolution or order appointing the liquidator; and

(b) satisfy the Registrar that the person has complied with the Companies Act, Cap. 486.

and the Registrar shall enter the appointment in respect of any land, lease or charge of which the company is registered as proprietor, and file the copy of the resolution or order.

(2) An instrument executed by or on behalf of a company in liquidation delivered for registration after the appointment of the liquidator has been entered under subsection (1) shall be sealed with the common seal of the company and attested by the liquidator or, in the case of a company not required by law to have a common seal, shall be signed by the liquidator whose signature shall be verified in accordance with the relevant law.

(3) Where a vesting order has been made under section 240 of the Companies Act, Cap.486 the liquidator shall present the order and the Registrar shall register the liquidator as proprietor of any land, lease or charge to which the order relates.

Transmission in other cases.

56. If a person has become entitled to any land, lease or charge under any law or by virtue of any order or certificate of sale made or issued under any law, the Registrar, on the application of any interested person supported by such evidence as the person may require, shall register the person entitled, as the proprietor.

PART VI—CO-TENANCY AND PARTITION

Meaning and incidents of co-tenancies.

57. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, if two or more persons, not forming an association of persons under this Act or any other way which specifies the nature and content of the rights of the persons forming that association, own land together under a right specified by this section, they may be either joint tenants or tenants in common.

(2) If land is owned jointly no tenant is entitled to any separate share in the land and consequently—

(a) dispositions may be made only by all the joint tenants;

(b) on the death of a joint tenant, that tenant’s interest shall vest in the surviving tenant or tenants jointly; or

(c) each joint tenant may transfer their interest inter vivos to all the other tenants but to no other

person, and any attempt to so transfer an interest to any other person shall be void. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(3) If any land, lease or charge is owned in common, each tenant shall be entitled to an undivided share in the whole and on the death of a tenant, the deceased’s share shall be treated as part of their estate.

(4) No tenant in common shall deal with their undivided share in favour of any person other than another tenant in common, except with the consent in writing of the remaining tenants.

(5) Joint tenants, not being trustees, may sever the joint ownership through procedures set forth in the Regulations.

Certificate of ownership of cotenants

58. Each co-tenant of land shall be entitled to receive a copy of the certificate of title of that land and issuance of such title shall be noted in the register.

Co-ownership and other relationships between spouses.

59. (1) If a spouse obtains matrimonial property for the co-ownership and use of both spouses the presumption is that the spouses will hold the matrimonial property as tenants in common.

(2) If matrimonial property is held in the name of one spouse only but the other spouse or spouses contribute by their labour or other resources to the productivity, upkeep and improvement of the matrimonial property, that spouse or those spouses shall be deemed by virtue of that contribution to have acquired an interest in that matrimonial property in the nature of an ownership in common of that matrimonial property with the spouse in whose name the certificate of ownership or customary certificate of ownership has been registered and such rights gained by the contribution of the spouse or spouses shall be recognized in all cases as if they were registered.

(3) A spouse who holds matrimonial property or a dwelling house in his or her name alone shall not dispose of this property without the consent of the spouse or spouses who hold any interest, whether or not it is registered, in that matrimonial property or dwelling house.

(4) Where a spouse under subsection (3) makes a disposition of that matrimonial property or dwelling house,—

(a) the chargee shall, if that disposition is charge, be under a duty to inquire of the chargor as to whether the spouse or spouses has or as the case may be, have consented to that charge and obtain a declaration certifying that the transferor has obtained consent from the spouse or spouses; or

(b) the assignee or transferee shall, if that disposition is an assignment or a transfer of land, be under a duty to inquire of the assignor or transferor as to whether the spouse or spouses have consented to that assignment and obtain a declaration certifying that the transferor has obtained consent from the spouse or spouses.

(5) If a spouse who holds matrimonial property or a dwelling house in his or her name alone disposes of that matrimonial property or dwelling house without the permission of the spouse or spouses who hold any interest in the matrimonial property, the disposition shall be voidable at the option of the spouse or spouses who have not consented to the disposition, where the transferee did not obtain a signed declaration from the transferor certifying that the consent of the spouse or spouse has been obtained.

(6) For avoidance of doubt, if a spouse undertaking the disposition deliberately misleads the chargee or, as the case may be, the assignee or transferee as to the answers to the inquiries made in accordance with subsection (4) (a) or (b), the disposition the spouse undertaking the disposition shall pay damages to the spouse had or spouses who have not consented to the disposition. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

Partition.

60. (1) Any one or more of the tenants in common may, with or without the consent of other tenants in common and subject to the provisions of this Act and of any other written law applying to or requiring consent to a sub-division of land and of any covenants or conditions in a certificate of a land, apply for a partition of land owned in common per the procedures set forth in the Land Registration Act, 2012.

(2) An application for partition may also be made by any person in whose favour an order has been made for the sale of an undivided share in the land in execution of a decree.

(3) The Registrar may, after hearing the applicant and any of the other tenants in common who wish to appear and be heard, make an order for the partition of land having regard to—

(a) whether the provisions of this Act, any other written law regulating the subdivision of land and any covenants and conditions in a land have been or will be complied with if the partition is effected;

(b) the nature and location of the land;

(c) the number of tenants in common and the extent of their respective shares in particular, the extent of the share of any tenant in common by whom or on whose behalf the application has been made;

(d) the value of any contribution made by any tenant in common to the cost of improvements to or the maintenance of the land or buildings occupied in common;

(e) if the tenants in common are spouses or those tenants in common who do not agree to the partition are dependants of or related to those tenants in common whether the interests of those tenants in common who have not agreed to the partition will be or have been adequately provided for as a consequence of or after the partition is effected, and in particular, a spouse or dependants of the tenant in common applying for partition will not be rendered homeless by such partition;

(f) in respect of an application made by a person referred to in paragraph (b) of subsection (2),

whether the interests of the spouse or any dependants of the tenant in common whose share is to be sold in execution of a judgment decree, will be adequately catered for and in particular, any spouse or dependants will not be rendered homeless by the sale;

(g) if the tenants in common are pastoralists, whether those tenants in common who have not agreed to the partition will, after the partition, still retain grazing rights, including grazing rights created by an easement in the partitioned land, to sufficient land of the quality and nature and

in the location customarily used by those pastoralists;

(h) the proper development and use of the land and whether it may be adversely affected by the

partition applied for;

(i) the hardship that would be caused to the applicant or applicants by a refusal of an order in comparison with the hardship that would be caused to any, other person by the making of the order; and

(j) any other matters that the Registrar considers relevant,

and may make that order subject to such limitations and conditions, including conditions as to the payment of compensation to those tenants in common who have not agreed to the partition by those tenants in common who have applied for the partition and how the expenses and costs of the partition are to be borne, as the Registrar considers just and reasonable. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

Ancillary powers of Registrar in connection with partition.

61. (1) If the land sought to be partitioned is capable of partition generally, and the tenants in common have reached an agreement on the partition, but the resultant share of any particular tenant would be less in area than the minimum prescribed under legislation or regulations either generally or for the development or use of the land which that particular proprietor intends to undertake on that land, the tenants in common shall endeavour to reach a compromise on the matter, with or without the aid of mediation, and any party dissatisfied with that compromise or otherwise may refer that partition to the Registrar who shall—

(a) add that share to the share of any other tenant in common; or

(b) distribute that share amongst two or more other tenants in common in any proportion that, in default of agreement, the Registrar shall think just and reasonable; and cause the value of the share added or distributed to be assessed and order that there be paid to the tenant in common of that share by each tenant in common who has received an addition to his or her share, the value of that addition.

(2) If any sum is payable subsection (1) (b), the Registrar may order that sum be secured by way of a charge on the share of the tenant or tenants in common liable to pay that sum.

Sale of co-owned land.

62. (1) If for any reason the land sought to be partitioned is incapable of partition, or the partition would adversely affect the proper use of the land, and the applicant for partition or one or more of the other tenants in common require that the land be sold, then if the tenants in common cannot agree on the terms and conditions of the sale or the application of the proceeds of the sale, an application may be made to the court for an order for sale and the court may—

(a) cause a valuation of the land and of the shares of the tenants in common to be made; and

(b) order the sale of the land or the separation and sale of the shares of the tenants in common by public auction or any other means which appears to the court to be suitable; or

(c) make any other order to dispose of the application which the court considers fair and reasonable,

and in exercising its powers under paragraphs (b) and (c), the court shall have regard to any of the matters set out in section 126 (3) (a) to (e) that seems to it to be relevant in the circumstances.

(2) A tenant in common shall be entitled to purchase the land or any share in it so offered for sale, either at an auction or at any time by private sale.

Partition to subject charge.

63. If any undivided share in land or for a lease by tenants in common is subject to a charge, upon partition of the land, the land appropriated to the chargor shall be deemed to be subject to the charge for all purposes as if it had originally been comprised in it and the land appropriated to the other tenants in common shall be released from the charge.

Leases General Provisions

Application of this Part.

64. (1) Unless otherwise provided in lease instrument, the provisions of this Part shall apply to all leases, other than leases governed by legislation relating to community land. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(2) The parties to a lease made or coming into effect before the commencement of this Act may agree, in writing, to adopt or incorporate any of the provisions of this Part into that lease and any provisions adopted or incorporated shall, unless the agreement otherwise provides, become a part of the lease and shall be enforceable in every respect, with effect from the date of the agreement.

(3) In this Part, unless the context expressly or by implication renders it unfeasible, references to a lease include a sub-lease.

Power to lease land.

65. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the owner of private land may—

(a) lease that land or part of it to any person for a definite period or for the life of the lessor or of the lessee or for a period which though indefinite, may be terminated by the lessor or the lessee; and

(b) subject the lease to any conditions that may be required by this Act or any other law or that the lessor may impose.

 

Periodic leases.

66. (1) If in any lease—

(a) the term of the lease is not specified and no provision is made for the giving of notice to terminate the tenancy, the lease shall be deemed to be a periodic lease;

(b) the term is from week to week, month to month, year to year or any other periodic basis to which the rent is payable in relation to agricultural land the periodic lease shall be for six months;

(c) the lessee remains in possession of land with the consent of the lessor after the term of the lease has expired, then—

(i) unless the lessor and lessee have agreed, expressly or by implication, that the continuing possession shall be for some other period, the lease shall be deemed to be a periodic one; and

(ii) all the terms and conditions of the lease that are consistent with the provisions of sub-paragraph (i) shall continue in force until the lease is terminated in accordance with this section.

(2) If the owner of land permits the exclusive occupation of the land or any part of it by any person at a rent but without any agreement in writing, that occupation shall be deemed to constitute a periodic tenancy.

(3) The periodic tenancy contemplated in subsection (1) (a) shall be the period by reference to which the rent is payable.

(4) A periodic tenancy may be terminated by either party giving notice to the other, the length of which shall be not less than the period of the tenancy and shall expire on one of the days on which rent is payable.

Short-term leases

67. (1) A short term lease is a lease—

(a) made for a term of two years or less without an option for renewal;

(b) that is a periodic; and

(c) to which section 66(2) applies. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(2) A short term lease may be made orally or in writing.

(3) A short term lease is not a registrable interest in land.

Lease terminating on the occurrence of a future event.

68. A lease that comes into operation after the date on which this Act comes into operation and that provides for its termination or permits notice of its termination to be given on the occurrence of a future event shall not be invalid by reason of the fact that the event is sufficiently defined in the lease so as to be identified when it occurs.

Lessee remaining in possession after termination of lease without the consent of lessor.

69. (1) If a lessee remains in possession of land without the consent of the lessor after the lease has been terminated or the term of the lease has expired, all the obligations of the lessee under the lease continue in force until such time as the lessee ceases to be in possession of the land.

(2) A lessor who accepts rent in respect of any period after the lease has been terminated or the term of the lease has expired, shall not, by reason of that fact, be deemed to have consented to the lessee remaining in possession of the land, or as having given up on any of the rights or remedies of the lessor against the lessee for breach of a covenant or condition of the lease, and if the lessor continues to accept rent from a tenant who remains in possession for two months, after the termination of the lease, a periodic lease from month to month shall be deemed to have come into force.

Future leases.

70. (1) For the avoidance of doubt, a lease of a land may be made for a term to begin on a future date, not being later than twenty-one years after the date on which the lease is executed.

(2) A future lease, which is expressed to be for a period of more than five years, shall be of no effect unless and until it is, registered.

Lessor’s consent to dealing with leases.

71. If a lease contains an express or implied condition, on the lessee not to transfer, sub-let, charge or part with the possession of the leased land or any part of it without the written consent of the lessor, no dealing with the lease shall be registered until the consent of the lessor has been produced to, and authenticated to the satisfaction of the Registrar.

Notice by co-owners.

72. If a lease is entered into by—

(a) two or more lessors as co-owners; or

(b) two or more lessees as co-owners,

and the lease is terminable by notice, the notice shall be given by and to all the co-owners, unless all the parties to the lease have, expressly or by implication, agreed otherwise.

Sublease for a term that is the same as or longer than the term of the head lease.

73. (1) This section shall apply to a sub-lease that comes into operation after the date of the commencement of this Act, under which, a lessee enters or purports to enter into a The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

sublease for a term that is to expire at the same time as or not later than, the expiry of the term of the head lease.

(2) A sublease to which this section applies shall not operate as an assignment of the head lease to the sublease, unless a contrary intention appears from the sublease or from the circumstances surrounding the granting of the sublease.

(3) If the term of the sublease to which this section applies is to expire after the expiry of the term of the head lease,—

(a) the term of the sublease shall be reduced, to expire one day earlier than the term of the head lease, but without prejudice to any remedies that the sublessee may have in respect of that reduction;

or

(b) if the term of the head lease is extended or renewed beyond the term for which the sublease was created, the sublease shall expire at the end of that original term; or

(c) if the term of the head lease is extended or the head lease is renewed, the term of the sublease shall be extended to expire—

(i) one day earlier than the extended term of the head lease or the term of the head lease as renewed; or

(ii) one day earlier than the time at which the head lease is expressed to expire,

whichever time is the earlier.

(4) The parties to a lease and sublease to which this section refers may renegotiate any terms or conditions of the sublease and the renegotiated terms or conditions shall not be more onerous to or impose more obligations on the sublessee than the original terms and conditions.

Surrender to enable a new head lease to be entered into not to affect the sublease.

74. (1) The surrender of a lease for the purpose of enabling a new lease to the same lessee to be entered into shall not require the surrender of any sublease in respect of the surrendered lease, if, on or before the date on which the term of the new head lease is to expire,—

(a) the term of the sublease is to expire; or

(b) in the case of a sublease that is a periodic tenancy, the sublease may be terminated by the giving of the specified period of notice of termination and the expiry of that period.

(2) A sublease preserved under subsection (1)—

(a) shall continue in force as though it had been entered into in respect of the new head lease; and

(b) all rights and obligations under the sublease, including those which relate to any period before the surrender of the head lease, shall continue to be enforceable, except to the extent that any such obligation is, by reason of the fact that a new head lease has been entered into, more onerous than it would have been had the original head lease not been surrendered.

(3) A sublease entered into in respect of a surrendered lease includes, for purposes of this section, any sublease entered into by a person deriving title through the lessee under the surrendered lease.

Covenants implied in a lease on part of the lessor. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

75. (1) In every lease, there shall be implied covenants by the lessor with the lessee, binding the lessor—

(a) to, so long as the lessee pays the rent and observes and performs covenants and conditions contained or implied in the lease to be observed and performed on the lessee’s part, the lessee shall peaceably and quietly possess and enjoy the land leased during the term of the lease without any lawful interruption from or by the lessor or any person rightfully claiming through the lessor;

(b) not to use or permit any adjoining or neighbouring land that the lessor owns or leases that would in any way render the leased land or any buildings on the leased land unfit or materially less fit for any purpose for which they may be ‘ used, consistent with the terms and conditions of the lease,

(c) if only part of a building is leased, to keep the roof, all external and main walls and main drains, and the common parts and common installations and facilities, including common passages and walkways in a proper state of repair;

(d) if any dwelling house, flat, or room is leased, the house, flat or room is fit for human habitation at the commencement of the tenancy and shall be kept fit for human habitation during the lease;

(e) that if, the leased premises or any part of them are destroyed or damaged at any time –

(i) by fire, flood or explosion or other accident not attributable to the negligence of the lessee, or lessee’s invitees or employees;

(ii) by civil commotion; or

(iii) by lightning, storm, earthquake, volcanic activity or other natural disaster,

so as to make the leased premises or any part of it wholly or partially unfit for occupation or use, the rent and any contribution payable by the lessee to the outgoings on the premises or a just proportion of that rent of contribution according to the nature and extend of the damage sustained shall be suspended and cease to be payable until the leased premises have been, once more, rendered fit for occupation and use; and if the leased premises have not been rendered fit for occupation and use within six months after the destruction or damage, the lessee shall have the option to terminate the lease after giving one month’s notice to;

(f) if it is an express or implied term of the lease that the leased land or a building on it may be used for any one specific purpose or purposes, the lessee may terminate the lease, on giving one month’s notice to the lessor, if the land or building cannot be, or can no longer lawfully be, used for any of those purposes; and

(g) to pay all rates, taxes, dues and other outgoings that are payable in respect of the leased land except to the extent otherwise specified in the lease.

(2) There shall be implied in every lease covenants by the lessee empowering the lessor to –

(a) either personally or by agents, enter, the leased land or buildings at any reasonable time for the purpose of inspecting the condition and repair of the premises, or for carrying out repairs and making good any defects that it is the lessor’s obligation so to do; but in the exercise of that power, the lessor shall not unreasonably interfere with the occupation and use of the land and buildings by the lessee ;

(b) terminate the lease by serving a notice of intention to terminate the lease on the lessee

where— The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(i) any rent is unpaid for one month after the due date for payment, whether or not a demand, in writing, for payment has been made by the lessor or an agent of the lessor;

(ii) the lessee has failed for a period of one month, to observe or perform any condition, covenant or other term, the observation or performance of which has been assumed by the lessee expressly or impliedly in the lease.

Conditions implied on leases on part of the lessee.

76. (1) There shall be implied in every lease, other than a short term lease, covenants by the lessee with the lessor binding the lessee—

(a) to pay the rent reserved by the lease at the times and in the manner specified in the lease;

(b) to use any land in a sustainable manner and in accordance with any conditions imposed on the use of that land by the lease, or any written law or any provisions in a grant of a public land out of which that lease has been created and, in particular, not to cut down, injure or destroy any living tree on the land unless the purpose for which the land has been leased cannot be carried out without so doing;

(c) to yield up the land and buildings in the same condition as they were when the term of the lease began, except that the lessee shall not be bound to repair damage or restore the land and buildings to the same conditions they were at the beginning of the lease if the damage or deterioration of the condition is caused by-

(i) reasonable wear and tear;

(ii) fire, flood or explosion or other accident not attributable to the negligence of the lessee, or the lessee’s invitees or employees;

(iii) civil commotion;

(iv) lightning, storm, earthquake, volcanic activity or other natural disaster;

(d) to keep all boundary marks in repair; and

(e) to keep all buildings comprised in the lease in a reasonable state

Consent by lessor to application by lessee under lease.

77. (1 ) On and after the commencement of this Act, a covenant by the lessee not to take an action without the consent of the lessor shall be construed as requiring the lessor not unreasonably to withhold consent to the taking of that action by lessee.

(2) If a lessee applies to the lessor for consent to —

(a) transfer or assign the lease;

(b) enter into a sublease;

(c) part with possession of the leased land or buildings;

(d) change the use of the land or buildings from a use which is permitted under the lease;

(e) extend, improve, add on to or in any other way develop any building beyond what is permitted in the lease;

(f) create a charge over the lease; The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(g) take any of the actions referred to in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e); or

(h) in relation to any part of the leased land or buildings, or for any part of the term of the

lease,

the lessor shall inform the lessee, in writing, within a reasonable time after receiving the application, whether the lessor is giving or refusing consent.

(3) Without limiting the generality of the lessor’s obligation under subsection (1), consent is unreasonably withheld if the lessor as a condition of or in relation to the giving of consent—

(a) requires the lessee to pay any money, by way of additional rent, or a premium or a fine or other consideration for the consent, other than the payment of the lessor’s reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the giving of consent;

(b) imposes on the lessee any unreasonable condition or precondition; or

(c) the lessee has requested for consent to transfer or assign the lease or enter into a sublease, and the lessor objects to the gender or nationality or other personal characteristic of the transferee, assignee or sub-lessee, in circumstances that a reasonable person would consider those factors irrelevant to the granting of such consent.

(4) If the lessor who refuses consent or gives consent subject to a condition or pre-condition and the lessee so requests, in writing, the lessor shall promptly inform the lessee, in writing, of the reasons for the refusal or for the imposition of the condition or pre-condition, as the case maybe.

(5) If the lessee or any person, to whom this section applies at the request of the lessee, has paid any money or suffered any loss in connection with subsection (3), that person may recover that money and seek damages for that loss from the lessor.

(6) This section shall not prevent the inclusion, in a lease, of a covenant binding the lessee absolutely not to take any action of the kind referred to in subsection (2).

Merger of lessor’s interest not to affect remedies.

78. If a sublessor surrenders the head lease to or merges the head lease with the land out of which it was created, the owner of the land shall have all the same remedies against the sublessee for non-performance or non- observation of the covenants and conditions expressed or implied in the sublease and all the same rights to give notice of the termination of the sublessee to the subleases as the sublessor had before the surrendered or merged the head lease.

Transfer and Assignment of Leases

Burden and benefit of covenants to run with the reversion.

79. (1) If the interest held by the lessor under a lease, the reversion, ceases to be so held by the lessor, whether by transfer, assignment, grant, operation of law or otherwise, then, unless a contrary intention, expressly or impliedly, appears from the lease, or from any other circumstance—

(a) the obligations imposed on the lessor by covenant of the lease run with the reversion and may be enforced by the person who is from time to time entitled to the reversion;

(b) the rights to the benefits of every covenant imposed on the lessee, that refers to the subject matter of the lease, may be exercised and enforced by the person who is from time to time entitled to the reversion against the person who is from time to time entitled to the lease. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(2) A person who becomes entitled to exercise a right to which subsection (1) (b) refers may exercise the right even if it first became exercisable or accrued before the time at which that person became so entitled unless before that time, the right was waived or the lessee was released from the obligation to which the right relates.

(3) If, in respect of a lease—

(a) there has been a division of the reversion into different parts so that different persons are lessors of the different parts; or

(b) the lease has terminated in relation to the part of the land comprised in the lease,

the obligations referred to in subsection (1)(a) and the rights and remedies referred to in subsection (1)(b) shall be apportioned, and to the extent required by that apportionment, remain attached to each part of that reversion or to that part of the land in respect of which the lease has not been terminated as the case may require and may be enforced by the person entitled to enforce those obligations under subsection (1)(a) and exercised by the person entitled to exercise those rights and remedies under subsection (1)(b).

Effect of payment by lessee to assignor of reversion.

80. (1) If a lessor has transferred or assigned the reversion, any payment by the lessee of any part of the rent or of any other money due under the lease to the transferor or assignor shall discharge the lessee to the extent of that payment unless the lessee had actual notice of the transfer or assignment before making the payment.

(2) Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary in any other written law, the registration of a transfer of the reversion shall not, for purposes of subsection (1), in itself, be an actual notice to the lessee of the transfer.

Transferor of assignor of lease released from liability to pay rent and observe covenants thereafter.

81. (1) In respect of any lease or any transfer or assignment of a lease or part of it made or coming into effect on or after the date of the commencement of this Act,—

(a) the rule of the common law that a transferor or assignor of a lease remains liable on the personal covenant to the lessor for payment of rent and for all breaches of covenants, notwithstanding that the transferor or assignor is no longer in possession or occupation of the leased land, shall cease to apply; and

(b) the effect of a transfer or assignment of a lease is, as from that date, to discharge absolutely and without more the transferor or assignor from any obligation to pay rent or to observe any covenants in respect of the land as from the date of the transfer or assignment, whether the person to whom the lease has been transferred or assigned is in or goes immediately into occupation or possession of the Land so transferred or assigned.

(2) As long as the transferor or assignor remains in occupation of the leased land and notwithstanding the transfer or assignment, that transferor or assignor shall remain liable to pay rent and comply with all the covenants as if the person were still the lessee for as long as the person shall remain in occupation.

(3) Subsection (1) shall not absolve a transferor or assignor of a lease from any obligation to pay rent or remedy and breach of a covenant that accrued or arose during the term of the lease when that transferor or assignor was bound by all the covenants in that lease and the lessor may enforce all such obligations of that lease that have so accrued or arisen against that transferor or assignor notwithstanding that the lease has been transferred or assigned.

(4) As from the date of the commencement of this Act— The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(a) the rule of common law that a lessee remains liable to pay rent and comply with all the covenants notwithstanding that the lessee has, with the agreement of the lessor, vacated the

leased land before the date for the termination of the lease, is shall cease to apply; and

(b) subsection (5) shall forthwith apply.

(5) A lessee who, with the agreement of the lessor, vacates land before the termination of a lease shall remain liable to pay rent and observe all the covenants in the lease for one year from the date on which the lessee vacates the land or buildings, unless the lease provides expressly for a shorter period, and if the lessor leases that land or any buildings to another person before the end of one year, the provisions of subsection (1) shall apply, with effect from the date of the execution of that lease.

(6) Subsection (1) shall not absolve a lessee to whom subsection (5) applies, from any obligation to pay rent or remedy a breach of a covenant that accrued or arose during the term of the lease when that lessee was bound by all the covenants in that lease and the lessor may enforce all such obligations of that lease that have accrued or arisen against that lessee notwithstanding the fact that the lessee has vacated the land.

(7) The provisions of subsections (1) and (5) shall apply in a similar manner to the transfer, or assignment of a lease of a part of the leased land and to the vacating of a part of the leased land as they apply to the transfer of assignment of the lease of all the land and the vacating of all the land comprised in the lease.

(8) Any term expressed or implied in a lease or in a condition or covenant in a lease that is in conflict with this section shall be void.

Transferor or assignee as lessee

82. (1) A person who accepts a transfer or assignment of a lease shall become the lessee and shall not be required to—

(a) acknowledge the lessor as such;

(b) take possession of the land or building that is the subject of the lease.

(2) If there is a covenant in the lease that the lessee shall not, or shall not, without the consent of the lessor transfer or assign the lease, a transfer or assignment has effect whether or not the lessor has consented to that transfer or assignment and whether or not that transfer or assignment is in breach of the covenant but this subsection does not prevent the lessor from seeking any remedy for any such breach.

(3) A person to whom this section applies who becomes a lessee—

(a) shall pay the lessor the rent payable under the lease;

(b) shall observe and perform all the covenants on the part of the lessee expressed or implied in

the lease; and

(c) may enforce all covenants made by and binding on the lessor expressed or implied in the lease.

Remedies and Relief

Application of determination of lease by re-entry or forfeiture.

83. (1) The power of a lessor to determine a lease by reentry or forfeiture shall cease to apply The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(2) On and after the commencement of this Act, a lessor may terminate a lease for non-payment of rent or for breach of any covenant only in accordance with the provisions of this Sub-Part, notwithstanding any provision in any lease to the contrary.

(3) Any term expressed or implied in a lease or in any condition or covenant in a lease is invalid to the extent that it purports to avoid, or has the purpose or effect of avoiding the need to comply with any section in this Sub-Part.

Termination of lease for non-payment of rent or for breach of covenant.

84. (1) A lessor may exercise a right to terminate a lease for failure to pay rent due under the lease or for breach of any covenant or condition in the lease by applying for and acting in accordance with an , order of the court for possession of the land or buildings comprised in the lease.

(2) The Rules Committee may, provide for the procedures to be followed in applying for and the granting of an order for possession and such rules may provide for the granting of a summary order of possession where the court is satisfied that the lessee has no reasonable defence or excuse for the non-observance of any covenant or condition in the lease or for not complying with any notice from the lessor requiring the breach to be remedied.

Notice of intention to terminate a lease for breach of covenant.

85. (1) Where a lessee is in arrears of the rent and has been in arrears for at least thirty days, the lessor may serve on that lessee a notice of intention to terminate the lease.

(2) A notice served on a lessee under subsection (1) shall inform the recipient of—

(a) the nature and extent of the breach complained of;

(b) the amount that must be paid to remedy the breach;

(c) the period, being not less than thirty days, from the date of the service of the notice, within which the breach must be remedied;

(d) the consequence that if the breach is not remedied the lessor shall apply to the court for an order of termination; and

(e) the right of the lessee to apply to the court, for relief against the termination of the lease.

Notice of intention to terminate a lease for breach of covenant other than to pay rent.

86. (1) If a lessee is in breach of a covenant or condition in the lease, the lessor may serve a notice of intention to terminate the lease on that lessee.

(2) A notice served on a lessee under this section shall inform the recipient —

(a) of the nature and extent of the breach;

(b) whether, in the opinion of the lessor, that the breach is capable of being remedied-

(i) the action that the lessee must take or desist from taking to remedy the breach;

(ii) the amount (if any) of compensation that the lessee must pay to remedy the breach and to reimburse the lessor’s reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the breach; and

(iii) the reasonable time, being not less than thirty days, within which the lessee must take or desist from taking the action specified in subparagraph (i); The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(c) that as a consequence of not remedying the breach within the time specified in subparagraph (iii) or not paying compensation, the lessor will apply to the court for an order of termination; and

(d) the right of the lessee to apply to the court for relief against the order of termination.

Consequential provisions relating to notice under section 85 and 86.

87. (1) When a lessor serves a notice on a lessee under section 85 or 86, or as soon as practicable after doing so, the lessor shall serve a copy of that notice on—

(a) any sub-lessee;

(b) spouse of the lessee;

(c) charge of the lessee or of sub-lessees; and

(d) the trustee in bankruptcy of the lessee, if the lessee is bankrupt.

(2) The obligation of the lessor under subsection (1) only applies to the persons specified in subsection (1) whose, names and addresses the lessor has actual notice.

(3) The acceptance by the lessor of any rent after the service of notice under section 85 or 86 does not operate as a waiver of the lessor’s right to apply for an order of termination on the ground of breach of any covenant or condition in the lease, unless acceptance of the rent by the

lessor causes the lessee reasonably to believe that the lessor no longer intends to apply for that order.

(4) The Cabinet Secretary by regulation may, prescribe the form of the notices to be served under sections 85 and 86.

Application for relief.

88. (1) An application for relief may be made to the court in a proceeding brought by —

(a) the lessor for an order of termination of the lease; or

(b) any of the persons referred to in subsection (2) before the lessor commences a proceeding contemplated in paragraph (a).

(2) An application for relief against an order of termination of a lease may be made by-

(a) the lessee;

(b) one or more persons who are entitled to the lease as co-owners;

(c) a sub lessee;

(d) a chargee for the lessee of a sub lease;

(e) the trustee in bankruptcy of the lessee.

(3) If an application made in accordance with subsection (1) (b) is not made by all the co-owners, it shall unless the court orders otherwise, be served on all the co-owners.

(4) Any person with an interest in the leased land or buildings that are the subject of an application by the lessor for an order of termination who on reasonable grounds, claims to The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

have been prejudiced by not being served with a notice to which section 85 and 86 may apply to the court for an extension of time within which to make an application for relief and the court may grant that person an extension of the time on any conditions that it considers fit.

(5) An application for relief shall not to be deemed as an admission by the lessee or any other person applying for relief that—

(a) there has been a breach of a covenant or condition of the lease by the lessee;

(b) the lessor has the right to terminate the lease by reason of such a breach;

(c) all notices that were required to be served by the lessor were properly served; or

(d) the period for remedying the breach specified in the notice served under section 86 was reasonable or had expired.

(6) The court may grant relief without determining all or any of the matters specified under subsection (5).

Power of the court with respect to the order of termination or relief.

89. (1) In considering whether to grant an order of termination or to grant relief against an order of termination, the court shall have regard to the following matters—

(a) in respect of lease of a dwelling house, the matters contained in section 14 of the Rent Restriction Act, Cap 296 applicable to dwelling houses;

(b) the gravity of the breach and in particular whether as a result of the breach any law has not been complied with;

(c) the reasonableness of the action required to be taken or desisted from by the lessee to remedy the breach and the time within which it has to be taken or desisted from as specified in the notice served by the lessor under this Act, and in particular with respect to the lease of any building, the age, condition and location of building;

(d) the reasonableness of the amount of compensation required to be paid and the manner of its payment by the lessee as specified in the notice served by the lessor under section 86;

(e) whether the lessor breached any covenants or conditions that obligate the lessor, under the lease and the extent to which those breaches have contributed to any breaches by the lessee;

(f) the degree of forbearance shown by the lessor in respect of other breaches of covenants and conditions by the lessee;

(g) the age, means and circumstances of the lessor;

(h) the age, means, and circumstances including the health and number of dependants of the lessee, and in particular whether-

(i) the lessee will be rendered landless or homeless by the grant of an order;

(ii) the lessee will have any alternative means of providing for self and dependants;

(iii) a spouse of the lessee will or is likely to suffer undue hardship if an order were made;

(i) whether there is any alternative remedy which can be applied in the circumstances;

(j) the interests of all other who are participating in the application for relief; The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(k) any other matter which the court considers appropriate and reasonable in all the circumstances

(2) A court may grant any relief against the operation of an order that the circumstances of the case require and without limiting the generality of that power, may—

(a) cancel, vary or postpone the order;

(b) extend the period of time for compliance by the lessee with a notice served under section

85;

(c) vary the amount of compensation required to be paid by the lessee by a notice served under

section 85;

(d) substitute a different remedy for the one specified by the lessor or a different time for taking or desisting from taking an action specified by the lessor in a notice served under section 86;

(e) provide that any arrears of rent or other payments due under the lease be paid in

such installments and at times determined by the court;

(f) require the lessor or the lessee to remedy any breaches of any covenants or conditions that

either or both of them are under an obligation to comply with;

(g) order the lessor to enter into a lease with-

(i) a chargee or the lessee; or

(ii) a sub-lessee; for a period, not being longer than the period of the lease which is to be terminated, and on any terms and conditions which the court thinks fit;

(h) confirm the notice notwithstanding that some procedural errors took place during the making of that notice if the court is satisfied that-

(i) the lessee or other person applying for relief was made fully aware of the substance of the notice; and

(ii) no substantial injustice will be done by confirming that notice, and may grant that relief of any conditions as to expenses, damages, compensation or any other relevant matter which the court thinks fit.

(3) A court may grant relief against an order for termination notwithstanding that the lessee has

breached an essential term of the lease and the breach is not capable of being remedied.

Remedies of lessor and lessee for breach of covenant.

90. (1) If a lessee is in breach of a covenant or condition of a lease, the lessor, instead of serving a notice of intention to terminate, may commence an action against the lessee—

(a) for damages;

(b) for a decree of specific performance;

(c) for an injunction; or

(d) to recover as a debt any arrears of rent, The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

but no action commenced before the service of a notice of intention to terminate shall be proceeded with or judgment given in respect of it until after the conclusion of any proceedings commenced in connection with an order of termination arising from the same breaches, including any appeal against any decision given in connection with that order of termination.

(2) If a lessor is in breach of a covenant or condition in a lease, the lessee may—

(a) commence an action against the lessor—

(i) for damages;

(ii) for a decree for specific performance;

or

(iii) for an injunction; or

(b) if the lessor has failed to comply with the covenants contained section 75 (1) (c) or

(d)-

(i) serve a notice on the lessor to undertake required repairs and maintenance within thirty days, failing which the lessee will undertake the repairs and maintenance;

(ii) if the lessor does not commence the repairs and maintenance as specified in the notice and does not seek an extension of time within which to undertake the repairs and maintenance specified in the notice referred to in subparagraph (i) in as economical and efficient a way as possible; and

(iii) set off the cost of that work against the rent due under the lease; or

(c) deduct from any rent due under the lease any sums that the lessor has required the lessee to pay as a condition either of obtaining the lease or of continuing as the lessee, contrary to the covenants and conditions in the lease or contrary to any written law; or

(d) repudiate the lease and cease to pay any rent under it on the grounds that the lessor’s conduct shows an intention to comply with the lease, and may pursue any two or more of these actions together as the case may require.

(3) Where the lessee commences an action for damages, the court may award damages for the inconvenience suffered by the lessee and any dependants living with the lessee for the lessor’s failure to comply within the covenants and conditions under the lease and in addition may award an element of damages to the lessee by way of a penalty on the lessor.

Unlawful eviction.

91. (1) A lessee who is evicted from the whole or a part of the leased land or buildings, contrary to the express or implied terms and conditions of a lease, shall be immediately relieved of all obligation to pay any rent or other monies due under the lease or perform any of the covenants and conditions on the part of the lessee expressed or implied in the lease in respect of the land or buildings or part thereof from which the lessee has been so evicted.

(2) For purposes of this section, a lessee shall be considered as having been evicted from the whole or part of the leased land or buildings, if, on the commencement of the lease, the lessee is unable to obtain possession of the land or buildings or part thereof, as a result of any action or non-action of the lessor or any of the lessor’s agents or employees, contrary to the express or implied terms of the lease.

Charges

General Provisions The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

Application of Part to charges.

92. (1) This Part applies to all charges on land including any charge made before the coming into effect of this Act and in effect at that time, any other charges of land which are specifically referred to in any section in this Part.

(2) References in this Part to “the charged land” shall be taken to mean and include a charged land, a charged lease and sublease and a second or subsequent charge.

Power to create charge.

93. (1) An owner of private land or a lessee, by an instrument in the prescribed form, may charge the interest in the land or a part thereof for any purpose including but not limited to securing the payment of an existing or a future or a contingent debt or other money or money’s worth or the fulfillment of a condition.

(2) The power conferred by subsection (1) shall include the power to create second and subsequent charges.

(3) A charge of a matrimonial home, shall be valid only if any document or form used in applying for such a charge, or used to grant the charge, is signed by the chargor and any spouse of the chargor living in that matrimonial home, or there is evidence from the document that it has been assented to by all such persons.

(4) The power conferred by this section shall be exercisable subject to—

(a) any prohibition or limitation imposed by this Act or any written law; and

(b) any restriction contained in an instrument creating or affecting the interest in land that is to be the subject of a charge.

(5) A charge shall take effect only when it is registered in a prescribed register and a chargee shall not be entitled to exercise any of the remedies under that charge unless it is so registered.

(6) Nothing in this section shall operate to prevent a chargor from offering or accepting—

(a) a written and witnessed undertaking, the clear intention of which is to charge the chargor’s land with the repayment of money or money’s worth obtained from the chargee; or

(b) a deposit of any of the following—

(i) a certificate of title to private land;

(ii) a certificate of a customary land;

(iii) a document of a lease;

(iv) other document which may be agreed upon to evidence a right to an interest in land, or to secure any payments which are referred to in subsection (1).

(7) An arrangement contemplated in subsection (6) (a) may be referred to as an “informal charge” and a deposit of documents contemplated in subsection (6) (b) shall be known and referred to as a “lien by deposit of documents.”

(8) A chargee shall not posessor sell land whose title document have been deposited with the chargor under an informal charge without the order of the Court.

Charge of land to take effect as security only. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

94. (1) Upon the commencement of this Act, a charge shall have effect as a security only and shall not operate as a transfer of any interests or rights in the land from the chargor to the chargee but the chargee shall have, subject to the provisions of this Part, all the powers and remedies in case of default by the chargor and be subject to all the obligations that would be conferred or implied in a transfer of an interest in land subject to redemption.

(2) In the case of the charge of a lease, the chargee shall not be liable to the lessor for rent or in respect of the covenants and conditions contained or implied in the lease to any greater extent than would have been the case if the charge had been by way of a sublease.

(3) Every charge instrument shall contain—

(a) the terms and conditions of sale;

(b) an explanation of the consequences of default; and

(c) the reliefs that the charge is entitled to including the right of sale.

Priority.

95. (1) Charges shall rank according to the order in which they are registered.

(2) Informal charges shall rank according to the order in which they are made provided that a registered informal charge shall take priority over any unregistered informal charge.

(3) If two informal charges are made on the same day or are registered on the same day, the charge which was first in time to be made or registered shall have priority.

(4) If a chargor, subsequent in time to a prior chargor under a charge, lends money or money’s worth on the security of a charge to a chargor as a consequence of or through the fraud, dishonesty or misrepresentation of the prior chargee, either in conjunction with or separately from the fraud, dishonesty or misrepresentation of the chargor, that prior chargee’s right to repayment under the charge shall be postponed to the rights of the subsequent chargor.

(5) The rules of priority for informal charges shall apply as far as the circumstances shall permit liens by deposit of documents.

Tacking.

96. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a chargor may make provision in the charge instrument to give further advances or credit to the chargor on a current or continuing account.

(2) A further advance referred to in subsection (1) shall not rank in priority to any subsequent charge unless—

(a) the provision for further advances is noted in the register in which the charge is registered; or

(b) the subsequent chargor has consented in writing to the priority of the further advance.

(3) Except as provided for in this section there is no right to tack.

(4) Where a charge provides for the payment for a principal sum by way of installments, the payment of those installments shall not be taken to be a further advance.

Consolidation. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

97. (1) Unless there is an express provision to the contrary clearly set out in the charge instrument, a chargor who has more than one charge with a single chargee on several securities may discharge any of the charges without having to redeem all charges.

(2) A chargee who has made provision in accordance with subsection (1) for the consolidation of charges shall record that right in the register or registers against all the charges so consolidated that are registered.

(3) Upon commencement of this Act, the rules of equity applicable to consolidation shall not apply to charges.

Variation of interest rate.

98. (1) Where it was contractually agreed upon that the rate of interest is variable, the rate of interest payable under a charge may be reduced or increased by a written notice served on the chargor by the chargee, —

(a) giving the chargor at least thirty days notice of the reduction or increase in the rate of interest; and

(b) stating clearly and in a manner that can be readily understood, the new rate of interest to be paid in respect of the charge.

(2) The amount secured by a charge may be reduced or increased by a memorandum which shall—

(a) comply with subsection (5); and

(b) be signed—

(i) in the case of a memorandum of reduction by the chargee; or

(ii) chargor; and

(c) state that the principal funds intended to be secured by the charge are reduced or increased as the case may be, to the amount or in the manner specified in the memorandum.

(3) The term of a charge may be reduced, extended or renewed by a memorandum which—

(a) complies with subsection (5);

(b) is signed by the chargor and the chargee; and

(c) states that the term of the charge has been reduced, extended or renewed, as the case may be, to the date or in the manner specified in the memorandum.

(4) The covenants, conditions and powers expressed or implied in a charge are varied in the manner specified in the memorandum.

(5) A memorandum for the purposes of subsections (2), (3) and (4) shall—

(a) be endorsed on or annexed to the charge instrument; and

(b) upon endorsement or being annexed to the charge instrument, vary the charge in accordance with the terms of the memorandum. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

Right to discharge.

99. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the chargor shall, upon payment of all money secured by a charge and the performance of all other conditions and obligations under the charge, be entitled to discharge the charge at any time before the charged land has been sold by the chargee or a receiver under the power of sale.

(2) Any agreement or provision in a charge instrument that is inconsistent with subsection (1) shall be void to the extent that it—

(a) purports to deprive the chargor of the right to discharge;

(b) seeks to fetter the exercise for this right; or

(c) stipulates for a collateral advantage that is unfair and unconscionable or inconsistent with the right to discharge.

(3) A chargee may provide, in a charge instrument, that a chargor who wishes to exercise the right to discharge the charge at any time before the expiry of the term of the charge—

(a) shall give one month’s notice of the intention to discharge; or

(b) shall pay not more than one month’s interest at the rate at which interest is payable on the principal sum secured by the charge or at any lesser rate which may be agreed, as well as paying all other money secured by the charge.

(4) A discharge of the whole or a part of a charge shall be as prescribed under this Act or any other law.

(5) For the avoidance of doubt, a discharge includes a re-conveyance and a re-assignment of charge or any other instrument used in extinguishing of interests in land conferred by charges.

Transfer of charge.

100. (1) A chargor or any person referred to in subsection (2) may, at any time, other than a time when the chargee is in possession of the charged land, in writing, request the chargee to transfer the charge to a person named in the request.

(2) Subject to the consent of the chargor which shall not be unreasonably withheld, the other persons who may make a written request under subsection (1) are—

(a) any person who has an interest in the land, lease or land, that is the subject of the charge;

(b) any surety for the payment of the amount secured by the charge; and

(c) any creditor of the chargor who has obtained a decree for sale of the land, lease or charge, that is the subject of the charge.

(3) The charge shall, on receiving a written request made under subsection (1) and on payment by the person or persons making the request of all money that would have been payable if discharge of the charge had been made under section 116, and the performance of all other obligations secured by the charge, transfer the charge to the person named in the written request.

Chargee’s consent to transfer.

101. If a charge contains a condition, express or implied that chargor prohibits the The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

chargors from, transferring, assigning, leasing, or in the case of a lease, subleasing the land, without the consent of the chargee, no transfer, assignment, lease or sublease shall be registered until the written consent of the chargee has been produced to the Registrar.

Covenants, Conditions and Powers Implied in Charges

Implied covenant by the chargor.

102. (1) There shall be implied in every charge covenants by the chargor with the chargee binding the chargor—

(a) to pay the principal money on the day appointed in the charge agreement, and, so long as any of the principal money or any part thereof remains unpaid, to pay interest on the money thereon or on so much of the money that for the time being remains unpaid at the rate and on the days and in the manner specified in charge agreement;

(b) to pay all rates, charges, rent, taxes and other outgoings that are at all times payable in respect of the charged land;

(c) to repair and keep in repair all buildings and other improvements upon the charged land or to permit the chargee or chargee’s agent to enter the land and examine the state and condition of such buildings and improvements at after a seven days notice to the chargor until the charge is discharged;

(d) to ensure by insurance or any other means that may be prescribed or which are appropriate, that resources will be available to make good any loss or damage caused by fire to any building on the land, and where insurance is taken out, it is done so in the joint names of the chargor and chargee with insurers approved by the chargee and to the full value of all the buildings;

(e) in the case of a charge of land used for agricultural purposes, to use the land in a sustainable manner in accordance with the principles any conditions subject to which the land or lease under which the land is held, and in to compliance with all written laws and lawful orders applicable to that use of the land;

(f) not to lease or sublease the charged land or any part of it for any period longer than a year without the previous consent in writing of the chargee, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld;

(g) not to transfer or assign the land or lease or part of it without the previous consent in writing of the chargee which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld;

(h) in the case of a charge of a lease, during the continuance of the charge, to pay, perform and observe the rent, covenants and conditions contained in or implied by and in the lease contained and implied and on the part of the lessee to be paid, performed and observed and to keep the chargee indemnified again stall proceedings, expenses and claims on account of non-payment any part of the rent or part of it or the breach or non-observance of any covenants and conditions referred to above, and, if the lessee has an enforceable right to renew the lease, to renew it;

(i) if the charge is a second or subsequent charge, that the chargor will pay the interest from time to time accruing on each prior charge when it becomes due and will at the proper time repay the principal money or part of it due on each prior charge at the proper time;

(j) if the chargor fails to comply with any of the covenants implied by paragraphs (b), (c), (d), (e) and (h) of this subsection, that the chargee may spend any money which is reasonably necessary to remedy the breach and may add the amount so spent to The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

the principal money and that amount shall be deemed for all purposes to be a part of the principal money secured by the charge.

(2) Reference to the obligation of the chargor in subsection (1) (b) to keep all buildings upon the charged land in repair shall be taken to be an obligation to keep such buildings in a reasonable state of repair as set out in section 75.

(3) The provisions of section 76 shall apply to an application by a chargor to a chargee for consent under paragraphs (f) and (g) of subsection (1).

Equity redemption.

103. (1) Any rule of law, written or unwritten, entitling a chargee (chargee) to foreclose the equity of redemption in charged land is prohibited.

(2) Upon commencement of this Act, a chargee shall not be entitled to enter into possession of the charged land or a charged lease or to receive the rents and profits of that land or lease by reason only that default has been made in the payment of the principal sum or of any interest or other periodic payment or of any part thereof or in the performance or observance of any agreement expressed or implied in the charge, other than in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Remedies of a chargee.

104. (1) If a chargor is in default of any obligation, fails to pay interest or any other periodic payment or any part thereof due under any charge or in the performance or observation of any covenant, express or implied in any charge, and continues to be in default for one month, the chargee may serve on the chargor a notice, in writing, to pay the money owing or to perform and observe the agreement as the case may be.

(2) The notice required by subsection (1) shall adequately inform the recipient of the following matters—

(a) the nature and extent of the default by the chargor;

(b) if the default consists of the non-payment of any money due under the charge, the amount that must be paid to rectify the default and the time, being not less than three months, by the end of which the payment in default must have been completed;

(c) if the default consists of the failure to perform or observe any covenant, express or implied, in the charge, the thing the chargor must do or desist from doing so as to rectify the default and the time, being not less than two months, by the end of which the default must have been rectified;

(d) the consequence that if the default is not rectified within the time specified in the notice, the chargee will proceed to exercise any of the remedies referred to in this section in accordance with the procedures provided for in this sub-part; and

(e) the right of the chargor in respect of certain remedies to apply to the court for relief against those remedies.

(3) If the chargor does not comply within two months after the date of service of the notice under, subsection (1), the chargee may—

(a) sue the chargor for any money due and owing under the charge;

(b) appoint a receiver of the income of the charged land;

(c) lease the charged land, or if the charge is of a lease, sublease the land; The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(d) enter into possession of the charged land; or

(e) sell the charged land;

(4) If the charge is a charge of land held for customary land, or community land shall be valid only if the charge is done with concurrence of members of the family or community the chargee may—

(a) appoint a receiver of the income of the charged land;

(b) apply to the court for an order to—

(i) lease the charged land or if the charge is of a lease, sublease the land or enter into possession of the charged land;

(ii) sell the charged land to any person or group of persons referred to in the law relating to community land.

(5) The Cabinet Secretary, in consultation with the Commission shall prescribe the form and content of a notice to be served under this section.

Chargee’s action for money secured by charge.

105. (1) The chargee may sue for the money secured by the charge only if—

(a) the chargor is personally bound to repay the money;

(b) by any cause other than the wrongful act of the chargor or chargee, the security is rendered insufficient and the chargee has given the chargor a reasonable opportunity to provide additional sufficient security and the chargor has failed to provide that additional security; or

(c) the chargee is deprived of the whole or part of the security through or in consequence of, a wrongful act or default of the chargor.

(2) No action shall be commenced until the time specified for complying with a notice served under section 87 has expired.

(3) The court may order the postponement of any proceedings brought under this section until the chargee has exhausted all other remedies relating to the charged land, unless the chargee agrees to discharge the charge.

Appointment, powers, remuneration and duties’ of the receiver.

106. (1) It shall be an implied condition in every charge that the chargee shall have the power to appoint a receiver of the income of the charged land.

(2) Before appointing a receiver under this section, the chargee shall serve a notice in the prescribed form on the chargor and shall not proceed with the appointment until a period of thirty days, from the date of the service of that notice, has elapsed.

(3) A chargee shall appoint a receiver, in writing, and the chargee shall sign the instrument of appointment.

(4) A receiver may, at any time, be removed and a new receiver appointed, in writing, by the chargee.

(5) A receiver appointed under this section shall be deemed to be the agent of the chargor for the purposes for which the receiver is appointed, and the chargor shall, unless the The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

charge instrument provides otherwise, be solely responsible for the acts and defaults of the receiver.

(6) If a court approves the appointment of a receiver under a small charge, it may order that the chargee be jointly responsible with the chargor for the acts and defaults of the receiver.

(7) The receiver shall have the power to demand and recover all the income of which the receiver is appointed, by action or otherwise, in the name of the chargor, and to give effectual receipts for the same.

(8) The receiver shall be entitled to retain, out of any money received, all costs, charges and expenses incurred by receiver and, for a commission at the rate specified in the appointment, but not exceeding five per centum of the gross amount of all money, received, or, if no rate is so specified at the rate of five per centum or any other rate as the chargor and chargee may agree or if the appointment of a receiver comes before the court, which the court considers fit.

(9) The receiver shall apply all money received in the following order of priority—

(a) first, in the payment of all rents, rates, charges, taxes and other outgoings required to be paid in respect of the charged property;

(b) second, in keeping down all annual sums or other payments, and the interest on all principal sums, having priority to the charge of which the receiver is appointed;

(c) third, in payment of the receivers commission and expenses;

(d) fourth, in payment of all reasonable expenses incurred in the doing of anything that a receiver is required or entitled to do in respect of the charged land, including but not limited to—

(i) the payment of any premiums on any insurance policy properly payable under the charge instrument; and

(ii) the costs of undertaking necessary and proper repairs to any buildings comprised in the charged land as directed in writing by the chargee;

(e) fifth, in the repayment of any money paid or advanced by the chargee to meet the reasonable expenses referred to in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) together with any interest on any amount so paid or advanced at the rate at which interest is payable on the principal sum secured by the charge;

(f) sixth, in payment of the interest accruing due in respect of any principal sum secured by the charge;

(g) seventh, in and towards the discharge of the principal sum secured by the charge, and shall pay the residue, if any, to the chargor or other person entitled to the charged land.

Chargee’s power of leasing.

107. (1) Unless the charge instrument expressly provides to the contrary, a chargee who has appointed a receiver under section 106, shall, unless the charge instrument expressly provides to the contrary, have power, subject to the provisions of this Act and any other laws applicable to the leases of land—

(a) to grant leases in respect of the charged land or any part thereof; and The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(b) to accept a surrender of any lease so granted and of any lease granted by the chargor,

and, for that purpose may, execute, in place of the chargor any instrument required to execute that lease or surrender in place of the chargor.

(2) Before granting a lease under this section, a chargee shall serve a notice on the chargor in the prescribed form and shall not proceed with the granting or execution of that lease until thirty days have elapsed from the service of that notice.

(3) Every lease granted by the chargee shall—

(a) be made to take effect in possession not later than six months after its date;

(b) reserve the best rent that can reasonably be obtained in the circumstances;

(c) be for a term not exceeding fifteen years or the length of the term of the charge whichever is the shorter subject to the provisions of subsection (5) (a);

(d) contain any reasonable terms and conditions, having regard to the interests of the chargor and of any other persons having an interest in the charged land; and

(e) contain a declaration that the chargee has appointed a receiver, with the date of the appointment.

(4) A lease created by a chargee under this section shall not be binding on any person holding, and shall not take priority over, any charge that has priority to the charge of the chargee who has granted the lease.

(5) If money has been advanced on the security of a customary charge, a lease created out of that charged land shall—

(a) be for a term not exceeding two years; and

(b) in the case of—

(i) land used for agricultural purposes, ensure that the chargor is left in possession of sufficient land and buildings to provide for to the chargor and dependants;

(ii) a dwelling house, ensure that the chargor is left sufficient space in that dwelling house or is provided with alternative accommodation to enable the chargor to provide basic shelter for the chargor and dependants living with the chargor.

Power of the chargee to take possession of the charged land.

108. (1) Upon expiry of the period specified in the section 104 (2) (b) and (c), a chargee may serve on the chargor a notice of intention to enter, in the prescribed form, notifying the chargor that the chargee intends enter into possession of the whole or a part of the charged land at a date that is at least one month from the date of the service of the notice.

(2) A chargee may exercise the power of entry peaceably and any forcible entry—

(a) entering into and taking physical possession of the land or a part of it peaceably and without committing any forcible entry; or

(b) asserting management or control over the land by serving a notice in the prescribed form requiring any lessee of the chargor or any other owner of the land to pay to the chargee any rent or profits that would otherwise be payable to the chargor.

(3) The chargee shall be regarded as being in possession on the date— The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(a) on which the chargee enters into possession in accordance with of subsection (2) (a); or

(b) on which the chargee first receives any rent or profit from the land.

(4) A chargee who has entered into possession may remain in possession.

(5) A chargee in possession shall be bound by all those covenants set out in of section 102 (1) (a) to (e), (h), (i) and (j) as if that chargee were the chargor referred to in that subsection.

(6) A chargee in possession of any charged land—

(a) by occupation, shall be entitled to manage the land and take all its profits, but shall be liable to the chargor for any act by which the value of the land, or any buildings on, or other permanent improvements to the land are impaired or the chargor otherwise suffers loss;

(b) whether by occupation or by receipt of rents and profits shall be accountable to the chargor not only for the sums actually received, but also for any additional sums that the chargee might reasonably have been expected to receive by the careful and business like exercise of the chargee’s powers;

(c) may renew a lease granted by the chargor on the same terms as the original lease but may not otherwise grant any lease out of the charged land.

(7) A chargee in possession shall apply all money to the same payments and in the same order as apply to a receiver as set out in section 106 (9), except that a chargee in possession shall not be entitled to receive any payments under paragraph (c) of that subsection.

(8) Any person on whom a notice under subsections (1) or (2) has been served shall forthwith comply and continue to comply with that notice until either—

(a) a notice of withdrawal in the prescribed form is served on that person by the chargee in possession; or

(b) the chargee in possession withdraws from that possession; or

(c) a court orders the chargee in possession to withdraw from possession.

Withdrawal of lender from possession.

109. (1) A chargee may, not sooner than one month after the service of a notice of withdrawal, serve in the prescribed form on the chargor and on all persons served with a notice under section 108 (1) and (2), withdraw from possession of the charged land.

(2) A chargee shall withdraw from possession of the charged land if—

(a) a court makes an order directing the chargee to withdraw;

(b) the chargee appoints a receiver under section 104 (3);

(c) the default which was the cause of the entry into possession has been rectified through the possession of the chargee;

(d) the chargee has exercised the power of sale under section 110; or

(e) the chargor has discharged all liabilities under the charge. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(3) A chargee in possession shall be taken to have withdrawn from possession of all or a part of the charged land in any case provided for—

(a) by subsection (2) (a), when the order of the court is made;

(b) by subsection (2) (b), when the receiver has been appointed in accordance with section 104;

(c) by (2) (c), when the chargee has either—

(i) ceased to occupy the charged land; or

(ii) is not in occupation, served a notice of withdraw on all persons served with a notice under section 110 (1) and (2) or section 111.

(d) by subsection (2) (d), when the purchaser of the charged land enters into occupation of that land;

(e) by subsection (2) (e), when the chargor serves notice of cancellation of possession in the prescribed form.

(4) A chargee who has withdrawn from possession of charged land may not again enter into possession of that land, otherwise than by complying with the provisions of sections 116 and 118 if the chargor is in a fresh default under the charge.

Chargee’s power of sale.

110. (1) Where a chargor is in default of the obligations under a charge and remains in default at the expiry of the time provided for the rectification of that default in the notice served on the chargor under section 104 (1), a chargee may exercise the power to sell the charged land.

(2) Before exercising the power to sell the charged land, the chargee shall serve on the chargor a notice to sell in the prescribed form and shall not proceed to complete any contract for the sale of the charged land until at least forty days have elapsed from the date of the service of that notice to sell.

(3) A copy of the notice to sell served in accordance with subsection (2) shall be served on—

(a) the Commission, if the charged land is public land;

(b) the holder of the land out which the lease has been granted, if the charged land is a lease;

(c) a spouse of the chargor who had given the consent;

(d) any lessee and sublessee of the charged land or of any buildings on the charged land;

(e) any person who is a co-owner with the chargor;

(f) any other chargee of money secured by a charge on the charged land of whom the chargee proposing to exercise the power of sale has actual notice;

(g) any guarantor of the money advanced under the charge;

(h) any other person known to have a right to enter on and use the land or the natural resources in, on, or under the charged land by affixing a notice at the property; and The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(i) any other persons as may be prescribed by regulations, and shall be posted in a prominent place at or as near as may be to the charged land.

Duty of lender exercising power of sale.

111. (1) A chargee who exercises a power to sell the charged land, including the exercise of the power to sell in pursuance of an order of a court, owes a duty of care to the chargor, any guarantor of the whole or any part of the sums advanced to the chargor, any chargee under a subsequent charge or under a lien to obtain the best price reasonably obtainable at the time of sale.

(2) A chargee shall, before exercising the right of sale, ensure that a forced sale valuation is undertaken by a valuer.

(3) If the price at which the charged land is sold is twenty-five per centum or below the market value at which comparable interests in land of the same character and quality are being sold in the open market—

(a) there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the chargee is in breach of the duty imposed by subsection (1); and

(b) the chargor whose charged land is being sold for that price may apply to a court for an order that the sale be declared void, but the fact that a plot of charged land is sold by the chargee at an undervalue being less than twenty-five per centum below the market value shall not be taken to mean that the chargee has complied with the duty imposed by subsection (1).

(4) It shall not be a defence to a proceeding against a chargee for breach of the duty imposed by subsection (1) that the chargee was acting as agent of or under a power of attorney from the chargor or any former chargor.

(5) A chargee shall not be entitled to any compensation or indemnity from the chargor, any former chargor or any guarantor in respect of any liability arising from a breach of the duty imposed by subsection (1).

(6) The sale by a prescribed chargee of any community land occupied by a person shall conform to the law relating to community land save that such a sale shall not require any approval from a Community Land Committee.

(7) Any attempt by a chargee to exclude all or any of the provisions of this section in any charge instrument or any agreement collateral to a charge or in any other way shall be void.

Powers incidental to the power of sale.

112. (1) If a chargee or a receiver becomes entitled to exercise the power of sale, that sale may be—

(a) of the whole part of the charged land;

(b) subject to or free of any charge or other encumbrance charge having priority to the chargee’s charge;

(c) by way of subdivision or otherwise;

(d) by private contract at market value;

(e) public auction with reserve price;

(f) for a purchase price payable in one sum or by installments; or The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(g) subject to any other conditions that the chargee shall think fit, having due regard to the duty imposed by section 111 (1).

(2) If a sale is to proceed by public auction, it shall be the duty of the chargee to ensure that the sale is publicly advertised in such a manner and form as to bring it to the attention of persons likely to be interested in bidding for the charged land and that the provisions relating to auctions and tenders for land are, as near as may be, followed in respect of that sale.

(3) A sale of the charged land by a chargee in exercise of the power of sale shall be made in the prescribed form and the Registrar shall accept it as sufficient evidence that the power has been duly exercised.

(4) Upon registration of the land or lease or other interest in land sold and transferred by the chargee the interest of the chargor as described therein shall pass to and vest in the purchaser free of all liability on account of the charge, or on account of any other charge or encumbrance to which the charge has priority, other than a lease easement to which the chargee had consented in writing.

Protection of purchaser.

113. (1) This section applies to—

(a) a person who purchases charged land from the chargee or receiver, except where the chargee is the purchaser; or

(b) a person claiming the charged land through the person who purchases charged land from the chargee or receiver, including a person claiming through the chargee if the chargee and the person so claiming obtained the charged land in good faith and for value.

(2) A person to whom this section applies—

(a) is not answerable for the loss, misapplication or non-application of the purchase money paid for the charged land;

(b) is not obliged to see to the application of the purchase price;

(c) is not obliged to inquire whether there has been a default by the chargor or whether any notice required to be given in connection with the exercise of the power of sale has been duly given or whether the sale is otherwise necessary, proper or regular.

(3) A person to whom this section applies is protected even if at any time before the completion of the sale, the person has actual notice that there has not been a default by the chargor, or that a notice has not been duly served or that the sale is in some way, unnecessary, improper or irregular, except in the case of fraud, misrepresentation or other dishonest conduct on the part of the chargee, of which that person has actual or constructive notice.

(4) A person prejudiced by an unauthorised, improper or irregular exercise of the power of sale shall have a remedy in damages against the person exercising that power.

Purchase by lender.

114. (1) Other than in the circumstances provided to in subsection (3), a chargee exercising the power of sale may, with leave of the Court, purchase the property.

(2) A court shall not grant leave unless the chargee satisfies the court that a sale of the charged land to the chargee is the most advantageous way of selling the land so as to comply with the duty imposed on the chargee by section 111 (1). The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(3) If the charged land is to be sold by public auction, the chargee may bid for and purchase the charged land at that public auction so long as the price bid for the charged land by the chargee is the greater of—

(a) the highest price bid for that land at the auction; and

(b) an amount equal to or higher than the reserve price, if any, put upon the land before the auction, whichever amount is the greater.

(4) If a chargee who has sold charged land to the chargee applies to the Registrar to be registered as the lawful owner of land under a land or lease, the Registrar may require that chargee to provide any evidence that the Registrar may specify showing that the provisions of this section have been complied with and the Registrar shall not be obliged to register any such land or lease until the chargee has so satisfied the Registrar.

Application of proceeds of sale of charged land.

115. The purchase money received by a chargee who has exercised the power of sale shall be applied in the following order of priority—

(a) first, in payment of any rates, rents, taxes, charges or other sums owing and required to be paid on the charged land;

(b) second, in discharge of any prior charge or other encumbrance subject to which the sale was made;

(c) third, in payment of all costs and reasonable expenses properly incurred and incidental to the sale or any attempted sale;

(d) fourth, in discharge of the sum advanced under the charge or so much of it as remains outstanding, interests, costs and all other money due under the charge, including any money advanced to a receiver in respect of the charged land under section 106; and

(e) fifth, in payment of any subsequent charges in order of their priority, and the residue, if any, of the money so received shall be paid to the person who, immediately before the sale, was entitled to discharge the charge.

Right of chargor to discharge charge on payment of any sum due any time before sale.

116. (1) At any time before the charged land is sold, or withdrawn from sale, the chargor or any other person entitled to discharge the charge may discharge the charge in whole or in part by paying to the chargee all money secured by the charge at the time of payment.

(2) If payment is made under subsection (1), the chargee shall deliver to the chargor—

(a) a discharge of the charge in the prescribed form over the whole or that part of the charged land to which the payment relates; and

(b) all instruments and documents of title held by the chargee in connection with the charged land.

Application for relief by chargor.

117. (1) An application for relief against the exercise by the chargee of any of the remedies referred to in section 99 (2) (a) and (b) may be made by— The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(a) the chargor;

(b) if two or more persons are joint chargors, by one or more of them on their own behalf;

(c) a spouse of the chargor;

(d) a lessee of the chargor; or

(e) the trustee in bankruptcy of the chargor.

(2) If an application made in accordance subsection (1) (b) is not made by all the joint chargors, then, unless the court orders otherwise, it must be served on all the joint chargors.

(3) An application for relief may be made at any time after the service of a notice under section 104 (1), section 105 (2), section 108(1), section 109 (1), or during the exercise of any of the remedies contemplated in those sections.

(4) An application for relief is not to be taken as an admission by the chargor or any other person applying for relief that—

(a) there has been a breach of a covenant of the charge by the chargor;

(b) by reason of such a breach, the chargee has the right to exercise the remedy in respect of which the application for relief has been made;

(c) all notices that were required to be served by the chargee were properly served; or

(d) the period for remedying the breach specified in the notice served under section 104 was reasonable or had expired, and the court may grant relief without determining all or any of those matters.

Power of the court in respect of remedies and Reliefs.

118. (1) In considering whether to grant relief as applied for, a court—

(a) shall, have regard to whether the remedy which the chargee proposes to exercise is reasonably necessary to prevent any or any further reduction in the value of the charged land or to reverse any such reduction as has already occurred if the charged land consists of agricultural land or commercial premises, and the remedy proposed is to appoint a receiver, or to take possession of or lease the land or a part thereof;

(b) shall, where the charged land consists of or includes, a dwelling-house, and the remedy proposed is to appoint a receiver, or take possession or lease the dwelling house or a part of it, have regard to the effect that the appointment of a receiver or the taking of possession or leasing the whole or a part of the dwelling house would have on the occupation of the dwelling house by the chargor and dependants and if the effect would be to impose undue disturbance on those owners, whether it is satisfied that—

(i) the chargee has made all reasonable efforts, including the use of other available remedies available, to induce the chargor to comply with the obligations under the charge; and

(ii) the chargor has persistently been in default of the obligations under the charge; and The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(iii) if the sale is of land held for a customary land, the chargee has had regard to the age, means, and circumstance including the health and number of dependants of the chargor, and in particular whether—

(aa) the chargor will be rendered landless or homeless;

(bb) the chargor will have any alternative means of providing for the chargor and dependants;

(iv) it is necessary to sell the charged land in order to enable the chargee to recover the money owing under the charge;

(v) in all the circumstances, it is reasonable to approve, or as the case may be, to make the order to sell the charged land.

(2) A court may refuse to authorise an order or may grant any relief against the operation of a remedy that the circumstances of the case require and without limiting the generality of those powers, may—

(a) cancel, vary, suspend or postpone the order for any period which the court thinks reasonable;

(b) extend the period of time for compliance by the chargor with a notice served under section 104;

(c) substitute a different remedy or the one applied for or proposed by the chargee or a different time for taking or desisting form taking any action specified by the lessor in a notice served under section 104;

(d) authorise or approve the remedy applied for or proposed by the chargee, notwithstanding that some procedural errors took place during the making of any notices served in connection with that remedy if the court is satisfied that—

(i) the chargor or other person applying for relief was made fully aware of the action required to be taken under or in connection with the remedy; and

(ii) no injustice will be done by authorising or approving the remedy, and may authorise or approve that remedy on any conditions as to expenses, damages, compensation or any other relevant matter as the court thinks fit.

(3) If under the terms of a charge, the chargor is entitled or is to be permitted to pay the principal sum secured by the charge by installments or otherwise to defer payment of it in whole or in part but provision is also made in the charge instrument or any collateral agreement for earlier payment of the whole sum in the event of any default by the chargor or of a demand by the chargee or otherwise, then for purposes of this section the court may treat as due under the charge in respect of the principal sum secured and of interest on it only the amounts that the chargor would have expected to be required to pay if there had been no such provision for earlier payment.

(4) A court must refuse to authorise or approve a remedy if it appears to the court that—

(a) the default in issue has been remedied;

(b) the threat to the security has been removed;

(c) the chargor has taken the steps that the chargor was required to take by the notice served under section 104; and The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(d) the chargee has taken or attempted to take some action against the chargor in contravention of section 104 (4).

Power of the court to re-open certain charges and revise terms.

119. (1) The Court may reopen—

(a) a charge for a sum equal to or less than the amount that maybe lent on the security of a small charge; or

(b) a charge of whatever amount secured on a matrimonial home, in the interests of doing justice between the parties.

(2) The Court may reopen a charge to which subsection (1) refers if it appears to the Court—

(a) that principles of fair dealing were contravened when the terms of the charge were agreed to;

(b) that the effect of the terms of the charge, at the time when the question of reopening it arises, is to give the chargee rights substantially greater than or different from those necessary to ensure that the charged land provides adequate security for the principal sum advanced on the security of that land;

(c) that the charge requires payments to be made that are exorbitant or illegal, whether such payments are of interest or capital or both or otherwise and whether such payments are required to be made unconditionally or otherwise;

(d) that the charge includes a term which postpones that right to discharge the charge or otherwise impedes the discharge of the charge which appears to contravene the provisions of section 103 (1);

(e) that the charge imposes terms on the chargor that are significantly disadvantageous to the chargor compared to terms imposed on other chargors in respect of similar charges and that these terms have been imposed solely or mainly because of the gender of the chargor.

Exercise of powers to reopen certain charges.

120. (1) The court may exercise the powers conferred on it by this Act either—

(a) on an application made to it for that purpose by either the chargor or the chargee—

(i) to enforce the charge; or

(ii) to commence an action under section 104; or

(iii) to obtain an order authorising the exercise of a remedy in connection with a default by the chargor under a small charge; or

(b) on an application by the chargor for relief against the exercise by the chargee of any remedy in connection with a default by the chargor under a charge; or

(c) by the Registrar in respect of—

(i) charges provided by one or more specific chargees where there is prima facie evidence of a pattern of unfair dealing and practices by that chargee or those chargees; or The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(ii) a chargee, being a corporate body, that appears to exercise discrimination against chargors on account of their gender, whether by granting charges on terms to which section 119 (2) (e) applies, or by refusing to grant charges to persons on account of their gender except that a chargee, being a corporate body that is implementing any programme, approved or assisted by the Government, designed to assist women to improve their economic and social position by providing them with advances secured by a charge of land shall not be taken to be acting in discriminatory manner if the advances under that programme are made only to women.

(2) In reopening the charge, the court may—

(a) direct that the charge shall have effect subject to modifications that the court shall order;

(b) require the chargee to repay the whole or part of any sum paid under the charge or any related or collateral agreement by the chargor or any guarantor or other person who assumed an obligation under the charge whether it was paid to the chargee or any other person;

(c) require the chargee to pay any compensation to the chargor which the court shall think fit; or

(d) direct the chargee, being a corporate body to cease acting in a discriminatory manner with respect to the granting of charges.

(3) In considering whether to exercise the powers conferred on it by this section, the court shall have regard to—

(a) the age, gender, experience, understanding of commercial transaction, and health of the chargor at the time when the charge was created, if the chargor is an individual;

(b) the financial standing and resources of the chargor relative to those of the chargee at the time of the creation of the charge;

(c) the degree to which, at the time of the creation of the charge, the chargor was under financial pressure and the nature of that pressure;

(d) the interest rates prevailing at the time of the creation of the charge and during the continuation of the charge and the relationship of those interest rates to the interest rate applying from time to time in the charge;

(e) the degree of risk accepted by the chargee, having regard to the value of the charged land and the financial standing and other resources of the chargor;

(f) the importance of not undermining the confidence of reputable chargees in the market for charges; and

(g) any other factors that the court considers relevant.

PART VII— COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF INTERESTS IN LAND

Preliminary notice.

121. (1) Whenever the national or county government is satisfied that it may be necessary to acquire some particular land under section 124, the respective Cabinet Secretary or the County Executive Committee Member shall submit a request for acquisition of public land to the Commission to acquire the land on its behalf.

(2) The Commission shall prescribe a criteria and guidelines to be adhered to by the The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

acquiring authorities in the acquisition of land.

(3) The Commission, may reject a request, of an acquiring authority, to undertake an acquisition if it establishes that the request does not meet the requirements prescribed under subsection (2) and Article 40(3) of the Constitution.

(4) In the event that the Commission has not undertaken the acquisition in accordance with subsection (1) the acquiring authority shall proceed and acquire the land.

(5) Upon approval the Commission shall publish a notice to that effect in the Gazette and the county, and shall deliver a copy of the notice to every person who appears to the Commission to be interested in the land.

(6) For the purposes of sections 124–156, interested persons shall include any person whose interests appear in the land registry and the spouse or spouses of any such person, as well as any person actually occupying the land and the spouse or spouses of such person.

(7) All land to be compulsorily acquired shall be geo-referenced and authenticated by the office or authority responsible for survey at both the national and county government

Power of entry to inspect land.

122. (1) The Commission may authorize, in writing, any person, to enter upon any land specified in a notice published under section 104 and inspect the land and to do all things that may be reasonably necessary to ascertain whether the land is suitable for the intended purpose.

(2) An authorization under subsection (1) shall not empower a person to enter a building, or an enclosed court or garden attached to a dwelling house, unless that person—

(a) has first obtained the consent of the occupier; or

(b) has served on the occupier not less than seven days’ written notice of the intention so to enter.

Payment for damage entry for inspection.

123. As soon as practicable after entry has been made under section 122, the Commission shall promptly pay in full, just compensation for any damage resulting from the entry.

Notice of acquisition and effect of acquisition on plant and machinery.

124. (1) Land may be acquired compulsorily under this Part if the Commission certifies, in writing, that—

(a) the land is required for the purposes of a public body;

(b) the land is required for public purposes

(c) the acquisition of the land is necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, urban area or city planning, town and country planning or the development or utilization of any property, in any manner, to promote the public benefit; and

(d) the necessity of acquiring the land is a reasonable justification for the causing of any hardship that may result to any person interested in the land. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(2) If, after land has been compulsorily acquired the public purpose or interest justifying the compulsory acquisition fails or ceases, the Commission may offer the original owners or their successors in title pre-emptive rights to re-acquire the land, upon restitution to the acquiring authority the full amount paid as compensation.

(3) If any plant or machinery are attached or permanently fastened to the land, the person interested in that plant or machinery may serve on the Commission a notice in writing that such person desires to sever and remove the plant and machinery, after receiving the notice of intention to acquire the land under section 121 (5), and not later than fifteen days before the inquiry appointed under section 126 (1).

Compensation to be paid.

125. (1) If land is acquired compulsorily under this Act, just compensation shall be paid promptly in full to all persons whose interests in the land have been determined.

(2) The Commission shall make rules to regulate the assessment of just compensation.

Inquiry as to compensation.

126. (1) At least thirty days after publishing the notice of intention to acquire land, the Commission shall appoint a date for an inquiry to hear issues of propriety and claims for compensation by persons interested in the land, and shall—

(a) cause notice of the inquiry to be published in the Gazette or county Gazette at least fifteen days before the inquiry; and

(b) serve a copy of the notice on every person who appears to the Commission to be interested or who claims to be interested in the land.

(2) The notice of inquiry shall call upon persons interested in the land to deliver a written claim of compensation to the Commission, not later than the date of the inquiry.

(3) At the hearing, the Commission shall—

(a) make full inquiry into and determine who are the persons interested in the land; and

(b) receive written claims of compensation from those interested in the land.

(4) The Commission may postpone an inquiry or adjourn the hearing of an inquiry from time to time for sufficient cause.

(5) For the purposes of an inquiry, the Commission shall have all the powers of the Court to summon and examine witnesses, including the persons interested in the land, to administer oaths and affirmations and to compel the production and delivery to the Commission of documents of title to the land.

(6) The public body for whose purposes the land is being acquired, and every person interested in the land, is entitled to be heard, to produce evidence and to call and to question witnesses at an inquiry.

Award of compensation.

127. (1) Upon the conclusion of the inquiry, the Commission shall prepare a written award, in which the Commission shall make a separate award of compensation for every person whom the Commission has determined to have an interest in the land.

(2) Subject to Article 40 (2) of the Constitution and section 136 and 142 of this Act, an The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

award—

(a) shall be final and conclusive evidence of—

(i) the size of the land to be acquired;

(ii) the value, in the opinion of the Commission, of the land;

(iii) the amount of the compensation payable, whether the persons interested in the land have or have not appeared at the inquiry; and

(b) shall not be invalidated by reason only of a discrepancy which may thereafter be found to exist between the area specified in the award and the actual area of the land.

(3) If an interest in land is held by two or more persons as co-tenants, the award shall state—

(a) the amount of compensation awarded in respect of that interest; and

(b) the shares in which it is payable to those persons.

(4) Every award shall be filed in the office of the Commission.

Notice of award.

128. (1) On making an award, the Commission shall serve on each person whom the Commission has determined to be interested in the land, a notice of the award and offer of compensation.

(2) Upon acquisition of land, and prior to taking possession of the land, the Commission may agree with the person who owned that land that instead of receiving an award, the person shall receive a grant of land, not exceeding in value the amount of compensation which the Commission considers would have been awarded, and upon the conclusion of the agreement that person shall be deemed to have conclusively been awarded and to have received all the compensation to which that person is entitled in respect of the interest in that land.

(3) An agreement under subsection (2) shall be recorded in the award.

Payment of compensation.

129. (1) After notice of an award has been served on all the persons determined to be interested in the land, the Commission shall, promptly pay compensation in accordance with the award to the persons entitled thereunder, except in a case where—

(a) there is no person competent to receive payment; or

(b) the person entitled does not consent to receive the amount awarded; or

(c) there is a dispute as to the right of the persons entitled to receive the compensation or as to the shares in which it is to be paid.

(2) In any of the cases referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (1), the Commission may at any time pay the amount of the compensation into a special compensation account held by the Commission, notifying any persons interested accordingly. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

Payment in error.

130. If a person has received any money by way of compensation awarded for an interest in the land being acquired, either in error or before it has been established that some other person is rightfully entitled to the interest, the Commission may, by notice in writing served on that person, require that person to refund to the Commission the amount received, and the amount shall be a debt due from that person to the Commission.

Grant of land in lieu of award.

131. (1) If the amount of any compensation awarded is not paid, the Commission shall on or before the taking of possession of the land, open a special account into which the Commission shall pay interest on the amount awarded at the rate prevailing bank rates from the time of taking possession until the time of payment.

(2) If additional compensation is payable under section 134 there shall be added to the amount of the additional compensation interest thereon at the prevailing bank rates from the time when possession was taken or compensation was paid, whichever is the earlier.

Payment of interest.

132. If part of the land comprised in documents of title has been acquired, the Commission shall, as soon as practicable, cause a final survey to be made of all the land acquired.

Survey where part only of holding acquired.

133. Whenever the survey provided for in section 132 discloses that the size of the land acquired is greater or less than the size of the land in respect of which the award has been made, compensation shall be paid for the excess size in accordance with this Act.

Additional compensation where area found to be greater.

134. (1) Only after the award has been made, and the amount of the first offer has been paid, the Commission shall take possession of the land by serving on every person interested in the land a notice that on a specified day possession of the land and the title to the land will vest in the national or county governments as the case may be.

(2) In cases of where there is an urgent necessity for the acquisition of land, and it would be contrary to the public interest for the acquisition to be delayed by following the normal procedures of compulsory acquisition under this Act, the Commission may take possession of uncultivated or pasture or arable land upon the expiration of fifteen days from the date of publication of the notice of intention to acquire, and on the expiration of that time the Commission shall, notwithstanding that no award has been made, take possession of that land in the manner prescribed by subsection (1).

(3) Upon taking possession of land under subsection (1) or subsection (2), the Commission shall also serve upon—

(a) the registered proprietor of the land; and

(b) the Registrar, a notice that possession of the land has been taken and that the land has vested in the national or county governments as the case may be.

(4) Upon taking possession and payment of just compensation in full, the land shall vest in the national or county governments absolutely free from encumbrances. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

Formal taking of possession and vesting.

135. (1) If the documents evidencing title to the land acquired have not been previously delivered, the Commission shall, in writing, require the person having possession of the documents of title to deliver them to the Registrar, and thereupon that person shall forthwith deliver the documents to the Registrar.

(2) On receipt of the documents of title, the Registrar shall—

(a) cancel the title documents if the whole of the land comprised in the documents has been acquired;

(b) if only part of the land comprised in the documents has been acquired, the Registrar shall register the resultant parcels and cause to be issued, to the parties, title documents in respect of the resultant parcels.

(3) If the documents are not forthcoming, the Registrar, will cause an entry to be made in the register recording the acquisition of the land under this Act.

Surrender of documents of title to the Commission.

136. (1) The powers of acquisition conferred by this Part shall not be exercised so as to acquire a part only of a permanent building in any case if—

(a) that part is reasonably required for the full and unimpaired use of that building; and

(b) a person interested in the building desires that the whole of the building shall be acquired.

(2)The person referred to under subsection (1) (b) may, at any time before the Commission has made an award, withdraw or modify the person’s statement by notice in writing served on the Commission.

(3) If the Commission is satisfied that the partial compulsory acquisition originally intended will render the remaining land inadequate for its intended use or will severely and disproportionally reduce the value of the remaining land, it will instruct the acquiring authority to acquire the remaining land.

(4) The remaining land referred to in subsection (3) shall be used for public purposes or be included in the Land Bank.

(5) If a question arises whether or not any part of a building is reasonably required for the full and unimpaired use thereof, and the parties cannot agree thereon, the matter shall be referred by the Commission to the Court for determination.

Acquisition of other land on account of severance.

137. (1) At any time before possession is taken of any land acquired under this Act, the Commission may, revoke a direction to acquire the land, and, shall determine and pay compensation for all damage suffered and all costs and expenses reasonably incurred by persons interested in the land by reason of or in consequence of the proceedings for acquiring the land.

(2) The principles relating to the determination of compensation set out in the regulations shall apply, so far as they are relevant, to the determination of compensation payable under this section. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

Withdrawal of acquisition.

138. (1) If the Commission is satisfied that the possession of any land is required by a public body for a particular period not exceeding five years, and that—

(a) the possession of the land is necessary for public purpose or pubic interest:

(b) the possession of the land is necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, urban and planning, or the development or utilization of any property in such manner as to promote the public benefit; and

(c) the necessity therefore is such as to afford reasonable justification for the causing of any hardship that may result to any person having an interest in or right over the property, and so certifies in writing, possession of such land may be taken for that period under this section.

(2) The Commission shall then serve on every person interested or who claims to be interested in the land to be taken possession of under subsection (1), or on such of them as after reasonable inquiry are known to the Commission, a notice that the Commission is to take possession of the land for the period in question.

(3) At the end of seven days after service of notices has been completed under subsection (2), the Commission may after paying the first offer of compensation, take possession of the land by entering, personally or by agents, on the land and positing on the land a notice in the prescribed form that possession has been taken of the land, and shall serve a copy of the notice on the occupier.

(4) This section shall not apply where the use of land is likely to cause permanent damage to land.

Power to obtain temporary occupation of land.

139. (1) The Commission shall, as soon as it practicable, before taking possession, pay full and just compensation to all persons interested in the land.

(2) An acquiring authority shall pay the first offer of compensation to the interested parties before taking possession.

Restoration of land.

140. If the Commission is satisfied that any land of which the occupation or use has been secured under this Part is needed solely as a means of access to other land, then—

(a) the use of the land shall extend to the passage of vehicles of all kinds, including heavy machinery, whether owned or operated by the public body occupying or using the land or by any contractor or servant employed by that body; and

(b) the compensation to be paid under section 134 shall be limited to the damage done to trees, plants, growing crops and permanent improvements on the land, together with a periodical sum for diminution in the profits of the land and of adjoining land by reason of that use.

Where land is needed for access.

141. (1) The Commission may at any time, by application in the prescribed form, refer to the Court for its determination any question as to— The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(a) the construction, validity or effect of any instrument;

(b) the persons who are interested in the land concerned;

(c) the extent or nature of their interest;

(d) the persons to whom compensation is payable;

(e) the shares in which compensation is to be paid to tenants in common;

(f) the question whether or not any part of a building is reasonably required for the full and unimpaired use of the building; or

(g) the condition of any land at the expiration of the term for which it is occupied or used.

(2) Without prejudice to the powers of the Court under this Part, the costs of any reference to the Court under subsection (1) shall be paid by such person as the Court may direct or, failing a direction, by the Commission.

Reference to the Environment and Land Court.

142. Any dispute arising out of any matter provided for under this Act may be referred to the Land and Environment Court for determination.

Right of entry.

143. The Commission and any officer or person authorized under section 122 shall, upon notice, have the right at all reasonable times to enter upon any land in furtherance of any of the purposes of this Act

Penalty for obstruction.

144. A person who willfully hinders or obstructs the Commission or an officer or person mentioned in section 143 in doing any of the acts authorized or required by this Act, or who willfully fills up, destroys, damages or displaces any trench, post or mark made or put on land under this Act, commits an offence and is liable, on conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to a fine not exceeding three million shillings, or to both.

Service of notices.

145. (1) A notice which may be given under this Part may be served on a person—

(a) by delivering it to the person personally;

(b) by sending it by registered post to the person’s last known address:

(c) if the whereabouts of the person or the address cannot, after reasonable inquiry, be ascertained, by leaving it with the occupier of the land concerned or, if there is no occupier, by affixing it upon some prominent part of the land;

(d) if the person is a body corporate, society or other association of persons, by serving it personally on a secretary, director or other officer thereof or on a person concerned or acting in the management thereof, or by leaving it or sending it by registered post addressed to the body corporate, society, or, if there is no registered office, at any place where it carries on business, or, if there is none, by leaving it with The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

the occupier of the land concerned, or, if there is no occupier, by affixing it upon some prominent part of the land; or

(e) the Commission may in addition to serving notice by paragraph (c) and (d), place an advertisement in two newspapers with a national circulation.

Exemption from stamp duty.

146. Stamp duty shall not be chargeable for a award or agreement made under this Act shall be chargeable with stamp duty, and no person claiming any such award or agreement shall be liable to pay a fee for a copy of the agreement.

Rules.

147. The Commission may make rules generally for carrying out the purposes and provisions of this Part.

PART VIII—SETTLEMENT PROGRAMMES

Establishment of settlement scheme.

148. (1) The Commission shall, on behalf of the national and county governments, implement settlement programmes to provide access to land for shelter and livelihood.

(2) Settlement programmes shall, for the purposes of this Act, include, but not limited to provision of access to land to squatters, persons displaced by natural causes, development projects, conservation, internal conflicts or other such causes that may lead to movement and displacement.

(3) The Commission shall, assist the national and county governments in the administration of settlement programmes.

(4) Identification of beneficiaries shall be carried out and verified by a sub-county selection committee comprising of the following—

(a) sub-county administrator who shall be the chairperson;

(b) a representative of the county governor;

(c) a representative of the Commission;

(d)a national government representative;

(e) a physical planner;

(f) a land surveyor;

(g) an officer in-charge of county settlement matters;

(h) a women’s representative nominated by a local women’s organization;

(i) a youth representative.

(5) The Commission shall reserve public land for the establishment of approved settlement programmes, and where public land is not available purchase private land subject to the Public Procurement and Disposal Act, 2005 No. 3 of 2005 or any other law.

(6) Upon planning and survey, land in settlement schemes shall be allocated to households in accordance with national values and principles of governance provided in Article 10 and the principles of land policy provided in Article 60 (1) of the Constitution and The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

any other requirements of natural justice.

(7) Any land acquired in a settlement scheme established under this Act, or any other law, shall not be transferable except through a process of succession.

(8) Beneficiaries of land in settlement schemes shall pay a sum of money as may be determined from time to time by the Commission and the body of trustees responsible for settlement matters.

(9) The funds provided by the national government and county governments for the purposes of the settlement programmes shall administered in accordance with the law relating to public finance management.

PART IX—EASEMENTS AND ANALOGOUS RIGHTS

General

Interpretation.

149. (1) In this Part unless the context otherwise requires—

(a) the land for the benefit of which any easement is created is referred to as the “dominant land” and the land of the person by whom an easement is created is referred to as “the servient land”; and

(b) an easement is, in relation to the dominant land referred to as “benefiting that land‖ and is, in relation to the servient land, referred to as “burdening that land”;

(2) Subject to the provisions of this Part, an easement shall be capable of existing only during the subsistence of the land or lease out of which they were created the subsistence of the land on lease of which they were created or in any other manner provided by any other legislation.

Application of this part.

150. (1) This Part shall apply to all easements made or coming into force on or after the commencement of this Act.

(2) Subsection (1) shall not, unless stated specifically otherwise, apply to easements, profits, restrictive agreements and all other like restrictions on the use of land having effect in customary law only.

(3) In this Part, reference to “analogous rights” means an access order made under section 153.

Nature of easement.

151. (1) Subject to any other written law applicable to the use of land, the rights capable of being created by an easement are—

(a) any rights to do something over, under or upon the servient land; or

(b) any right that something should not be so done;

(c) any right to require the owner of servient land to do something over, under or upon that land;

(d) any right to graze stock on the servient land. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(2) The rights capable of being created by an easement do not include—

(a) any right to take and carry away anything from the servient land;

(b) any right to the exclusive possession of any land.

(3) Unless an easement has been created for specific period of time which will terminate at a fixed date in the future or on the happening of a specific event in the future or on the death of the grantor, the grantee or some other person named in the grant, an easement burdens the servient land and runs with the land for the same period of time as the land or lease held by the grantor who created that easement.

(4) Subject to the provisions of this part an easement shall be capable of existing only during the subsistence of the land or lease out of which it was created.

Rights of Way

Entry on neighbouring land where easement is refused.

152. (1) An owner of any dominant land may apply to a court on the prescribed form for an order, referred to as an entry order authorising his or her entry on or over any servient land for the purpose of erecting, repairing, adding to, painting or demolishing the whole or any part of any structure on the dominant land or doing any other necessary or desirable thing on that land.

(2) The applicant shall give not less than fourteen days notice in writing to—

(a) the owner of the servient land; and

(b) the local authority having jurisdiction in the area were the dominant and servient land are located, of the intention to apply for an entry order under this section.

(2) On an application under subsection (1), the court after hearing the applicant and the persons to whom notice was given under subsection (2), may make an entry order authorising the applicant to do all or any of the following—

(a) to enter on or over the servient land, either personally or through the applicant’s employees, agents or contractors, for any purpose specified in the entry order;

(b) to use for that purpose on or over the servient land any vehicles and other means of transport and any plant machinery, cranes or other equipment as are specified in the entry order;

(c) to store on the servient land such materials as may be required for the purposes of the work and in any quantities that are specified in the entry order.

(3) In determining whether to grant an entry order under subsection (3), the court shall have regard to—

(a) the nature and conduct of the negotiations if any, between the owners of the dominant and servient land with respect to any attempt by the owner of the dominant land to obtain an easement for the purpose for which the entry order is applied for from the owner of the servient land;

(b) the urgency, importance and desirability of the work for which the entry order is being applied for; The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(c) the scope of the work and the length of the time for which the entry order is being applied for;

(d) whether the applicant has applied for or obtained all permissions, license and consents required from all relevant public authorities to execute the works;

(e) any other matters that shall appear to the court to be relevant.

(4) An order made under subsection (3) may be made on any condition including—

(a) the period of time during which the entry on or over the servient land is authorized;

(b) the hours of the day during which the work may be done;

(c) the preservation of the safety of persons or property on the servient land;

(d) the preservation, so far as is consistent with the work to be executed, of the natural features and condition of the servient land;

(e) the restoration of the servient land to its former state at the conclusion of the work;

(f) the maintenance of adequate access to the servient land;

(g) the provision of security or indemnity to secure—

(i) the performance of any conditions of the entry order; or

(ii) the making good of any damage caused by entry on or over the servient land, or work on or over the land; or

(iii) the reimbursement of the owner of the servient land for any costs, expenses or loss arising from the entry;

(h) any other relevant matter.

(5) If, as a result of fire, civil commotion or natural disaster, a structure on the dominant land has become a threat to public safety or public health, and there is an urgent need to effect repairs to or demolish that structure and such action may only be executed by entry on or over the servient land, the owner of the dominant land may enter the servient land and effect the repairs or demolition, after giving at least twenty-four hours’ notice in writing to the owner of the servient land, but the entry and execution of works shall not prevent the owner of the servient land from applying to the court for an order requiring the owner of the dominant land to make good any damage caused by the entry and works and to reimburse the owner of the servient land for any costs, expenses or loss arising from the entry and works.

(6) In this section—

(a) an owner of land includes an owner under a lease, a lessor and lessee; and

(b) neighboring land means any land in respect of which an order is sought under this section, whether or not it adjoins the land occupied by the applicant for an entry order.

Access order.

153. (1) An owner of landlocked land may apply in the prescribed form to a court for an access order, granting reasonable access to that land.

(2) A copy of the application shall be served on— The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(a) the owners of each piece of land adjoining the landlocked land;

(b) any person claiming an interest in any such piece of land of whom the applicant has actual notice;

(c) the local authority having jurisdiction in the area where the landlocked land is located;

(d) any other person occupying or having an interest in land which in the opinion of the court may be affected by the granting of the application.

(3) The court, after hearing the applicant and any person served with an application under subsection (2) may make an access order in respect of any other piece of land, the owner of which was served with a copy of the application under subsection (2), for the benefit of the landlocked land.

(4) In considering whether to grant an access order, the court shall consider—

(a) the nature and quality of the access, if any, to the landlocked land when the applicant first occupied the land;

(b) the circumstances in which the land became landlocked;

(c) the nature and conduct of the negotiations, if any, between the owners of the landlocked land and any adjoining or other land with respect to any attempt by the owner of the landlocked land to obtain an easement from one or more owners of the adjoining or other land;

(d) the hardship that may be caused to the applicant by the refusal of the access order, in comparison to the hardship that may be caused to any other person the making of the order;

(e) the purposes for which access is or may be required; and

(f) any other matter that appears to the court to be relevant.

(5) An access order may be made subject to any conditions including—

(a) the period for which the access order is to be made;

(b) the payment of reasonable compensation by the applicant to any other person;

(c) the allocation of the costs of any work necessary to give effect to the order between the applicant and any other person;

(d) the fencing of any land and the upkeep and maintenance of any such fence;

(e) the upkeep and maintenance of any land over which the access order has been granted;

(f) the execution of any instrument or the completion of any prescribed form or the doing of any other thing necessary to give effect to the order;

(g) any conditions set out in subsection (4) which in the opinion of the court are applicable to an access order; and

(h) any other relevant matter. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(6) An access order made under this section shall be deemed to have all the characteristics and incidents of an easement and the land over which it has been granted shall be deemed to be the servient land and landlocked land shall be deemed to be the dominant land in respect of that easement.

Enjoyment of easement and analogous rights.

154. (1) The benefit of an easement, and an analogous right granted under this part shall, during the term of its existence, be enjoyed by the owner of the dominant land and that owner’s successors in title and by—

(a) any lessee of the dominant land, or so far as the nature of the easement, or analogous right permit, and part of it, and

(b) any lender on the security of a charge for the time being in possession of the dominant land, or so far as the nature of the easement or analogous right permit, any part of it.

(2) Any person referred to in subsection (1) (a) and (b) who is entitled to the benefit of an easement or analogous right may take in the person’s own name any proceedings necessary to enforce that easement or those analogous rights.

Cancellation and extinguishment of easements and analogous rights.

155. (1) Subject to subsection (3), any easement granted under this part or any analogous right created under this part may be cancelled by the person occupying the dominant land.

(2) Any cancellation under subsection (1) shall be effected in the prescribed form and the easement, or analogous right shall be extinguished on the date that the cancellation is recorded in the register.

(3) On the application of any person occupying servient land, the Registrar may cancel any easement or an analogous right if the Registrar is satisfied that—

(a) the period of time for which the easement of analogous right was intended to subsist had expired; or

(b) the event upon which the easement or analogous right was intended to terminate has occurred.

(4) The consent of any lessee or lender for the time being entitled to the benefit of any easement or analogous right shall be necessary for any cancellation of any such easements or rights and such consent shall be given in the prescribed form.

Public Rights of Way

Power of the Commission to create public rights of way.

156. (1) Subject to and in accordance with this section and section 159, the Commission may, create a right of way which shall be known as public right of way.

(2) A public right of way may be—

(a) a right of way created for the benefit of the national or county government, a local authority, a public authority or any corporate body to enable all such institutions, organisations, authorities and bodies to carry out their functions, referred to in this Act as a way leave; or The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(b) a right of way created for the benefit of the public, referred to in section158 of this Act as a communal right of way.

(3) A public right of way shall attach to and run with the servient land in respect of which it has been created and shall be binding on all owners from time to time of the servient land, any manner they are occupying the land, whether under a land or a derivative right thereof, or under customary law or as a successor in title to any such owner or as a trespasser.

(4) A wayleave shall authorize persons in the employment to or who are acting as agents of or contractors for any of the organizations, authorities and bodies to enter on the servient land for the purpose of executing works, building and maintain installations and structures and insetting all such works, installations and structures on the servient land and to pass and re-pass along that wayleave in connection with purposes of those organisations, authorities or bodies.

(5) A communal right of way created for the benefit of the public shall entitle the public to pass and re-pass along that right of way and in areas designated for that purpose, to undertake recreational activities or other prescribed activity of the kind permitted in that designated area.

Application for wayleave.

157. (1) Unless the Commission is proposing of its own motion to create a wayleave, an application, for the creation of a wayleave, shall be made by any State department, or the county government, or public authority or corporate body, to the Commission.

(2) An application shall be made in the prescribed form and shall be accompanied by any prescribed information or other information that the Commission may, in writing require the applicant to supply and the Commission shall not begin the process of creating a wayleave until all prescribed or required information has been submitted to it.

(3) In order to enable a proposed wayleave to be created by the Commission of its own motion to comply with the provisions of this section, the Commission shall complete an application form as if it were applying to create a wayleave and references to “the applicant” in this Sub-part in relation to an application to create a wayleave shall be taken to apply as well to the Commission.

(4) The applicant shall serve a notice on—

(a) all persons occupying land over which the proposed wayleave is to be created, including persons occupying land in accordance with customary pastoral rights;

(b) the county government in whose area of jurisdiction land over which the proposed way leave is to be created is located;

(c) all persons in actual occupation of land in an urban and per-urban area over which the proposed way leave is to be created; and

(d) any other interested person.

(5) The Commission shall publish the application along the route of the proposed wayleave calculated to bring the application clearly and in a comprehensible manner to the notice of all persons using land over which the proposed wayleave is likely to be created.

Application for communal right of way.

158. (1) A county government, an association, or any group of persons may make an application to the commission for a communal right of way. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

Determination on creation of public right of way.

159. (1) The Commission shall—

(a) on receipt of all information prescribed or required under this Act;

(b) after at least ninety days from the date of the serving of notices under section under this Act, consider all the information so received and all representations and objections made by any person served with a notice under the aforesaid subsections and recommend to the Cabinet Secretary whether to—

(i) appoint a public inquiry to give further consideration to the representations and objections; or

(ii) refer the application to the County Government for its opinion on whether to approve the application; or

(iii) initiate and facilitate negotiations between those persons who have made representations on the application and the applicant with a view to reaching a consensus on that application.

(2) If the Commission has proposed the creation of a public right of way of its own motion and representations have been made on that proposal which are concerned with the matters other than the compensation payable for the use of the land for that public right of way, the Commission shall recommend to the Cabinet Secretary only that the Cabinet Secretary exercise the powers under subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection (1).

(3) The Cabinet Secretary shall determine whether or not to create a public right of way, after taking account, as the case may be, of—

(a) the recommendations of the Commission; or

(b) the advice of the County government;

(c) the outcome of any negotiations initiated under subsection (1) (b) (iii).

(4) The Cabinet Secretary may, by order in the Gazette, create a public right of way under this section subject to any amendments, limitations and conditions, including conditions as to the costs of constructing and maintain a public right of way.

(5) If an agreement has been reached between the parties to any negotiations initiated under subsection (1) (b) (iii) and if the Cabinet Secretary intends to create a public right of way but not to accept any amendment, limitation or condition of that agreement, the Cabinet Secretary shall refer the matter back to the parties for reconsideration and take no decision on the creation of that right of way until at least than thirty days have elapsed from the date of the referral of the matter back to the parties or the parties have resubmitted their agreement, with or without amendments, to the Cabinet Secretary whichever is the shorter period.

(6)The order of the Cabinet Secretary to create a public right of way shall—

(a) delineate the route of that public right of way;

(b) be published in the Gazette;

(c) be notified to a county government having jurisdiction along the route of the public right of way; The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(d) be publicized in any manner which is calculated to bring it to the attention of people occupying and using land along the route of the public right of way; and

(e) come into force thirty days after it has been published in the Gazette.

(7) Any person who makes any representation or objection to an application to create a public right of way, within six weeks after the order has been made, may appeal to the Court on a point of law against an order made by the Cabinet Secretary under this section, but apart from such an appeal, an order of the Cabinet Secretary shall not be questioned by way of judicial review or otherwise in any court.

Power of registrar with respect to public right of way.

160. (1) If the Cabinet Secretary has made an order to create a public right of way the Commission shall cause all the necessary documents, plans, demarcations and surveys of the route of that public right of way to be delivered to the Registrar to enable the registrar to exercise the powers under this section.

(2) On receipt of the information referred to in subsection (1), the Registrar after the expiry of the time allowed in section 159 (6) (e) to appeal against the order of the Cabinet Secretary shall, take any necessary, desirable or prescribed action which the Registrar may consider necessary and desirable or which may be prescribed—

(a) to cause to be recorded, using such forms as may be prescribed, the route of the public right of way on any certificate of occupancy or other document of title held in any office of the land registry having reference to land over which the public right of way has been created; and

(b) to cause to be delivered to the Registrar all certificates of occupancy having reference to land over which the public right of way has been created held by—

(i) persons occupying such land under such right of occupying; or

(ii) by any lender of money secured by a charge or lien who is holding that certificate of occupancy as part of the security for that loan, so as to amend that certificate of occupancy by recording the route of the public right of way on that certificate of occupancy.

Compensation in respect of public right of way.

161. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, compensation shall be payable to any person for the use of land, of which the person is in lawful or actual occupation, as a communal right of way and, with respect to a wayleave, in addition to any compensation for the use of land for any damage suffered in respect of trees crops and buildings as shall, in cases of private land, be based on the value of the land as determined by a qualified valuer.

(2) Compensation relating to a wayleave or communal right of way shall not be paid to a public body unless there is a demonstrable interference of the use of the land by that public body.

(3) Damage caused as a result of the creation of a wayleave shall include any preliminary work undertaken in connection with surveying or determining the route of that wayleave, and whether the trees, crops or buildings so damaged were included in the route of the wayleave as delineated in the order of the Cabinet Secretary.

(4) The duty to pay compensation payable under this section shall lie with the State Department, county government, public authority or corporate body that applied for the public right of way and that duty shall be complied with promptly.

(5) If the person entitled to compensation under this section and the body under a duty The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

to pay that compensation are unable to agree on the amount or method of payment of that compensation or if the person entitled to compensation is dissatisfied with the time taken to pay compensation, to make, negotiate or process an offer of compensation, that person may apply to the Court to determine the amount and method of payment of compensation and the Court in making any award may, make any additional costs and inconvenience incurred by the person entitled to compensation.

(6) The Commission shall make Regulations prescribing the criteria to be applied in the payment of compensation under this section and to give effect to this section.

Powers of Court

Power of courts to enforce public rights of way.

162. In determining any question or dispute concerning the existence or effect of a public right of way, a court may make an order on any condition, which it thinks fit on all or any of the following matters—

(a) the existence of a public right of way;

(b) the enforceability a public right of way by or against any person;

(c) the extent of the use of the easement, analogous right or public right of way and whether that use exceeds what is reasonable or is permitted under the terms of the grant of the easement or the terms of the order creating the analogous right or public right of way;

(d) the question whether any work is required to be done under the terms of an easement, analogous right or public right of way; and, if so, the nature and extent of the work required to be undertaken;

(e) the reasonable and proper cost of any such work as is required to be undertaken;

(f) the person or persons by whom the costs of any such work is to be borne and if the cost is to be shared between two or more persons, the shares to be borne by each such person;

(g) the date by which and the manner in which any such work is to be undertaken;

(h) the entry on to any land, whether or not it is land over which an easement, analogous right or public right of way has been created, for the purpose of doing the work and the use over or on that land of any vehicles, plant, machinery and installations for the purpose of carrying out that work;

(i) any other matter arising in relation to question or dispute about an easement, analogous right or public right or way.

PART X—MISCELLANEOUS

Jurisdiction of Environment and Land Court.

163. The Environment and Land Court established in the Environment and Land Court Act is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes, actions and proceedings concerning land under this Act.

Substituted service.

164. If the Commission is satisfied that a notice effected and cannot be served The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

personally or by post, either because the person to be served is evading service or for some other reason the Commission may order service to be effected by—

(a) affixing a copy of the notice in a conspicuous place—

(i) on or as near as may be to the land where possible; and

(ii) if the land is community land, at the offices of the Community Land Committee or other public place within the village, or

(iii) if the land is public land, at the offices of the county government having jurisdiction in the area where the land is located or other public place in the area where the land is located; and

(b) publishing a copy in the Gazette and if it thinks fit, one or more newspapers circulating in Kenya.

Rights of entry.

165. (1) Any person authorised in that behalf by the Commission shall have power, on the giving of not less than forty eight hours notice, to enter and inspect at all reasonable times between the hours of 6.00 a.m. and 6.00 p.m. any public land, other than land occupied exclusively as a dwelling house, for any purpose connected with the implementation of this Act.

(2) The notice required by subsection (1) to be given prior to any entry on to land shall specify clearly the purpose for which and the time at which the authorised person will enter the land.

(3) Every person authorised to enter or inspect land under this section shall be furnished with a written authorization signed by the Commission and if so required by any person having an interest in or occupying the land to be entered and inspected, shall produce the same to that person.

(4) If any person authorised under this section causes any damage to land or anything on the land during an entry and inspection, the Commission, shall forthwith appoint a person to assess the damage and pay promptly compensation based on that assessment to the person whose land or thing on the land have been damage.

Land Compensation Fund.

166. (1) There shall be established a Land Compensation Fund, to be known as the Fund.

(2) The objects and purposes of the fund is to provide compensation to any person who, as a result of the implementation of any of the provisions of this Act by the National Government, county government, urban area or city or any public, suffers any loss or deprivation or diminution of any rights or interests in land or any injurious affection in respect of any ownership of land.

(3) The Fund shall be administered in accordance with the provision relating to public Funds under the law relating to public finance management.

Fees.

167. (1) The Cabinet Secretary shall prescribe the rates of fees for all matters in respect of which, by this Act, prescribed fees are required to be paid by any person and shall keep such fees under continuous review. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(2) Fees prescribed under this section shall be at a per centum rate of the value of the land the subject of the application or other matter in respect of which fees are required to be paid.

(3) The Registrar shall refuse to make any entry on the register or register any document in respect of any grant of a land or any disposition of or arising in connection with a land in respect of which a fee has not been paid in whole or in part, unless the Registrar is satisfied on the basis of written evidence that the fee has been waived in whole or in part or that it has been agreed between the payer and payee that the fee may be paid in installments and there are no arrears in those installments.

(4) Unpaid fees or expenses incurred by the Government in connection with any attempt to recover those unpaid fees shall constitute civil debt recoverable summarily.

Unlawful occupation of land.

168. (1) Any person who, without, express or implied, lawful authority or without any right or license, under customary or statutory land law so to do—

(a) occupies, or erects any building on any public land;

(b) clears, digs, ploughs, cultivates, or grazes animals over, any public land or part of it;

(c) cuts or removes any timber or other produce on or from any public land or part of it,

shall be taken to be in unlawful occupation of that land.

(2) If, with respect to public land the Commission is of the opinion that a person is in unlawful occupation of public land, the Commission may serve on that person a notice in the prescribed form or give to that person an oral communication, in a language calculated to be understood by that person requiring that person to show cause as to why the person should not be required to vacate that land within any time and subject to any terms and conditions as to the removal of buildings, the reaping of growing crops and any other matters which the justice of the case may require, which may be specified in the notice or oral communication.

(3) Any notice referred to in subsection (2) shall inform the person to whom it is addressed that if has a right to be heard in connection with showing cause as to why the person should not vacate the land to which the notice relates.

(4) In determining whether to serve a notice or oral communication and the period of time to be specified in the notice by the end of which the person is required to vacate the land, the Commission shall take account of—

(a) whether the person has reasonable belief that the person is in lawful occupation of land;

(b) the use which the person is making of the land, including any crops being grown by that person and when they may reasonably be expected to be ready to be harvested;

(c) the length of time that person has been on that land and the person’s age and general circumstances;

(d) whether that person is living with any dependants;

(e) whether that person or any dependants of that person are in employment near to that land; The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(f) whether the occupation of the land took place peaceably or by force and whether the occupation is, as a consequence, depriving and person of the lawful occupation and use of that land which that person could take up immediately the land was vacated;

(g) whether the occupation of the land is preventing some necessary or desirable development or public works;

(h) the nature and environment if the land and where the land is land reserved for the primary use of wildlife, whether the occupation of the land is hindering or preventing the use of the land by wildlife or is in practice in harmony with that use;

(i) whether in all the circumstance, it would be reasonable to pay any sum of money to the person on account of being required to vacate the land;

(j) any other factors, which seem relevant include any matters that the person occupying the land brings to the attention of the Commission.

(5) A person served with a notice or oral communication under this section shall, within not more than sixty days, show cause to the Commission as to why the person should not vacate the land to which the notice relates.

(6) If a person does not show cause within sixty days as to why the land should not be vacated, and has no reasonable excuse for not so complying, the person shall be deemed to have accepted the notice and shall be under duty to comply with that notice.

(7) Where if after considering any representations made by the person attempting to show cause the Commission determines that the person has failed to show cause, the Commission shall inform that person by notice or oral communication to vacate the land within the time specified in the notice served under subsection (2).

(8) A person who responded to the notice to show cause but who failed so to do in terms of subsection (5) may apply to the court for relief against the operation of that notice or oral communication, within thirty days of being notified of the failure has failed to show cause.

(9) An application for relief is not to be taken as an admission by the person applying for relief provided that—

(a) the person is in unlawful occupation of the land;

(b) by reason of that unlawful occupation, the Commission has the right to require the person to vacate the land in respect of which the application for relief has been made;

(c) all notices and oral communications which were required to be served by the Commission were properly served;

(d) the period by which the land must be vacated specified in the notice or oral communication was reasonable or had expired.

(10) The court, may after considering the matters set out in subsection (4), grant relief to the person applying for the same on any terms and conditions that appear to the court to be just and reasonable and, without prejudice to the generality of this provision, the court may—

(a) cancel the notice or oral communication and declare that the person is entitled to remain on the land;

(b) postpone the operation of the notice or oral communication and grant the person a license to remain on the land until the notice or oral communication shall come into operation; The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(c) vary the operation of the notice or oral communication by granting the person an easement of grazing of any terms and conditions which the court shall think fit, if the person is a pastoralist;

(d) vary any of the terms of the notice or oral communication or the period within which the person is required to vacate the land; or

(e) vary the amount of any payment to be paid, or where no payment has been offered, order that payment as the court shall think just be made to the person on vacating of the land.

(11) If the court has confirmed the notice or oral communication, with or without any variations, alterations or additions in the exercise of its powers under subsection (10), the notice or oral communication, the person on whom has been served shall be under a duty to comply with that notice or oral communication as confirmed by the court.

Obstruction of public rights of way.

169. (1) If the Commission is satisfied that there has been any wrongful obstruction of or encroachment on any public right of way, it may make an order requiring the person responsible for that obstruction or encroachment to remove that obstruction or encroachment within the time specified in the order, which shall be not less than fourteen days, and if that order is not complied with within the time specified, the Commission may take any steps which may be necessary for the purpose.

(2) Any notice made by the Commission under subsection (1) shall be served on or otherwise communicated to the person alleged by the notice to be responsible for the obstruction or encroachment in such a manner as that person will understand that notice and what is required to be done under the notice.

(3) A person served with a notice under subsection (1), may request the Commission to reconsider the notice within the time specified in the notice and on giving reasons.

(4) A person who does not take action under subsection (3) shall be taken to have accepted the notice and shall be under a duty to comply with it.

(5) If the Commission has reconsidered the notice in response to a request made in accordance with subsection (3), and determines to confirm the notice, it shall inform the person who made the request for a reconsideration that it has confirmed the notice.

(6) A person whose request for a reconsideration of the notice has resulted in the notice being confirmed may appeal to a court against that confirmed notice, but if the person does not so appeal within the time specified in the notice for compliance with the notice, the person shall be deemed to have accepted the notice and shall be under a duty to comply with it.

(7) A court hearing an appeal under this section may—

(a) confirm the notice and order the person to desist from obstructing or encroaching on the public right of way; or

(b) suspend the operation of the notice for any period which the court shall determine; or

(c) quash the notice,

and may make any ancillary orders which the circumstances of the case may require.

Offences.

170. (1) Any person who— The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(a) knowingly makes any false statement, orally or in writing, in connection with any disposition or other transaction affecting land or any other matter arising under this Act, or

(b) knowingly gives any false information or makes any false statement, either orally or in writing, in connection with any call for information made under this Act or in connection with any investigation into the commission of any offence under this Act;

(c) fraudulently procures—

(i) the registration or issue of any certificate of ownership, or any other document or instrument relating to the land; or

(ii) the making of any entry or the endorsement of any matter on any document or instrument referred to in subparagraph (i);

(iii) the cancellation or amendment of any of the documents referred to in this paragraph instruments our entries or endorsements;

(d) fraudulently alters, adds to, erases, defaces, mutilates or destroys any document or instrument relating to land or any entry on or endorsement of any such document or instrument; suppresses or conceals form the Commission, the Registrar, or any authorized officer exercising powers under this Act or assists or joins in so doing, any material document, fact or matter, commits an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine not exceeding ten million shillings or imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or to both the fine and imprisonment

(2) Any person who unlawfully occupies public land commits an offence and upon conviction is liable to a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand shillings, and in the case of a continuing offence to an additional fine not exceeding ten thousand shillings for every day during which the offence shall have continued.

(3) Any person who wrongfully obstructs or encroaches on to a public right of way and who does not within the time specified in any notice served on the person under section 126 or where the person has appealed against the notice, within the time specified in the notice after the hearing of the appeal where the court has rejected that appeal, remove that obstruction or cease that encroachment commits an offence and upon conviction is liable, on conviction to a fine not exceeding ten million shillings and in the case of a continuing offence to an additional fine not exceeding one hundred thousand shilling for every day during which the offence continues.

(4) Any person who willfully—

(a) delays; or

(b) obstructs; or

(c) hinders; or

(d) intimidates; or

(e) assaults,

any person authorized under this Act to inspect any land in the lawful exercise of the power in that behalf commits an offence and upon conviction is liable to a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand shillings or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding three years or to both the fine and imprisonment.

(5) Any person who, being an authorized officer under this Act, whether generally or for a specific function, in the course of any official function or otherwise, unlawfully or with force The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

enters on the land of any person or while on land, willfully commits any damage to the land or anything on the land, whether naturally on the land, or stock owned by any person using the land or crops planted or buildings erected on the land commits an offence and upon conviction is liable, to a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand shillings or to imprisonment not exceeding three months or to both the fine and imprisonment.

(6) If a court has convicted any person of an offence under this section and the commission of that offence enabled that person to obtain or retain or regain any interest in land which the person would otherwise not have been able to obtain, retain or regain, the court may in addition to any punishment provided for by this section imposed on such person, make any such order in relation to that interest in land so obtained, retained or regained by such person as appears to the court necessary to ensure that such person does not profit by the offence of which the person has been convicted and without prejudice to the generality of this provision, any such order may—

(a) direct the Commission to commence proceedings to—

(i) revoke the allocation; or

(ii) terminate a lease;

(b) direct the Registrar to cancel any entry in any register which has been obtained by virtue or on account of the offence;

(c) require that person to make restitution to any person who has suffered loss by virtue or on account of the offence, including taking all necessary action to transfer to any such person any interest in land obtained, retained or regained by such offence from that person, and any such order may be made subject to any conditions which the court.

(7) The Registrar shall not be personally liable in respect of any act done while exercising any powers under this Act and within the scope of official capacity, if the Registrar did that act in the honest belief that the Registrar was entitled to do it.

Corrupt transactions.

171. (1) Nothing in this Act shall be taken or construed to validate, affirm, authenticate or give any legal effect to—

(a) any grant of public land;

(b) any issue of a certificate of ownership of land; or

(c) any disposition, or any contract for any of the earlier mentioned transactions,

which was obtained or induced by corruption, on the part of any government official, county government official or employee of the Commission whether or not that government official, county government official or employee of the Commission was directly involved in that transaction.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other written law, a transaction under subsection (1) shall be illegal its inception and shall be void and of no legal effect.

(3) For purposes of this section, a transaction shall be considered to be affected or tainted by corruption when either—

(a) any party to or involved directly or indirectly in the transaction in respect of which it is alleged that an action was corrupt is convicted of corruption and all final appeals arising from that conviction have been concluded; or The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(b) any employee of the Commission or other public official is interdicted, or is retired in the public interest, from the position on the grounds that the person has been engaged in corrupt actions and that these actions involved that transaction; or

(c) a court of competent jurisdiction so determines.

(4) Any person occupying land obtained as a consequence of participating in any of the transactions under subsections (1) and (3) shall be liable to forfeit that land to the government without any entitlement to any compensation.

(5) Notwithstanding that a transaction covered by this section is void, a person occupying land as a consequence of that transaction shall be obliged to comply with all the terms and conditions of the transaction as if it had been a valid transaction and shall be liable to all the remedies which may be applied to a person who fails to comply with the terms and conditions of a valid transaction in addition to any penalties which may be applied under this section.

Land sizes.

172. (1) Within one year of the coming into force of this Act, the Cabinet Secretary shall commission a scientific study to determine the economic viability of minimum and maximum acreages in respect of private land for various land zones in the country.

(2) The findings of the study shall be available for the public to make observations and shall be modified based on valid representations in accordance with principles of participation of the people, good governance, transparency and accountability.

(3) Within three months after the publication of the final report of the scientific study commissioned under subsection (1) the Cabinet Secretary shall table the report to Parliament for debate and adoption.

(4) The Cabinet Secretary shall prescribe the rules and regulations for determining the minimum and maximum acreages in respect of private land solely based on the recommendations in the report.

(5) The Registrar shall not accept for registration any instrument of dispositions that confers interest in land that has the effect of breaching the prescribed guidelines on minimum and maximum acreages in respect of private land.

General power to make Regulations.

173. (1) The Commission or the Cabinet Secretary, where applicable, make regulations prescribing anything which may be prescribed under this Act and generally for the better carrying into effect of the purposes and provisions of this Act and removing any difficulties occasioned by the coming into operation of this Act and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, such regulations may prescribe—

(a) the forms to be used in connection with this Act;

(b) the management of the Land Compensation Fund;

(c) the use and management of public rights of way created under this Act;

(d) procedures to be followed with respect to the making of any claim for compensation and the payment of any compensation under this Act;

(e) the manner of assessing value of an interest in land; or

(f) The minimum and maximum land holding acreages in respect of private land. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(2) Without prejudice to the foregoing, the Cabinet Secretary shall have powers to make regulations—

(a) to secure the land rights of the minority communities to individually or collectively access and use land and land based resources following an inventory of the existing minority communities to obtain a clear assessment of their status and land rights;

(b) to prevent and manage land based disasters and to provide for settlement in the event of natural disasters;

(c) to establish, plan and manage refugee camps;

(d) to deal with issues that arise from internal displacement of persons and provide for the settlement of the internally displaced persons; and

(e) with respect to squatters—

(i) to establish appropriate mechanisms for their removal from unsuitable land and their settlement;

(ii) to facilitate negotiation between private owners and squatters in cases of squatter settlements found on private land;

(iii) to transfer unutilized land and land belonging to absentee land owners to squatters; and

(iv) to facilitate the regularization of existing squatter settlements found on public and community land for purposes of upgrading or development.

Repeals.

174. (1) The written laws set out in the Schedule to this Act are hereby repealed.

(2) All other law relating to land shall be construed with the alterations, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions necessary to give effect to this Act.

Savings and transitional provisions with respect to rights, actions, dispositions etc.

175. (1) Unless the contrary is specifically provided in this Act, any right, interest, title, power, or obligation acquired, accrued, established, coming into force or exercisable before the commencement of this Act shall continue to be governed by the law applicable to it immediately prior to the commencement of this Act.

(2) Unless the contrary is specifically provided in this Act or the circumstances are such that the contrary must be presumed to be the case, if any step has been taken to create, acquire, assign, transfer, or otherwise execute a disposition, any such transaction shall be continued in accordance with the law applicable to it immediately prior to the commencement of this Act.

(3) Any instrument executed before the commencement of this Act whereby any disposition permitted under this Act is completed may be presented for registration in the prescribed register and—

(a) the question whether any instrument so presented is to be registered shall be determined by the Registrar by reference to the law in force at the time of its execution; and

(b) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (a), the provisions of this Act shall apply to that instrument as if it had been executed after the commencement of this Act. The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

(4) If a lessor or lender had initiated any steps to forfeit a lease or to foreclose a charge, as the case may be, before the commencement of this Act, a court may on the application of the lessee or the chargor issue an injunction to the lessor or, to the lender to stop the continuation of any such step.

Savings and transitional provisions with respect to rights, actions, dispositions, etc

176. (1) Unless the contrary is specifically provided in this Act, any right, interest, title, power, or obligation acquired, accrued, established, coming into force or exercisable before the commencement of this Act shall continue to be governed by the law applicable to it immediately prior to the commencement of this Act.

(2) Unless the contrary is specifically provided for in this Act or the circumstances are such that the contrary must be presumed to be the case, if any step has been taken to create, acquire, assign, transfer, or otherwise execute a disposition, any such transaction shall be continued in accordance with the law applicable to it immediately prior to the commencement of this Act.

(3) Any instrument executed before the commencement of this Act whereby any disposition permitted under this Act is completed may be presented for registration in the prescribed register and—

(a) the question whether any instrument so presented is to be registered shall be determined by the Registrar by reference to the law in force at the time of its execution; and

(b) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (a), the provisions of this Act shall apply to that instrument as if it had been executed after the commencement of this Act.

(4) If a lessor or lender had initiated any steps to forfeit a lease or to foreclose a charge, as the case may be, before the commencement of this Act, a court may on the application of the lessee or the chargor issue an injunction to the lessor or, to the lender to stop the continuation of any such step.

(5) If a court has issued an injunction under subsection (4), the lessor or lender to whom the injunction has been issued may commence any action under this Act to terminate that lease or bring that charge to an end.

SCHEDULE (s.174)

The Wayleaves Act, Cap. 292

The Land Acquisition Act, Cap. 295

MEMORANDUM OF OBJECTS AND REASONS

The object of this Bill is to operationalise the provisions relating to the management and administration of land and land based resources under Article 68 of the Constitution. It aims at consolidating the laws relating to land and providing a legal framework for its management and administration by the National Land Commission.

Part I of the Bill relates to the preliminary provisions of the Bill. It deals with the short title and interpretation of words and expressions used in the Bill. It also outlines the values and principles guiding the management and administration of land by the Commission and the forms of land tenure under the Bill and the methods by which title to land may be acquired.

Part II of the Bill deals with the management of public land by the Commission on behalf of the national and county governments. Clause 10 provides for the guidelines in the management of public land. This Part provides for the allocation of public land by the Commission and the factors to be considered during such allocation. It also provides for the reservation of public land with clause 15 providing for the vesting of the care, control and management of reserved land in a management body as shall be determined by the Commission. Clause 16 provides for the preparation and submission of The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

development plans by a management body for the management of the reserved land. This Part also provides for the conservation of the land based natural resources within the public land.

Part III provides for the administration of public land by the Commission. Clause 19 provides for the issuance of temporary licences to unalienated public land with ∫ providing for the removal of any temporary structures erected during the licence period. This Part also provides for the forfeiture of a licence where a person fails to pay any rent or tax due under the licence or fails to comply with a condition of the licence. This part also specified the covenants and conditions that are implied in a lease or licence issued under the Act as well as obligations of parties to a lease or licence under the Act. Clause 31 provides for the forfeiture of a lease where rent is unpaid or a licensee fails to comply with a condition of a lease with the acceptance of any money due under the lease by the Commission not being deemed to operate as a waiver of any forfeiture accruing by reason of any breach by a licensee. Clause 36 mandates the Commission to avail to Parliament and the public, a report on the allocation of public land, agreements for the use of such land and any revenues generated thereof.

Part IV provides for the management of community land in accordance with Article 63 of the Constitution.

Part V provides for the administration and management of private land. Clause 38 provides for the requirements of a contract for the disposition of land upon which any suit is founded. Clause 39 outlines the procedure for regaining possession of land and obtaining a court order where obtaining possession peaceably is not possible by vendor where the purchaser has entered into possession of the land. Clause 40 confers on such a vendor the right to claim damages for breach with clause 43 confering a right on a purchaser to apply for a relief where the court does not order specific performance and the purchaser is not entitled under the agreement to rescind or repudiate the contract.

Clauses 44 to 50 of this Part deals with the transfer of land which is to take place immediately and not upon the happening of a future event. It provides for the transfer of a portion of land upon its subdivision as well as transfer of leases. Clause 45 implies an agreement by the transferee to pay any interest secured by a charge in the case of a transfer subject to a lease. Clause 50 deals with transfers subject to a lease.

Clauses 51 to 56 deal with transmissions of land. Clause 52 provides for process of registration of a proprietor’s personal representative as proprietor where a sole proprietor or proprietor in common dies. Clause 53 provides for the registration of a trustee in bankruptcy as proprietor of any land lease or charge where a bankrupt proprietor dies while clause 55 provides for the appointment by the Registrar of companies and subsequent registration of a liquidator as proprietor of land held by a company that is being wound up.

Part VI deals with co-tenancies and partitions. It provides for the meaning, partitioning and disposition of land that is owned either as a joint tenancy or tenancy in common. It also provides for co-ownership between spouses in which land held for the use of both spouses is presumed to be held by the spouses as tenants in common.

Clause 64 to 78 deals with general provisions relating to leases. It provides for the characteristics of periodic and short term leases as well as the termination of leases on the occurrence of a future event. It provides for the presumption a month to month lease where a lessee remains in possession of land upon the expiry of a lease and without the consent of a lessor, with all the obligations under the lease continuing in force till vacation of the land by the lessee. This Part also provides for implied covenants and conditions in a lease on the part of the lessor and lessee respectively. Clauses 79 to 82 deal with transfers and assignment of leases and the implications on a lessee and assignee.

Clause 83 to 93 deals with remedies and relief for breach of the terms of a lease under this Part. This Part provides for procedure for the termination of a lease for non-payment of rent as well as manner in which notices to terminate a lease for non-payment of rent or breach of any other covenant under the lease are issued. It also provides for the application for an order to terminate a lease by a lessor or for a relief against an order for termination by a lessee or persons interested under the lease. Clause 90 provides for the commencement of an action by a lessor for damages, specific performance, an injunction or recovery of any rent arrears instead of terminating a lease. Clauses 94 to 101 deals with charges. It provides for the tacking, consolidation, variation and transfer of charges. Clause 101 makes it mandatory to obtain consent where a charge contains a prohibition of the transfer of a charge.

Clauses 102 to 120 deals with covenants, conditions and powers implied in a charge and provides for the remedies of a lender where a chargor defaults or breaches a covenant in a charge including entry and possession of charged land by the charge under clause 108. Clause 110 confers on the charge the right to exercise the power of sale with clause 111 conferring on the charge a duty to exercise due case in obtaining the best price obtainable at the time of sale with a breach of this duty The Land Bill, 2012 http://www.kenyalaw.org

being implied where the sale price is at twenty five percent below the market price. This Part provides for the protection of the interests of the purchaser and the powers of a court in granting relief under this Part.

Part VII provides for the compulsory acquisition of interest in land and the process to be followed in the issuance of a notice and the determination and award of compensation upon acquisition.

Part VIII provides for the establishment of settlement schemes by the Commission on behalf of the national and county governments.

Part IX deals with easements and analogous rights and provides for their enjoyment and cancellation or extinguishment. Clause 156 confers power on the Commission to create public rights of way with this Part providing for the process and compensation where applicable and the powers of a court to enforce such rights.

Part X contains miscellaneous matters. It provides for the jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court in dealing with disputes under this Act. Clause 166 provides for the establishment of the Land Compensation Fund for the purpose of compensating persons affected by the implementation of this Act leading to loss of land or interest in land. This part creates offences and provides for transactions that may be considered as corrupt under clause 171. This Part also confers on the Commission and the Cabinet Secretary power to make regulations for the purpose of operationalising the Act and also deals with savings and transitional provisions.

The First Schedule contains the existing legislation that is to be repealed upon the coming into force of this Act.

The enactment of this Bill will occasion additional expenditure of public funds which shall be provided for through the estimates.

Dated the 10th February, 2012.

JAMES ORENGO,

Minister for Lands.

Letter to Pope LeoXIII on Land Value Tax; Lessons for Kenya

Letter to Pope LeoXIII on Land Value Tax; Lessons for Kenya

http://www.wealthandwant.com/HG/the_condition_of_labor.htm
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To Pope Leo XIII.
YOUR HOLINESS: I have read with care your Encyclical letter on the condition of labor, addressed, through the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops and Bishops of your faith, to the Christian World. Since its most strikingly pronounced condemnations are directed against a theory that we who hold it know to be deserving of your support, I ask permission to lay before your Holiness the grounds of our belief, and to set forth some considerations that you have unfortunately overlooked. The momentous seriousness of the facts you refer to, the poverty, suffering and seething discontent that pervade the Christian world, the danger that passion may lead ignorance in a blind struggle against social conditions rapidly becoming intolerable, are my justification.

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American apologists for slavery used to contend that the black skin and woolly hair of the negro indicated the intent of nature that the black should serve the white; but the difference that you assume to be natural is between men of the same race. What difference does nature show between such men as would indicate her intent that one should live idly yet be rich, and the other should work hard yet be poor? If I could bring you from the United States a man who has $200,000,000, and one who is glad to work for a few dollars a week, and place them side by side in your antechamber, would you be able to tell which was which, even were you to call in the most skilled anatomist? Is it not clear that God in no way countenances or condones the division of rich and poor that exists today, or in any way permits it, except as having given them free will he permits men to choose either good or evil, and to avoid heaven if they prefer hell.
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The natural right which each man has is not that of demanding employment or wages from another man; but that of employing himself — that of applying by his own labor to the inexhaustible storehouse which the Creator has in the land provided for all men. Were that storehouse open, as by the single tax we would open it, the natural demand for labor would keep pace with the supply, the man who sold labor and the man who bought it would become free exchangers for mutual advantage, and all cause for dispute between workman and employer would be gone. For then, all being free to employ themselves, the mere opportunity to labor would cease to seem a boon; and since no one would work for another for less, all things considered, than he could earn by working for himself, wages would necessarily rise to their full value, and the relations of workman and employer be regulated by mutual interest and convenience.
This is the only way in which they can be satisfactorily regulated.
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Consider the moral teachings of the Encyclical:
• You tell us that God owes to man an inexhaustible storehouse which he finds only in the land. Yet you support a system that denies to the great majority of men all right of recourse to this storehouse.
• You tell us that the necessity of labor is a consequence of original sin. Yet you support a system that exempts a privileged class from the necessity for labor and enables them to shift their share and much more than their share of labor on others.
• You tell us that God has not created us for the perishable and transitory things of earth, but has given us this world as a place of exile and not as our true country. Yet you tell us that some of the exiles have the exclusive right of ownership in this place of common exile, so that they may compel their fellow-exiles to pay them for sojourning here, and that this exclusive ownership they may transfer to other exiles yet to come, with the same right of excluding their fellows.
• You tell us that virtue is the common inheritance of all; that all men are children of God the common Father; that all have the same last end; that all are redeemed by Jesus Christ; that the blessings of nature and the gifts of grace belong in common to all, and that to all except the unworthy is promised the inheritance of the Kingdom of Heaven! Yet in all this and through all this you insist as a moral duty on the maintenance of a system that makes the reservoir of all God’s material bounties and blessings to man the exclusive property of a few of their number — you give us equal rights in heaven, but deny us equal rights on earth!
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Here is the answer, the only true answer: If men lack bread it is not that God has not done his part in providing it. If men willing to labor are cursed with poverty, it is not that the storehouse that God owes men has failed; that the daily supply he has promised for the daily wants of his children is not here in abundance. It is, that impiously violating the benevolent intentions of their Creator, men have made land private property, and thus given into the exclusive ownership of the few the provision that a bountiful Father has made for all.
Any other answer than that, no matter how it may be shrouded in the mere forms of religion, is practically an atheistical answer.
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Wishing for your Holiness the chiefest of all blessings, that you may know the truth and be freed by the truth; wishing for you the days and the strength that may enable you by the great service you may render to humanity to make your pontificate through all coming time most glorious; and with the profound respect due to your personal character and to your exalted office, I am,
Yours sincerely,
HENRY GEORGE
NEW YORK, September 11, 1891.

Read Full letter here

An Open Letter to Pope Leo XIII by Henry George September, 1891

An Open Letter to Pope Leo XIII by Henry George September, 1891

To Pope Leo XIII.

http://www.wealthandwant.com/HG/the_condition_of_labor.htm

YOUR HOLINESS: I have read with care your Encyclical letter on the condition of labor, addressed, through the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops and Bishops of your faith, to the Christian World. Since its most strikingly pronounced condemnations are directed against a theory that we who hold it know to be deserving of your support, I ask permission to lay before your Holiness the grounds of our belief, and to set forth some considerations that you have unfortunately overlooked. The momentous seriousness of the facts you refer to, the poverty, suffering and seething discontent that pervade the Christian world, the danger that passion may lead ignorance in a blind struggle against social conditions rapidly becoming intolerable, are my justification.

I.

Our postulates are all stated or implied in your Encyclical. They are the primary perceptions of human reason, the fundamental teachings of the Christian faith:

We hold: That—

This world is the creation of God.

The men brought into it for the brief period of their earthly lives are the equal creatures of his bounty, the equal subjects of his provident care.

By his constitution man is beset by physical wants, on the satisfaction of which depend not only the maintenance of his physical life but also the development of his intellectual and spiritual life.

God has made the satisfaction of these wants dependent on man’s own exertions, giving him the power and laying on him the injunction to labor — a power that of itself raises him far above the brute, since we may reverently say that it enables him to become as it were a helper in the creative work.

God has not put on man the task of making bricks without straw. With the need for labor and the power to labor he has also given to man the material for labor. This material is land — man physically being a land animal, who can live only on and from land, and can use other elements, such as air, sunshine and water, only by the use of land.

Being the equal creatures of the Creator, equally entitled under his providence to live their lives and satisfy their needs, men are equally entitled to the use of land, and any adjustment that denies this equal use of land is morally wrong.
As to the right of ownership, we hold: That —

Being created individuals, with individual wants and powers, men are individually entitled (subject of course to the moral obligations that arise from such relations as that of the family) to the use of their own powers and the enjoyment of the results. There thus arises, anterior to human law, and deriving its validity from the law of God, a right of private ownership in things produced by labor — a right that the possessor may transfer, but of which to deprive him without his will is theft.

This right of property, originating in the right of the individual to himself, is the only full and complete right of property. It attaches to things produced by labor, but cannot attach to things created by God.

Thus, if a man take a fish from the ocean he acquires a right of property in that fish, which exclusive right he may transfer by sale or gift. But he cannot obtain a similar right of property in the ocean, so that he may sell it or give it or forbid others to use it.

Or, if he set up a windmill he acquires a right of property in the things such use of wind enables him to produce. But he cannot claim a right of property in the wind itself, so that he may sell it or forbid others to use it.

Or, if he cultivate grain he acquires a right of property in the grain his labor brings forth. But he cannot obtain a similar right of property in the sun which ripened it or the soil on which it grew. For these things are of the continuing gifts of God to all generations of men, which all may use, but none may claim as his alone.

To attach to things created by God the same right of private ownership that justly attaches to things produced by labor is to impair and deny the true rights of property. For a man who out of the proceeds of his labor is obliged to pay another man for the use of ocean or air or sunshine or soil, all of which are to men involved in the single term land, is in this deprived of his rightful property and thus robbed.


As to the use of land
, we hold: That —

While the right of ownership that justly attaches to things produced by labor cannot attach to land, there may attach to land a right of possession. As your Holiness says, “God has not granted the earth to mankind in general in the sense that all without distinction can deal with it as they please,” and regulations necessary for its best use may be fixed by human laws. But such regulations must conform to the moral law — must secure to all equal participation in the advantages of God’s general bounty. The principle is the same as where a human father leaves property equally to a number of children. Some of the things thus left may be incapable of common use or of specific division. Such things may properly be assigned to some of the children, but only under condition that the equality of benefit among them all be preserved.

In the rudest social state, while industry consists in hunting, fishing, and gathering the spontaneous fruits of the earth, private possession of land is not necessary. But as men begin to cultivate the ground and expend their labor in permanent works, private possession of the land on which labor is thus expended is needed to secure the right of property in the products of labor. For who would sow if not assured of the exclusive possession needed to enable him to reap? who would attach costly works to the soil without such exclusive possession of the soil as would enable him to secure the benefit?

This right of private possession in things created by God is however very different from the right of private ownership in things produced by labor. The one is limited, the other unlimited, save in cases when the dictate of self-preservation terminates all other rights. The purpose of the one, the exclusive possession of land, is merely to secure the other, the exclusive ownership of the products of labor; and it can never rightfully be carried so far as to impair or deny this. While any one may hold exclusive possession of land so far as it does not interfere with the equal rights of others, he can rightfully hold it no further.

Thus Cain and Abel, were there only two men on earth, might by agreement divide the earth between them. Under this compact each might claim exclusive right to his share as against the other. But neither could rightfully continue such claim against the next man born. For since no one comes into the world without God’s permission, his presence attests his equal right to the use of God’s bounty. For them to refuse him any use of the earth which they had divided between them would therefore be for them to commit murder. And for them to refuse him any use of the earth, unless by laboring for them or by giving them part of the products of his labor he bought it of them, would be for them to commit theft.

God’s laws do not change. Though their applications may alter with altering conditions, the same principles of right and wrong that hold when men are few and industry is rude also hold amid teeming populations and complex industries. In our cities of millions and our states of scores of millions, in a civilization where the division of labor has gone so far that large numbers are hardly conscious that they are land-users, it still remains true that we are all land animals and can live only on land, and that land is God’s bounty to all, of which no one can be deprived without being murdered, and for which no one can be compelled to pay another without being robbed. But even in a state of society where the elaboration of industry and the increase of permanent improvements have made the need for private possession of land wide-spread, there is no difficulty in conforming individual possession with the equal right to land. For as soon as any piece of land will yield to the possessor a larger return than is had by similar labor on other land a value attaches to it which is shown when it is sold or rented. Thus, the value of the land itself, irrespective of the value of any improvements in or on it, always indicates the precise value of the benefit to which all are entitled in its use, as distinguished from the value which, as producer or successor of a producer, belongs to the possessor in individual right.

To combine the advantages of private possession with the justice of common ownership it is only necessary therefore to take for common uses what value attaches to land irrespective of any exertion of labor on it. The principle is the same as in the case referred to, where a human father leaves equally to his children things not susceptible of specific division or common use. In that case such things would be sold or rented and the value equally applied.

It is on this common-sense principle that we, who term ourselves single-tax men, would have the community act.We do not propose to assert equal rights to land by keeping land common, letting any one use any part of it at any time. We do not propose the task, impossible in the present state of society, of dividing land in equal shares; still less the yet more impossible task of keeping it so divided.

We propose — leaving land in the private possession of individuals, with full liberty on their part to give, sell or bequeath it — simply to levy on it for public uses a tax that shall equal the annual value of the land itself, irrespective of the use made of it or the improvements on it. And since this would provide amply for the need of public revenues, we would accompany this tax on land values with the repeal of all taxes now levied on the products and processes of industry — which taxes, since they take from the earnings of labor, we hold to be infringements of the right of property.

This we propose, not as a cunning device of human ingenuity, but as a conforming of human regulations to the will of God.

God cannot contradict himself nor impose on his creatures laws that clash.

If it be God’s command to men that they should not steal — that is to say, that they should respect the right of property which each one has in the fruits of his labor;

And if he be also the Father of all men, who in his common bounty has intended all to have equal opportunities for sharing;

Then, in any possible stage of civilization, however elaborate, there must be some way in which the exclusive right to the products of industry may be reconciled with the equal right to land.

If the Almighty be consistent with himself, it cannot be, as say those socialists referred to by you, that in order to secure the equal participation of men in the opportunities of life and labor we must ignore the right of private property. Nor yet can it be, as you yourself in the Encyclical seem to argue, that to secure the right of private property we must ignore the equality of right in the opportunities of life and labor. To say the one thing or the other is equally to deny the harmony of God’s laws.

But, the private possession of land, subject to the payment to the community of the value of any special advantage thus given to the individual, satisfies both laws, securing to all equal participation in the bounty of the Creator and to each the full ownership of the products of his labor.

Nor do we hesitate to say that this way of securing the equal right to the bounty of the Creator and the exclusive right to the products of labor is the way intended by God for raising public revenues. For we are not atheists, who deny God; nor semi-atheists, who deny that he has any concern in politics and legislation.

It is true as you say — a salutary truth too often forgotten — that “man is older than the state, and he holds the right of providing for the life of his body prior to the formation of any state.” Yet, as you too perceive, it is also true that the state is in the divinely appointed order. For He who foresaw all things and provided for all things, foresaw and provided that with the increase of population and the development of industry the organization of human society into states or governments would become both expedient and necessary.

No sooner does the state arise than, as we all know, it needs revenues. This need for revenues is small at first, while population is sparse, industry rude and the functions of the state few and simple. But with growth of population and advance of civilization the functions of the state increase and larger and larger revenues are needed.

Now, He that made the world and placed man in it, He that pre-ordained civilization as the means whereby man might rise to higher powers and become more and more conscious of the works of his Creator, must have foreseen this increasing need for state revenues and have made provision for it. That is to say: The increasing need for public revenues with social advance, being a natural, God-ordained need, there must be a right way of raising them — some way that we can truly say is the way intended by God. It is clear that this right way of raising public revenues must accord with the moral law.

Hence:

It must not take from individuals what rightfully belongs to individuals.

It must not give some an advantage over others, as by increasing the prices of what some have to sell and others must buy.

It must not lead men into temptation, by requiring trivial oaths, by making it profitable to lie, to swear falsely, to bribe or to take bribes.

It must not confuse the distinctions of right and wrong, and weaken the sanctions of religion and the state by creating crimes that are not sins, and punishing men for doing what in itself they have an undoubted right to do.

It must not repress industry. It must not check commerce. It must not punish thrift. It must offer no impediment to the largest production and the fairest division of wealth.

Let me ask your Holiness to consider the taxes on the processes and products of industry by which through the civilized world public revenues are collected — the octroi duties that surround Italian cities with barriers; the monstrous customs duties that hamper intercourse between so-called Christian states; the taxes on occupations, on earnings, on investments, on the building of houses, on the cultivation of fields, on industry and thrift in all forms. Can these be the ways God has intended that governments should raise the means they need? Have any of them the characteristics indispensable in any plan we can deem a right one?

All these taxes violate the moral law. They take by force what belongs to the individual alone; they give to the unscrupulous an advantage over the scrupulous; they have the effect, nay are largely intended, to increase the price of what some have to sell and others must buy; they corrupt government; they make oaths a mockery; they shackle commerce; they fine industry and thrift; they lessen the wealth that men might enjoy, and enrich some by impoverishing others.

Yet what most strikingly shows how opposed to Christianity is this system of raising public revenues is its influence on thought.

Christianity teaches us that all men are brethren; that their true interests are harmonious, not antagonistic. It gives us, as the golden rule of life, that we should do to others as we would have others do to us. But out of the system of taxing the products and processes of labor, and out of its effects in increasing the price of what some have to sell and others must buy, has grown the theory of “protection,” which denies this gospel, which holds Christ ignorant of political economy and proclaims laws of national well-being utterly at variance with his teaching. This theory sanctifies national hatreds; it inculcates a universal war of hostile tariffs; it teaches peoples that their prosperity lies in imposing on the productions of other peoples restrictions they do not wish imposed on their own; and instead of the Christian doctrine of man’s brotherhood it makes injury of foreigners a civic virtue.

“By their fruits ye shall know them.” Can anything more clearly show that to tax the products and processes of industry is not the way God intended public revenues to be raised?

But to consider what we propose — the raising of public revenues by a single tax on the value of land irrespective of improvements — is to see that in all respects this does conform to the moral law.

Let me ask your Holiness to keep in mind that the value we propose to tax, the value of land irrespective of improvements, does not come from any exertion of labor or investment of capital on or in it — the values produced in this way being values of improvement which we would exempt. The value of land irrespective of improvement is the value that attaches to land by reason of increasing population and social progress. This is a value that always goes to the owner as owner, and never does and never can go to the user; for if the user be a different person from the owner he must always pay the owner for it in rent or in purchase-money; while if the user be also the owner, it is as owner, not as user, that he receives it, and by selling or renting the land he can, as owner, continue to receive it after he ceases to be a user.

Thus, taxes on land irrespective of improvement cannot lessen the rewards of industry, nor add to prices,* nor in any way take from the individual what belongs to the individual. They can take only the value that attaches to land by the growth of the community, and which therefore belongs to the community as a whole.

* As to this point it may be well to add that all economists are agreed that taxes on land values irrespective of improvement or use — or what in the terminology of political economy is styled rent, a term distinguished from the ordinary use of the word rent by being applied solely to payments for the use of land itself — must be paid by the owner and cannot be shifted by him on the user. To explain in another way the reason given in the text: Price is not determined by the will of the seller or the will of the buyer, but by the equation of demand and supply, and therefore as to things constantly demanded and constantly produced rests at a point determined by the cost of production — whatever tends to increase the cost of bringing fresh quantities of such articles to the consumer increasing price by checking supply, and whatever tends to reduce such cost decreasing price by increasing supply. Thus taxes on wheat or tobacco or cloth add to the price that the consumer must pay, and thus the cheapening in the cost of producing steel which improved processes have made in recent years has greatly reduced the price of steel. But land has no cost of production, since it is created by God, not produced by man. Its price therefore is fixed —

1 (monopoly rent), where land is held in close monopoly, by what the owners can extract from the users under penalty of deprivation and consequently of starvation, and amounts to all that common labor can earn on it beyond what is necessary to life;
2 (economic rent proper), where there is no special monopoly, by what the particular land will yield to common labor over and above what may be had by like expenditure and exertion on land having no special advantage and for which no rent is paid; and,
3 (speculative rent, which is a species of monopoly rent, telling particularly in selling price), by the expectation of future increase of value from social growth and improvement, which expectation causing landowners to withhold land at present prices has the same effect as combination.

Taxes on land values or economic rent can therefore never be shifted by the landowner to the land-user, since they in no wise increase the demand for land or enable landowners to check supply by withholding land from use. Where rent depends on mere monopolization, a case I mention because rent may in this way be demanded for the use of land even before economic or natural rent arises, the taking by taxation of what the landowners were able to extort from labor could not enable them to extort any more, since laborers, if not left enough to live on, will die. So, in the case of economic rent proper, to take from the landowners the premiums they receive, would in no way increase the superiority of their land and the demand for it. While, so far as price is affected by speculative rent, to compel the landowners to pay taxes on the value of land whether they were getting any income from it or not, would make it more difficult for them to withhold land from use; and to tax the full value would not merely destroy the power but the desire to do so.

To take land values for the state, abolishing all taxes on the products of labor, would therefore leave to the laborer the full produce of labor; to the individual all that rightfully belongs to the individual. It would impose no burden on industry, no check on commerce, no punishment on thrift; it would secure the largest production and the fairest distribution of wealth, by leaving men free to produce and to exchange as they please, without any artificial enhancement of prices; and by taking for public purposes a value that cannot be carried off, that cannot be hidden, that of all values is most easily ascertained and most certainly and cheaply collected, it would enormously lessen the number of officials, dispense with oaths, do away with temptations to bribery and evasion, and abolish man-made crimes in themselves innocent.

But, further: That God has intended the state to obtain the revenues it needs by the taxation of land values is shown by the same order and degree of evidence that shows that God has intended the milk of the mother for the nourishment of the babe.

See how close is the analogy. In that primitive condition ere the need for the state arises there are no land values. The products of labor have value, but in the sparsity of population no value as yet attaches to land itself. But as increasing density of population and increasing elaboration of industry necessitate the organization of the state, with its need for revenues, value begins to attach to land. As population still increases and industry grows more elaborate, so the needs for public revenues increase. And at the same time and from the same causes land values increase. The connection is invariable. The value of things produced by labor tends to decline with social development, since the larger scale of production and the improvement of processes tend steadily to reduce their cost. But the value of land on which population centers goes up and up. Take Rome or Paris or London or New York or Melbourne. Consider the enormous value of land in such cities as compared with the value of land in sparsely settled parts of the same countries. To what is this due? Is it not due to the density and activity of the populations of those cities — to the very causes that require great public expenditure for streets, drains, public buildings, and all the many things needed for the health, convenience and safety of such great cities? See how with the growth of such cities the one thing that steadily increases in value is land; how the opening of roads, the building of railways, the making of any public improvement, adds to the value of land. Is it not clear that here is a natural law — that is to say a tendency willed by the Creator? Can it mean anything else than that He who ordained the state with its needs has in the values which attach to land provided the means to meet those needs?

 

That it does mean this and nothing else is confirmed if we look deeper still, and inquire not merely as to the intent, but as to the purpose of the intent. If we do so we may see in this natural law by which land values increase with the growth of society not only such a perfectly adapted provision for the needs of society as gratifies our intellectual perceptions by showing us the wisdom of the Creator, but a purpose with regard to the individual that gratifies our moral perceptions by opening to us a glimpse of his beneficence.

Consider: Here is a natural law by which as society advances the one thing that increases in value is land — a natural law by virtue of which all growth of population, all advance of the arts, all general improvements of whatever kind, add to a fund that both the commands of justice and the dictates of expediency prompt us to take for the common uses of society. Now, since increase in the fund available for the common uses of society is increase in the gain that goes equally to each member of society, is it not clear that the law by which land values increase with social advance while the value of the products of labor does not increase, tends with the advance of civilization to make the share that goes equally to each member of society more and more important as compared with what goes to him from his individual earnings, and thus to make the advance of civilization lessen relatively the differences that in a ruder social state must exist between the strong and the weak, the fortunate and the unfortunate? Does it not show the purpose of the Creator to be that the advance of man in civilization should be an advance not merely to larger powers but to a greater and greater equality, instead of what we, by our ignoring of his intent, are making it, an advance toward a more and more monstrous inequality?

 

That the value attaching to land with social growth is intended for social needs is shown by the final proof. God is indeed a jealous God in the sense that nothing but injury and disaster can attend the effort of men to do things other than in the way he has intended; in the sense that where the blessings he proffers to men are refused or misused they turn to evils that scourge us. And just as for the mother to withhold the provision that fills her breast with the birth of the child is to endanger physical health, so for society to refuse to take for social uses the provision intended for them is to breed social disease.

For refusal to take for public purposes the increasing values that attach to land with social growth is to necessitate the getting of public revenues by taxes that lessen production, distort distribution and corrupt society. It is to leave some to take what justly belongs to all; it is to forego the only means by which it is possible in an advanced civilization to combine the security of possession that is necessary to improvement with the equality of natural opportunity that is the most important of all natural rights. It is thus at the basis of all social life to set up an unjust inequality between man and man, compelling some to pay others for the privilege of living, for the chance of working, for the advantages of civilization, for the gifts of their God. But it is even more than this. The very robbery that the masses of men thus suffer gives rise in advancing communities to a new robbery. For the value that with the increase of population and social advance attaches to land being suffered to go to individuals who have secured ownership of the land, it prompts to a forestalling of and speculation in land wherever there is any prospect of advancing population or of coming improvement, thus producing an artificial scarcity of the natural elements of life and labor, and a strangulation of production that shows itself in recurring spasms of industrial depression as disastrous to the world as destructive wars. It is this that is driving men from the old countries to the new countries, only to bring there the same curses. It is this that causes our material advance not merely to fail to improve the condition of the mere worker, but to make the condition of large classes positively worse. It is this that in our richest Christian countries is giving us a large population whose lives are harder, more hopeless, more degraded than those of the veriest savages. It is this that leads so many men to think that God is a bungler and is constantly bringing more people into his world than he has made provision for; or that there is no God, and that belief in him is a superstition which the facts of life and the advance of science are dispelling.

The darkness in light, the weakness in strength, the poverty amid wealth, the seething discontent foreboding civil strife, that characterize our civilization of today, are the natural, the inevitable results of our rejection of God’s beneficence, of our ignoring of his intent. Were we on the other hand to follow his clear, simple rule of right, leaving scrupulously to the individual all that individual labor produces, and taking for the community the value that attaches to land by the growth of the community itself, not merely could evil modes of raising public revenues be dispensed with, but all men would be placed on an equal level of opportunity with regard to the bounty of their Creator, on an equal level of opportunity to exert their labor and to enjoy its fruits. And then, without drastic or restrictive measures the forestalling of land would cease. For then the possession of land would mean only security for the permanence of its use, and there would be no object for any one to get land or to keep land except for use; nor would his possession of better land than others had confer any unjust advantage on him, or unjust deprivation on them, since the equivalent of the advantage would be taken by the state for the benefit of all.

The Right Reverend Dr. Thomas Nulty, Bishop of Meath, who sees all this as clearly as we do, in pointing out to the clergy and laity of his diocese* the design of Divine Providence that the rent of land should be taken for the community, says:

I think, therefore, that I may fairly infer, on the strength of authority as well as of reason, that the people are and always must be the real owners of the land of their country. This great social fact appears to me to be of incalculable importance, and it is fortunate, indeed, that on the strictest principles of justice it is not clouded even by a shadow of uncertainty or doubt. There is, moreover, a charm and a peculiar beauty in the clearness with which it reveals the wisdom and the benevolence of the designs of Providence in the admirable provision he has made for the wants and the necessities of that state of social existence of which he is author, and in which the very instincts of nature tell us we are to spend our lives. A vast public property, a great national fund, has been placed under the dominion and at the disposal of the nation to supply itself abundantly with resources necessary to liquidate the expenses of its government, the administration of its laws and the education of its youth, and to enable it to provide for the suitable sustentation and support of its criminal and pauper population. One of the most interesting peculiarities of this property is that its value is never stationary; it is constantly progressive and increasing in a direct ratio to the growth of the population, and the very causes thatincrease and multiply the demands made on it increase proportionately its ability to meet them.
* Letter addressed to the Clergy and Laity of the Diocese of Meath, Ireland, April 2, 1881.

There is, indeed, as Bishop Nulty says, a peculiar beauty in the clearness with which the wisdom and benevolence of Providence are revealed in this great social fact, the provision made for the common needs of society in what economists call the law of rent. Of all the evidence that natural religion gives, it is this that most clearly shows the existence of a beneficent God, and most conclusively silences the doubts that in our days lead so many to materialism.

For in this beautiful provision made by natural law for the social needs of civilization we see that God has intended civilization; that all our discoveries and inventions do not and cannot outrun his forethought, and that steam, electricity and labor-saving appliances only make the great moral laws clearer and more important. In the growth of this great fund, increasing with social advance — a fund that accrues from the growth of the community and belongs therefore to the community — we see not only that there is no need for the taxes that lessen wealth, that engender corruption, that promote inequality and teach men to deny the gospel; but that to take this fund for the purpose for which it was evidently intended would in the highest civilization secure to all the equal enjoyment of God’s bounty, the abundant opportunity to satisfy their wants, and would provide amply for every legitimate need of the state. We see that God in his dealings with men has not been a bungler or a niggard; that he has not brought too many men into the world; that he has not neglected abundantly to supply them; that he has not intended that bitter competition of the masses for a mere animal existence and that monstrous aggregation of wealth which characterize our civilization; but that these evils which lead so many to say there is no God, or yet more impiously to say that they are of God’s ordering, are due to our denial of his moral law. We see that the law of justice, the law of the Golden Rule, is not a mere counsel of perfection, but indeed the law of social life. We see that if we were only to observe it there would be work for all, leisure for all, abundance for all; and that civilization would tend to give to the poorest not only necessities, but all comforts and reasonable luxuries as well. We see that Christ was not a mere dreamer when he told men that if they would seek the kingdom of God and its right-doing they might no more worry about material things than do the lilies of the field about their raiment; but that he was only declaring what political economy in the light of modern discovery shows to be a sober truth.

Your Holiness, even to see this is deep and lasting joy. For it is to see for one’s self that there is a God who lives and reigns, and that be is a God of justice and love — Our Father who art in Heaven. It is to open a rift of sunlight through the clouds of our darker questionings, and to make the faith that trusts where it cannot see a living thing.

II.

Your Holiness will see from the explanation I have given that the reform we propose, like all true reforms, has both an ethical and an economic side. By ignoring the ethical side, and pushing our proposal merely as a reform of taxation, we could avoid the objections that arise from confounding ownership with possession and attributing to private property in land that security of use and improvement that can be had even better without it. All that we seek practically is the legal abolition, as fast as possible, of taxes on the products and processes of labor, and the consequent concentration of taxation on land values irrespective of improvements. To put our proposals in this way would be to urge them merely as a matter of wise public expediency.

There are indeed many single-tax men who do put our proposals in this way; who seeing the beauty of our plan from a fiscal standpoint do not concern themselves further. But to those who think as I do, the ethical is the more important side. Not only do we not wish to evade the question of private property in land, but to us it seems that the beneficent and far-reaching revolution we aim at is too great a thing to be accomplished by “intelligent self-interest,” and can be carried by nothing less than the religious conscience.

Hence we earnestly seek the judgment of religion. This is the tribunal of which your Holiness as the head of the largest body of Christians is the most august representative.

It therefore behooves us to examine the reasons you urge in support of private property in land — if they be sound to accept them, and if they be not sound respectfully to point out to you wherein is their error.

To your proposition that “Our first and most fundamental principle when we undertake to alleviate the condition of the masses must be the inviolability of private property” we would joyfully agree if we could only understand you to have in mind the moral element, and to mean rightful private property, as when you speak of marriage as ordained by God’s authority we may understand an implied exclusion of improper marriages. Unfortunately, however, other expressions show that you mean private property in general and have expressly in mind private property in land. This confusion of thought, this non-distribution of terms, runs through your whole argument, leading you to conclusions so unwarranted by your premises as to be utterly repugnant to them, as when from the moral sanction of private property in the things produced by labor you infer something entirely different and utterly opposed, a similar right of property in the land created by God.

Private property is not of one species, and moral sanction can no more be asserted universally of it than of marriage. That proper marriage conforms to the law of God does not justify the polygamic or polyandric or incestuous marriages that are in some countries permitted by the civil law. And as there may be immoral marriage so may there be immoral private property. Private property is that which may be held in ownership by an individual, or that which may be held in ownership by an individual with the sanction of the state. The mere lawyer, the mere servant of the state, may rest here, refusing to distinguish between what the state holds equally lawful. Your Holiness, however, is not a servant of the state, but a servant of God, a guardian of morals. You know, as said by St. Thomas of Aquin, that —

Human law is law only in virtue of its accordance with right reason and it is thus manifest that it flows from the eternal law. And in so far as it deviates from right reason it is called an unjust law. In such case it is not law at all, but rather a species of violence.

Thus, that any species of property is permitted by the state does not of itself give it moral sanction. The state has often made things property that are not justly property, but involve violence and robbery. For instance, the things of religion, the dignity and authority of offices of the church, the power of administering her sacraments and controlling her temporalities, have often by profligate princes been given as salable property to courtiers and concubines. At this very day in England an atheist or a heathen may buy in open market, and hold as legal property, to be sold, given or bequeathed as he pleases, the power of appointing to the cure of souls, and the value of these legal rights of presentation is said to be no less than £17,000,000.

Or again: Slaves were universally treated as property by the customs and laws of the classical nations, and were so acknowledged in Europe long after the acceptance of Christianity. At the beginning of this century there was no Christian nation that did not, in her colonies at least, recognize property in slaves, and slaveships crossed the seas under Christian flags. In the United States, little more than thirty years ago, to buy a man gave the same legal ownership as to buy a horse, and in Mohammedan countries law and custom yet make the slave the property of his captor or purchaser.

Yet your Holiness, one of the glories of whose pontificate is the attempt to break up slavery in its last strongholds, will not contend that the moral sanction that attaches to property in things produced by labor can, or ever could, apply to property in slaves.

Your use, in so many passages of your Encyclical, of the inclusive term “property” or “private” property, of which in morals nothing can be either affirmed or denied, makes your meaning, if we take isolated sentences, in many places ambiguous. But reading it as a whole, there can be no doubt of your intention that private property in land shall be understood when you speak merely of private property. With this interpretation, I find that the reasons you urge for private property in land are eight. Let us consider them in order of presentation. You urge:


1. That what is bought with rightful property is rightful property. (5.)*

* To facilitate references the paragraphs of the Encyclical are indicated by number.

Clearly, purchase and sale cannot give, but can only transfer ownership. Property that in itself has no moral sanction does not obtain moral sanction by passing from seller to buyer.

If right reason does not make the slave the property of the slave-hunter it does not make him the property of the slave-buyer. Yet your reasoning as to private property in land would as well justify property in slaves. To show this it is only needful to change in your argument the word land to the word slave. It would then read:

It is surely undeniable that, when a man engages in remunerative labor, the very reason and motive of his work is to obtain property, and to hold it as his own private possession.

If one man hires out to another his strength or his industry, he does this for the purpose of receiving in return what is necessary for food and living; he thereby expressly proposes to acquire a full and legal right, not only to the remuneration, but also to the disposal of that remuneration as he pleases.

Thus, if he lives sparingly, saves money, and invests his savings, for greater security, in a slave, the slave in such a case is only his wages in another form; and consequently, a working-man’s slave thus purchased should be as completely at his own disposal as the wages he receives for his labor.

Nor in turning your argument for private property in land into an argument for private property in men am I doing a new thing. In my own country, in my own time, this very argument, that purchase gave ownership, was the common defense of slavery. It was made by statesmen, by jurists, by clergymen, by bishops; it was accepted over the whole country by the great mass of the people. By it was justified the separation of wives from husbands, of children from parents, the compelling of labor, the appropriation of its fruits, the buying and selling of Christians by Christians. In language almost identical with yours it was asked, “Here is a poor man who has worked hard, lived sparingly, and invested his savings in a few slaves. Would you rob him of his earnings by liberating those slaves?” Or it was said: “Here is a poor widow; all her husband has been able to leave her is a few negroes, the earnings of his hard toil. Would you rob the widow and the orphan by freeing these negroes?” And because of this perversion of reason, this confounding of unjust property rights with just property rights, this acceptance of man’s law as though it were God’s law, there came on our nation a judgment of fire and blood.

The error of our people in thinking that what in itself was not rightfully property could become rightful property by purchase and sale is the same error into which your Holiness falls. It is not merely formally the same; it is essentially the same. Private property in land, no less than private property in slaves, is a violation of the true rights of property. They are different forms of the same robbery; twin devices by which the perverted ingenuity of man has sought to enable the strong and the cunning to escape God’s requirement of labor by forcing it on others.

What difference does it make whether I merely own the land on which another man must live or own the man himself? Am I not in the one case as much his master as in the other? Can I not compel him to work for me? Can I not take to myself as much of the fruits of his labor; as fully dictate his actions? Have I not over him the power of life and death?

For to deprive a man of land is as certainly to kill him as to deprive him of blood by opening his veins, or of air by tightening a halter around his neck.

The essence of slavery is in empowering one man to obtain the labor of another without recompense. Private property in land does this as fully as chattel slavery. The slave-owner must leave to the slave enough of his earnings to enable him to live. Are there not in so-called free countries great bodies of working-men who get no more? How much more of the fruits of their toil do the agricultural laborers of Italy and England get than did the slaves of our Southern States? Did not private property in land permit the landowner of Europe in ruder times to demand the jus primae noctis? Does not the same last outrage exist today in diffused form in the immorality born of monstrous wealth on the one hand and ghastly poverty on the other?

In what did the slavery of Russia consist but in giving to the master land on which the serf was forced to live? When an Ivan or a Catherine enriched their favorites with the labor of others they did not give men, they gave land. And when the appropriation of land has gone so far that no free land remains to which the landless man may turn, then without further violence the more insidious form of labor robbery involved in private property in land takes the place of chattel slavery, because more economical and convenient. For under it the slave does not have to be caught or held, or to be fed when not needed. He comes of himself, begging the privilege of serving, and when no longer wanted can be discharged. The lash is unnecessary; hunger is as efficacious. This is why the Norman conquerors of England and the English conquerors of Ireland did not divide up the people, but divided the land. This is why European slave-ships took their cargoes to the New World, not to Europe.

Slavery is not yet abolished. Though in all Christian countries its ruder form has now gone, it still exists in the heart of our civilization in more insidious form, and is increasing. There is work to be done for the glory of God and the liberty of man by other soldiers of the cross than those warrior monks whom, with the blessing of your Holiness, Cardinal Lavigerie is sending into the Sahara. Yet, your Encyclical employs in defense of one form of slavery the same fallacies that the apologists for chattel slavery used in defense of the other!

The Arabs are not wanting in acumen. Your Encyclical reaches far. What shall your warrior monks say, if when at the muzzle of their rifles they demand of some Arab slave-merchant his miserable caravan, he shall declare that he bought them with his savings, and producing a copy of your Encyclical, shall prove by your reasoning that his slaves are consequently “only his wages in another form,” and ask if they who bear your blessing and own your authority propose to “deprive him of the liberty of disposing of his wages and thus of all hope and possibility of increasing his stock and bettering his condition in life”?

 

2. That private property in land proceeds from man’s gift of reason. (6-7.)

In the second place your Holiness argues that man possessing reason and forethought may not only acquire ownership of the fruits of the earth, but also of the earth itself, so that out of its products he may make provision for the future.

Reason, with its attendant forethought, is indeed the distinguishing attribute of man; that which raises him above the brute, and shows, as the Scriptures declare, that he is created in the likeness of God. And this gift of reason does, as your Holiness points out, involve the need and right of private property in whatever is produced by the exertion of reason and its attendant forethought, as well as in what is produced by physical labor. In truth, these elements of man’s production are inseparable, and labor involves the use of reason. It is by his reason that man differs from the animals in being a producer, and in this sense a maker. Of themselves his physical powers are slight, forming as it were but the connection by which the mind takes hold of material things, so as to utilize to its will the matter and forces of nature. It is mind, the intelligent reason, that is the prime mover in labor, the essential agent in production.

The right of private ownership does therefore indisputably attach to things provided by man’s reason and forethought. But it cannot attach to things provided by the reason and forethought of God!

To illustrate: Let us suppose a company traveling through the desert as the Israelites traveled from Egypt. Such of them as had the forethought to provide themselves with vessels of water would acquire a just right of property in the water so carried, and in the thirst of the waterless desert those who had neglected to provide themselves, though they might ask water from the provident in charity, could not demand it in right. For while water itself is of the providence of God, the presence of this water in such vessels, at such place, results from the providence of the men who carried it. Thus they have to it an exclusive right.

But suppose others use their forethought in pushing ahead and appropriating the springs, refusing when their fellows come up to let them drink of the water save as they buy it of them. Would such forethought give any right?

Your Holiness, it is not the forethought of carrying water where it is needed, but the forethought of seizing springs, that you seek to defend in defending the private ownership of land!

Let me show this more fully, since it may be worth while to meet those who say that if private property in land be not just, then private property in the products of labor is not just, as the material of these products is taken from land. It will be seen on consideration that all of man’s production is analogous to such transportation of water as we have supposed. In growing grain, or smelting metals, or building houses, or weaving cloth, or doing any of the things that constitute producing, all that man does is to change in place or form preexisting matter. As a producer man is merely a changer, not a creator; God alone creates. And since the changes in which man’s production consists inhere in matter so long as they persist, the right of private ownership attaches the accident to the essence, and gives the right of ownership in that natural material in which the labor of production is embodied. Thus water, which in its original form and place is the common gift of God to all men, when drawn from its natural reservoir and brought into the desert, passes rightfully into the ownership of the individual who by changing its place has produced it there.

But such right of ownership is in reality a mere right of temporary possession. For though man may take material from the storehouse of nature and change it in place or form to suit his desires, yet from the moment he takes it, it tends back to that storehouse again. Wood decays, iron rusts, stone disintegrates and is displaced, while of more perishable products, some will last for only a few months, others for only a few days, and some disappear immediately on use. Though, so far as we can see, matter is eternal and force forever persists; though we can neither annihilate nor create the tiniest mote that floats in a sunbeam or the faintest impulse that stirs a leaf, yet in the ceaseless flux of nature, man’s work of moving and combining constantly passes away. Thus the recognition of the ownership of what natural material is embodied in the products of man never constitutes more than temporary possession — never interferes with the reservoir provided for all. As taking water from one place and carrying it to another place by no means lessens the store of water, since whether it is drunk or spilled or left to evaporate, it must return again to the natural reservoirs — so is it with all things on which man in production can lay the impress of his labor.

Hence, when you say that man’s reason puts it within his right to have in stable and permanent possession not only things that perish in the using, but also those that remain for use in the future, you are right in so far as you may include such things as buildings, which with repair will last for generations, with such things as food or fire-wood, which are destroyed in the use. But when you infer that man can have private ownership in those permanent things of nature that are the reservoirs from which all must draw, you are clearly wrong. Man may indeed hold in private ownership the fruits of the earth produced by his labor, since they lose in time the impress of that labor, and pass again into the natural reservoirs from which they were taken, and thus the ownership of them by one works no injury to others. But he cannot so own the earth itself, for that is the reservoir from which must constantly be drawn not only the material with which alone men can produce, but even their very bodies.
The conclusive reason why man cannot claim ownership in the earth itself as he can in the fruits that he by labor brings forth from it, is in the facts stated by you in the very next paragraph (7), when you truly say:

Man’s needs do not die out, but recur; satisfied today, they demand new supplies tomorrow. Nature, therefore, owes to man a storehouse that shall never fail, the daily supply of his daily wants. And this he finds only in the inexhaustible fertility of the earth.

By man you mean all men. Can what nature owes to all men be made the private property of some men, from which they may debar all other men?

Let me dwell on the words of your Holiness, “Nature, therefore, owes to man a storehouse that shall never fail.” By Nature you mean God. Thus your thought, that in creating us, God himself has incurred an obligation to provide us with a storehouse that shall never fail, is the same as is thus expressed and carried to its irresistible conclusion by the Bishop of Meath:

God was perfectly free in the act by which He created us; but having created us he bound himself by that act to provide us with the means necessary for our subsistence. The land is the only source of this kind now known to us. The land, therefore, of every country is the common property of the people of that country, because its real owner, the Creator who made it, has transferred it as a voluntary gift to them. “Terram autem dedit filiis hominum.” Now, as every individual in that country is a creature and child of God, and as all his creatures are equal in his sight, any settlement of the land of a country that would exclude the humblest man in that country from his share of the common inheritance would be not only an injustice and a wrong to that man, but, moreover, be AN IMPIOUS RESISTANCE TO THE BENEVOLENT INTENTIONS OF HIS CREATOR.

 

3. That private property in land deprives no one of the use of land. (8.)

Your own statement that land is the inexhaustible storehouse that God owes to man must have aroused in your Holiness’s mind an uneasy questioning of its appropriation as private property, for, as though to reassure yourself, you proceed to argue that its ownership by some will not injure others. You say in substance, that even though divided among private owners the earth does not cease to minister to the needs of all, since those who do not possess the soil can by selling their labor obtain in payment the produce of the land.

Suppose that to your Holiness as a judge of morals one should put this case of conscience:

I am one of several children to whom our father left a field abundant for our support. As he assigned no part of it to any one of us in particular, leaving the limits of our separate possession to be fixed by ourselves, I being the eldest took the whole field in exclusive ownership. But in doing so I have not deprived my brothers of their support from it, for I have let them work for me on it, paying them from the produce as much wages as I would have had to pay strangers. Is there any reason why my conscience should not be clear?

What would be your answer? Would you not tell him that he was in mortal sin, and that his excuse added to his guilt? Would you not call on him to make restitution and to do penance?

Or, suppose that as a temporal prince your Holiness were ruler of a rainless land, such as Egypt, where there were no springs or brooks, their want being supplied by a bountiful river like the Nile. Supposing that having sent a number of your subjects to make fruitful this land, bidding them do justly and prosper, you were told that some of them had set up a claim of ownership in the river, refusing the others a drop of water, except as they bought it of them; and that thus they had become rich without work, while the others, though working hard, were so impoverished by paying for water as to be hardly able to exist?

Would not your indignation wax hot when this was told?

Suppose that then the river-owners should send to you and thus excuse their action:

The river, though divided among private owners, ceases not thereby to minister to the needs of all, for there is no one who drinks who does not drink of the water of the river. Those who do not possess the water of the river contribute their labor to get it; so that it may be truly said that all water is supplied either from one’s own river, or from some laborious industry which is paid for either in the water, or in that which is exchanged for the water.

Would the indignation of your Holiness be abated? Would it not wax fiercer yet for the insult to your intelligence of this excuse?

I do not need more formally to show your Holiness that between utterly depriving a man of God’s gifts and depriving him of God’s gifts unless he will buy them, is merely the difference between the robber who leaves his victim to die and the robber who puts him to ransom. But I would like to point out how your statement that “the earth, though divided among private owners, ceases not thereby to minister to the needs of all” overlooks the largest facts.

From your palace of the Vatican the eye may rest on the expanse of the Campagna, where the pious toil of religious congregations and the efforts of the state are only now beginning to make it possible for men to live. Once that expanse was tilled by thriving husbandmen and dotted with smiling hamlets. What for centuries has condemned it to desertion? History tells us. It was private property in land; the growth of the great estates of which Pliny saw that ancient Italy was perishing; the cause that, by bringing failure to the crop of men, let in the Goths and Vandals, gave Roman Britain to the worship of Odin and Thor, and in what were once the rich and populous provinces of the East shivered the thinned ranks and palsied arms of the legions on the simitars of Mohammedan hordes, and in the sepulcher of our Lord and in the Church of St. Sophia trampled the cross to rear the crescent!

If you will go to Scotland, you may see great tracts that under the Gaelic tenure, which recognized the right of each to a foothold in the soil, bred sturdy men, but that now, under the recognition of private property in land, are given up to wild animals. If you go to Ireland, your Bishops will show you, on lands where now only beasts graze, the traces of hamlets that, when they were young priests, were filled with honest, kindly, religious people.*

* Let any one who wishes visit this diocese and see with his own eyes the vast and boundless extent of the fairest land in Europe that has been ruthlessly depopulated since the commencement of the present century, and which is now abandoned to a loneliness and solitude more depressing than that of the prairie or the wilderness. Thus has this land system actually exercised the power of life and death on a vast scale, for which there is no parallel even in the dark records of slavery. — Bishop Nulty’s Letter to the Clergy and Laity of the Diocese of Meath.

If you will come to the United States, you will find in a land wide enough and rich enough to support in comfort the whole population of Europe, the growth of a sentiment that looks with evil eye on immigration, because the artificial scarcity that results from private property in land makes it seem as if there is not room enough and work enough for those already here.

Or go to the Antipodes, and in Australia, as in England, you may see that private property in land is operating to leave the land barren and to crowd the bulk of the population into great cities. Go wherever you please where the forces loosed by modern invention are beginning to be felt and you may see that private property in land is the curse, denounced by the prophet, that prompts men to lay field to field till they “alone dwell in the midst of the earth.

To the mere materialist this is sin and shame. Shall we to whom this world is God’s world — we who hold that man is called to this life only as a prelude to a higher life — shall we defend it?

4. That Industry expended on land gives ownership in the land itself. (9-10.)

Your Holiness next contends that industry expended on land gives a right to ownership of the land, and that the improvement of land creates benefits indistinguishable and inseparable from the land itself.

This contention, if valid, could only justify the ownership of land by those who expend industry on it. It would not justify private property in land as it exists. On the contrary, it would justify a gigantic no-rent declaration that would take land from those who now legally own it, the landlords, and turn it over to the tenants and laborers. And if it also be that improvements cannot be distinguished and separated from the land itself, how could the landlords claim consideration even for improvements they had made?

But your Holiness cannot mean what your words imply. What you really mean, I take it, is that the original justification and title of landownership is in the expenditure of labor on it. But neither can this justify private property in land as it exists. For is it not all but universally true that existing land titles do not come from use, but from force or fraud?

Take Italy! Is it not true that the greater part of the land of Italy is held by those who so far from ever having expended industry on it have been mere appropriators of the industry of those who have? Is this not also true of Great Britain and of other countries? Even in the United States, where the forces of concentration have not yet had time fully to operate and there has been some attempt to give land to users, it is probably true today that the greater part of the land is held by those who neither use it nor propose to use it themselves, but merely hold it to compel others to pay them for permission to use it.

And if industry give ownership to land what are the limits of this ownership? If a man may acquire the ownership of several square miles of land by grazing sheep on it, does this give to him and his heirs the ownership of the same land when it is found to contain rich mines, or when by the growth of population and the progress of society it is needed for farming, for gardening, for the close occupation of a great city? Is it on the rights given by the industry of those who first used it for grazing cows or growing potatoes that you would found the title to the land now covered by the city of New York and having a value of thousands of millions of dollars?

But your contention is not valid. Industry expended on land gives ownership in the fruits of that industry, but not in the land itself, just as industry expended on the ocean would give a right of ownership to the fish taken by it, but not a right of ownership in the ocean. Nor yet is it true that private ownership of land is necessary to secure the fruits of labor on land; nor does the improvement of land create benefits indistinguishable and inseparable from the land itself. That secure possession is necessary to the use and improvement of land I have already explained, but that ownership is not necessary is shown by the fact that in all civilized countries land owned by one person is cultivated and improved by other persons. Most of the cultivated land in the British Islands, as in Italy and other countries, is cultivated not by owners but by tenants. And so the costliest buildings are erected by those who are not owners of the land, but who have from the owner a mere right of possession for a time on condition of certain payments. Nearly the whole of London has been built in this way, and in New York, Chicago, Denver, San Francisco, Sydney and Melbourne, as well as in continental cities, the owners of many of the largest edifices will be found to be different persons from the owners of the ground. So far from the value of improvements being inseparable from the value of land, it is in individual transactions constantly separated. For instance, one-half of the land on which the immense Grand Pacific Hotel in Chicago stands was recently separately sold, and in Ceylon it is a not infrequent occurrence for one person to own a fruit-tree and another to own the ground in which it is implanted.

There is, indeed, no improvement of land, whether it be clearing, plowing, manuring, cultivating, the digging of cellars, the opening of wells or the building of houses, that so long as its usefulness continues does not have a value clearly distinguishable from the value of the land. For land having such improvements will always sell or rent for more than similar land without them.

If, therefore, the state levy a tax equal to what the land irrespective of improvement would bring, it will take the benefits of mere ownership, but will leave the full benefits of use and improvement, which the prevailing system does not do. And since the holder, who would still in form continue to be the owner, could at any time give or sell both possession and improvements, subject to future assessment by the state on the value of the land alone, he will be perfectly free to retain or dispose of the full amount of property that the exertion of his labor or the investment of his capital has attached to or stored up in the land.

Thus, what we propose would secure, as it is impossible in any other way to secure, what you properly say is just and right — ”that the results of labor should belong to him who has labored.” But private property in land — to allow the holder without adequate payment to the state to take for himself the benefit of the value that attaches to land with social growth and improvement — does take the results of labor from him who has labored, does turn over the fruits of one man’s labor to be enjoyed by another. For labor, as the active factor, is the producer of all wealth. Mere ownership produces nothing. A man might own a world, but so sure is the decree that “by the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread,” that without labor he could not get a meal or provide himself a garment. Hence, when the owners of land, by virtue of their ownership and without laboring themselves, get the products of labor in abundance, these things must come from the labor of others, must be the fruits of others’ sweat, taken from those who have a right to them and enjoyed by those who have no right to them.

The only utility of private ownership of land as distinguished from possession is the evil utility of giving to the owner products of labor he does not earn. For until land will yield to its owner some return beyond that of the labor and capital he expends on it — that is to say, until by sale or rental he can without expenditure of labor obtain from it products of labor, ownership amounts to no more than security of possession, and has no value. Its importance and value begin only when, either in the present or prospectively, it will yield a revenue — that is to say, will enable the owner as owner to obtain products of labor without exertion on his part, and thus to enjoy the results of others’ labor.

What largely keeps men from realizing the robbery involved in private property in land is that in the most striking cases the robbery is not of individuals, but of the community. For, as I have before explained, it is impossible for rent in the economic sense — that value which attaches to land by reason of social growth and improvement — to go to the user. It can go only to the owner or to the community. Thus those who pay enormous rents for the use of land in such centers as London or New York are not individually injured. Individually they get a return for what they pay, and must feel that they have no better right to the use of such peculiarly advantageous localities without paying for it than have thousands of others. And so, not thinking or not caring for the interests of the community, they make no objection to the system.

It recently came to light in New York that a man having no title whatever had been for years collecting rents on a piece of land that the growth of the city had made very valuable. Those who paid these rents had never stopped to ask whether he had any right to them. They felt that they had no right to land that so many others would like to have, without paying for it, and did not think of, or did not care for, the rights of all.

 

5. That private property in land has the support of the common opinion of mankind, and has conduced to peace and tranquillity, and that it is sanctioned by Divine Law. (11.)

Even were it true that the common opinion of mankind has sanctioned private property in land, this would no more prove its justice than the once universal practice of the known world would have proved the justice of slavery.

But it is not true. Examination will show that wherever we can trace them the first perceptions of mankind have always recognized the equality of right to land, and that when individual possession became necessary to secure the right of ownership in things produced by labor some method of securing equality, sufficient in the existing state of social development, was adopted. Thus, among some peoples, land used for cultivation was periodically divided, land used for pasturage and wood being held in common. Among others, every family was permitted to hold what land it needed for a dwelling and for cultivation, but the moment that such use and cultivation stopped any one else could step in and take it on like tenure. Of the same nature were the land laws of the Mosaic code. The land, first fairly divided among the people, was made inalienable by the provision of the jubilee, under which, if sold, it reverted every fiftieth year to the children of its original possessors.

Private property in land as we know it, the attaching to land of the same right of ownership that justly attaches to the products of labor, has never grown up anywhere save by usurpation or force. Like slavery, it is the result of war. It comes to us of the modern world from your ancestors, the Romans, whose civilization it corrupted and whose empire it destroyed.

It made with the freer spirit of the northern peoples the combination of the feudal system, in which, though subordination was substituted for equality, there was still a rough recognition of the principle of common rights in land. A fief was a trust, and to enjoyment was annexed some obligation. The sovereign, the representative of the whole people, was the only owner of land. Of him, immediately or mediately, held tenants, whose possession involved duties or payments, which, though rudely and imperfectly, embodied the idea that we would carry out in the single tax, of taking land values for public uses. The crown lands maintained the sovereign and the civil list; the church lands defrayed the cost of public worship and instruction, of the relief of the sick, the destitute and the wayworn; while the military tenures provided for public defense and bore the costs of war. A fourth and very large portion of the land remained in common, the people of the neighborhood being free to pasture it, cut wood on it, or put it to other common uses.

In this partial yet substantial recognition of common rights to land is to be found the reason why, in a time when the industrial arts were rude, wars frequent, and the great discoveries and inventions of our time unthought of, the condition of the laborer was devoid of that grinding poverty which despite our marvelous advances now exists. Speaking of England, the highest authority on such subjects, the late Professor Therold Rogers, declares that in the thirteenth century there was no class so poor, so helpless, so pressed and degraded as are millions of Englishmen in our boasted nineteenth century; and that, save in times of actual famine, there was no laborer so poor as to fear that his wife and children might come to want even were he taken from them. Dark and rude in many respects as they were, these were the times when the cathedrals and churches and religious houses whose ruins yet excite our admiration were built; the times when England had no national debt, no poor law, no standing army, no hereditary paupers, no thousands and thousands of human beings rising in the morning without knowing where they might lay their heads at night.

With the decay of the feudal system, the system of private property in land that had destroyed Rome was extended. As to England, it may briefly be said that the crown lands were for the most part given away to favorites; that the church lands were parceled among his courtiers by Henry VIII., and in Scotland grasped by the nobles; that the military dues were finally remitted in the seventeenth century, and taxation on consumption substituted; and that by a process beginning with the Tudors and extending to our own time all but a mere fraction of the commons were inclosed by the greater landowners; while the same private ownership of land was extended over Ireland and the Scottish Highlands, partly by the sword and partly by bribery of the chiefs. Even the military dues, had they been commuted, not remitted, would today have more than sufficed to pay all public expenses without one penny of other taxation.

Of the New World, whose institutions but continue those of Europe, it is only necessary to say that to the parceling out of land in great tracts is due the backwardness and turbulence of Spanish America; that to the large plantations of the Southern States of the Union was due the persistence of slavery there, and that the more northern settlements showed the earlier English feeling, land being fairly well divided and the attempts to establish manorial estates coming to little or nothing. In this lies the secret of the more vigorous growth of the Northern States. But the idea that land was to be treated as private property had been thoroughly established in English thought before the colonial period ended, and it has been so treated by the United States and by the several States. And though land was at first sold cheaply, and then given to actual settlers, it was also sold in large quantities to speculators, given away in great tracts for railroads and other purposes, until now the public domain of the United States, which a generation ago seemed illimitable, has practically gone. And this, as the experience of other countries shows, is the natural result in a growing community of making land private property. When the possession of land means the gain of unearned wealth, the strong and unscrupulous will secure it. But when, as we propose, economic rent, the “unearned increment of wealth,” is taken by the state for the use of the community, then land will pass into the hands of users and remain there, since no matter how great its value, its possession will be profitable only to users.

As to private property in land having conduced to the peace and tranquillity of human life, it is not necessary more than to allude to the notorious fact that the struggle for land has been the prolific source of wars and of lawsuits, while it is the poverty engendered by private property in land that makes the prison and the workhouse the unfailing attributes of what we call Christian civilization.

Your Holiness intimates that the Divine Law gives its sanction to the private ownership of land, quoting from Deuteronomy, “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s wife, nor his house, nor his field, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything which is his.”

If, as your Holiness conveys, this inclusion of the words, “nor his field,” is to be taken as sanctioning private property in land as it exists today, then, but with far greater force, must the words, “his man-servant, nor his maid-servant,” be taken to sanction chattel slavery; for it is evident from other provisions of the same code that these terms referred both to bondsmen for a term of years and to perpetual slaves. But the word “field” involves the idea of use and improvement, to which the right of possession and ownership does attach without recognition of property in the land itself. And that this reference to the “field” is not a sanction of private property in land as it exists today is proved by the fact that the Mosaic code expressly denied such unqualified ownership in land, and with the declaration, “the land also shall not be sold forever, because it is mine, and you are strangers and sojourners with me,” provided for its reversion every fiftieth year; thus, in a way adapted to the primitive industrial conditions of the time, securing to all of the chosen people a foothold in the soil.

Nowhere in fact throughout the Scriptures can the slightest justification be found for the attaching to land of the same right of property that justly attaches to the things produced by labor. Everywhere is it treated as the free bounty of God, “the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.”

 

6. That fathers should provide for their children and that private property in land is necessary to enable them to do so. (14-17.)

With all that your Holiness has to say of the sacredness of the family relation we are in full accord. But how the obligation of the father to the child can justify private property in land we cannot see. You reason that private property in land is necessary to the discharge of the duty of the father, and is therefore requisite and just, because —

It is a most sacred law of nature that a father must provide food and all necessaries for those whom he has begotten; and, similarly, nature dictates that a man’s children, who carry on, as it were, and continue his own personality, should be provided by him with all that is needful to enable them honorably to keep themselves from want and misery in the uncertainties of this mortal life. Now, in no other way can a father effect this except by the ownership of profitable property, which he can transmit to his children by inheritance. (14.)

Thanks to Him who has bound the generations of men together by a provision that brings the tenderest love to greet our entrance into the world and soothes our exit with filial piety, it is both the duty and the joy of the father to care for the child till its powers mature, and afterwards in the natural order it becomes the duty and privilege of the child to be the stay of the parent. This is the natural reason for that relation of marriage, the groundwork of the sweetest, tenderest and purest of human joys, which the Catholic Church has guarded with such unremitting vigilance.

We do, for a few years, need the providence of our fathers after the flesh. But how small, how transient, how narrow is this need, as compared with our constant need for the providence of Him in whom we live, move and have our being — Our Father who art in Heaven! It is to him, “the giver of every good and perfect gift,” and not to our fathers after the flesh, that Christ taught us to pray, “Give us this day our daily bread.” And how true it is that it is through him that the generations of men exist! Let the mean temperature of the earth rise or fall a few degrees, an amount as nothing compared with differences produced in our laboratories, and mankind would disappear as ice disappears under a tropical sun, would fall as the leaves fall at the touch of frost. Or, let for two or three seasons the earth refuse her increase, and how many of our millions would remain alive?

The duty of fathers to transmit to their children profitable property that will enable them to keep themselves from want and misery in the uncertainties of this mortal life! What is not possible cannot be a duty. And how is it possible for fathers to do that? Your Holiness has not considered how mankind really lives from hand to mouth, getting each day its daily bread; how little one generation does or can leave another. It is doubtful if the wealth of the civilized world all told amounts to anything like as much as one year’s labor, while it is certain that if labor were to stop and men had to rely on existing accumulation, it would be only a few days ere in the richest countries pestilence and famine would stalk.
The profitable property your Holiness refers to, is private property in land. Now profitable land, as all economists will agree, is land superior to the land that the ordinary man can get. It is land that will yield an income to the owner as owner, and therefore that will permit the owner to appropriate the products of labor without doing labor, its profitableness to the individual involving the robbery of other individuals. It is therefore possible only for some fathers to leave their children profitable land. What therefore your Holiness practically declares is, that it is the duty of all fathers to struggle to leave their children what only the few peculiarly strong, lucky or unscrupulous can leave; and that, a something that involves the robbery of others — their deprivation of the material gifts of God.

This anti-Christian doctrine has been long in practice throughout the Christian world. What are its results?

Are they not the very evils set forth in your Encyclical? Are they not, so far from enabling men to keep themselves from want and misery in the uncertainties of this mortal life, to condemn the great masses of men to want and misery that the natural conditions of our mortal life do not entail; to want and misery deeper and more wide-spread than exist among heathen savages? Under the régime of private property in land and in the richest countries not five per cent of fathers are able at their death to leave anything substantial to their children, and probably a large majority do not leave enough to bury them! Some few children are left by their fathers richer than it is good for them to be, but the vast majority not only are left nothing by their fathers, but by the system that makes land private property are deprived of the bounty of their Heavenly Father; are compelled to sue others for permission to live and to work, and to toil all their lives for a pittance that often does not enable them to escape starvation and pauperism.

What your Holiness is actually, though of course inadvertently, urging, is that earthly fathers should assume the functions of the Heavenly Father. It is not the business of one generation to provide the succeeding generation “with all that is needful to enable them honorably to keep themselves from want and misery.” That is God’s business. We no more create our children than we create our fathers. It is God who is the Creator of each succeeding generation as fully as of the one that preceded it. And, to recall your own words (7), “Nature [God], therefore, owes to man a storehouse that shall never fail, the daily supply of his daily wants. And this he finds only in the inexhaustible fertility of the earth.” What you are now assuming is, that it is the duty of men to provide for the wants of their children by appropriating this storehouse and depriving other men’s children of the unfailing supply that God has provided for all.

The duty of the father to the child — the duty possible to all fathers! Is it not so to conduct himself, so to nurture and teach it, that it shall come to manhood with a sound body, well-developed mind, habits of virtue, piety and industry, and in a state of society that shall give it and all others free access to the bounty of God, the providence of the All-Father?

In doing this the father would be doing more to secure his children from want and misery than is possible now to the richest of fathers — as much more as the providence of God surpasses that of man. For the justice of God laughs at the efforts of men to circumvent it, and the subtle law that binds humanity together poisons the rich in the sufferings of the poor. Even the few who are able in the general struggle to leave their children wealth that they fondly think will keep them from want and misery in the uncertainties of this mortal life — do they succeed? Does experience show that it is a benefit to a child to place him above his fellows and enable him to think God’s law of labor is not for him? Is not such wealth oftener a curse than a blessing, and does not its expectation often destroy filial love and bring dissensions and heartburnings into families? And how far and how long are even the richest and strongest able to exempt their children from the common lot? Nothing is more certain than that the blood of the masters of the world flows today in lazzaroni and that the descendants of kings and princes tenant slums and workhouses.

But in the state of society we strive for, where the monopoly and waste of God’s bounty would be done away with and the fruits of labor would go to the laborer, it would be within the ability of all to make more than a comfortable living with reasonable labor. And for those who might be crippled or incapacitated, or deprived of their natural protectors and breadwinners, the most ample provision could be made out of that great and increasing fund with which God in his law of rent has provided society — not as a matter of niggardly and degrading alms, but as a matter of right, as the assurance which in a Christian state society owes to all its members.

Thus it is that the duty of the father, the obligation to the child, instead of giving any support to private property in land, utterly condemns it, urging us by the most powerful considerations to abolish it in the simple and efficacious way of the single tax.

This duty of the father, this obligation to children, is not confined to those who have actually children of their own, but rests on all of us who have come to the powers and responsibilities of manhood.

For did not Christ set a little child in the midst of the disciples, saying to them that the angels of such little ones always behold the face of his Father; saying to them that it were better for a man to hang a millstone about his neck and plunge into the uttermost depths of the sea than to injure such a little one?

And what today is the result of private property in land in the richest of so-called Christian countries? Is it not that young people fear to marry; that married people fear to have children; that children are driven out of life from sheer want of proper nourishment and care, or compelled to toil when they ought to be at school or at play; that great numbers of those who attain maturity enter it with under-nourished bodies, overstrained nerves, undeveloped minds — under conditions that foredoom them, not merely to suffering, but to crime; that fit them in advance for the prison and the brothel?

If your Holiness will consider these things we are confident that instead of defending private property in land you will condemn it with anathema!

7. That the private ownership of land stimulates industry, increases wealth, and attaches men to the soil and to their country. (51.)

The idea, as expressed by Arthur Young, that “the magic of property turns barren sands to gold” springs from the confusion of ownership with possession, of which I have before spoken, that attributes to private property in land what is due to security of the products of labor. It is needless for me again to point out that the change we propose, the taxation for public uses of land values, or economic rent, and the abolition of other taxes, would give to the user of land far greater security for the fruits of his labor than the present system and far greater permanence of possession. Nor is it necessary further to show how it would give homes to those who are now homeless and bind men to their country. For under it every one who wanted a piece of land for a home or for productive use could get it without purchase price and hold it even without tax, since the tax we propose would not fall on all land, nor even on all land in use, but only on land better than the poorest land in use, and is in reality not a tax at all, but merely a return to the state for the use of a valuable privilege. And even those who from circumstances or occupation did not wish to make permanent use of land would still have an equal interest with all others in the land of their country and in the general prosperity.

But I should like your Holiness to consider how utterly unnatural is the condition of the masses in the richest and most progressive of Christian countries; how large bodies of them live in habitations in which a rich man would not ask his dog to dwell; how the great majority have no homes from which they are not liable on the slightest misfortune to be evicted; how numbers have no homes at all, but must seek what shelter chance or charity offers. I should like to ask your Holiness to consider how the great majority of men in such countries have no interest whatever in what they are taught to call their native land, for which they are told that on occasions it is their duty to fight or to die. What right, for instance, have the majority of your countrymen in the land of their birth? Can they live in Italy outside of a prison or a poorhouse except as they buy the privilege from some of the exclusive owners of Italy? Cannot an Englishman, an American, an Arab or a Japanese do as much? May not what was said centuries ago by Tiberius Gracchus be said today: “Men of Rome! you are called the lords of the world, yet have no right to a square foot of its soil! The wild beasts have their dens, but the soldiers of Italy have only water and air!”

What is true of Italy is true of the civilized world — is becoming increasingly true. It is the inevitable effect as civilization progresses of private property in land.

 

8. That the right to possess private property in land is from nature, not from man; that the state has no right to abolish it, and that to take the value of landownership in taxation would be unjust and cruel to the private owner. (51.)

This, like much else that your Holiness says, is masked in the use of the indefinite terms “private property” and “private owner” — a want of precision in the use of words that has doubtless aided in the confusion of your own thought. But the context leaves no doubt that by private property you mean private property in land, and by private owner, the private owner of land.

The contention, thus made, that private property in land is from nature, not from man, has no other basis than the confounding of ownership with possession and the ascription to property in land of what belongs to its contradictory, property in the proceeds of labor. You do not attempt to show for it any other basis, nor has any one else ever attempted to do so. That private property in the products of labor is from nature is clear, for nature gives such things to labor and to labor alone. Of every article of this kind, we know that it came into being as nature’s response to the exertion of an individual man or of individual men — given by nature directly and exclusively to him or to them. Thus there inheres in such things a right of private property, which originates from and goes back to the source of ownership, the maker of the thing. This right is anterior to the state and superior to its enactments, so that, as we hold, it is a violation of natural right and an injustice to the private owner for the state to tax the processes and products of labor. They do not belong to Caesar. They are things that God, of whom nature is but an expression, gives to those who apply for them in the way he has appointed — by labor.

But who will dare trace the individual ownership of land to any grant from the Maker of land? What does nature give to such ownership? how does she in any way recognize it? Will any one show from difference of form or feature, of stature or complexion, from dissection of their bodies or analysis of their powers and needs, that one man was intended by nature to own land and another to live on it as his tenant? That which derives its existence from man and passes away like him, which is indeed but the evanescent expression of his labor, man may hold and transfer as the exclusive property of the individual; but how can such individual ownership attach to land, which existed before man was, and which continues to exist while the generations of men come and go — the unfailing storehouse that the Creator gives to man for “the daily supply of his daily wants”?
Clearly, the private ownership of land is from the state, not from nature. Thus, not merely can no objection be made on the score of morals when it is proposed that the state shall abolish it altogether, but insomuch as it is a violation of natural right, its existence involving a gross injustice on the part of the state, an “impious violation of the benevolent intention of the Creator,” it is a moral duty that the state so abolish it.

So far from there being anything unjust in taking the full value of landownership for the use of the community, the real injustice is in leaving it in private hands — an injustice that amounts to robbery and murder.

And when your Holiness shall see this I have no fear that you will listen for one moment to the impudent plea that before the community can take what God intended it to take — before men who have been disinherited of their natural rights can be restored to them, the present owners of land shall first be compensated.

For not only will you see that the single tax will directly and largely benefit small landowners, whose interests as laborers and capitalists are much greater than their interests as landowners, and that though the great landowners — or rather the propertied class in general among whom the profits of landownership are really divided through mortgages, rent-charges, etc. — would relatively lose, they too would be absolute gainers in the increased prosperity and improved morals; but more quickly, more strongly, more peremptorily than from any calculation of gains or losses would your duty as a man, your faith as a Christian, forbid you to listen for one moment to any such paltering with right and wrong.

Where the state takes some land for public uses it is only just that those whose land is taken should be compensated, otherwise some landowners would be treated more harshly than others. But where, by a measure affecting all alike, rent is appropriated for the benefit of all, there can be no claim to compensation. Compensation in such case would be a continuance of the same in another form — the giving to landowners in the shape of interest of what they before got as rent. Your Holiness knows that justice and injustice are not thus to be juggled with, and when you fully realize that land is really the storehouse that God owes to all his children, you will no more listen to any demand for compensation for restoring it to them than Moses would have listened to a demand that Pharaoh should be compensated before letting the children of Israel go.

Compensated for what? For giving up what has been unjustly taken? The demand of landowners for compensation is not that. We do not seek to spoil the Egyptians. We do not ask that what has been unjustly taken from laborers shall be restored. We are willing that bygones should be bygones and to leave dead wrongs to bury their dead. We propose to let those who by the past appropriation of land values have taken the fruits of labor to retain what they have thus got. We merely propose that for the future such robbery of labor shall cease — that for the future, not for the past, landholders shall pay to the community the rent that to the community is justly due.

 

III.

I have said enough to show your Holiness the injustice into which you fall in classing us, who in seeking virtually to abolish private property in land seek more fully to secure the true rights of property, with those whom you speak of as socialists, who wish to make all property common. But you also do injustice to the socialists.

There are many, it is true, who feeling bitterly the monstrous wrongs of the present distribution of wealth are animated only by a blind hatred of the rich and a fierce desire to destroy existing social adjustments. This class is indeed only less dangerous than those who proclaim that no social improvement is needed or is possible. But it is not fair to confound with them those who, however mistakenly, propose definite schemes of remedy.

The socialists, as I understand them, and as the term has come to apply to anything like a definite theory and not to be vaguely and improperly used to include all who desire social improvement, do not, as you imply, seek the abolition of all private property. Those who do this are properly called communists. What the socialists seek is the state assumption of capital (in which they vaguely and erroneously include land), or more properly speaking, of large capitals, and state management and direction of at least the larger operations of industry. In this way they hope to abolish interest, which they regard as a wrong and an evil; to do away with the gains of exchangers, speculators, contractors and middlemen, which they regard as waste; to do away with the wage system and secure general cooperation; and to prevent competition, which they deem the fundamental cause of the impoverishment of labor. The more moderate of them, without going so far, go in the same direction, and seek some remedy or palliation of the worst forms of poverty by government regulation. The essential character of socialism is that it looks to the extension of the functions of the state for the remedy of social evils; that it would substitute regulation and direction for competition; and intelligent control by organized society for the free play of individual desire and effort.

Though not usually classed as socialists, both the trades-unionists and the protectionists have the same essential character. The trades-unionists seek the increase of wages, the reduction of working-hours and the general improvement in the condition of wage-workers, by organizing them into guilds or associations which shall fix the rates at which they will sell their labor; shall deal as one body with employers in case of dispute; shall use on occasion their necessary weapon, the strike; and shall accumulate funds for such purposes and for the purpose of assisting members when on a strike, or (sometimes) when out of employment. The protectionists seek by governmental prohibitions or taxes on imports to regulate the industry and control the exchanges of each country, so as, they imagine, to diversify home industries and prevent the competition of people of other countries.

At the opposite extreme are the anarchists, a term which, though frequently applied to mere violent destructionists, refers also to those who, seeing the many evils of too much government, regard government in itself as evil, and believe that in the absence of coercive power the mutual interests of men would secure voluntarily what cooperation is needed.

Differing from all these are those for whom I would speak. Believing that the rights of true property are sacred, we would regard forcible communism as robbery that would bring destruction. But we would not be disposed to deny that voluntary communism might be the highest possible state of which men can conceive. Nor do we say that it cannot be possible for mankind to attain it, since among the early Christians and among the religious orders of the Catholic Church we have examples of communistic societies on a small scale. St. Peter and St. Paul, St. Thomas of Aquin and Fra Angelico, the illustrious orders of the Carmelites and Franciscans, the Jesuits, whose heroism carried the cross among the most savage tribes of American forests, the societies that wherever your communion is known have deemed no work of mercy too dangerous or too repellent — were or are communists. Knowing these things we cannot take it on ourselves to say that a social condition may not be possible in which an all-embracing love shall have taken the place of all other motives. But we see that communism is only possible where there exists a general and intense religious faith, and we see that such a state can be reached only through a state of justice. For before a man can be a saint he must first be an honest man.

With both anarchists and socialists, we, who for want of a better term have come to call ourselves single-tax men, fundamentally differ. We regard them as erring in opposite directions — the one in ignoring the social nature of man, the other in ignoring his individual nature. While we see that man is primarily an individual, and that nothing but evil has come or can come from the interference by the state with things that belong to individual action, we also see that he is a social being, or, as Aristotle called him, a political animal, and that the state is requisite to social advance, having an indispensable place in the natural order. Looking on the bodily organism as the analogue of the social organism, and on the proper functions of the state as akin to those that in the human organism are discharged by the conscious intelligence, while the play of individual impulse and interest performs functions akin to those discharged in the bodily organism by the unconscious instincts and involuntary motions, the anarchists seem to us like men who would try to get along without heads and the socialists like men who would try to rule the wonderfully complex and delicate internal relations of their frames by conscious will.

The philosophical anarchists of whom I speak are few in number, and of little practical importance. It is with socialism in its various phases that we have to do battle.

With the socialists we have some points of agreement, for we recognize fully the social nature of man and believe that all monopolies should be held and governed by the state. In these, and in directions where the general health, knowledge, comfort and convenience might be improved, we, too, would extend the functions of the state.

But it seems to us the vice of socialism in all its degrees is its want of radicalism, of going to the root. It takes its theories from those who have sought to justify the impoverishment of the masses, and its advocates generally teach the preposterous and degrading doctrine that slavery was the first condition of labor. It assumes that the tendency of wages to a minimum is the natural law, and seeks to abolish wages; it assumes that the natural result of competition is to grind down workers, and seeks to abolish competition by restrictions, prohibitions and extensions of governing power. Thus mistaking effects for causes, and childishly blaming the stone for hitting it, it wastes strength in striving for remedies that when not worse are futile. Associated though it is in many places with democratic aspiration, yet its essence is the same delusion to which the children of Israel yielded when against the protest of their prophet they insisted on a king; the delusion that has everywhere corrupted democracies and enthroned tyrants — that power over the people can be used for the benefit of the people; that there may be devised machinery that through human agencies will secure for the management of individual affairs more wisdom and more virtue than the people themselves possess.
This superficiality and this tendency may be seen in all the phases of socialism.

Take, for instance, protectionism. What support it has, beyond the mere selfish desire of sellers to compel buyers to pay them more than their goods are worth, springs from such superficial ideas as that production, not consumption, is the end of effort; that money is more valuable than money’s-worth, and to sell more profitable than to buy; and above all from a desire to limit competition, springing from an unanalyzing recognition of the phenomena that necessarily follow when men who have the need to labor are deprived by monopoly of access to the natural and indispensable element of all labor. Its methods involve the idea that governments can more wisely direct the expenditure of labor and the investment of capital than can laborers and capitalists, and that the men who control governments will use this power for the general good and not in their own interests. They tend to multiply officials, restrict liberty, invent crimes. They promote perjury, fraud and corruption. And they would, were the theory carried to its logical conclusion, destroy civilization and reduce mankind to savagery.

Take trades-unionism. While within narrow lines trades-unionism promotes the idea of the mutuality of interests, and often helps to raise courage and further political education, and while it has enabled limited bodies of working-men to improve somewhat their condition, and gain, as it were, breathing-space, yet it takes no note of the general causes that determine the conditions of labor, and strives for the elevation of only a small part of the great body by means that cannot help the rest. Aiming at the restriction of competition — the limitation of the right to labor, its methods are like those of an army, which even in a righteous cause are subversive of liberty and liable to abuse, while its weapon, the strike, is destructive in its nature, both to combatants and non-combatants, being a form of passive war. To apply the principle of trades-unions to all industry, as some dream of doing, would be to enthrall men in a caste system.

Or take even such moderate measures as the limitation of working-hours and of the labor of women and children. They are superficial in looking no further than to the eagerness of men and women and little children to work unduly, and in proposing forcibly to restrain overwork while utterly ignoring its cause — the sting of poverty that forces human beings to it. And the methods by which these restraints must be enforced, multiply officials, interfere with personal liberty, tend to corruption, and are liable to abuse.

As for thoroughgoing socialism, which is the more to be honored as having the courage of its convictions, it would carry these vices to full expression. Jumping to conclusions without effort to discover causes, it fails to see that oppression does not come from the nature of capital, but from the wrong that robs labor of capital by divorcing it from land, and that creates a fictitious capital that is really capitalized monopoly. It fails to see that it would be impossible for capital to oppress labor were labor free to the natural material of production; that the wage system in itself springs from mutual convenience, being a form of cooperation in which one of the parties prefers a certain to a contingent result; and that what it calls the “iron law of wages” is not the natural law of wages, but only the law of wages in that unnatural condition in which men are made helpless by being deprived of the materials for life and work. It fails to see that what it mistakes for the evils of competition are really the evils of restricted competition — are due to a one-sided competition to which men are forced when deprived of land. While its methods, the organization of men into industrial armies, the direction and control of all production and exchange by governmental or semi-governmental bureaus, would, if carried to full expression, mean Egyptian despotism.

We differ from the socialists in our diagnosis of the evil and we differ from them as to remedies. We have no fear of capital, regarding it as the natural handmaiden of labor; we look on interest in itself as natural and just; we would set no limit to accumulation, nor impose on the rich any burden that is not equally placed on the poor; we see no evil in competition, but deem unrestricted competition to be as necessary to the health of the industrial and social organism as the free circulation of the blood is to the health of the bodily organism — to be the agency whereby the fullest cooperation is to be secured. We would simply take for the community what belongs to the community, the value that attaches to land by the growth of the community; leave sacredly to the individual all that belongs to the individual; and, treating necessary monopolies as functions of the state, abolish all restrictions and prohibitions save those required for public health, safety, morals and convenience.

But the fundamental difference — the difference I ask your Holiness specially to note, is in this: socialism in all its phases looks on the evils of our civilization as springing from the inadequacy or inharmony of natural relations, which must be artificially organized or improved. In its idea there devolves on the state the necessity of intelligently organizing the industrial relations of men; the construction, as it were, of a great machine whose complicated parts shall properly work together under the direction of human intelligence. This is the reason why socialism tends toward atheism. Failing to see the order and symmetry of natural law, it fails to recognize God.

On the other hand, we who call ourselves single-tax men (a name which expresses merely our practical propositions) see in the social and industrial relations of men not a machine which requires construction, but an organism which needs only to be suffered to grow. We see in the natural social and industrial laws such harmony as we see in the adjustments of the human body, and that as far transcends the power of man’s intelligence to order and direct as it is beyond man’s intelligence to order and direct the vital movements of his frame. We see in these social and industrial laws so close a relation to the moral law as must spring from the same Authorship, and that proves the moral law to be the sure guide of man where his intelligence would wander and go astray. Thus, to us, all that is needed to remedy the evils of our time is to do justice and give freedom. This is the reason why our beliefs tend toward, nay are indeed the only beliefs consistent with a firm and reverent faith in God, and with the recognition of his law as the supreme law which men must follow if they would secure prosperity and avoid destruction. This is the reason why to us political economy only serves to show the depth of wisdom in the simple truths which common people heard gladly from the lips of Him of whom it was said with wonder, “Is not this the Carpenter of Nazareth?”

And it is because that in what we propose — the securing to all men of equal natural opportunities for the exercise of their powers and the removal of all legal restriction on the legitimate exercise of those powers — we see the conformation of human law to the moral law, that we hold with confidence that this is not merely the sufficient remedy for all the evils you so strikingly portray, but that it is the only possible remedy.

Nor is there any other. The organization of man is such, his relations to the world in which he is placed are such — that is to say, the immutable laws of God are such, that it is beyond the power of human ingenuity to devise any way by which the evils born of the injustice that robs men of their birthright can be removed otherwise than by doing justice, by opening to all the bounty that God has provided for all.

Since man can live only on land and from land, since land is the reservoir of matter and force from which man’s body itself is taken, and on which he must draw for all that he can produce, does it not irresistibly follow that to give the land in ownership to some men and to deny to others all right to it is to divide mankind into the rich and the poor, the privileged and the helpless? Does it not follow that those who have no rights to the use of land can live only by selling their power to labor to those who own the land? Does it not follow that what the socialists call “the iron law of wages,” what the political economists term “the tendency of wages to a minimum,” must take from the landless masses — the mere laborers, who of themselves have no power to use their labor — all the benefits of any possible advance or improvement that does not alter this unjust division of land? For having no power to employ themselves, they must, either as labor-sellers or as land-renters, compete with one another for permission to labor. This competition with one another of men shut out from God’s inexhaustible storehouse has no limit but starvation, and must ultimately force wages to their lowest point, the point at which life can just be maintained and reproduction carried on.

This is not to say that all wages must fall to this point, but that the wages of that necessarily largest stratum of laborers who have only ordinary knowledge, skill and aptitude must so fall. The wages of special classes, who are fenced off from the pressure of competition by peculiar knowledge, skill or other causes, may remain above that ordinary level. Thus, where the ability to read and write is rare its possession enables a man to obtain higher wages than the ordinary laborer. But as the diffusion of education makes the ability to read and write general this advantage is lost. So when a vocation requires special training or skill, or is made difficult of access by artificial restrictions, the checking of competition tends to keep wages in it at a higher level. But as the progress of invention dispenses with peculiar skill, or artificial restrictions are broken down, these higher wages sink to the ordinary level. And so, it is only so long as they are special that such qualities as industry, prudence and thrift can enable the ordinary laborer to maintain a condition above that which gives a mere living. Where they become general, the law of competition must reduce the earnings or savings of such qualities to the general level — which, land being monopolized and labor helpless, can be only that at which the next lowest point is the cessation of life.

Or, to state the same thing in another way: Land being necessary to life and labor, its owners will be able, in return for permission to use it, to obtain from mere laborers all that labor can produce, save enough to enable such of them to maintain life as are wanted by the landowners and their dependents.

Thus, where private property in land has divided society into a landowning class and a landless class, there is no possible invention or improvement, whether it be industrial, social or moral, which, so long as it does not affect the ownership of land, can prevent poverty or relieve the general conditions of mere laborers. For whether the effect of any invention or improvement be to increase what labor can produce or to decrease what is required to support the laborer, it can, so soon as it becomes general, result only in increasing the income of the owners of land, without at all benefiting the mere laborers. In no event can those possessed of the mere ordinary power to labor, a power utterly useless without the means necessary to labor, keep more of their earnings than enough to enable them to live.

How true this is we may see in the facts of today. In our own time invention and discovery have enormously increased the productive power of labor, and at the same time greatly reduced the cost of many things necessary to the support of the laborer. Have these improvements anywhere raised the earnings of the mere laborer? Have not their benefits mainly gone to the owners of land — enormously increased land values?

I say mainly, for some part of the benefit has gone to the cost of monstrous standing armies and warlike preparations; to the payment of interest on great public debts; and, largely disguised as interest on fictitious capital, to the owners of monopolies other than that of land. But improvements that would do away with these wastes would not benefit labor; they would simply increase the profits of landowners. Were standing armies and all their incidents abolished, were all monopolies other than that of land done away with, were governments to become models of economy, were the profits of speculators, of middlemen, of all sorts of exchangers saved, were every one to become so strictly honest that no policemen, no courts, no prisons, no precautions against dishonesty would be needed — the result would not differ from that which has followed the increase of productive power.

Nay, would not these very blessings bring starvation to many of those who now manage to live? Is it not true that if there were proposed today, what all Christian men ought to pray for, the complete disbandment of all the armies of Europe, the greatest fears would be aroused for the consequences of throwing on the labor-market so many unemployed laborers?

The explanation of this and of similar paradoxes that in our time perplex on every side may be easily seen. The effect of all inventions and improvements that increase productive power, that save waste and economize effort, is to lessen the labor required for a given result, and thus to save labor, so that we speak of them as labor-saving inventions or improvements. Now, in a natural state of society where the rights of all to the use of the earth are acknowledged, labor-saving improvements might go to the very utmost that can be imagined without lessening the demand for men, since in such natural conditions the demand for men lies in their own enjoyment of life and the strong instincts that the Creator has implanted in the human breast. But in that unnatural state of society where the masses of men are disinherited of all but the power to labor when opportunity to labor is given them by others, there the demand for them becomes simply the demand for their services by those who hold this opportunity, and man himself becomes a commodity. Hence, although the natural effect of labor-saving improvement is to increase wages, yet in the unnatural condition which private ownership of the land begets, the effect, even of such moral improvements as the disbandment of armies and the saving of the labor that vice entails, is, by lessening the commercial demand, to lower wages and reduce mere laborers to starvation or pauperism. If labor-saving inventions and improvements could be carried to the very abolition of the necessity for labor, what would be the result? Would it not be that landowners could then get all the wealth that the land was capable of producing, and would have no need at all for laborers, who must then either starve or live as pensioners on the bounty of the landowners?

Thus, so long as private property in land continues — so long as some men are treated as owners of the earth and other men can live on it only by their sufferance — human wisdom can devise no means by which the evils of our present condition may be avoided.

Nor yet could the wisdom of God.

By the light of that right reason of which St. Thomas speaks we may see that even he, the Almighty, so long as his laws remain what they are, could do nothing to prevent poverty and starvation while property in land continues.

How could he? Should he infuse new vigor into the sunlight, new virtue into the air, new fertility into the soil, would not all this new bounty go to the owners of the land, and work not benefit, but rather injury, to mere laborers? Should he open the minds of men to the possibilities of new substances, new adjustments, new powers, could this do any more to relieve poverty than steam, electricity and all the numberless discoveries and inventions of our time have done? Or, if he were to send down from the heavens above or cause to gush up from the subterranean depths, food, clothing, all the things that satisfy man’s material desires, to whom under our laws would all these belong? So far from benefiting man, would not this increase and extension of his bounty prove but a curse, enabling the privileged class more riotously to roll in wealth, and bringing the disinherited class to more wide-spread starvation or pauperism?

 

IV.

Believing that the social question is at bottom a religious question, we deem it of happy augury to the world that in your Encyclical the most influential of all religious teachers has directed attention to the condition of labor.

But while we appreciate the many wholesome truths you utter, while we feel, as all must feel, that you are animated by a desire to help the suffering and oppressed, and to put an end to any idea that the church is divorced from the aspiration for liberty and progress, yet it is painfully obvious to us that one fatal assumption hides from you the cause of the evils you see, and makes it impossible for you to propose any adequate remedy. This assumption is, that private property in land is of the same nature and has the same sanctions as private property in things produced by labor. In spite of its undeniable truths and its benevolent spirit, your Encyclical shows you to be involved in such difficulties as a physician called to examine one suffering from disease of the stomach would meet should he begin with a refusal to consider the stomach.

Prevented by this assumption from seeing the true cause, the only causes you find it possible to assign for the growth of misery and wretchedness are the destruction of working-men’s guilds in the last century, the repudiation in public institutions and laws of the ancient religion, rapacious usury, the custom of working by contract, and the concentration of trade.

Such diagnosis is manifestly inadequate to account for evils that are alike felt in Catholic countries, in Protestant countries, in countries that adhere to the Greek communion and in countries where no religion is professed by the state; that are alike felt in old countries and in new countries; where industry is simple and where it is most elaborate; and amid all varieties of industrial customs and relations.

But the real cause will be clear if you will consider that since labor must find its workshop and reservoir in land, the labor question is but another name for the land question, and will reexamine your assumption that private property in land is necessary and right.

See how fully adequate is the cause I have pointed out. The most important of all the material relations of man is his relation to the planet he inhabits, and hence, the “impious resistance to the benevolent intentions of his Creator,” which, as Bishop Nulty says, is involved in private property in land, must produce evils wherever it exists. But by virtue of the law, “unto whom much is given, from him much is required,” the very progress of civilization makes the evils produced by private property in land more wide-spread and intense.

What is producing throughout the civilized world that condition of things you rightly describe as intolerable is not this and that local error or minor mistake. It is nothing less than the progress of civilization itself; nothing less than the intellectual advance and the material growth in which our century has been so preeminent, acting in a state of society based on private property in land; nothing less than the new gifts that in our time God has been showering on man, but which are being turned into scourges by man’s “impious resistance to the benevolent intentions of his Creator.”

The discoveries of science, the gains of invention, have given to us in this wonderful century more than has been given to men in any time before; and, in a degree so rapidly accelerating as to suggest geometrical progression, are placing in our hands new material powers. But with the benefit comes the obligation. In a civilization beginning to pulse with steam and electricity, where the sun paints pictures and the phonograph stores speech, it will not do to be merely as just as were our fathers. Intellectual advance and material advance require corresponding moral advance. Knowledge and power are neither good nor evil. They are not ends but means — evolving forces that if not controlled in orderly relations must take disorderly and destructive forms. The deepening pain, the increasing perplexity, the growing discontent for which, as you truly say, some remedy must be found and quickly found, mean nothing less than that forces of destruction swifter and more terrible than those that have shattered every preceding civilization are already menacing ours — that if it does not quickly rise to a higher moral level; if it does not become in deed as in word a Christian civilization, on the wall of its splendor must flame the doom of Babylon: “Thou art weighed in the balance and found wanting!”

 

One false assumption prevents you from seeing the real cause and true significance of the facts that have prompted your Encyclical. And it fatally fetters you when you seek a remedy.

You state that you approach the subject with confidence, yet in all that greater part of the Encyclical (19-67) devoted to the remedy, while there is an abundance of moral reflections and injunctions, excellent in themselves but dead and meaningless as you apply them, the only definite practical proposals for the improvement of the condition of labor are:

1. That the state should step in to prevent overwork, to restrict the employment of women and children, to secure in workshops conditions not unfavorable to health and morals, and, at least where there is danger of insufficient wages provoking strikes, to regulate wages (39-40).

2. That it should encourage the acquisition of property (in land) by working-men (50-51).

3. That working-men’s associations should be formed (52-67). These remedies so far as they go are socialistic, and though the Encyclical is not without recognition of the individual character of man and of the priority of the individual and the family to the state, yet the whole tendency and spirit of its remedial suggestions lean unmistakably to socialism — extremely moderate socialism it is true; socialism hampered and emasculated by a supreme respect for private possessions; yet socialism still. But, although you frequently use the ambiguous term “private property” when the context shows that you have in mind private property in land, the one thing clear on the surface and becoming clearer still with examination is that you insist that whatever else may be done, the private ownership of land shall be left untouched.

I have already referred generally to the defects that attach to all socialistic remedies for the evil condition of labor, but respect for your Holiness dictates that I should speak specifically, even though briefly, of the remedies proposed or suggested by you.

 

Of these, the widest and strongest are that the state should restrict the hours of labor, the employment of women and children, the unsanitary conditions of workshops, etc. Yet how little may in this way be accomplished.

A strong, absolute ruler might hope by such regulations to alleviate the conditions of chattel slaves. But the tendency of our times is toward democracy, and democratic states are necessarily weaker in paternalism, while in the industrial slavery, growing out of private ownership of land, that prevails in Christendom today, it is not the master who forces the slave to labor, but the slave who urges the master to let him labor. Thus the greatest difficulty in enforcing such regulations comes from those whom they are intended to benefit. It is not, for instance, the masters who make it difficult to enforce restrictions on child labor in factories, but the mothers, who, prompted by poverty, misrepresent the ages of their children even to the masters, and teach the children to misrepresent.

But while in large factories and mines regulations as to hours, ages, etc., though subject to evasion and offering opportunities for extortion and corruption, may be to some extent enforced, how can they have any effect in those far wider branches of industry where the laborer works for himself or for small employers?

All such remedies are of the nature of the remedy for overcrowding that is generally prescribed with them — the restriction under penalty of the number who may occupy a room and the demolition of unsanitary buildings. Since these measures have no tendency to increase house accommodation or to augment ability to pay for it, the overcrowding that is forced back in some places goes on in other places and to a worse degree. All such remedies begin at the wrong end. They are like putting on brake and bit to hold in quietness horses that are being lashed into frenzy; they are like trying to stop a locomotive by holding its wheels instead of shutting off steam; like attempting to cure smallpox by driving back its pustules. Men do not overwork themselves because they like it; it is not in the nature of the mother’s heart to send children to work when they ought to be at play; it is not of choice that laborers will work under dangerous and unsanitary conditions. These things, like overcrowding, come from the sting of poverty. And so long as the poverty of which they are the expression is left untouched, restrictions such as you indorse can have only partial and evanescent results. The cause remaining, repression in one place can only bring out its effects in other places, and the task you assign to the state is as hopeless as to ask it to lower the level of the ocean by bailing out the sea.

Nor can the state cure poverty by regulating wages. It is as much beyond the power of the state to regulate wages as it is to regulate the rates of interest. Usury laws have been tried again and again, but the only effect they have ever had has been to increase what the poorer borrowers must pay, and for the same reasons that all attempts to lower by regulation the price of goods have always resulted merely in increasing them. The general rate of wages is fixed by the ease or difficulty with which labor can obtain access to land, ranging from the full earnings of labor, where land is free, to the least on which laborers can live and reproduce, where land is fully monopolized. Thus, where it has been comparatively easy for laborers to get land, as in the United States and in Australasia, wages have been higher than in Europe and it has been impossible to get European laborers to work there for wages that they would gladly accept at home; while as monopolization goes on under the influence of private property in land, wages tend to fall, and the social conditions of Europe to appear. Thus, under the partial yet substantial recognition of common rights to land, of which I have spoken, the many attempts of the British Parliament to reduce wages by regulation failed utterly. And so, when the institution of private property in land had done its work in England, all attempts of Parliament to raise wages proved unavailing. In the beginning of this century it was even attempted to increase the earnings of laborers by grants in aid of wages. But the only result was to lower commensurately what wages employers paid.

The state could maintain wages above the tendency of the market (for as I have shown labor deprived of land becomes a commodity), only by offering employment to all who wish it; or by lending its sanction to strikes and supporting them with its funds. Thus it is, that the thoroughgoing socialists who want the state to take all industry into its hands are much more logical than those timid socialists who propose that the state should regulate private industry — but only a little.

 

The same hopelessness attends your suggestion that working-people should be encouraged by the state in obtaining a share of the land. It is evident that by this you mean that, as is now being attempted in Ireland, the state shall buy out large landowners in favor of small ones, establishing what are known as peasant proprietors. Supposing that this can be done even to a considerable extent, what will be accomplished save to substitute a larger privileged class for a smaller privileged class? What will be done for the still larger class that must remain, the laborers of the agricultural districts, the workmen of the towns, the proletarians of the cities? Is it not true, as Professor De Laveleye says, that in such countries as Belgium, where peasant proprietary exists, the tenants, for there still exist tenants, are rack-rented with a mercilessness unknown in Ireland? Is it not true that in such countries as Belgium the condition of the mere laborer is even worse than it is in Great Britain, where large ownerships obtain? And if the state attempts to buy up land for peasant proprietors will not the effect be, what is seen today in Ireland, to increase the market value of land and thus make it more difficult for those not so favored, and for those who will come after, to get land? How, moreover, on the principle which you declare (36), that “to the state the interests of all are equal, whether high or low,” will you justify state aid to one man to buy a bit of land without also insisting on state aid to another man to buy a donkey, to another to buy a shop, to another to buy the tools and materials of a trade — state aid in short to everybody who may be able to make good use of it or thinks that he could? And are you not thus landed in communism — not the communism of the early Christians and of the religious orders, but communism that uses the coercive power of the state to take rightful property by force from those who have, to give to those who have not? For the state has no purse of Fortunatus; the state cannot repeat the miracle of the loaves and fishes; all that the state can give, it must get by some form or other of the taxing power. And whether it gives or lends money, or gives or lends credit, it cannot give to those who have not, without taking from those who have.

But aside from all this, any scheme of dividing up land while maintaining private property in land is futile. Small holdings cannot coexist with the treatment of land as private property where civilization is materially advancing and wealth augments. We may see this in the economic tendencies that in ancient times were the main cause that transformed world-conquering Italy from a land of small farms to a land of great estates. We may see it in the fact that while two centuries ago the majority of English farmers were owners of the land they tilled, tenancy has been for a long time the all but universal condition of the English farmer. And now the mighty forces of steam and electricity have come to urge concentration. It is in the United States that we may see on the largest scale how their power is operating to turn a nation of landowners into a nation of tenants. The principle is clear and irresistible. Material progress makes land more valuable, and when this increasing value is left to private owners land must pass from the ownership of the poor into the ownership of the rich, just as diamonds so pass when poor men find them. What the British government is attempting in Ireland is to build snow-houses in the Arabian desert! to plant bananas in Labrador!

There is one way, and only one way, in which working-people in our civilization may be secured a share in the land of their country, and that is the way that we propose — the taking of the profits of landownership for the community.

 

As to working-men’s associations, what your Holiness seems to contemplate is the formation and encouragement of societies akin to the Catholic sodalities, and to the friendly and beneficial societies, like the Odd Fellows, which have had a large extension in English-speaking countries. Such associations may promote fraternity, extend social intercourse and provide assurance in case of sickness or death, but if they go no further they are powerless to affect wages even among their members. As to trades-unions proper, it is hard to define your position, which is, perhaps, best stated as one of warm approbation provided that they do not go too far. For while you object to strikes; while you reprehend societies that “do their best to get into their hands the whole field of labor and to force working-men either to join them or to starve;” while you discountenance the coercing of employers and seem to think that arbitration might take the place of strikes; yet you use expressions and assert principles that are all that the trades-unionist would ask, not merely to justify the strike and the boycott, but even the use of violence where only violence would suffice. For you speak of the insufficient wages of workmen as due to the greed of rich employers; you assume the moral right of the workman to obtain employment from others at wages greater than those others are willing freely to give; and you deny the right of any one to work for such wages as he pleases, in such a way as to lead Mr. Stead, in so widely read a journal as the Review of Reviews, approvingly to declare that you regard “blacklegging,” i.e., the working for less than union wages, as a crime.

To men conscious of bitter injustice, to men steeped in poverty yet mocked by flaunting wealth, such words mean more than I can think you realize.

When fire shall be cool and ice be warm, when armies shall throw away lead and iron, to try conclusions by the pelting of rose-leaves, such labor associations as you are thinking of may be possible. But not till then. For labor associations can do nothing to raise wages but by force. It may be force applied passively, or force applied actively, or force held in reserve, but it must be force. They must coerce or hold the power to coerce employers; they must coerce those among their own members disposed to straggle; they must do their best to get into their hands the whole field of labor they seek to occupy and to force other working-men either to join them or to starve. Those who tell you of trades-unions bent on raising wages by moral suasion alone are like those who would tell you of tigers that live on oranges.

The condition of the masses today is that of men pressed together in a hall where ingress is open and more are constantly coming, but where the doors for egress are closed. If forbidden to relieve the general pressure by throwing open those doors, whose bars and bolts are private property in land, they can only mitigate the pressure on themselves by forcing back others, and the weakest must be driven to the wall. This is the way of labor-unions and trade-guilds. Even those amiable societies that you recommend would in their efforts to find employment for their own members necessarily displace others.

For even the philanthropy which, recognizing the evil of trying to help labor by alms, seeks to help men to help themselves by finding them work, becomes aggressive in the blind and bitter struggle that private property in land entails, and in helping one set of men injures others. Thus, to minimize the bitter complaints of taking work from others and lessening the wages of others in providing their own beneficiaries with work and wages, benevolent societies are forced to devices akin to the digging of holes and filling them up again. Our American societies feel this difficulty, General Booth encounters it in England, and the Catholic societies which your Holiness recommends must find it, when they are formed.
Your Holiness knows of, and I am sure honors, the princely generosity of Baron Hirsch toward his suffering coreligionists. But, as I write, the New York newspapers contain accounts of an immense meeting held in Cooper Union, in this city, on the evening of Friday, September 4, in which a number of Hebrew trades-unions protested in the strongest manner against the loss of work and reduction of wages that are being effected by Baron Hirsch’s generosity in bringing their own countrymen here and teaching them to work. The resolution unanimously adopted at this great meeting thus concludes:

We now demand of Baron Hirsch himself that he release us from his “charity” and take back the millions, which, instead of a blessing, have proved a curse and a source of misery.

Nor does this show that the members of these Hebrew labor-unions — who are themselves immigrants of the same class as those Baron Hirsch is striving to help, for in the next generation they lose with us their distinctiveness — are a whit less generous than other men.

Labor associations of the nature of trade-guilds or unions are necessarily selfish; by the law of their being they must fight for their own hand, regardless of who is hurt; they ignore and must ignore the teaching of Christ that we should do to others as we would have them do to us, which a true political economy shows is the only way to the full emancipation of the masses. They must do their best to starve workmen who do not join them, they must by all means in their power force back the “blackleg” — as the soldier in battle must shoot down his mother’s son if in the opposing ranks. And who is the blackleg? A fellow-creature seeking work — a fellow-creature in all probability more pressed and starved than those who so bitterly denounce him, and often with the hungry pleading faces of wife and child behind him.

And, in so far as they succeed, what is it that trade-guilds and unions do but to impose more restrictions on natural rights; to create “trusts” in labor; to add to privileged classes other somewhat privileged classes; and to press the weaker closer to the wall?

I speak without prejudice against trades-unions, of which for years I was an active member. And in pointing out to your Holiness that their principle is selfish and incapable of large and permanent benefits, and that their methods violate natural rights and work hardship and injustice, I am only saying to you what, both in my books and by word of mouth, I have said over and over again to them. Nor is what I say capable of dispute. Intelligent trades-unionists know it, and the less intelligent vaguely feel it. And even those of the classes of wealth and leisure who, as if to head off the demand for natural rights, are preaching trades-unionism to working-men, must needs admit it.

Your Holiness will remember the great London dock strike of two years ago, which, with that of other influential men, received the moral support of that Prince of the Church whom we of the English speech hold higher and dearer than any prelate has been held by us since the blood of Thomas à Becket stained the Canterbury altar.

In a volume called “The Story of the Dockers’ Strike,” written by Messrs. H. Llewellyn Smith and Vaughan Nash, with an introduction by Sydney Buxton, M.P., which advocates trades-unionism as the solution of the labor question, and of which a large number were sent to Australia as a sort of official recognition of the generous aid received from there by the strikers, I find in the summing up, on pages 164-165, the following:

If the settlement lasts, work at the docks will be more regular, better paid, and carried on under better conditions than ever before. All this will be an unqualified gain to those who get the benefit from it. But another result will undoubtedly be to contract the field of employment and lessen the number of those for whom work can be found. The lower-class casual will, in the end, find his position more precarious than ever before, in proportion to the increased regularity of work which the “fitter” of the laborers will secure. The effect of the organization of dock labor, as of all classes of labor, will be to squeeze out the residuum. The loafer, the cadger, the failure in the industrial race — the members of “Class B” of Mr. Charles Booth’s hierarchy of social classes — will be no gainers by the change, but will rather find another door closed against them, and this in many cases the last door to employment.

I am far from wishing that your Holiness should join in that pharisaical denunciation of trades-unions common among those who, while quick to point out the injustice of trades-unions in denying to others the equal right to work, are themselves supporters of that more primary injustice that denies the equal right to the standing-place and natural material necessary to work. What I wish to point out is that trades-unionism, while it may be a partial palliative, is not a remedy; that it has not that moral character which could alone justify one in the position of your Holiness in urging it as good in itself. Yet, so long as you insist on private property in land what better can you do?

 

V.

In the beginning of the Encyclical you declare that the responsibility of the apostolical office urges your Holiness to treat the question of the condition of labor “expressly and at length in order that there may be no mistake as to the principles which truth and justice dictate for its settlement.” But, blinded by one false assumption, you do not see even fundamentals.

You assume that the labor question is a question between wage-workers and their employers. But working for wages is not the primary or exclusive occupation of labor. Primarily men work for themselves without the intervention of an employer. And the primary source of wages is in the earnings of labor, the man who works for himself and consumes his own products receiving his wages in the fruits of his labor. Are not fishermen, boatmen, cab-drivers, peddlers, working farmers — all, in short, of the many workers who get their wages directly by the sale of their services or products without the medium of an employer, as much laborers as those who work for the specific wages of an employer? In your consideration of remedies you do not seem even to have thought of them. Yet in reality the laborers who work for themselves are the first to be considered, since what men will be willing to accept from employers depends manifestly on what they can get by working for themselves.
You assume that all employers are rich men, who might raise wages much higher were they not so grasping. But is it not the fact that the great majority of employers are in reality as much pressed by competition as their workmen, many of them constantly on the verge of failure? Such employers could not possibly raise the wages they pay, however they might wish to, unless all others were compelled to do so.

You assume that there are in the natural order two classes, the rich and the poor, and that laborers naturally belong to the poor.

It is true as you say that there are differences in capacity, in diligence, in health and in strength, that may produce differences in fortune. These, however, are not the differences that divide men into rich and poor. The natural differences in powers and aptitudes are certainly not greater than are natural differences in stature. But while it is only by selecting giants and dwarfs that we can find men twice as tall as others, yet in the difference between rich and poor that exists today we find some men richer than other men by the thousandfold and the millionfold.

Nowhere do these differences between wealth and poverty coincide with differences in individual powers and aptitudes. The real difference between rich and poor is the difference between those who hold the tollgates and those who pay toll; between tribute-receivers and tribute-yielders.

In what way does nature justify such a difference? In the numberless varieties of animated nature we find some species that are evidently intended to live on other species. But their relations are always marked by unmistakable differences in size, shape or organs. To man has been given dominion over all the other living things that tenant the earth. But is not this mastery indicated even in externals, so that no one can fail on sight to distinguish between a man and one of the inferior animals? Our American apologists for slavery used to contend that the black skin and woolly hair of the negro indicated the intent of nature that the black should serve the white; but the difference that you assume to be natural is between men of the same race. What difference does nature show between such men as would indicate her intent that one should live idly yet be rich, and the other should work hard yet be poor? If I could bring you from the United States a man who has $200,000,000, and one who is glad to work for a few dollars a week, and place them side by side in your antechamber, would you be able to tell which was which, even were you to call in the most skilled anatomist? Is it not clear that God in no way countenances or condones the division of rich and poor that exists today, or in any way permits it, except as having given them free will he permits men to choose either good or evil, and to avoid heaven if they prefer hell. For is it not clear that the division of men into the classes rich and poor has invariably its origin in force and fraud; invariably involves violation of the moral law; and is really a division into those who get the profits of robbery and those who are robbed; those who hold in exclusive possession what God made for all, and those who are deprived of his bounty? Did not Christ in all his utterances and parables show that the gross difference between rich and poor is opposed to God’s law? Would he have condemned the rich so strongly as he did, if the class distinction between rich and poor did not involve injustice — was not opposed to God’s intent?

It seems to us that your Holiness misses its real significance in intimating that Christ, in becoming the son of a carpenter and himself working as a carpenter, showed merely that “there is nothing to be ashamed of in seeking one’s bread by labor.” To say that is almost like saying that by not robbing people he showed that there is nothing to be ashamed of in honesty. If you will consider how true in any large view is the classification of all men into working-men, beggar-men and thieves, you will see that it was morally impossible that Christ during his stay on earth should have been anything else than a working-man, since he who came to fulfil the law must by deed as well as word obey God’s law of labor.

See how fully and how beautifully Christ’s life on earth illustrated this law. Entering our earthly life in the weakness of infancy, as it is appointed that all should enter it, he lovingly took what in the natural order is lovingly rendered, the sustenance, secured by labor, that one generation owes to its immediate successors. Arrived at maturity, he earned his own subsistence by that common labor in which the majority of men must and do earn it. Then passing to a higher — to the very highest — sphere of labor, he earned his subsistence by the teaching of moral and spiritual truths, receiving its material wages in the love-offerings of grateful hearers, and not refusing the costly spikenard with which Mary anointed his feet. So, when he chose his disciples, he did not go to landowners or other monopolists who live on the labor of others, but to common laboring-men. And when he called them to a higher sphere of labor and sent them out to teach moral and spiritual truths, he told them to take, without condescension on the one hand or sense of degradation on the other, the loving return for such labor, saying to them that “the laborer is worthy of his hire,” thus showing, what we hold, that all labor does not consist in what is called manual labor, but that whoever helps to add to the material, intellectual, moral or spiritual fullness of life is also a laborer.*

* Nor should it be forgotten that the investigator, the philosopher, the teacher, the artist, the poet, the priest, though not engaged in the production of wealth, are not only engaged in the production of utilities and satisfactions to which the production of wealth is only a means, but by acquiring and diffusing knowledge, stimulating mental powers and elevating the moral sense, may greatly increase the ability to produce wealth. For man does not live by bread alone. . . . He who by any exertion of mind or body adds to the aggregate of enjoyable wealth, increases the sum of human knowledge, or gives to human life higher elevation or greater fullness — he is, in the large meaning of the words, a “producer,” a “working-man,” a “laborer,” and is honestly earning honest wages. But he who without doing aught to make mankind richer, wiser, better, happier, lives on the toil of others — he, no matter by what name of honor he may be called, or how lustily the priests of Mammon may swing their censers before him, is in the last analysis but a beggar-man or a thief. — Protection or Free Trade, pp. 74-75.

In assuming that laborers, even ordinary manual laborers, are naturally poor, you ignore the fact that labor is the producer of wealth, and attribute to the natural law of the Creator an injustice that comes from man’s impious violation of his benevolent intention. In the rudest stage of the arts it is possible, where justice prevails, for all well men to earn a living. With the labor-saving appliances of our time, it should be possible for all to earn much more. And so, in saying that poverty is no disgrace, you convey an unreasonable implication. For poverty ought to be a disgrace, since in a condition of social justice, it would, where unsought from religious motives or unimposed by unavoidable misfortune, imply recklessness or laziness.

 

The sympathy of your Holiness seems exclusively directed to the poor, the workers. Ought this to be so? Are not the rich, the idlers, to be pitied also? By the word of the gospel it is the rich rather than the poor who call for pity, for the presumption is that they will share the fate of Dives. And to any one who believes in a future life the condition of him who wakes to find his cherished millions left behind must seem pitiful. But even in this life, how really pitiable are the rich. The evil is not in wealth in itself — in its command over material things; it is in the possession of wealth while others are steeped in poverty; in being raised above touch with the life of humanity, from its work and its struggles, its hopes and its fears, and above all, from the love that sweetens life, and the kindly sympathies and generous acts that strengthen faith in man and trust in God.

Consider how the rich see the meaner side of human nature; how they are surrounded by flatterers and sycophants; how they find ready instruments not only to gratify vicious impulses, but to prompt and stimulate them; how they must constantly be on guard lest they be swindled; how often they must suspect an ulterior motive behind kindly deed or friendly word; how if they try to be generous they are beset by shameless beggars and scheming impostors; how often the family affections are chilled for them, and their deaths anticipated with the ill-concealed joy of expectant possession. The worst evil of poverty is not in the want of material things, but in the stunting and distortion of the higher qualities. So, though in another way, the possession of unearned wealth likewise stunts and distorts what is noblest in man.

God’s commands cannot be evaded with impunity. If it be God’s command that men shall earn their bread by labor, the idle rich must suffer. And they do. See the utter vacancy of the lives of those who live for pleasure; see the loathsome vices bred in a class who surrounded by poverty are sated with wealth. See that terrible punishment of ennui, of which the poor know so little that they cannot understand it; see the pessimism that grows among the wealthy classes — that shuts out God, that despises men, that deems existence in itself an evil, and fearing death yet longs for annihilation.

When Christ told the rich young man who sought him to sell all he had and to give it to the poor, he was not thinking of the poor, but of the young man. And I doubt not that among the rich, and especially among the self-made rich, there are many who at times at least feel keenly the folly of their riches and fear for the dangers and temptations to which these expose their children. But the strength of long habit, the prompting of pride, the excitement of making and holding what have become for them the counters in a game of cards, the family expectations that have assumed the character of rights, and the real difficulty they find in making any good use of their wealth, bind them to their burden, like a weary donkey to his pack, till they stumble on the precipice that bounds this life.

Men who are sure of getting food when they shall need it eat only what appetite dictates. But with the sparse tribes who exist on the verge of the habitable globe life is either a famine or a feast. Enduring hunger for days, the fear of it prompts them to gorge like anacondas when successful in their quest of game. And so, what gives wealth its curse is what drives men to seek it, what makes it so envied and admired — the fear of want. As the unduly rich are the corollary of the unduly poor, so is the soul-destroying quality of riches but the reflex of the want that embrutes and degrades. The real evil lies in the injustice from which unnatural possession and unnatural deprivation both spring.

But this injustice can hardly be charged on individuals or classes. The existence of private property in land is a great social wrong from which society at large suffers, and of which the very rich and the very poor are alike victims, though at the opposite extremes. Seeing this, it seems to us like a violation of Christian charity to speak of the rich as though they individually were responsible for the sufferings of the poor. Yet, while you do this, you insist that the cause of monstrous wealth and degrading poverty shall not be touched. Here is a man with a disfiguring and dangerous excrescence. One physician would kindly, gently, but firmly remove it. Another insists that it shall not be removed, but at the same time holds up the poor victim to hatred and ridicule. Which is right?

In seeking to restore all men to their equal and natural rights we do not seek the benefit of any class, but of all. For we both know by faith and see by fact that injustice can profit no one and that justice must benefit all.

Nor do we seek any “futile and ridiculous equality.” We recognize, with you, that there must always be differences and inequalities. In so far as these are in conformity with the moral law, in so far as they do not violate the command, “Thou shalt not steal,” we are content. We do not seek to better God’s work; we seek only to do his will. The equality we would bring about is not the equality of fortune, but the equality of natural opportunity; the equality that reason and religion alike proclaim — the equality in usufruct of all his children to the bounty of Our Father who art in Heaven.

And in taking for the uses of society what we clearly see is the great fund intended for society in the divine order, we would not levy the slightest tax on the possessors of wealth, no matter how rich they might be. Not only do we deem such taxes a violation of the right of property, but we see that by virtue of beautiful adaptations in the economic laws of the Creator, it is impossible for any one honestly to acquire wealth, without at the same time adding to the wealth of the world.

 

To persist in a wrong, to refuse to undo it, is always to become involved in other wrongs. Those who defend private property in land, and thereby deny the first and most important of all human rights, the equal right to the material substratum of life, are compelled to one of two courses. Either they must, as do those whose gospel is “Devil take the hindermost,” deny the equal right to life, and by some theory like that to which the English clergyman Malthus has given his name, assert that nature (they do not venture to say God) brings into the world more men than there is provision for; or, they must, as do the socialists, assert as rights what in themselves are wrongs.

Your Holiness in the Encyclical gives an example of this. Denying the equality of right to the material basis of life, and yet conscious that there is a right to live, you assert the right of laborers to employment and their right to receive from their employers a certain indefinite wage. No such rights exist. No one has a right to demand employment of another, or to demand higher wages than the other is willing to give, or in any way to put pressure on another to make him raise such wages against his will. There can be no better moral justification for such demands on employers by working-men than there would be for employers demanding that working-men shall be compelled to work for them when they do not want to and to accept wages lower than they are willing to take. Any seeming justification springs from a prior wrong, the denial to working-men of their natural rights, and can in the last analysis rest only on that supreme dictate of self-preservation that under extraordinary circumstances makes pardonable what in itself is theft, or sacrilege or even murder.

A fugitive slave with the bloodhounds of his pursuers baying at his heels would in true Christian morals be held blameless if he seized the first horse he came across, even though to take it he had to knock down the rider. But this is not to justify horse-stealing as an ordinary means of traveling.

When his disciples were hungry Christ permitted them to pluck corn on the Sabbath day. But he never denied the sanctity of the Sabbath by asserting that it was under ordinary circumstances a proper time to gather corn.

He justified David, who when pressed by hunger committed what ordinarily would be sacrilege, by taking from the temple the loaves of proposition. But in this he was far from saying that the robbing of temples was a proper way of getting a living.

In the Encyclical however you commend the application to the ordinary relations of life, under normal conditions, of principles that in ethics are only to be tolerated under extraordinary conditions. You are driven to this assertion of false rights by your denial of true rights. The natural right which each man has is not that of demanding employment or wages from another man; but that of employing himself — that of applying by his own labor to the inexhaustible storehouse which the Creator has in the land provided for all men. Were that storehouse open, as by the single tax we would open it, the natural demand for labor would keep pace with the supply, the man who sold labor and the man who bought it would become free exchangers for mutual advantage, and all cause for dispute between workman and employer would be gone. For then, all being free to employ themselves, the mere opportunity to labor would cease to seem a boon; and since no one would work for another for less, all things considered, than he could earn by working for himself, wages would necessarily rise to their full value, and the relations of workman and employer be regulated by mutual interest and convenience.

This is the only way in which they can be satisfactorily regulated.

Your Holiness seems to assume that there is some just rate of wages that employers ought to be willing to pay and that laborers should be content to receive, and to imagine that if this were secured there would be an end of strife. This rate you evidently think of as that which will give working-men a frugal living, and perhaps enable them by hard work and strict economy to lay by a little something.

But how can a just rate of wages be fixed without the “higgling of the market” any more than the just price of corn or pigs or ships or paintings can be so fixed? And would not arbitrary regulation in the one case as in the other check that interplay that most effectively promotes the economical adjustment of productive forces? Why should buyers of labor, any more than buyers of commodities, be called on to pay higher prices than in a free market they are compelled to pay? Why should the sellers of labor be content with anything less than in a free market they can obtain? Why should working-men be content with frugal fare when the world is so rich? Why should they be satisfied with a lifetime of toil and stinting, when the world is so beautiful? Why should not they also desire to gratify the higher instincts, the finer tastes? Why should they be forever content to travel in the steerage when others find the cabin more enjoyable?

Nor will they. The ferment of our time does not arise merely from the fact that working-men find it harder to live on the same scale of comfort. It is also and perhaps still more largely due to the increase of their desires with an improved scale of comfort. This increase of desire must continue. For working-men are men. And man is the unsatisfied animal.

He is not an ox, of whom it may be said, so much grass, so much grain, so much water, and a little salt, and he will be content. On the contrary, the more he gets the more he craves. When he has enough food then he wants better food. When he gets a shelter then he wants a more commodious and tasty one. When his animal needs are satisfied then mental and spiritual desires arise.

This restless discontent is of the nature of man — of that nobler nature that raises him above the animals by so immeasurable a gulf, and shows him to be indeed created in the likeness of God. It is not to be quarreled with, for it is the motor of all progress. It is this that has raised St. Peter’s dome and on dull, dead canvas made the angelic face of the Madonna to glow; it is this that has weighed suns and analyzed stars, and opened page after page of the wonderful works of creative intelligence; it is this that has narrowed the Atlantic to an ocean ferry and trained the lightning to carry our messages to the remotest lands; it is this that is opening to us possibilities beside which all that our modern civilization has as yet accomplished seem small. Nor can it be repressed save by degrading and embruting men; by reducing Europe to Asia.

Hence, short of what wages may be earned when all restrictions on labor are removed and access to natural opportunities on equal terms secured to all, it is impossible to fix any rate of wages that will be deemed just, or any rate of wages that can prevent working-men striving to get more. So far from it making working-men more contented to improve their condition a little, it is certain to make them more discontented.

Nor are you asking justice when you ask employers to pay their working-men more than they are compelled to pay — more than they could get others to do the work for. You are asking charity. For the surplus that the rich employer thus gives is not in reality wages, it is essentially alms.
In speaking of the practical measures for the improvement of the condition of labor which your Holiness suggests, I have not mentioned what you place much stress upon — charity. But there is nothing practical in such recommendations as a cure for poverty, nor will any one so consider them. If it were possible for the giving of alms to abolish poverty there would be no poverty in Christendom.

Charity is indeed a noble and beautiful virtue, grateful to man and approved by God. But charity must be built on justice. It cannot supersede justice.

What is wrong with the condition of labor through the Christian world is that labor is robbed. And while you justify the continuance of that robbery it is idle to urge charity. To do so — to commend charity as a substitute for justice, is indeed something akin in essence to those heresies, condemned by your predecessors, that taught that the gospel had superseded the law, and that the love of God exempted men from moral obligations.

All that charity can do where injustice exists is here and there to mollify somewhat the effects of injustice. It cannot cure them. Nor is even what little it can do to mollify the effects of injustice without evil. For what may be called the superimposed, and in this sense, secondary virtues, work evil where the fundamental or primary virtues are absent. Thus sobriety is a virtue and diligence is a virtue. But a sober and diligent thief is all the more dangerous. Thus patience is a virtue. But patience under wrong is the condoning of wrong. Thus it is a virtue to seek knowledge and to endeavor to cultivate the mental powers. But the wicked man becomes more capable of evil by reason of his intelligence. Devils we always think of as intelligent.

And thus that pseudo-charity that discards and denies justice works evil. On the one side, it demoralizes its recipients, outraging that human dignity which as you say “God himself treats with reverence,” and turning into beggars and paupers men who to become self-supporting, self-respecting citizens need only the restitution of what God has given them. On the other side, it acts as an anodyne to the consciences of those who are living on the robbery of their fellows, and fosters that moral delusion and spiritual pride that Christ doubtless had in mind when he said it was easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven. For it leads men steeped in injustice, and using their money and their influence to bolster up injustice, to think that in giving alms they are doing something more than their duty toward man and deserve to be very well thought of by God, and in a vague way to attribute to their own goodness what really belongs to God’s goodness. For consider: Who is the All-Provider? Who is it that as you say, “owes to man a storehouse that shall never fail,” and which “he finds only in the inexhaustible fertility of the earth.” Is it not God? And when, therefore, men, deprived of the bounty of their God, are made dependent on the bounty of their fellow-creatures, are not these creatures, as it were, put in the place of God, to take credit to themselves for paying obligations that you yourself say God owes?

But worse perhaps than all else is the way in which this substituting of vague injunctions to charity for the clear-cut demands of justice opens an easy means for the professed teachers of the Christian religion of all branches and communions to placate Mammon while persuading themselves that they are serving God. Had the English clergy not subordinated the teaching of justice to the teaching of charity — to go no further in illustrating a principle of which the whole history of Christendom from Constantine’s time to our own is witness — the Tudor tyranny would never have arisen, and the separation of the church been averted; had the clergy of France never substituted charity for justice, the monstrous iniquities of the ancient régime would never have brought the horrors of the Great Revolution; and in my own country had those who should have preached justice not satisfied themselves with preaching kindness, chattel slavery could never have demanded the holocaust of our civil war.

No, your Holiness; as faith without works is dead, as men cannot give to God his due while denying to their fellows the rights be gave them, so charity unsupported by justice can do nothing to solve the problem of the existing condition of labor. Though the rich were to “bestow all their goods to feed the poor and give their bodies to be burned,” poverty would continue while property in land continues.

Take the case of the rich man today who is honestly desirous of devoting his wealth to the improvement of the condition of labor. What can he do?

  • Bestow his wealth on those who need it? He may help some who deserve it, but will not improve general conditions. And against the good he may do will be the danger of doing harm.
  • Build churches? Under the shadow of churches poverty festers and the vice that is born of it breeds.
  • Build schools and colleges? Save as it may lead men to see the iniquity of private property in land, increased education can effect nothing for mere laborers, for as education is diffused the wages of education sink.
  • Establish hospitals? Why, already it seems to laborers that there are too many seeking work, and to save and prolong life is to add to the pressure.
  • Build model tenements? Unless he cheapens house accommodations he but drives further the class he would benefit, and as he cheapens house accommodations he brings more to seek employment and cheapens wages.
  • Institute laboratories, scientific schools, workshops for physical experiments? He but stimulates invention and discovery, the very forces that, acting on a society based on private property in land, are crushing labor as between the upper and the nether millstone.
  • Promote emigration from places where wages are low to places where they are somewhat higher? If he does, even those whom he at first helps to emigrate will soon turn on him to demand that such emigration shall be stopped as reducing their wages.
  • Give away what land he may have, or refuse to take rent for it, or let it at lower rents than the market price? He will simply make new landowners or partial landowners; he may make some individuals the richer, but he will do nothing to improve the general condition of labor.
  • Or, bethinking himself of those public-spirited citizens of classic times who spent great sums in improving their native cities, shall he try to beautify the city of his birth or adoption? Let him widen and straighten narrow and crooked streets, let him build parks and erect fountains, let him open tramways and bring in railroads, or in any way make beautiful and attractive his chosen city, and what will be the result? Must it not be that those who appropriate God’s bounty will take his also? Will it not be that the value of land will go up, and that the net result of his benefactions will be an increase of rents and a bounty to landowners? Why, even the mere announcement that he is going to do such things will start speculation and send up the value of land by leaps and bounds.

What, then, can the rich man do to improve the condition of labor?

He can do nothing at all except to use his strength for the abolition of the great primary wrong that robs men of their birthright. The justice of God laughs at the attempts of men to substitute anything else for it.

 

If when in speaking of the practical measures your Holiness proposes, I did not note the moral injunctions that the Encyclical contains, it is not because we do not think morality practical. On the contrary it seems to us that in the teachings of morality is to be found the highest practicality, and that the question, What is wise? may always safely be subordinated to the question, What is right? But your Holiness in the Encyclical expressly deprives the moral truths you state of all real bearing on the condition of labor, just as the American people, by their legalization of chattel slavery, used to deprive of all practical meaning the declaration they deem their fundamental charter, and were accustomed to read solemnly on every national anniversary. That declaration asserts that “We hold these truths to be self-evident — that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” But what did this truth mean on the lips of men who asserted that one man was the rightful property of another man who had bought him; who asserted that the slave was robbing the master in running away, and that the man or the woman who helped the fugitive to escape, or even gave him a cup of cold water in Christ’s name, was an accessory to theft, on whose head the penalties of the state should be visited?

Consider the moral teachings of the Encyclical:

  • You tell us that God owes to man an inexhaustible storehouse which he finds only in the land. Yet you support a system that denies to the great majority of men all right of recourse to this storehouse.
  • You tell us that the necessity of labor is a consequence of original sin. Yet you support a system that exempts a privileged class from the necessity for labor and enables them to shift their share and much more than their share of labor on others.
  • You tell us that God has not created us for the perishable and transitory things of earth, but has given us this world as a place of exile and not as our true country. Yet you tell us that some of the exiles have the exclusive right of ownership in this place of common exile, so that they may compel their fellow-exiles to pay them for sojourning here, and that this exclusive ownership they may transfer to other exiles yet to come, with the same right of excluding their fellows.
  • You tell us that virtue is the common inheritance of all; that all men are children of God the common Father; that all have the same last end; that all are redeemed by Jesus Christ; that the blessings of nature and the gifts of grace belong in common to all, and that to all except the unworthy is promised the inheritance of the Kingdom of Heaven! Yet in all this and through all this you insist as a moral duty on the maintenance of a system that makes the reservoir of all God’s material bounties and blessings to man the exclusive property of a few of their number — you give us equal rights in heaven, but deny us equal rights on earth!

It was said of a famous decision of the Supreme Court of the United States made just before the civil war, in a fugitive-slave case, that “it gave the law to the North and the nigger to the South.” It is thus that your Encyclical gives the gospel to laborers and the earth to the landlords. Is it really to be wondered at that there are those who sneeringly say, “The priests are ready enough to give the poor an equal share in all that is out of sight, but they take precious good care that the rich shall keep a tight grip on all that is within sight”?

 

Herein is the reason why the working masses all over the world are turning away from organized religion.

And why should they not? What is the office of religion if not to point out the principles that ought to govern the conduct of men toward each other; to furnish a clear, decisive rule of right which shall guide men in all the relations of life — in the workshop, in the mart, in the forum and in the senate, as well as in the church; to supply, as it were, a compass by which amid the blasts of passion, the aberrations of greed and the delusions of a short-sighted expediency men may safely steer? What is the use of a religion that stands palsied and paltering in the face of the most momentous problems? What is the use of a religion that whatever it may promise for the next world can do nothing to prevent injustice in this? Early Christianity was not such a religion, else it would never have encountered the Roman persecutions; else it would never have swept the Roman world. The skeptical masters of Rome, tolerant of all gods, careless of what they deemed vulgar superstitions, were keenly sensitive to a doctrine based on equal rights; they feared instinctively a religion that inspired slave and proletarian with a new hope; that took for its central figure a crucified carpenter; that taught the equal Fatherhood of God and the equal brotherhood of men; that looked for the speedy reign of justice, and that prayed, “Thy Kingdom come on Earth!

Today, the same perceptions, the same aspirations, exist among the masses. Man is, as he has been called, a religious animal, and can never quite rid himself of the feeling that there is some moral government of the world, some eternal distinction between wrong and right; can never quite abandon the yearning for a reign of righteousness. And today, men who, as they think, have cast off all belief in religion, will tell you, even though they know not what it is, that with regard to the condition of labor something is wrong! If theology be, as St. Thomas of Aquin held it, the sum and focus of the sciences, is it not the business of religion to say clearly and fearlessly what that wrong is? It was by a deep impulse that of old when threatened and perplexed by general disaster men came to the oracles to ask, In what have we offended the gods? today, menaced by growing evils that threaten the very existence of society, men, conscious that something is wrong, are putting the same question to the ministers of religion. What is the answer they get? Alas, with few exceptions, it is as vague, as inadequate, as the answers that used to come from heathen oracles.

Is it any wonder that the masses of men are losing faith?

 

Let me again state the case that your Encyclical presents:

What is that condition of labor which as you truly say is “the question of the hour,” and “fills every mind with painful apprehension”? Reduced to its lowest expression it is the poverty of men willing to work. And what is the lowest expression of this phrase? It is that they lack bread — for in that one word we most concisely and strongly express all the manifold material satisfactions needed by humanity, the absence of which constitutes poverty.

Now what is the prayer of Christendom — the universal prayer; the prayer that goes up daily and hourly wherever the name of Christ is honored; that ascends from your Holiness at the high altar of St. Peter’s, and that is repeated by the youngest child that the poorest Christian mother has taught to lisp a request to her Father in Heaven? It is, “Give us this day our daily bread!”

Yet where this prayer goes up, daily and hourly, men lack bread. Is it not the business of religion to say why? If it cannot do so, shall not scoffers mock its ministers as Elias mocked the prophets of Baal, saying, “Cry with a louder voice, for he is a god; and perhaps he is talking, or is in an inn, or on a journey, or perhaps be is asleep, and must be awaked!” What answer can those ministers give? Either there is no God, or he is asleep, or else he does give men their daily bread, and it is in some way intercepted.

Here is the answer, the only true answer: If men lack bread it is not that God has not done his part in providing it. If men willing to labor are cursed with poverty, it is not that the storehouse that God owes men has failed; that the daily supply he has promised for the daily wants of his children is not here in abundance. It is, that impiously violating the benevolent intentions of their Creator, men have made land private property, and thus given into the exclusive ownership of the few the provision that a bountiful Father has made for all.

Any other answer than that, no matter how it may be shrouded in the mere forms of religion, is practically an atheistical answer.

___________________

I have written this letter not alone for your Holiness, but for all whom I may hope it to reach. But in sending it to you personally, and in advance of publication, I trust that it may be by you personally read and weighed. In setting forth the grounds of our belief and in pointing out considerations which it seems to us you have unfortunately overlooked, I have written frankly, as was my duty on a matter of such momentous importance, and as I am sure you would have me write. But I trust I have done so without offense. For your office I have profound respect, for yourself personally the highest esteem. And while the views I have opposed seem to us erroneous and dangerous, we do not wish to be understood as in the slightest degree questioning either your sincerity or intelligence in adopting them. For they are views all but universally held by the professed religious teachers of Christendom, in all communions and creeds, and that have received the sanction of those looked to as the wise and learned. Under the conditions that have surrounded you, and under the pressure of so many high duties and responsibilities, culminating in those of your present exalted position, it is not to be expected that you should have hitherto thought to question them. But I trust that the considerations herein set forth may induce you to do so, and even if the burdens and cares that beset you shall now make impossible the careful consideration that should precede expression by one in your responsible position I trust that what I have written may not be without use to others.

And, as I have said, we are deeply grateful for your Encyclical. It is much that by so conspicuously calling attention to the condition of labor, you have recalled the fact forgotten by so many that the social evils and problems of our time directly and pressingly concern the church. It is much that you should thus have placed the stamp of your disapproval on that impious doctrine which directly and by implication has been so long and so widely preached in the name of Christianity, that the sufferings of the poor are due to mysterious decrees of Providence which men may lament but cannot alter. Your Encyclical will be seen by those who carefully analyze it to be directed not against socialism, which in moderate form you favor, but against what we in the United States call the single tax. Yet we have no solicitude for the truth save that it shall be brought into discussion, and we recognize in your Holiness’s Encyclical a most efficient means of promoting discussion, and of promoting discussion along the lines that we deem of the greatest importance — the lines of morality and religion. In this you deserve the gratitude of all who would follow truth, for it is of the nature of truth always to prevail over error where discussion goes on.

And the truth for which we stand has now made such progress in the minds of men that it must be heard; that it can never be stifled; that it must go on conquering and to conquer. Far-off Australia leads the van, and has already taken the first steps toward the single tax. In Great Britain, in the United States, and in Canada, the question is on the verge of practical politics and soon will be the burning issue of the time. Continental Europe cannot long linger behind. Faster than ever the world is moving.

Forty years ago slavery seemed stronger in the United States than ever before, and the market price of slaves — both working slaves and breeding slaves — was higher than it had ever been before, for the title of the owner seemed growing more secure. In the shadow of the Hall where the equal rights of man had been solemnly proclaimed, the manacled fugitive was dragged back to bondage, and on what to American tradition was our Marathon of freedom, the slave-master boasted that he would yet call the roll of his chattels.

Yet forty years ago, though the party that was to place Abraham Lincoln in the Presidential chair had not been formed, and nearly a decade was yet to pass ere the signal-gun was to ring out, slavery, as we may now see, was doomed.

today a wider, deeper, more beneficent revolution is brooding, not over one country, but over the world. God’s truth impels it, and forces mightier than he has ever before given to man urge it on. It is no more in the power of vested wrongs to stay it than it is in man’s power to stay the sun. The stars in their courses fight against Sisera, and in the ferment of today, to him who hath ears to hear, the doom of industrial slavery is sealed.

Where shall the dignitaries of the church be in the struggle that is coming, nay that is already here? On the side of justice and liberty, or on the side of wrong and slavery? with the delivered when the timbrels shall sound again, or with the chariots and the horsemen that again shall be engulfed in the sea?

As to the masses, there is little fear where they will be. Already, among those who hold it with religious fervor, the single tax counts great numbers of Catholics, many priests, secular and regular, and at least some bishops, while there is no communion or denomination of the many into which English-speaking Christians are divided where its advocates are not to be found.

Last Sunday evening in the New York church that of all churches in the world is most richly endowed, I saw the cross carried through its aisles by a hundred choristers, and heard a priest of that English branch of the church that three hundred years since was separated from your obedience, declare to a great congregation that the labor question was at bottom a religious question; that it could only be settled on the basis of moral right; that the first and clearest of rights is the equal right to the use of the physical basis of all life; and that no human titles could set aside God’s gift of the land to all men.

And as the cross moved by, and the choristers sang,

Raise ye the Christian’s war-cry —
The Cross of Christ the Lord!

men to whom it was a new thing bowed their heads, and in hearts long steeled against the church, as the willing handmaid of oppression, rose the “God wills it!” of the grandest and mightiest of crusades.

Servant of the Servants of God! I call you by the strongest and sweetest of your titles. In your hands more than in those of any living man lies the power to say the word and make the sign that shall end an unnatural divorce, and marry again to religion all that is pure and high in social aspiration.

Wishing for your Holiness the chiefest of all blessings, that you may know the truth and be freed by the truth; wishing for you the days and the strength that may enable you by the great service you may render to humanity to make your pontificate through all coming time most glorious; and with the profound respect due to your personal character and to your exalted office, I am,

Yours sincerely,
HENRY GEORGE
NEW YORK, September 11, 1891.

Letter to Pope LeoXIII on Land Value Tax; Lessons for Kenya

Letter to Pope LeoXIII on Land Value Tax; Lessons for Kenya

http://www.wealthandwant.com/HG/the_condition_of_labor.htm

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To Pope Leo XIII.
YOUR HOLINESS: I have read with care your Encyclical letter on the condition of labor, addressed, through the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops and Bishops of your faith, to the Christian World. Since its most strikingly pronounced condemnations are directed against a theory that we who hold it know to be deserving of your support, I ask permission to lay before your Holiness the grounds of our belief, and to set forth some considerations that you have unfortunately overlooked. The momentous seriousness of the facts you refer to, the poverty, suffering and seething discontent that pervade the Christian world, the danger that passion may lead ignorance in a blind struggle against social conditions rapidly becoming intolerable, are my justification.

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American apologists for slavery used to contend that the black skin and woolly hair of the negro indicated the intent of nature that the black should serve the white; but the difference that you assume to be natural is between men of the same race. What difference does nature show between such men as would indicate her intent that one should live idly yet be rich, and the other should work hard yet be poor? If I could bring you from the United States a man who has $200,000,000, and one who is glad to work for a few dollars a week, and place them side by side in your antechamber, would you be able to tell which was which, even were you to call in the most skilled anatomist? Is it not clear that God in no way countenances or condones the division of rich and poor that exists today, or in any way permits it, except as having given them free will he permits men to choose either good or evil, and to avoid heaven if they prefer hell.
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The natural right which each man has is not that of demanding employment or wages from another man; but that of employing himself — that of applying by his own labor to the inexhaustible storehouse which the Creator has in the land provided for all men. Were that storehouse open, as by the single tax we would open it, the natural demand for labor would keep pace with the supply, the man who sold labor and the man who bought it would become free exchangers for mutual advantage, and all cause for dispute between workman and employer would be gone. For then, all being free to employ themselves, the mere opportunity to labor would cease to seem a boon; and since no one would work for another for less, all things considered, than he could earn by working for himself, wages would necessarily rise to their full value, and the relations of workman and employer be regulated by mutual interest and convenience.
This is the only way in which they can be satisfactorily regulated.
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Consider the moral teachings of the Encyclical:
• You tell us that God owes to man an inexhaustible storehouse which he finds only in the land. Yet you support a system that denies to the great majority of men all right of recourse to this storehouse.
• You tell us that the necessity of labor is a consequence of original sin. Yet you support a system that exempts a privileged class from the necessity for labor and enables them to shift their share and much more than their share of labor on others.
• You tell us that God has not created us for the perishable and transitory things of earth, but has given us this world as a place of exile and not as our true country. Yet you tell us that some of the exiles have the exclusive right of ownership in this place of common exile, so that they may compel their fellow-exiles to pay them for sojourning here, and that this exclusive ownership they may transfer to other exiles yet to come, with the same right of excluding their fellows.
• You tell us that virtue is the common inheritance of all; that all men are children of God the common Father; that all have the same last end; that all are redeemed by Jesus Christ; that the blessings of nature and the gifts of grace belong in common to all, and that to all except the unworthy is promised the inheritance of the Kingdom of Heaven! Yet in all this and through all this you insist as a moral duty on the maintenance of a system that makes the reservoir of all God’s material bounties and blessings to man the exclusive property of a few of their number — you give us equal rights in heaven, but deny us equal rights on earth!
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Here is the answer, the only true answer: If men lack bread it is not that God has not done his part in providing it. If men willing to labor are cursed with poverty, it is not that the storehouse that God owes men has failed; that the daily supply he has promised for the daily wants of his children is not here in abundance. It is, that impiously violating the benevolent intentions of their Creator, men have made land private property, and thus given into the exclusive ownership of the few the provision that a bountiful Father has made for all.
Any other answer than that, no matter how it may be shrouded in the mere forms of religion, is practically an atheistical answer.
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Wishing for your Holiness the chiefest of all blessings, that you may know the truth and be freed by the truth; wishing for you the days and the strength that may enable you by the great service you may render to humanity to make your pontificate through all coming time most glorious; and with the profound respect due to your personal character and to your exalted office, I am,
Yours sincerely,
HENRY GEORGE
NEW YORK, September 11, 1891.

Read full letter here

An Open Letter to Pope Leo XIII by Henry George September, 1891

An Open Letter to Pope Leo XIII by Henry George September, 1891

To Pope Leo XIII.

http://www.wealthandwant.com/HG/the_condition_of_labor.htm

 

YOUR HOLINESS: I have read with care your Encyclical letter on the condition of labor, addressed, through the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops and Bishops of your faith, to the Christian World. Since its most strikingly pronounced condemnations are directed against a theory that we who hold it know to be deserving of your support, I ask permission to lay before your Holiness the grounds of our belief, and to set forth some considerations that you have unfortunately overlooked. The momentous seriousness of the facts you refer to, the poverty, suffering and seething discontent that pervade the Christian world, the danger that passion may lead ignorance in a blind struggle against social conditions rapidly becoming intolerable, are my justification.

I.

Our postulates are all stated or implied in your Encyclical. They are the primary perceptions of human reason, the fundamental teachings of the Christian faith:

We hold: That—

This world is the creation of God.

The men brought into it for the brief period of their earthly lives are the equal creatures of his bounty, the equal subjects of his provident care.

By his constitution man is beset by physical wants, on the satisfaction of which depend not only the maintenance of his physical life but also the development of his intellectual and spiritual life.

God has made the satisfaction of these wants dependent on man’s own exertions, giving him the power and laying on him the injunction to labor — a power that of itself raises him far above the brute, since we may reverently say that it enables him to become as it were a helper in the creative work.

God has not put on man the task of making bricks without straw. With the need for labor and the power to labor he has also given to man the material for labor. This material is land — man physically being a land animal, who can live only on and from land, and can use other elements, such as air, sunshine and water, only by the use of land.

Being the equal creatures of the Creator, equally entitled under his providence to live their lives and satisfy their needs, men are equally entitled to the use of land, and any adjustment that denies this equal use of land is morally wrong.
As to the right of ownership, we hold: That —

Being created individuals, with individual wants and powers, men are individually entitled (subject of course to the moral obligations that arise from such relations as that of the family) to the use of their own powers and the enjoyment of the results. There thus arises, anterior to human law, and deriving its validity from the law of God, a right of private ownership in things produced by labor — a right that the possessor may transfer, but of which to deprive him without his will is theft.

This right of property, originating in the right of the individual to himself, is the only full and complete right of property. It attaches to things produced by labor, but cannot attach to things created by God.

Thus, if a man take a fish from the ocean he acquires a right of property in that fish, which exclusive right he may transfer by sale or gift. But he cannot obtain a similar right of property in the ocean, so that he may sell it or give it or forbid others to use it.

Or, if he set up a windmill he acquires a right of property in the things such use of wind enables him to produce. But he cannot claim a right of property in the wind itself, so that he may sell it or forbid others to use it.

Or, if he cultivate grain he acquires a right of property in the grain his labor brings forth. But he cannot obtain a similar right of property in the sun which ripened it or the soil on which it grew. For these things are of the continuing gifts of God to all generations of men, which all may use, but none may claim as his alone.

To attach to things created by God the same right of private ownership that justly attaches to things produced by labor is to impair and deny the true rights of property. For a man who out of the proceeds of his labor is obliged to pay another man for the use of ocean or air or sunshine or soil, all of which are to men involved in the single term land, is in this deprived of his rightful property and thus robbed.


As to the use of land
, we hold: That —

While the right of ownership that justly attaches to things produced by labor cannot attach to land, there may attach to land a right of possession. As your Holiness says, “God has not granted the earth to mankind in general in the sense that all without distinction can deal with it as they please,” and regulations necessary for its best use may be fixed by human laws. But such regulations must conform to the moral law — must secure to all equal participation in the advantages of God’s general bounty. The principle is the same as where a human father leaves property equally to a number of children. Some of the things thus left may be incapable of common use or of specific division. Such things may properly be assigned to some of the children, but only under condition that the equality of benefit among them all be preserved.

In the rudest social state, while industry consists in hunting, fishing, and gathering the spontaneous fruits of the earth, private possession of land is not necessary. But as men begin to cultivate the ground and expend their labor in permanent works, private possession of the land on which labor is thus expended is needed to secure the right of property in the products of labor. For who would sow if not assured of the exclusive possession needed to enable him to reap? who would attach costly works to the soil without such exclusive possession of the soil as would enable him to secure the benefit?

This right of private possession in things created by God is however very different from the right of private ownership in things produced by labor. The one is limited, the other unlimited, save in cases when the dictate of self-preservation terminates all other rights. The purpose of the one, the exclusive possession of land, is merely to secure the other, the exclusive ownership of the products of labor; and it can never rightfully be carried so far as to impair or deny this. While any one may hold exclusive possession of land so far as it does not interfere with the equal rights of others, he can rightfully hold it no further.

Thus Cain and Abel, were there only two men on earth, might by agreement divide the earth between them. Under this compact each might claim exclusive right to his share as against the other. But neither could rightfully continue such claim against the next man born. For since no one comes into the world without God’s permission, his presence attests his equal right to the use of God’s bounty. For them to refuse him any use of the earth which they had divided between them would therefore be for them to commit murder. And for them to refuse him any use of the earth, unless by laboring for them or by giving them part of the products of his labor he bought it of them, would be for them to commit theft.

God’s laws do not change. Though their applications may alter with altering conditions, the same principles of right and wrong that hold when men are few and industry is rude also hold amid teeming populations and complex industries. In our cities of millions and our states of scores of millions, in a civilization where the division of labor has gone so far that large numbers are hardly conscious that they are land-users, it still remains true that we are all land animals and can live only on land, and that land is God’s bounty to all, of which no one can be deprived without being murdered, and for which no one can be compelled to pay another without being robbed. But even in a state of society where the elaboration of industry and the increase of permanent improvements have made the need for private possession of land wide-spread, there is no difficulty in conforming individual possession with the equal right to land. For as soon as any piece of land will yield to the possessor a larger return than is had by similar labor on other land a value attaches to it which is shown when it is sold or rented. Thus, the value of the land itself, irrespective of the value of any improvements in or on it, always indicates the precise value of the benefit to which all are entitled in its use, as distinguished from the value which, as producer or successor of a producer, belongs to the possessor in individual right.

To combine the advantages of private possession with the justice of common ownership it is only necessary therefore to take for common uses what value attaches to land irrespective of any exertion of labor on it. The principle is the same as in the case referred to, where a human father leaves equally to his children things not susceptible of specific division or common use. In that case such things would be sold or rented and the value equally applied.

It is on this common-sense principle that we, who term ourselves single-tax men, would have the community act.We do not propose to assert equal rights to land by keeping land common, letting any one use any part of it at any time. We do not propose the task, impossible in the present state of society, of dividing land in equal shares; still less the yet more impossible task of keeping it so divided.

We propose — leaving land in the private possession of individuals, with full liberty on their part to give, sell or bequeath it — simply to levy on it for public uses a tax that shall equal the annual value of the land itself, irrespective of the use made of it or the improvements on it. And since this would provide amply for the need of public revenues, we would accompany this tax on land values with the repeal of all taxes now levied on the products and processes of industry — which taxes, since they take from the earnings of labor, we hold to be infringements of the right of property.

This we propose, not as a cunning device of human ingenuity, but as a conforming of human regulations to the will of God.

God cannot contradict himself nor impose on his creatures laws that clash.

If it be God’s command to men that they should not steal — that is to say, that they should respect the right of property which each one has in the fruits of his labor;

And if he be also the Father of all men, who in his common bounty has intended all to have equal opportunities for sharing;

Then, in any possible stage of civilization, however elaborate, there must be some way in which the exclusive right to the products of industry may be reconciled with the equal right to land.

If the Almighty be consistent with himself, it cannot be, as say those socialists referred to by you, that in order to secure the equal participation of men in the opportunities of life and labor we must ignore the right of private property. Nor yet can it be, as you yourself in the Encyclical seem to argue, that to secure the right of private property we must ignore the equality of right in the opportunities of life and labor. To say the one thing or the other is equally to deny the harmony of God’s laws.

But, the private possession of land, subject to the payment to the community of the value of any special advantage thus given to the individual, satisfies both laws, securing to all equal participation in the bounty of the Creator and to each the full ownership of the products of his labor.

Nor do we hesitate to say that this way of securing the equal right to the bounty of the Creator and the exclusive right to the products of labor is the way intended by God for raising public revenues. For we are not atheists, who deny God; nor semi-atheists, who deny that he has any concern in politics and legislation.

It is true as you say — a salutary truth too often forgotten — that “man is older than the state, and he holds the right of providing for the life of his body prior to the formation of any state.” Yet, as you too perceive, it is also true that the state is in the divinely appointed order. For He who foresaw all things and provided for all things, foresaw and provided that with the increase of population and the development of industry the organization of human society into states or governments would become both expedient and necessary.

No sooner does the state arise than, as we all know, it needs revenues. This need for revenues is small at first, while population is sparse, industry rude and the functions of the state few and simple. But with growth of population and advance of civilization the functions of the state increase and larger and larger revenues are needed.

Now, He that made the world and placed man in it, He that pre-ordained civilization as the means whereby man might rise to higher powers and become more and more conscious of the works of his Creator, must have foreseen this increasing need for state revenues and have made provision for it. That is to say: The increasing need for public revenues with social advance, being a natural, God-ordained need, there must be a right way of raising them — some way that we can truly say is the way intended by God. It is clear that this right way of raising public revenues must accord with the moral law.

Hence:

It must not take from individuals what rightfully belongs to individuals.

It must not give some an advantage over others, as by increasing the prices of what some have to sell and others must buy.

It must not lead men into temptation, by requiring trivial oaths, by making it profitable to lie, to swear falsely, to bribe or to take bribes.

It must not confuse the distinctions of right and wrong, and weaken the sanctions of religion and the state by creating crimes that are not sins, and punishing men for doing what in itself they have an undoubted right to do.

It must not repress industry. It must not check commerce. It must not punish thrift. It must offer no impediment to the largest production and the fairest division of wealth.

Let me ask your Holiness to consider the taxes on the processes and products of industry by which through the civilized world public revenues are collected — the octroi duties that surround Italian cities with barriers; the monstrous customs duties that hamper intercourse between so-called Christian states; the taxes on occupations, on earnings, on investments, on the building of houses, on the cultivation of fields, on industry and thrift in all forms. Can these be the ways God has intended that governments should raise the means they need? Have any of them the characteristics indispensable in any plan we can deem a right one?

All these taxes violate the moral law. They take by force what belongs to the individual alone; they give to the unscrupulous an advantage over the scrupulous; they have the effect, nay are largely intended, to increase the price of what some have to sell and others must buy; they corrupt government; they make oaths a mockery; they shackle commerce; they fine industry and thrift; they lessen the wealth that men might enjoy, and enrich some by impoverishing others.

Yet what most strikingly shows how opposed to Christianity is this system of raising public revenues is its influence on thought.

Christianity teaches us that all men are brethren; that their true interests are harmonious, not antagonistic. It gives us, as the golden rule of life, that we should do to others as we would have others do to us. But out of the system of taxing the products and processes of labor, and out of its effects in increasing the price of what some have to sell and others must buy, has grown the theory of “protection,” which denies this gospel, which holds Christ ignorant of political economy and proclaims laws of national well-being utterly at variance with his teaching. This theory sanctifies national hatreds; it inculcates a universal war of hostile tariffs; it teaches peoples that their prosperity lies in imposing on the productions of other peoples restrictions they do not wish imposed on their own; and instead of the Christian doctrine of man’s brotherhood it makes injury of foreigners a civic virtue.

“By their fruits ye shall know them.” Can anything more clearly show that to tax the products and processes of industry is not the way God intended public revenues to be raised?

But to consider what we propose — the raising of public revenues by a single tax on the value of land irrespective of improvements — is to see that in all respects this does conform to the moral law.

Let me ask your Holiness to keep in mind that the value we propose to tax, the value of land irrespective of improvements, does not come from any exertion of labor or investment of capital on or in it — the values produced in this way being values of improvement which we would exempt. The value of land irrespective of improvement is the value that attaches to land by reason of increasing population and social progress. This is a value that always goes to the owner as owner, and never does and never can go to the user; for if the user be a different person from the owner he must always pay the owner for it in rent or in purchase-money; while if the user be also the owner, it is as owner, not as user, that he receives it, and by selling or renting the land he can, as owner, continue to receive it after he ceases to be a user.

Thus, taxes on land irrespective of improvement cannot lessen the rewards of industry, nor add to prices,* nor in any way take from the individual what belongs to the individual. They can take only the value that attaches to land by the growth of the community, and which therefore belongs to the community as a whole.

* As to this point it may be well to add that all economists are agreed that taxes on land values irrespective of improvement or use — or what in the terminology of political economy is styled rent, a term distinguished from the ordinary use of the word rent by being applied solely to payments for the use of land itself — must be paid by the owner and cannot be shifted by him on the user. To explain in another way the reason given in the text: Price is not determined by the will of the seller or the will of the buyer, but by the equation of demand and supply, and therefore as to things constantly demanded and constantly produced rests at a point determined by the cost of production — whatever tends to increase the cost of bringing fresh quantities of such articles to the consumer increasing price by checking supply, and whatever tends to reduce such cost decreasing price by increasing supply. Thus taxes on wheat or tobacco or cloth add to the price that the consumer must pay, and thus the cheapening in the cost of producing steel which improved processes have made in recent years has greatly reduced the price of steel. But land has no cost of production, since it is created by God, not produced by man. Its price therefore is fixed —

1 (monopoly rent), where land is held in close monopoly, by what the owners can extract from the users under penalty of deprivation and consequently of starvation, and amounts to all that common labor can earn on it beyond what is necessary to life;
2 (economic rent proper), where there is no special monopoly, by what the particular land will yield to common labor over and above what may be had by like expenditure and exertion on land having no special advantage and for which no rent is paid; and,
3 (speculative rent, which is a species of monopoly rent, telling particularly in selling price), by the expectation of future increase of value from social growth and improvement, which expectation causing landowners to withhold land at present prices has the same effect as combination.

Taxes on land values or economic rent can therefore never be shifted by the landowner to the land-user, since they in no wise increase the demand for land or enable landowners to check supply by withholding land from use. Where rent depends on mere monopolization, a case I mention because rent may in this way be demanded for the use of land even before economic or natural rent arises, the taking by taxation of what the landowners were able to extort from labor could not enable them to extort any more, since laborers, if not left enough to live on, will die. So, in the case of economic rent proper, to take from the landowners the premiums they receive, would in no way increase the superiority of their land and the demand for it. While, so far as price is affected by speculative rent, to compel the landowners to pay taxes on the value of land whether they were getting any income from it or not, would make it more difficult for them to withhold land from use; and to tax the full value would not merely destroy the power but the desire to do so.

To take land values for the state, abolishing all taxes on the products of labor, would therefore leave to the laborer the full produce of labor; to the individual all that rightfully belongs to the individual. It would impose no burden on industry, no check on commerce, no punishment on thrift; it would secure the largest production and the fairest distribution of wealth, by leaving men free to produce and to exchange as they please, without any artificial enhancement of prices; and by taking for public purposes a value that cannot be carried off, that cannot be hidden, that of all values is most easily ascertained and most certainly and cheaply collected, it would enormously lessen the number of officials, dispense with oaths, do away with temptations to bribery and evasion, and abolish man-made crimes in themselves innocent.

But, further: That God has intended the state to obtain the revenues it needs by the taxation of land values is shown by the same order and degree of evidence that shows that God has intended the milk of the mother for the nourishment of the babe.

See how close is the analogy. In that primitive condition ere the need for the state arises there are no land values. The products of labor have value, but in the sparsity of population no value as yet attaches to land itself. But as increasing density of population and increasing elaboration of industry necessitate the organization of the state, with its need for revenues, value begins to attach to land. As population still increases and industry grows more elaborate, so the needs for public revenues increase. And at the same time and from the same causes land values increase. The connection is invariable. The value of things produced by labor tends to decline with social development, since the larger scale of production and the improvement of processes tend steadily to reduce their cost. But the value of land on which population centers goes up and up. Take Rome or Paris or London or New York or Melbourne. Consider the enormous value of land in such cities as compared with the value of land in sparsely settled parts of the same countries. To what is this due? Is it not due to the density and activity of the populations of those cities — to the very causes that require great public expenditure for streets, drains, public buildings, and all the many things needed for the health, convenience and safety of such great cities? See how with the growth of such cities the one thing that steadily increases in value is land; how the opening of roads, the building of railways, the making of any public improvement, adds to the value of land. Is it not clear that here is a natural law — that is to say a tendency willed by the Creator? Can it mean anything else than that He who ordained the state with its needs has in the values which attach to land provided the means to meet those needs?

 

That it does mean this and nothing else is confirmed if we look deeper still, and inquire not merely as to the intent, but as to the purpose of the intent. If we do so we may see in this natural law by which land values increase with the growth of society not only such a perfectly adapted provision for the needs of society as gratifies our intellectual perceptions by showing us the wisdom of the Creator, but a purpose with regard to the individual that gratifies our moral perceptions by opening to us a glimpse of his beneficence.

Consider: Here is a natural law by which as society advances the one thing that increases in value is land — a natural law by virtue of which all growth of population, all advance of the arts, all general improvements of whatever kind, add to a fund that both the commands of justice and the dictates of expediency prompt us to take for the common uses of society. Now, since increase in the fund available for the common uses of society is increase in the gain that goes equally to each member of society, is it not clear that the law by which land values increase with social advance while the value of the products of labor does not increase, tends with the advance of civilization to make the share that goes equally to each member of society more and more important as compared with what goes to him from his individual earnings, and thus to make the advance of civilization lessen relatively the differences that in a ruder social state must exist between the strong and the weak, the fortunate and the unfortunate? Does it not show the purpose of the Creator to be that the advance of man in civilization should be an advance not merely to larger powers but to a greater and greater equality, instead of what we, by our ignoring of his intent, are making it, an advance toward a more and more monstrous inequality?

 

That the value attaching to land with social growth is intended for social needs is shown by the final proof. God is indeed a jealous God in the sense that nothing but injury and disaster can attend the effort of men to do things other than in the way he has intended; in the sense that where the blessings he proffers to men are refused or misused they turn to evils that scourge us. And just as for the mother to withhold the provision that fills her breast with the birth of the child is to endanger physical health, so for society to refuse to take for social uses the provision intended for them is to breed social disease.

For refusal to take for public purposes the increasing values that attach to land with social growth is to necessitate the getting of public revenues by taxes that lessen production, distort distribution and corrupt society. It is to leave some to take what justly belongs to all; it is to forego the only means by which it is possible in an advanced civilization to combine the security of possession that is necessary to improvement with the equality of natural opportunity that is the most important of all natural rights. It is thus at the basis of all social life to set up an unjust inequality between man and man, compelling some to pay others for the privilege of living, for the chance of working, for the advantages of civilization, for the gifts of their God. But it is even more than this. The very robbery that the masses of men thus suffer gives rise in advancing communities to a new robbery. For the value that with the increase of population and social advance attaches to land being suffered to go to individuals who have secured ownership of the land, it prompts to a forestalling of and speculation in land wherever there is any prospect of advancing population or of coming improvement, thus producing an artificial scarcity of the natural elements of life and labor, and a strangulation of production that shows itself in recurring spasms of industrial depression as disastrous to the world as destructive wars. It is this that is driving men from the old countries to the new countries, only to bring there the same curses. It is this that causes our material advance not merely to fail to improve the condition of the mere worker, but to make the condition of large classes positively worse. It is this that in our richest Christian countries is giving us a large population whose lives are harder, more hopeless, more degraded than those of the veriest savages. It is this that leads so many men to think that God is a bungler and is constantly bringing more people into his world than he has made provision for; or that there is no God, and that belief in him is a superstition which the facts of life and the advance of science are dispelling.

The darkness in light, the weakness in strength, the poverty amid wealth, the seething discontent foreboding civil strife, that characterize our civilization of today, are the natural, the inevitable results of our rejection of God’s beneficence, of our ignoring of his intent. Were we on the other hand to follow his clear, simple rule of right, leaving scrupulously to the individual all that individual labor produces, and taking for the community the value that attaches to land by the growth of the community itself, not merely could evil modes of raising public revenues be dispensed with, but all men would be placed on an equal level of opportunity with regard to the bounty of their Creator, on an equal level of opportunity to exert their labor and to enjoy its fruits. And then, without drastic or restrictive measures the forestalling of land would cease. For then the possession of land would mean only security for the permanence of its use, and there would be no object for any one to get land or to keep land except for use; nor would his possession of better land than others had confer any unjust advantage on him, or unjust deprivation on them, since the equivalent of the advantage would be taken by the state for the benefit of all.

The Right Reverend Dr. Thomas Nulty, Bishop of Meath, who sees all this as clearly as we do, in pointing out to the clergy and laity of his diocese* the design of Divine Providence that the rent of land should be taken for the community, says:

I think, therefore, that I may fairly infer, on the strength of authority as well as of reason, that the people are and always must be the real owners of the land of their country. This great social fact appears to me to be of incalculable importance, and it is fortunate, indeed, that on the strictest principles of justice it is not clouded even by a shadow of uncertainty or doubt. There is, moreover, a charm and a peculiar beauty in the clearness with which it reveals the wisdom and the benevolence of the designs of Providence in the admirable provision he has made for the wants and the necessities of that state of social existence of which he is author, and in which the very instincts of nature tell us we are to spend our lives. A vast public property, a great national fund, has been placed under the dominion and at the disposal of the nation to supply itself abundantly with resources necessary to liquidate the expenses of its government, the administration of its laws and the education of its youth, and to enable it to provide for the suitable sustentation and support of its criminal and pauper population. One of the most interesting peculiarities of this property is that its value is never stationary; it is constantly progressive and increasing in a direct ratio to the growth of the population, and the very causes thatincrease and multiply the demands made on it increase proportionately its ability to meet them.
* Letter addressed to the Clergy and Laity of the Diocese of Meath, Ireland, April 2, 1881.

There is, indeed, as Bishop Nulty says, a peculiar beauty in the clearness with which the wisdom and benevolence of Providence are revealed in this great social fact, the provision made for the common needs of society in what economists call the law of rent. Of all the evidence that natural religion gives, it is this that most clearly shows the existence of a beneficent God, and most conclusively silences the doubts that in our days lead so many to materialism.

For in this beautiful provision made by natural law for the social needs of civilization we see that God has intended civilization; that all our discoveries and inventions do not and cannot outrun his forethought, and that steam, electricity and labor-saving appliances only make the great moral laws clearer and more important. In the growth of this great fund, increasing with social advance — a fund that accrues from the growth of the community and belongs therefore to the community — we see not only that there is no need for the taxes that lessen wealth, that engender corruption, that promote inequality and teach men to deny the gospel; but that to take this fund for the purpose for which it was evidently intended would in the highest civilization secure to all the equal enjoyment of God’s bounty, the abundant opportunity to satisfy their wants, and would provide amply for every legitimate need of the state. We see that God in his dealings with men has not been a bungler or a niggard; that he has not brought too many men into the world; that he has not neglected abundantly to supply them; that he has not intended that bitter competition of the masses for a mere animal existence and that monstrous aggregation of wealth which characterize our civilization; but that these evils which lead so many to say there is no God, or yet more impiously to say that they are of God’s ordering, are due to our denial of his moral law. We see that the law of justice, the law of the Golden Rule, is not a mere counsel of perfection, but indeed the law of social life. We see that if we were only to observe it there would be work for all, leisure for all, abundance for all; and that civilization would tend to give to the poorest not only necessities, but all comforts and reasonable luxuries as well. We see that Christ was not a mere dreamer when he told men that if they would seek the kingdom of God and its right-doing they might no more worry about material things than do the lilies of the field about their raiment; but that he was only declaring what political economy in the light of modern discovery shows to be a sober truth.

Your Holiness, even to see this is deep and lasting joy. For it is to see for one’s self that there is a God who lives and reigns, and that be is a God of justice and love — Our Father who art in Heaven. It is to open a rift of sunlight through the clouds of our darker questionings, and to make the faith that trusts where it cannot see a living thing.

II.

Your Holiness will see from the explanation I have given that the reform we propose, like all true reforms, has both an ethical and an economic side. By ignoring the ethical side, and pushing our proposal merely as a reform of taxation, we could avoid the objections that arise from confounding ownership with possession and attributing to private property in land that security of use and improvement that can be had even better without it. All that we seek practically is the legal abolition, as fast as possible, of taxes on the products and processes of labor, and the consequent concentration of taxation on land values irrespective of improvements. To put our proposals in this way would be to urge them merely as a matter of wise public expediency.

There are indeed many single-tax men who do put our proposals in this way; who seeing the beauty of our plan from a fiscal standpoint do not concern themselves further. But to those who think as I do, the ethical is the more important side. Not only do we not wish to evade the question of private property in land, but to us it seems that the beneficent and far-reaching revolution we aim at is too great a thing to be accomplished by “intelligent self-interest,” and can be carried by nothing less than the religious conscience.

Hence we earnestly seek the judgment of religion. This is the tribunal of which your Holiness as the head of the largest body of Christians is the most august representative.

It therefore behooves us to examine the reasons you urge in support of private property in land — if they be sound to accept them, and if they be not sound respectfully to point out to you wherein is their error.

To your proposition that “Our first and most fundamental principle when we undertake to alleviate the condition of the masses must be the inviolability of private property” we would joyfully agree if we could only understand you to have in mind the moral element, and to mean rightful private property, as when you speak of marriage as ordained by God’s authority we may understand an implied exclusion of improper marriages. Unfortunately, however, other expressions show that you mean private property in general and have expressly in mind private property in land. This confusion of thought, this non-distribution of terms, runs through your whole argument, leading you to conclusions so unwarranted by your premises as to be utterly repugnant to them, as when from the moral sanction of private property in the things produced by labor you infer something entirely different and utterly opposed, a similar right of property in the land created by God.

Private property is not of one species, and moral sanction can no more be asserted universally of it than of marriage. That proper marriage conforms to the law of God does not justify the polygamic or polyandric or incestuous marriages that are in some countries permitted by the civil law. And as there may be immoral marriage so may there be immoral private property. Private property is that which may be held in ownership by an individual, or that which may be held in ownership by an individual with the sanction of the state. The mere lawyer, the mere servant of the state, may rest here, refusing to distinguish between what the state holds equally lawful. Your Holiness, however, is not a servant of the state, but a servant of God, a guardian of morals. You know, as said by St. Thomas of Aquin, that —

Human law is law only in virtue of its accordance with right reason and it is thus manifest that it flows from the eternal law. And in so far as it deviates from right reason it is called an unjust law. In such case it is not law at all, but rather a species of violence.

Thus, that any species of property is permitted by the state does not of itself give it moral sanction. The state has often made things property that are not justly property, but involve violence and robbery. For instance, the things of religion, the dignity and authority of offices of the church, the power of administering her sacraments and controlling her temporalities, have often by profligate princes been given as salable property to courtiers and concubines. At this very day in England an atheist or a heathen may buy in open market, and hold as legal property, to be sold, given or bequeathed as he pleases, the power of appointing to the cure of souls, and the value of these legal rights of presentation is said to be no less than £17,000,000.

Or again: Slaves were universally treated as property by the customs and laws of the classical nations, and were so acknowledged in Europe long after the acceptance of Christianity. At the beginning of this century there was no Christian nation that did not, in her colonies at least, recognize property in slaves, and slaveships crossed the seas under Christian flags. In the United States, little more than thirty years ago, to buy a man gave the same legal ownership as to buy a horse, and in Mohammedan countries law and custom yet make the slave the property of his captor or purchaser.

Yet your Holiness, one of the glories of whose pontificate is the attempt to break up slavery in its last strongholds, will not contend that the moral sanction that attaches to property in things produced by labor can, or ever could, apply to property in slaves.

Your use, in so many passages of your Encyclical, of the inclusive term “property” or “private” property, of which in morals nothing can be either affirmed or denied, makes your meaning, if we take isolated sentences, in many places ambiguous. But reading it as a whole, there can be no doubt of your intention that private property in land shall be understood when you speak merely of private property. With this interpretation, I find that the reasons you urge for private property in land are eight. Let us consider them in order of presentation. You urge:


1. That what is bought with rightful property is rightful property. (5.)*

* To facilitate references the paragraphs of the Encyclical are indicated by number.

Clearly, purchase and sale cannot give, but can only transfer ownership. Property that in itself has no moral sanction does not obtain moral sanction by passing from seller to buyer.

If right reason does not make the slave the property of the slave-hunter it does not make him the property of the slave-buyer. Yet your reasoning as to private property in land would as well justify property in slaves. To show this it is only needful to change in your argument the word land to the word slave. It would then read:

It is surely undeniable that, when a man engages in remunerative labor, the very reason and motive of his work is to obtain property, and to hold it as his own private possession.

If one man hires out to another his strength or his industry, he does this for the purpose of receiving in return what is necessary for food and living; he thereby expressly proposes to acquire a full and legal right, not only to the remuneration, but also to the disposal of that remuneration as he pleases.

Thus, if he lives sparingly, saves money, and invests his savings, for greater security, in a slave, the slave in such a case is only his wages in another form; and consequently, a working-man’s slave thus purchased should be as completely at his own disposal as the wages he receives for his labor.

Nor in turning your argument for private property in land into an argument for private property in men am I doing a new thing. In my own country, in my own time, this very argument, that purchase gave ownership, was the common defense of slavery. It was made by statesmen, by jurists, by clergymen, by bishops; it was accepted over the whole country by the great mass of the people. By it was justified the separation of wives from husbands, of children from parents, the compelling of labor, the appropriation of its fruits, the buying and selling of Christians by Christians. In language almost identical with yours it was asked, “Here is a poor man who has worked hard, lived sparingly, and invested his savings in a few slaves. Would you rob him of his earnings by liberating those slaves?” Or it was said: “Here is a poor widow; all her husband has been able to leave her is a few negroes, the earnings of his hard toil. Would you rob the widow and the orphan by freeing these negroes?” And because of this perversion of reason, this confounding of unjust property rights with just property rights, this acceptance of man’s law as though it were God’s law, there came on our nation a judgment of fire and blood.

The error of our people in thinking that what in itself was not rightfully property could become rightful property by purchase and sale is the same error into which your Holiness falls. It is not merely formally the same; it is essentially the same. Private property in land, no less than private property in slaves, is a violation of the true rights of property. They are different forms of the same robbery; twin devices by which the perverted ingenuity of man has sought to enable the strong and the cunning to escape God’s requirement of labor by forcing it on others.

What difference does it make whether I merely own the land on which another man must live or own the man himself? Am I not in the one case as much his master as in the other? Can I not compel him to work for me? Can I not take to myself as much of the fruits of his labor; as fully dictate his actions? Have I not over him the power of life and death?

For to deprive a man of land is as certainly to kill him as to deprive him of blood by opening his veins, or of air by tightening a halter around his neck.

The essence of slavery is in empowering one man to obtain the labor of another without recompense. Private property in land does this as fully as chattel slavery. The slave-owner must leave to the slave enough of his earnings to enable him to live. Are there not in so-called free countries great bodies of working-men who get no more? How much more of the fruits of their toil do the agricultural laborers of Italy and England get than did the slaves of our Southern States? Did not private property in land permit the landowner of Europe in ruder times to demand the jus primae noctis? Does not the same last outrage exist today in diffused form in the immorality born of monstrous wealth on the one hand and ghastly poverty on the other?

In what did the slavery of Russia consist but in giving to the master land on which the serf was forced to live? When an Ivan or a Catherine enriched their favorites with the labor of others they did not give men, they gave land. And when the appropriation of land has gone so far that no free land remains to which the landless man may turn, then without further violence the more insidious form of labor robbery involved in private property in land takes the place of chattel slavery, because more economical and convenient. For under it the slave does not have to be caught or held, or to be fed when not needed. He comes of himself, begging the privilege of serving, and when no longer wanted can be discharged. The lash is unnecessary; hunger is as efficacious. This is why the Norman conquerors of England and the English conquerors of Ireland did not divide up the people, but divided the land. This is why European slave-ships took their cargoes to the New World, not to Europe.

Slavery is not yet abolished. Though in all Christian countries its ruder form has now gone, it still exists in the heart of our civilization in more insidious form, and is increasing. There is work to be done for the glory of God and the liberty of man by other soldiers of the cross than those warrior monks whom, with the blessing of your Holiness, Cardinal Lavigerie is sending into the Sahara. Yet, your Encyclical employs in defense of one form of slavery the same fallacies that the apologists for chattel slavery used in defense of the other!

The Arabs are not wanting in acumen. Your Encyclical reaches far. What shall your warrior monks say, if when at the muzzle of their rifles they demand of some Arab slave-merchant his miserable caravan, he shall declare that he bought them with his savings, and producing a copy of your Encyclical, shall prove by your reasoning that his slaves are consequently “only his wages in another form,” and ask if they who bear your blessing and own your authority propose to “deprive him of the liberty of disposing of his wages and thus of all hope and possibility of increasing his stock and bettering his condition in life”?

 

2. That private property in land proceeds from man’s gift of reason. (6-7.)

In the second place your Holiness argues that man possessing reason and forethought may not only acquire ownership of the fruits of the earth, but also of the earth itself, so that out of its products he may make provision for the future.

Reason, with its attendant forethought, is indeed the distinguishing attribute of man; that which raises him above the brute, and shows, as the Scriptures declare, that he is created in the likeness of God. And this gift of reason does, as your Holiness points out, involve the need and right of private property in whatever is produced by the exertion of reason and its attendant forethought, as well as in what is produced by physical labor. In truth, these elements of man’s production are inseparable, and labor involves the use of reason. It is by his reason that man differs from the animals in being a producer, and in this sense a maker. Of themselves his physical powers are slight, forming as it were but the connection by which the mind takes hold of material things, so as to utilize to its will the matter and forces of nature. It is mind, the intelligent reason, that is the prime mover in labor, the essential agent in production.

The right of private ownership does therefore indisputably attach to things provided by man’s reason and forethought. But it cannot attach to things provided by the reason and forethought of God!

To illustrate: Let us suppose a company traveling through the desert as the Israelites traveled from Egypt. Such of them as had the forethought to provide themselves with vessels of water would acquire a just right of property in the water so carried, and in the thirst of the waterless desert those who had neglected to provide themselves, though they might ask water from the provident in charity, could not demand it in right. For while water itself is of the providence of God, the presence of this water in such vessels, at such place, results from the providence of the men who carried it. Thus they have to it an exclusive right.

But suppose others use their forethought in pushing ahead and appropriating the springs, refusing when their fellows come up to let them drink of the water save as they buy it of them. Would such forethought give any right?

Your Holiness, it is not the forethought of carrying water where it is needed, but the forethought of seizing springs, that you seek to defend in defending the private ownership of land!

Let me show this more fully, since it may be worth while to meet those who say that if private property in land be not just, then private property in the products of labor is not just, as the material of these products is taken from land. It will be seen on consideration that all of man’s production is analogous to such transportation of water as we have supposed. In growing grain, or smelting metals, or building houses, or weaving cloth, or doing any of the things that constitute producing, all that man does is to change in place or form preexisting matter. As a producer man is merely a changer, not a creator; God alone creates. And since the changes in which man’s production consists inhere in matter so long as they persist, the right of private ownership attaches the accident to the essence, and gives the right of ownership in that natural material in which the labor of production is embodied. Thus water, which in its original form and place is the common gift of God to all men, when drawn from its natural reservoir and brought into the desert, passes rightfully into the ownership of the individual who by changing its place has produced it there.

But such right of ownership is in reality a mere right of temporary possession. For though man may take material from the storehouse of nature and change it in place or form to suit his desires, yet from the moment he takes it, it tends back to that storehouse again. Wood decays, iron rusts, stone disintegrates and is displaced, while of more perishable products, some will last for only a few months, others for only a few days, and some disappear immediately on use. Though, so far as we can see, matter is eternal and force forever persists; though we can neither annihilate nor create the tiniest mote that floats in a sunbeam or the faintest impulse that stirs a leaf, yet in the ceaseless flux of nature, man’s work of moving and combining constantly passes away. Thus the recognition of the ownership of what natural material is embodied in the products of man never constitutes more than temporary possession — never interferes with the reservoir provided for all. As taking water from one place and carrying it to another place by no means lessens the store of water, since whether it is drunk or spilled or left to evaporate, it must return again to the natural reservoirs — so is it with all things on which man in production can lay the impress of his labor.

Hence, when you say that man’s reason puts it within his right to have in stable and permanent possession not only things that perish in the using, but also those that remain for use in the future, you are right in so far as you may include such things as buildings, which with repair will last for generations, with such things as food or fire-wood, which are destroyed in the use. But when you infer that man can have private ownership in those permanent things of nature that are the reservoirs from which all must draw, you are clearly wrong. Man may indeed hold in private ownership the fruits of the earth produced by his labor, since they lose in time the impress of that labor, and pass again into the natural reservoirs from which they were taken, and thus the ownership of them by one works no injury to others. But he cannot so own the earth itself, for that is the reservoir from which must constantly be drawn not only the material with which alone men can produce, but even their very bodies.
The conclusive reason why man cannot claim ownership in the earth itself as he can in the fruits that he by labor brings forth from it, is in the facts stated by you in the very next paragraph (7), when you truly say:

Man’s needs do not die out, but recur; satisfied today, they demand new supplies tomorrow. Nature, therefore, owes to man a storehouse that shall never fail, the daily supply of his daily wants. And this he finds only in the inexhaustible fertility of the earth.

By man you mean all men. Can what nature owes to all men be made the private property of some men, from which they may debar all other men?

Let me dwell on the words of your Holiness, “Nature, therefore, owes to man a storehouse that shall never fail.” By Nature you mean God. Thus your thought, that in creating us, God himself has incurred an obligation to provide us with a storehouse that shall never fail, is the same as is thus expressed and carried to its irresistible conclusion by the Bishop of Meath:

God was perfectly free in the act by which He created us; but having created us he bound himself by that act to provide us with the means necessary for our subsistence. The land is the only source of this kind now known to us. The land, therefore, of every country is the common property of the people of that country, because its real owner, the Creator who made it, has transferred it as a voluntary gift to them. “Terram autem dedit filiis hominum.” Now, as every individual in that country is a creature and child of God, and as all his creatures are equal in his sight, any settlement of the land of a country that would exclude the humblest man in that country from his share of the common inheritance would be not only an injustice and a wrong to that man, but, moreover, be AN IMPIOUS RESISTANCE TO THE BENEVOLENT INTENTIONS OF HIS CREATOR.

 

3. That private property in land deprives no one of the use of land. (8.)

Your own statement that land is the inexhaustible storehouse that God owes to man must have aroused in your Holiness’s mind an uneasy questioning of its appropriation as private property, for, as though to reassure yourself, you proceed to argue that its ownership by some will not injure others. You say in substance, that even though divided among private owners the earth does not cease to minister to the needs of all, since those who do not possess the soil can by selling their labor obtain in payment the produce of the land.

Suppose that to your Holiness as a judge of morals one should put this case of conscience:

I am one of several children to whom our father left a field abundant for our support. As he assigned no part of it to any one of us in particular, leaving the limits of our separate possession to be fixed by ourselves, I being the eldest took the whole field in exclusive ownership. But in doing so I have not deprived my brothers of their support from it, for I have let them work for me on it, paying them from the produce as much wages as I would have had to pay strangers. Is there any reason why my conscience should not be clear?

What would be your answer? Would you not tell him that he was in mortal sin, and that his excuse added to his guilt? Would you not call on him to make restitution and to do penance?

Or, suppose that as a temporal prince your Holiness were ruler of a rainless land, such as Egypt, where there were no springs or brooks, their want being supplied by a bountiful river like the Nile. Supposing that having sent a number of your subjects to make fruitful this land, bidding them do justly and prosper, you were told that some of them had set up a claim of ownership in the river, refusing the others a drop of water, except as they bought it of them; and that thus they had become rich without work, while the others, though working hard, were so impoverished by paying for water as to be hardly able to exist?

Would not your indignation wax hot when this was told?

Suppose that then the river-owners should send to you and thus excuse their action:

The river, though divided among private owners, ceases not thereby to minister to the needs of all, for there is no one who drinks who does not drink of the water of the river. Those who do not possess the water of the river contribute their labor to get it; so that it may be truly said that all water is supplied either from one’s own river, or from some laborious industry which is paid for either in the water, or in that which is exchanged for the water.

Would the indignation of your Holiness be abated? Would it not wax fiercer yet for the insult to your intelligence of this excuse?

I do not need more formally to show your Holiness that between utterly depriving a man of God’s gifts and depriving him of God’s gifts unless he will buy them, is merely the difference between the robber who leaves his victim to die and the robber who puts him to ransom. But I would like to point out how your statement that “the earth, though divided among private owners, ceases not thereby to minister to the needs of all” overlooks the largest facts.

From your palace of the Vatican the eye may rest on the expanse of the Campagna, where the pious toil of religious congregations and the efforts of the state are only now beginning to make it possible for men to live. Once that expanse was tilled by thriving husbandmen and dotted with smiling hamlets. What for centuries has condemned it to desertion? History tells us. It was private property in land; the growth of the great estates of which Pliny saw that ancient Italy was perishing; the cause that, by bringing failure to the crop of men, let in the Goths and Vandals, gave Roman Britain to the worship of Odin and Thor, and in what were once the rich and populous provinces of the East shivered the thinned ranks and palsied arms of the legions on the simitars of Mohammedan hordes, and in the sepulcher of our Lord and in the Church of St. Sophia trampled the cross to rear the crescent!

If you will go to Scotland, you may see great tracts that under the Gaelic tenure, which recognized the right of each to a foothold in the soil, bred sturdy men, but that now, under the recognition of private property in land, are given up to wild animals. If you go to Ireland, your Bishops will show you, on lands where now only beasts graze, the traces of hamlets that, when they were young priests, were filled with honest, kindly, religious people.*

* Let any one who wishes visit this diocese and see with his own eyes the vast and boundless extent of the fairest land in Europe that has been ruthlessly depopulated since the commencement of the present century, and which is now abandoned to a loneliness and solitude more depressing than that of the prairie or the wilderness. Thus has this land system actually exercised the power of life and death on a vast scale, for which there is no parallel even in the dark records of slavery. — Bishop Nulty’s Letter to the Clergy and Laity of the Diocese of Meath.

If you will come to the United States, you will find in a land wide enough and rich enough to support in comfort the whole population of Europe, the growth of a sentiment that looks with evil eye on immigration, because the artificial scarcity that results from private property in land makes it seem as if there is not room enough and work enough for those already here.

Or go to the Antipodes, and in Australia, as in England, you may see that private property in land is operating to leave the land barren and to crowd the bulk of the population into great cities. Go wherever you please where the forces loosed by modern invention are beginning to be felt and you may see that private property in land is the curse, denounced by the prophet, that prompts men to lay field to field till they “alone dwell in the midst of the earth.

To the mere materialist this is sin and shame. Shall we to whom this world is God’s world — we who hold that man is called to this life only as a prelude to a higher life — shall we defend it?

4. That Industry expended on land gives ownership in the land itself. (9-10.)

Your Holiness next contends that industry expended on land gives a right to ownership of the land, and that the improvement of land creates benefits indistinguishable and inseparable from the land itself.

This contention, if valid, could only justify the ownership of land by those who expend industry on it. It would not justify private property in land as it exists. On the contrary, it would justify a gigantic no-rent declaration that would take land from those who now legally own it, the landlords, and turn it over to the tenants and laborers. And if it also be that improvements cannot be distinguished and separated from the land itself, how could the landlords claim consideration even for improvements they had made?

But your Holiness cannot mean what your words imply. What you really mean, I take it, is that the original justification and title of landownership is in the expenditure of labor on it. But neither can this justify private property in land as it exists. For is it not all but universally true that existing land titles do not come from use, but from force or fraud?

Take Italy! Is it not true that the greater part of the land of Italy is held by those who so far from ever having expended industry on it have been mere appropriators of the industry of those who have? Is this not also true of Great Britain and of other countries? Even in the United States, where the forces of concentration have not yet had time fully to operate and there has been some attempt to give land to users, it is probably true today that the greater part of the land is held by those who neither use it nor propose to use it themselves, but merely hold it to compel others to pay them for permission to use it.

And if industry give ownership to land what are the limits of this ownership? If a man may acquire the ownership of several square miles of land by grazing sheep on it, does this give to him and his heirs the ownership of the same land when it is found to contain rich mines, or when by the growth of population and the progress of society it is needed for farming, for gardening, for the close occupation of a great city? Is it on the rights given by the industry of those who first used it for grazing cows or growing potatoes that you would found the title to the land now covered by the city of New York and having a value of thousands of millions of dollars?

But your contention is not valid. Industry expended on land gives ownership in the fruits of that industry, but not in the land itself, just as industry expended on the ocean would give a right of ownership to the fish taken by it, but not a right of ownership in the ocean. Nor yet is it true that private ownership of land is necessary to secure the fruits of labor on land; nor does the improvement of land create benefits indistinguishable and inseparable from the land itself. That secure possession is necessary to the use and improvement of land I have already explained, but that ownership is not necessary is shown by the fact that in all civilized countries land owned by one person is cultivated and improved by other persons. Most of the cultivated land in the British Islands, as in Italy and other countries, is cultivated not by owners but by tenants. And so the costliest buildings are erected by those who are not owners of the land, but who have from the owner a mere right of possession for a time on condition of certain payments. Nearly the whole of London has been built in this way, and in New York, Chicago, Denver, San Francisco, Sydney and Melbourne, as well as in continental cities, the owners of many of the largest edifices will be found to be different persons from the owners of the ground. So far from the value of improvements being inseparable from the value of land, it is in individual transactions constantly separated. For instance, one-half of the land on which the immense Grand Pacific Hotel in Chicago stands was recently separately sold, and in Ceylon it is a not infrequent occurrence for one person to own a fruit-tree and another to own the ground in which it is implanted.

There is, indeed, no improvement of land, whether it be clearing, plowing, manuring, cultivating, the digging of cellars, the opening of wells or the building of houses, that so long as its usefulness continues does not have a value clearly distinguishable from the value of the land. For land having such improvements will always sell or rent for more than similar land without them.

If, therefore, the state levy a tax equal to what the land irrespective of improvement would bring, it will take the benefits of mere ownership, but will leave the full benefits of use and improvement, which the prevailing system does not do. And since the holder, who would still in form continue to be the owner, could at any time give or sell both possession and improvements, subject to future assessment by the state on the value of the land alone, he will be perfectly free to retain or dispose of the full amount of property that the exertion of his labor or the investment of his capital has attached to or stored up in the land.

Thus, what we propose would secure, as it is impossible in any other way to secure, what you properly say is just and right — ”that the results of labor should belong to him who has labored.” But private property in land — to allow the holder without adequate payment to the state to take for himself the benefit of the value that attaches to land with social growth and improvement — does take the results of labor from him who has labored, does turn over the fruits of one man’s labor to be enjoyed by another. For labor, as the active factor, is the producer of all wealth. Mere ownership produces nothing. A man might own a world, but so sure is the decree that “by the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread,” that without labor he could not get a meal or provide himself a garment. Hence, when the owners of land, by virtue of their ownership and without laboring themselves, get the products of labor in abundance, these things must come from the labor of others, must be the fruits of others’ sweat, taken from those who have a right to them and enjoyed by those who have no right to them.

The only utility of private ownership of land as distinguished from possession is the evil utility of giving to the owner products of labor he does not earn. For until land will yield to its owner some return beyond that of the labor and capital he expends on it — that is to say, until by sale or rental he can without expenditure of labor obtain from it products of labor, ownership amounts to no more than security of possession, and has no value. Its importance and value begin only when, either in the present or prospectively, it will yield a revenue — that is to say, will enable the owner as owner to obtain products of labor without exertion on his part, and thus to enjoy the results of others’ labor.

What largely keeps men from realizing the robbery involved in private property in land is that in the most striking cases the robbery is not of individuals, but of the community. For, as I have before explained, it is impossible for rent in the economic sense — that value which attaches to land by reason of social growth and improvement — to go to the user. It can go only to the owner or to the community. Thus those who pay enormous rents for the use of land in such centers as London or New York are not individually injured. Individually they get a return for what they pay, and must feel that they have no better right to the use of such peculiarly advantageous localities without paying for it than have thousands of others. And so, not thinking or not caring for the interests of the community, they make no objection to the system.

It recently came to light in New York that a man having no title whatever had been for years collecting rents on a piece of land that the growth of the city had made very valuable. Those who paid these rents had never stopped to ask whether he had any right to them. They felt that they had no right to land that so many others would like to have, without paying for it, and did not think of, or did not care for, the rights of all.

 

5. That private property in land has the support of the common opinion of mankind, and has conduced to peace and tranquillity, and that it is sanctioned by Divine Law. (11.)

Even were it true that the common opinion of mankind has sanctioned private property in land, this would no more prove its justice than the once universal practice of the known world would have proved the justice of slavery.

But it is not true. Examination will show that wherever we can trace them the first perceptions of mankind have always recognized the equality of right to land, and that when individual possession became necessary to secure the right of ownership in things produced by labor some method of securing equality, sufficient in the existing state of social development, was adopted. Thus, among some peoples, land used for cultivation was periodically divided, land used for pasturage and wood being held in common. Among others, every family was permitted to hold what land it needed for a dwelling and for cultivation, but the moment that such use and cultivation stopped any one else could step in and take it on like tenure. Of the same nature were the land laws of the Mosaic code. The land, first fairly divided among the people, was made inalienable by the provision of the jubilee, under which, if sold, it reverted every fiftieth year to the children of its original possessors.

Private property in land as we know it, the attaching to land of the same right of ownership that justly attaches to the products of labor, has never grown up anywhere save by usurpation or force. Like slavery, it is the result of war. It comes to us of the modern world from your ancestors, the Romans, whose civilization it corrupted and whose empire it destroyed.

It made with the freer spirit of the northern peoples the combination of the feudal system, in which, though subordination was substituted for equality, there was still a rough recognition of the principle of common rights in land. A fief was a trust, and to enjoyment was annexed some obligation. The sovereign, the representative of the whole people, was the only owner of land. Of him, immediately or mediately, held tenants, whose possession involved duties or payments, which, though rudely and imperfectly, embodied the idea that we would carry out in the single tax, of taking land values for public uses. The crown lands maintained the sovereign and the civil list; the church lands defrayed the cost of public worship and instruction, of the relief of the sick, the destitute and the wayworn; while the military tenures provided for public defense and bore the costs of war. A fourth and very large portion of the land remained in common, the people of the neighborhood being free to pasture it, cut wood on it, or put it to other common uses.

In this partial yet substantial recognition of common rights to land is to be found the reason why, in a time when the industrial arts were rude, wars frequent, and the great discoveries and inventions of our time unthought of, the condition of the laborer was devoid of that grinding poverty which despite our marvelous advances now exists. Speaking of England, the highest authority on such subjects, the late Professor Therold Rogers, declares that in the thirteenth century there was no class so poor, so helpless, so pressed and degraded as are millions of Englishmen in our boasted nineteenth century; and that, save in times of actual famine, there was no laborer so poor as to fear that his wife and children might come to want even were he taken from them. Dark and rude in many respects as they were, these were the times when the cathedrals and churches and religious houses whose ruins yet excite our admiration were built; the times when England had no national debt, no poor law, no standing army, no hereditary paupers, no thousands and thousands of human beings rising in the morning without knowing where they might lay their heads at night.

With the decay of the feudal system, the system of private property in land that had destroyed Rome was extended. As to England, it may briefly be said that the crown lands were for the most part given away to favorites; that the church lands were parceled among his courtiers by Henry VIII., and in Scotland grasped by the nobles; that the military dues were finally remitted in the seventeenth century, and taxation on consumption substituted; and that by a process beginning with the Tudors and extending to our own time all but a mere fraction of the commons were inclosed by the greater landowners; while the same private ownership of land was extended over Ireland and the Scottish Highlands, partly by the sword and partly by bribery of the chiefs. Even the military dues, had they been commuted, not remitted, would today have more than sufficed to pay all public expenses without one penny of other taxation.

Of the New World, whose institutions but continue those of Europe, it is only necessary to say that to the parceling out of land in great tracts is due the backwardness and turbulence of Spanish America; that to the large plantations of the Southern States of the Union was due the persistence of slavery there, and that the more northern settlements showed the earlier English feeling, land being fairly well divided and the attempts to establish manorial estates coming to little or nothing. In this lies the secret of the more vigorous growth of the Northern States. But the idea that land was to be treated as private property had been thoroughly established in English thought before the colonial period ended, and it has been so treated by the United States and by the several States. And though land was at first sold cheaply, and then given to actual settlers, it was also sold in large quantities to speculators, given away in great tracts for railroads and other purposes, until now the public domain of the United States, which a generation ago seemed illimitable, has practically gone. And this, as the experience of other countries shows, is the natural result in a growing community of making land private property. When the possession of land means the gain of unearned wealth, the strong and unscrupulous will secure it. But when, as we propose, economic rent, the “unearned increment of wealth,” is taken by the state for the use of the community, then land will pass into the hands of users and remain there, since no matter how great its value, its possession will be profitable only to users.

As to private property in land having conduced to the peace and tranquillity of human life, it is not necessary more than to allude to the notorious fact that the struggle for land has been the prolific source of wars and of lawsuits, while it is the poverty engendered by private property in land that makes the prison and the workhouse the unfailing attributes of what we call Christian civilization.

Your Holiness intimates that the Divine Law gives its sanction to the private ownership of land, quoting from Deuteronomy, “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s wife, nor his house, nor his field, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything which is his.”

If, as your Holiness conveys, this inclusion of the words, “nor his field,” is to be taken as sanctioning private property in land as it exists today, then, but with far greater force, must the words, “his man-servant, nor his maid-servant,” be taken to sanction chattel slavery; for it is evident from other provisions of the same code that these terms referred both to bondsmen for a term of years and to perpetual slaves. But the word “field” involves the idea of use and improvement, to which the right of possession and ownership does attach without recognition of property in the land itself. And that this reference to the “field” is not a sanction of private property in land as it exists today is proved by the fact that the Mosaic code expressly denied such unqualified ownership in land, and with the declaration, “the land also shall not be sold forever, because it is mine, and you are strangers and sojourners with me,” provided for its reversion every fiftieth year; thus, in a way adapted to the primitive industrial conditions of the time, securing to all of the chosen people a foothold in the soil.

Nowhere in fact throughout the Scriptures can the slightest justification be found for the attaching to land of the same right of property that justly attaches to the things produced by labor. Everywhere is it treated as the free bounty of God, “the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.”

 

6. That fathers should provide for their children and that private property in land is necessary to enable them to do so. (14-17.)

With all that your Holiness has to say of the sacredness of the family relation we are in full accord. But how the obligation of the father to the child can justify private property in land we cannot see. You reason that private property in land is necessary to the discharge of the duty of the father, and is therefore requisite and just, because —

It is a most sacred law of nature that a father must provide food and all necessaries for those whom he has begotten; and, similarly, nature dictates that a man’s children, who carry on, as it were, and continue his own personality, should be provided by him with all that is needful to enable them honorably to keep themselves from want and misery in the uncertainties of this mortal life. Now, in no other way can a father effect this except by the ownership of profitable property, which he can transmit to his children by inheritance. (14.)

Thanks to Him who has bound the generations of men together by a provision that brings the tenderest love to greet our entrance into the world and soothes our exit with filial piety, it is both the duty and the joy of the father to care for the child till its powers mature, and afterwards in the natural order it becomes the duty and privilege of the child to be the stay of the parent. This is the natural reason for that relation of marriage, the groundwork of the sweetest, tenderest and purest of human joys, which the Catholic Church has guarded with such unremitting vigilance.

We do, for a few years, need the providence of our fathers after the flesh. But how small, how transient, how narrow is this need, as compared with our constant need for the providence of Him in whom we live, move and have our being — Our Father who art in Heaven! It is to him, “the giver of every good and perfect gift,” and not to our fathers after the flesh, that Christ taught us to pray, “Give us this day our daily bread.” And how true it is that it is through him that the generations of men exist! Let the mean temperature of the earth rise or fall a few degrees, an amount as nothing compared with differences produced in our laboratories, and mankind would disappear as ice disappears under a tropical sun, would fall as the leaves fall at the touch of frost. Or, let for two or three seasons the earth refuse her increase, and how many of our millions would remain alive?

The duty of fathers to transmit to their children profitable property that will enable them to keep themselves from want and misery in the uncertainties of this mortal life! What is not possible cannot be a duty. And how is it possible for fathers to do that? Your Holiness has not considered how mankind really lives from hand to mouth, getting each day its daily bread; how little one generation does or can leave another. It is doubtful if the wealth of the civilized world all told amounts to anything like as much as one year’s labor, while it is certain that if labor were to stop and men had to rely on existing accumulation, it would be only a few days ere in the richest countries pestilence and famine would stalk.
The profitable property your Holiness refers to, is private property in land. Now profitable land, as all economists will agree, is land superior to the land that the ordinary man can get. It is land that will yield an income to the owner as owner, and therefore that will permit the owner to appropriate the products of labor without doing labor, its profitableness to the individual involving the robbery of other individuals. It is therefore possible only for some fathers to leave their children profitable land. What therefore your Holiness practically declares is, that it is the duty of all fathers to struggle to leave their children what only the few peculiarly strong, lucky or unscrupulous can leave; and that, a something that involves the robbery of others — their deprivation of the material gifts of God.

This anti-Christian doctrine has been long in practice throughout the Christian world. What are its results?

Are they not the very evils set forth in your Encyclical? Are they not, so far from enabling men to keep themselves from want and misery in the uncertainties of this mortal life, to condemn the great masses of men to want and misery that the natural conditions of our mortal life do not entail; to want and misery deeper and more wide-spread than exist among heathen savages? Under the régime of private property in land and in the richest countries not five per cent of fathers are able at their death to leave anything substantial to their children, and probably a large majority do not leave enough to bury them! Some few children are left by their fathers richer than it is good for them to be, but the vast majority not only are left nothing by their fathers, but by the system that makes land private property are deprived of the bounty of their Heavenly Father; are compelled to sue others for permission to live and to work, and to toil all their lives for a pittance that often does not enable them to escape starvation and pauperism.

What your Holiness is actually, though of course inadvertently, urging, is that earthly fathers should assume the functions of the Heavenly Father. It is not the business of one generation to provide the succeeding generation “with all that is needful to enable them honorably to keep themselves from want and misery.” That is God’s business. We no more create our children than we create our fathers. It is God who is the Creator of each succeeding generation as fully as of the one that preceded it. And, to recall your own words (7), “Nature [God], therefore, owes to man a storehouse that shall never fail, the daily supply of his daily wants. And this he finds only in the inexhaustible fertility of the earth.” What you are now assuming is, that it is the duty of men to provide for the wants of their children by appropriating this storehouse and depriving other men’s children of the unfailing supply that God has provided for all.

The duty of the father to the child — the duty possible to all fathers! Is it not so to conduct himself, so to nurture and teach it, that it shall come to manhood with a sound body, well-developed mind, habits of virtue, piety and industry, and in a state of society that shall give it and all others free access to the bounty of God, the providence of the All-Father?

In doing this the father would be doing more to secure his children from want and misery than is possible now to the richest of fathers — as much more as the providence of God surpasses that of man. For the justice of God laughs at the efforts of men to circumvent it, and the subtle law that binds humanity together poisons the rich in the sufferings of the poor. Even the few who are able in the general struggle to leave their children wealth that they fondly think will keep them from want and misery in the uncertainties of this mortal life — do they succeed? Does experience show that it is a benefit to a child to place him above his fellows and enable him to think God’s law of labor is not for him? Is not such wealth oftener a curse than a blessing, and does not its expectation often destroy filial love and bring dissensions and heartburnings into families? And how far and how long are even the richest and strongest able to exempt their children from the common lot? Nothing is more certain than that the blood of the masters of the world flows today in lazzaroni and that the descendants of kings and princes tenant slums and workhouses.

But in the state of society we strive for, where the monopoly and waste of God’s bounty would be done away with and the fruits of labor would go to the laborer, it would be within the ability of all to make more than a comfortable living with reasonable labor. And for those who might be crippled or incapacitated, or deprived of their natural protectors and breadwinners, the most ample provision could be made out of that great and increasing fund with which God in his law of rent has provided society — not as a matter of niggardly and degrading alms, but as a matter of right, as the assurance which in a Christian state society owes to all its members.

Thus it is that the duty of the father, the obligation to the child, instead of giving any support to private property in land, utterly condemns it, urging us by the most powerful considerations to abolish it in the simple and efficacious way of the single tax.

This duty of the father, this obligation to children, is not confined to those who have actually children of their own, but rests on all of us who have come to the powers and responsibilities of manhood.

For did not Christ set a little child in the midst of the disciples, saying to them that the angels of such little ones always behold the face of his Father; saying to them that it were better for a man to hang a millstone about his neck and plunge into the uttermost depths of the sea than to injure such a little one?

And what today is the result of private property in land in the richest of so-called Christian countries? Is it not that young people fear to marry; that married people fear to have children; that children are driven out of life from sheer want of proper nourishment and care, or compelled to toil when they ought to be at school or at play; that great numbers of those who attain maturity enter it with under-nourished bodies, overstrained nerves, undeveloped minds — under conditions that foredoom them, not merely to suffering, but to crime; that fit them in advance for the prison and the brothel?

If your Holiness will consider these things we are confident that instead of defending private property in land you will condemn it with anathema!

7. That the private ownership of land stimulates industry, increases wealth, and attaches men to the soil and to their country. (51.)

The idea, as expressed by Arthur Young, that “the magic of property turns barren sands to gold” springs from the confusion of ownership with possession, of which I have before spoken, that attributes to private property in land what is due to security of the products of labor. It is needless for me again to point out that the change we propose, the taxation for public uses of land values, or economic rent, and the abolition of other taxes, would give to the user of land far greater security for the fruits of his labor than the present system and far greater permanence of possession. Nor is it necessary further to show how it would give homes to those who are now homeless and bind men to their country. For under it every one who wanted a piece of land for a home or for productive use could get it without purchase price and hold it even without tax, since the tax we propose would not fall on all land, nor even on all land in use, but only on land better than the poorest land in use, and is in reality not a tax at all, but merely a return to the state for the use of a valuable privilege. And even those who from circumstances or occupation did not wish to make permanent use of land would still have an equal interest with all others in the land of their country and in the general prosperity.

But I should like your Holiness to consider how utterly unnatural is the condition of the masses in the richest and most progressive of Christian countries; how large bodies of them live in habitations in which a rich man would not ask his dog to dwell; how the great majority have no homes from which they are not liable on the slightest misfortune to be evicted; how numbers have no homes at all, but must seek what shelter chance or charity offers. I should like to ask your Holiness to consider how the great majority of men in such countries have no interest whatever in what they are taught to call their native land, for which they are told that on occasions it is their duty to fight or to die. What right, for instance, have the majority of your countrymen in the land of their birth? Can they live in Italy outside of a prison or a poorhouse except as they buy the privilege from some of the exclusive owners of Italy? Cannot an Englishman, an American, an Arab or a Japanese do as much? May not what was said centuries ago by Tiberius Gracchus be said today: “Men of Rome! you are called the lords of the world, yet have no right to a square foot of its soil! The wild beasts have their dens, but the soldiers of Italy have only water and air!”

What is true of Italy is true of the civilized world — is becoming increasingly true. It is the inevitable effect as civilization progresses of private property in land.

 

8. That the right to possess private property in land is from nature, not from man; that the state has no right to abolish it, and that to take the value of landownership in taxation would be unjust and cruel to the private owner. (51.)

This, like much else that your Holiness says, is masked in the use of the indefinite terms “private property” and “private owner” — a want of precision in the use of words that has doubtless aided in the confusion of your own thought. But the context leaves no doubt that by private property you mean private property in land, and by private owner, the private owner of land.

The contention, thus made, that private property in land is from nature, not from man, has no other basis than the confounding of ownership with possession and the ascription to property in land of what belongs to its contradictory, property in the proceeds of labor. You do not attempt to show for it any other basis, nor has any one else ever attempted to do so. That private property in the products of labor is from nature is clear, for nature gives such things to labor and to labor alone. Of every article of this kind, we know that it came into being as nature’s response to the exertion of an individual man or of individual men — given by nature directly and exclusively to him or to them. Thus there inheres in such things a right of private property, which originates from and goes back to the source of ownership, the maker of the thing. This right is anterior to the state and superior to its enactments, so that, as we hold, it is a violation of natural right and an injustice to the private owner for the state to tax the processes and products of labor. They do not belong to Caesar. They are things that God, of whom nature is but an expression, gives to those who apply for them in the way he has appointed — by labor.

But who will dare trace the individual ownership of land to any grant from the Maker of land? What does nature give to such ownership? how does she in any way recognize it? Will any one show from difference of form or feature, of stature or complexion, from dissection of their bodies or analysis of their powers and needs, that one man was intended by nature to own land and another to live on it as his tenant? That which derives its existence from man and passes away like him, which is indeed but the evanescent expression of his labor, man may hold and transfer as the exclusive property of the individual; but how can such individual ownership attach to land, which existed before man was, and which continues to exist while the generations of men come and go — the unfailing storehouse that the Creator gives to man for “the daily supply of his daily wants”?
Clearly, the private ownership of land is from the state, not from nature. Thus, not merely can no objection be made on the score of morals when it is proposed that the state shall abolish it altogether, but insomuch as it is a violation of natural right, its existence involving a gross injustice on the part of the state, an “impious violation of the benevolent intention of the Creator,” it is a moral duty that the state so abolish it.

So far from there being anything unjust in taking the full value of landownership for the use of the community, the real injustice is in leaving it in private hands — an injustice that amounts to robbery and murder.

And when your Holiness shall see this I have no fear that you will listen for one moment to the impudent plea that before the community can take what God intended it to take — before men who have been disinherited of their natural rights can be restored to them, the present owners of land shall first be compensated.

For not only will you see that the single tax will directly and largely benefit small landowners, whose interests as laborers and capitalists are much greater than their interests as landowners, and that though the great landowners — or rather the propertied class in general among whom the profits of landownership are really divided through mortgages, rent-charges, etc. — would relatively lose, they too would be absolute gainers in the increased prosperity and improved morals; but more quickly, more strongly, more peremptorily than from any calculation of gains or losses would your duty as a man, your faith as a Christian, forbid you to listen for one moment to any such paltering with right and wrong.

Where the state takes some land for public uses it is only just that those whose land is taken should be compensated, otherwise some landowners would be treated more harshly than others. But where, by a measure affecting all alike, rent is appropriated for the benefit of all, there can be no claim to compensation. Compensation in such case would be a continuance of the same in another form — the giving to landowners in the shape of interest of what they before got as rent. Your Holiness knows that justice and injustice are not thus to be juggled with, and when you fully realize that land is really the storehouse that God owes to all his children, you will no more listen to any demand for compensation for restoring it to them than Moses would have listened to a demand that Pharaoh should be compensated before letting the children of Israel go.

Compensated for what? For giving up what has been unjustly taken? The demand of landowners for compensation is not that. We do not seek to spoil the Egyptians. We do not ask that what has been unjustly taken from laborers shall be restored. We are willing that bygones should be bygones and to leave dead wrongs to bury their dead. We propose to let those who by the past appropriation of land values have taken the fruits of labor to retain what they have thus got. We merely propose that for the future such robbery of labor shall cease — that for the future, not for the past, landholders shall pay to the community the rent that to the community is justly due.

 

III.

I have said enough to show your Holiness the injustice into which you fall in classing us, who in seeking virtually to abolish private property in land seek more fully to secure the true rights of property, with those whom you speak of as socialists, who wish to make all property common. But you also do injustice to the socialists.

There are many, it is true, who feeling bitterly the monstrous wrongs of the present distribution of wealth are animated only by a blind hatred of the rich and a fierce desire to destroy existing social adjustments. This class is indeed only less dangerous than those who proclaim that no social improvement is needed or is possible. But it is not fair to confound with them those who, however mistakenly, propose definite schemes of remedy.

The socialists, as I understand them, and as the term has come to apply to anything like a definite theory and not to be vaguely and improperly used to include all who desire social improvement, do not, as you imply, seek the abolition of all private property. Those who do this are properly called communists. What the socialists seek is the state assumption of capital (in which they vaguely and erroneously include land), or more properly speaking, of large capitals, and state management and direction of at least the larger operations of industry. In this way they hope to abolish interest, which they regard as a wrong and an evil; to do away with the gains of exchangers, speculators, contractors and middlemen, which they regard as waste; to do away with the wage system and secure general cooperation; and to prevent competition, which they deem the fundamental cause of the impoverishment of labor. The more moderate of them, without going so far, go in the same direction, and seek some remedy or palliation of the worst forms of poverty by government regulation. The essential character of socialism is that it looks to the extension of the functions of the state for the remedy of social evils; that it would substitute regulation and direction for competition; and intelligent control by organized society for the free play of individual desire and effort.

Though not usually classed as socialists, both the trades-unionists and the protectionists have the same essential character. The trades-unionists seek the increase of wages, the reduction of working-hours and the general improvement in the condition of wage-workers, by organizing them into guilds or associations which shall fix the rates at which they will sell their labor; shall deal as one body with employers in case of dispute; shall use on occasion their necessary weapon, the strike; and shall accumulate funds for such purposes and for the purpose of assisting members when on a strike, or (sometimes) when out of employment. The protectionists seek by governmental prohibitions or taxes on imports to regulate the industry and control the exchanges of each country, so as, they imagine, to diversify home industries and prevent the competition of people of other countries.

At the opposite extreme are the anarchists, a term which, though frequently applied to mere violent destructionists, refers also to those who, seeing the many evils of too much government, regard government in itself as evil, and believe that in the absence of coercive power the mutual interests of men would secure voluntarily what cooperation is needed.

Differing from all these are those for whom I would speak. Believing that the rights of true property are sacred, we would regard forcible communism as robbery that would bring destruction. But we would not be disposed to deny that voluntary communism might be the highest possible state of which men can conceive. Nor do we say that it cannot be possible for mankind to attain it, since among the early Christians and among the religious orders of the Catholic Church we have examples of communistic societies on a small scale. St. Peter and St. Paul, St. Thomas of Aquin and Fra Angelico, the illustrious orders of the Carmelites and Franciscans, the Jesuits, whose heroism carried the cross among the most savage tribes of American forests, the societies that wherever your communion is known have deemed no work of mercy too dangerous or too repellent — were or are communists. Knowing these things we cannot take it on ourselves to say that a social condition may not be possible in which an all-embracing love shall have taken the place of all other motives. But we see that communism is only possible where there exists a general and intense religious faith, and we see that such a state can be reached only through a state of justice. For before a man can be a saint he must first be an honest man.

With both anarchists and socialists, we, who for want of a better term have come to call ourselves single-tax men, fundamentally differ. We regard them as erring in opposite directions — the one in ignoring the social nature of man, the other in ignoring his individual nature. While we see that man is primarily an individual, and that nothing but evil has come or can come from the interference by the state with things that belong to individual action, we also see that he is a social being, or, as Aristotle called him, a political animal, and that the state is requisite to social advance, having an indispensable place in the natural order. Looking on the bodily organism as the analogue of the social organism, and on the proper functions of the state as akin to those that in the human organism are discharged by the conscious intelligence, while the play of individual impulse and interest performs functions akin to those discharged in the bodily organism by the unconscious instincts and involuntary motions, the anarchists seem to us like men who would try to get along without heads and the socialists like men who would try to rule the wonderfully complex and delicate internal relations of their frames by conscious will.

The philosophical anarchists of whom I speak are few in number, and of little practical importance. It is with socialism in its various phases that we have to do battle.

With the socialists we have some points of agreement, for we recognize fully the social nature of man and believe that all monopolies should be held and governed by the state. In these, and in directions where the general health, knowledge, comfort and convenience might be improved, we, too, would extend the functions of the state.

But it seems to us the vice of socialism in all its degrees is its want of radicalism, of going to the root. It takes its theories from those who have sought to justify the impoverishment of the masses, and its advocates generally teach the preposterous and degrading doctrine that slavery was the first condition of labor. It assumes that the tendency of wages to a minimum is the natural law, and seeks to abolish wages; it assumes that the natural result of competition is to grind down workers, and seeks to abolish competition by restrictions, prohibitions and extensions of governing power. Thus mistaking effects for causes, and childishly blaming the stone for hitting it, it wastes strength in striving for remedies that when not worse are futile. Associated though it is in many places with democratic aspiration, yet its essence is the same delusion to which the children of Israel yielded when against the protest of their prophet they insisted on a king; the delusion that has everywhere corrupted democracies and enthroned tyrants — that power over the people can be used for the benefit of the people; that there may be devised machinery that through human agencies will secure for the management of individual affairs more wisdom and more virtue than the people themselves possess.
This superficiality and this tendency may be seen in all the phases of socialism.

Take, for instance, protectionism. What support it has, beyond the mere selfish desire of sellers to compel buyers to pay them more than their goods are worth, springs from such superficial ideas as that production, not consumption, is the end of effort; that money is more valuable than money’s-worth, and to sell more profitable than to buy; and above all from a desire to limit competition, springing from an unanalyzing recognition of the phenomena that necessarily follow when men who have the need to labor are deprived by monopoly of access to the natural and indispensable element of all labor. Its methods involve the idea that governments can more wisely direct the expenditure of labor and the investment of capital than can laborers and capitalists, and that the men who control governments will use this power for the general good and not in their own interests. They tend to multiply officials, restrict liberty, invent crimes. They promote perjury, fraud and corruption. And they would, were the theory carried to its logical conclusion, destroy civilization and reduce mankind to savagery.

Take trades-unionism. While within narrow lines trades-unionism promotes the idea of the mutuality of interests, and often helps to raise courage and further political education, and while it has enabled limited bodies of working-men to improve somewhat their condition, and gain, as it were, breathing-space, yet it takes no note of the general causes that determine the conditions of labor, and strives for the elevation of only a small part of the great body by means that cannot help the rest. Aiming at the restriction of competition — the limitation of the right to labor, its methods are like those of an army, which even in a righteous cause are subversive of liberty and liable to abuse, while its weapon, the strike, is destructive in its nature, both to combatants and non-combatants, being a form of passive war. To apply the principle of trades-unions to all industry, as some dream of doing, would be to enthrall men in a caste system.

Or take even such moderate measures as the limitation of working-hours and of the labor of women and children. They are superficial in looking no further than to the eagerness of men and women and little children to work unduly, and in proposing forcibly to restrain overwork while utterly ignoring its cause — the sting of poverty that forces human beings to it. And the methods by which these restraints must be enforced, multiply officials, interfere with personal liberty, tend to corruption, and are liable to abuse.

As for thoroughgoing socialism, which is the more to be honored as having the courage of its convictions, it would carry these vices to full expression. Jumping to conclusions without effort to discover causes, it fails to see that oppression does not come from the nature of capital, but from the wrong that robs labor of capital by divorcing it from land, and that creates a fictitious capital that is really capitalized monopoly. It fails to see that it would be impossible for capital to oppress labor were labor free to the natural material of production; that the wage system in itself springs from mutual convenience, being a form of cooperation in which one of the parties prefers a certain to a contingent result; and that what it calls the “iron law of wages” is not the natural law of wages, but only the law of wages in that unnatural condition in which men are made helpless by being deprived of the materials for life and work. It fails to see that what it mistakes for the evils of competition are really the evils of restricted competition — are due to a one-sided competition to which men are forced when deprived of land. While its methods, the organization of men into industrial armies, the direction and control of all production and exchange by governmental or semi-governmental bureaus, would, if carried to full expression, mean Egyptian despotism.

We differ from the socialists in our diagnosis of the evil and we differ from them as to remedies. We have no fear of capital, regarding it as the natural handmaiden of labor; we look on interest in itself as natural and just; we would set no limit to accumulation, nor impose on the rich any burden that is not equally placed on the poor; we see no evil in competition, but deem unrestricted competition to be as necessary to the health of the industrial and social organism as the free circulation of the blood is to the health of the bodily organism — to be the agency whereby the fullest cooperation is to be secured. We would simply take for the community what belongs to the community, the value that attaches to land by the growth of the community; leave sacredly to the individual all that belongs to the individual; and, treating necessary monopolies as functions of the state, abolish all restrictions and prohibitions save those required for public health, safety, morals and convenience.

But the fundamental difference — the difference I ask your Holiness specially to note, is in this: socialism in all its phases looks on the evils of our civilization as springing from the inadequacy or inharmony of natural relations, which must be artificially organized or improved. In its idea there devolves on the state the necessity of intelligently organizing the industrial relations of men; the construction, as it were, of a great machine whose complicated parts shall properly work together under the direction of human intelligence. This is the reason why socialism tends toward atheism. Failing to see the order and symmetry of natural law, it fails to recognize God.

On the other hand, we who call ourselves single-tax men (a name which expresses merely our practical propositions) see in the social and industrial relations of men not a machine which requires construction, but an organism which needs only to be suffered to grow. We see in the natural social and industrial laws such harmony as we see in the adjustments of the human body, and that as far transcends the power of man’s intelligence to order and direct as it is beyond man’s intelligence to order and direct the vital movements of his frame. We see in these social and industrial laws so close a relation to the moral law as must spring from the same Authorship, and that proves the moral law to be the sure guide of man where his intelligence would wander and go astray. Thus, to us, all that is needed to remedy the evils of our time is to do justice and give freedom. This is the reason why our beliefs tend toward, nay are indeed the only beliefs consistent with a firm and reverent faith in God, and with the recognition of his law as the supreme law which men must follow if they would secure prosperity and avoid destruction. This is the reason why to us political economy only serves to show the depth of wisdom in the simple truths which common people heard gladly from the lips of Him of whom it was said with wonder, “Is not this the Carpenter of Nazareth?”

And it is because that in what we propose — the securing to all men of equal natural opportunities for the exercise of their powers and the removal of all legal restriction on the legitimate exercise of those powers — we see the conformation of human law to the moral law, that we hold with confidence that this is not merely the sufficient remedy for all the evils you so strikingly portray, but that it is the only possible remedy.

Nor is there any other. The organization of man is such, his relations to the world in which he is placed are such — that is to say, the immutable laws of God are such, that it is beyond the power of human ingenuity to devise any way by which the evils born of the injustice that robs men of their birthright can be removed otherwise than by doing justice, by opening to all the bounty that God has provided for all.

Since man can live only on land and from land, since land is the reservoir of matter and force from which man’s body itself is taken, and on which he must draw for all that he can produce, does it not irresistibly follow that to give the land in ownership to some men and to deny to others all right to it is to divide mankind into the rich and the poor, the privileged and the helpless? Does it not follow that those who have no rights to the use of land can live only by selling their power to labor to those who own the land? Does it not follow that what the socialists call “the iron law of wages,” what the political economists term “the tendency of wages to a minimum,” must take from the landless masses — the mere laborers, who of themselves have no power to use their labor — all the benefits of any possible advance or improvement that does not alter this unjust division of land? For having no power to employ themselves, they must, either as labor-sellers or as land-renters, compete with one another for permission to labor. This competition with one another of men shut out from God’s inexhaustible storehouse has no limit but starvation, and must ultimately force wages to their lowest point, the point at which life can just be maintained and reproduction carried on.

This is not to say that all wages must fall to this point, but that the wages of that necessarily largest stratum of laborers who have only ordinary knowledge, skill and aptitude must so fall. The wages of special classes, who are fenced off from the pressure of competition by peculiar knowledge, skill or other causes, may remain above that ordinary level. Thus, where the ability to read and write is rare its possession enables a man to obtain higher wages than the ordinary laborer. But as the diffusion of education makes the ability to read and write general this advantage is lost. So when a vocation requires special training or skill, or is made difficult of access by artificial restrictions, the checking of competition tends to keep wages in it at a higher level. But as the progress of invention dispenses with peculiar skill, or artificial restrictions are broken down, these higher wages sink to the ordinary level. And so, it is only so long as they are special that such qualities as industry, prudence and thrift can enable the ordinary laborer to maintain a condition above that which gives a mere living. Where they become general, the law of competition must reduce the earnings or savings of such qualities to the general level — which, land being monopolized and labor helpless, can be only that at which the next lowest point is the cessation of life.

Or, to state the same thing in another way: Land being necessary to life and labor, its owners will be able, in return for permission to use it, to obtain from mere laborers all that labor can produce, save enough to enable such of them to maintain life as are wanted by the landowners and their dependents.

Thus, where private property in land has divided society into a landowning class and a landless class, there is no possible invention or improvement, whether it be industrial, social or moral, which, so long as it does not affect the ownership of land, can prevent poverty or relieve the general conditions of mere laborers. For whether the effect of any invention or improvement be to increase what labor can produce or to decrease what is required to support the laborer, it can, so soon as it becomes general, result only in increasing the income of the owners of land, without at all benefiting the mere laborers. In no event can those possessed of the mere ordinary power to labor, a power utterly useless without the means necessary to labor, keep more of their earnings than enough to enable them to live.

How true this is we may see in the facts of today. In our own time invention and discovery have enormously increased the productive power of labor, and at the same time greatly reduced the cost of many things necessary to the support of the laborer. Have these improvements anywhere raised the earnings of the mere laborer? Have not their benefits mainly gone to the owners of land — enormously increased land values?

I say mainly, for some part of the benefit has gone to the cost of monstrous standing armies and warlike preparations; to the payment of interest on great public debts; and, largely disguised as interest on fictitious capital, to the owners of monopolies other than that of land. But improvements that would do away with these wastes would not benefit labor; they would simply increase the profits of landowners. Were standing armies and all their incidents abolished, were all monopolies other than that of land done away with, were governments to become models of economy, were the profits of speculators, of middlemen, of all sorts of exchangers saved, were every one to become so strictly honest that no policemen, no courts, no prisons, no precautions against dishonesty would be needed — the result would not differ from that which has followed the increase of productive power.

Nay, would not these very blessings bring starvation to many of those who now manage to live? Is it not true that if there were proposed today, what all Christian men ought to pray for, the complete disbandment of all the armies of Europe, the greatest fears would be aroused for the consequences of throwing on the labor-market so many unemployed laborers?

The explanation of this and of similar paradoxes that in our time perplex on every side may be easily seen. The effect of all inventions and improvements that increase productive power, that save waste and economize effort, is to lessen the labor required for a given result, and thus to save labor, so that we speak of them as labor-saving inventions or improvements. Now, in a natural state of society where the rights of all to the use of the earth are acknowledged, labor-saving improvements might go to the very utmost that can be imagined without lessening the demand for men, since in such natural conditions the demand for men lies in their own enjoyment of life and the strong instincts that the Creator has implanted in the human breast. But in that unnatural state of society where the masses of men are disinherited of all but the power to labor when opportunity to labor is given them by others, there the demand for them becomes simply the demand for their services by those who hold this opportunity, and man himself becomes a commodity. Hence, although the natural effect of labor-saving improvement is to increase wages, yet in the unnatural condition which private ownership of the land begets, the effect, even of such moral improvements as the disbandment of armies and the saving of the labor that vice entails, is, by lessening the commercial demand, to lower wages and reduce mere laborers to starvation or pauperism. If labor-saving inventions and improvements could be carried to the very abolition of the necessity for labor, what would be the result? Would it not be that landowners could then get all the wealth that the land was capable of producing, and would have no need at all for laborers, who must then either starve or live as pensioners on the bounty of the landowners?

Thus, so long as private property in land continues — so long as some men are treated as owners of the earth and other men can live on it only by their sufferance — human wisdom can devise no means by which the evils of our present condition may be avoided.

Nor yet could the wisdom of God.

By the light of that right reason of which St. Thomas speaks we may see that even he, the Almighty, so long as his laws remain what they are, could do nothing to prevent poverty and starvation while property in land continues.

How could he? Should he infuse new vigor into the sunlight, new virtue into the air, new fertility into the soil, would not all this new bounty go to the owners of the land, and work not benefit, but rather injury, to mere laborers? Should he open the minds of men to the possibilities of new substances, new adjustments, new powers, could this do any more to relieve poverty than steam, electricity and all the numberless discoveries and inventions of our time have done? Or, if he were to send down from the heavens above or cause to gush up from the subterranean depths, food, clothing, all the things that satisfy man’s material desires, to whom under our laws would all these belong? So far from benefiting man, would not this increase and extension of his bounty prove but a curse, enabling the privileged class more riotously to roll in wealth, and bringing the disinherited class to more wide-spread starvation or pauperism?

 

IV.

Believing that the social question is at bottom a religious question, we deem it of happy augury to the world that in your Encyclical the most influential of all religious teachers has directed attention to the condition of labor.

But while we appreciate the many wholesome truths you utter, while we feel, as all must feel, that you are animated by a desire to help the suffering and oppressed, and to put an end to any idea that the church is divorced from the aspiration for liberty and progress, yet it is painfully obvious to us that one fatal assumption hides from you the cause of the evils you see, and makes it impossible for you to propose any adequate remedy. This assumption is, that private property in land is of the same nature and has the same sanctions as private property in things produced by labor. In spite of its undeniable truths and its benevolent spirit, your Encyclical shows you to be involved in such difficulties as a physician called to examine one suffering from disease of the stomach would meet should he begin with a refusal to consider the stomach.

Prevented by this assumption from seeing the true cause, the only causes you find it possible to assign for the growth of misery and wretchedness are the destruction of working-men’s guilds in the last century, the repudiation in public institutions and laws of the ancient religion, rapacious usury, the custom of working by contract, and the concentration of trade.

Such diagnosis is manifestly inadequate to account for evils that are alike felt in Catholic countries, in Protestant countries, in countries that adhere to the Greek communion and in countries where no religion is professed by the state; that are alike felt in old countries and in new countries; where industry is simple and where it is most elaborate; and amid all varieties of industrial customs and relations.

But the real cause will be clear if you will consider that since labor must find its workshop and reservoir in land, the labor question is but another name for the land question, and will reexamine your assumption that private property in land is necessary and right.

See how fully adequate is the cause I have pointed out. The most important of all the material relations of man is his relation to the planet he inhabits, and hence, the “impious resistance to the benevolent intentions of his Creator,” which, as Bishop Nulty says, is involved in private property in land, must produce evils wherever it exists. But by virtue of the law, “unto whom much is given, from him much is required,” the very progress of civilization makes the evils produced by private property in land more wide-spread and intense.

What is producing throughout the civilized world that condition of things you rightly describe as intolerable is not this and that local error or minor mistake. It is nothing less than the progress of civilization itself; nothing less than the intellectual advance and the material growth in which our century has been so preeminent, acting in a state of society based on private property in land; nothing less than the new gifts that in our time God has been showering on man, but which are being turned into scourges by man’s “impious resistance to the benevolent intentions of his Creator.”

The discoveries of science, the gains of invention, have given to us in this wonderful century more than has been given to men in any time before; and, in a degree so rapidly accelerating as to suggest geometrical progression, are placing in our hands new material powers. But with the benefit comes the obligation. In a civilization beginning to pulse with steam and electricity, where the sun paints pictures and the phonograph stores speech, it will not do to be merely as just as were our fathers. Intellectual advance and material advance require corresponding moral advance. Knowledge and power are neither good nor evil. They are not ends but means — evolving forces that if not controlled in orderly relations must take disorderly and destructive forms. The deepening pain, the increasing perplexity, the growing discontent for which, as you truly say, some remedy must be found and quickly found, mean nothing less than that forces of destruction swifter and more terrible than those that have shattered every preceding civilization are already menacing ours — that if it does not quickly rise to a higher moral level; if it does not become in deed as in word a Christian civilization, on the wall of its splendor must flame the doom of Babylon: “Thou art weighed in the balance and found wanting!”

 

One false assumption prevents you from seeing the real cause and true significance of the facts that have prompted your Encyclical. And it fatally fetters you when you seek a remedy.

You state that you approach the subject with confidence, yet in all that greater part of the Encyclical (19-67) devoted to the remedy, while there is an abundance of moral reflections and injunctions, excellent in themselves but dead and meaningless as you apply them, the only definite practical proposals for the improvement of the condition of labor are:

1. That the state should step in to prevent overwork, to restrict the employment of women and children, to secure in workshops conditions not unfavorable to health and morals, and, at least where there is danger of insufficient wages provoking strikes, to regulate wages (39-40).

2. That it should encourage the acquisition of property (in land) by working-men (50-51).

3. That working-men’s associations should be formed (52-67). These remedies so far as they go are socialistic, and though the Encyclical is not without recognition of the individual character of man and of the priority of the individual and the family to the state, yet the whole tendency and spirit of its remedial suggestions lean unmistakably to socialism — extremely moderate socialism it is true; socialism hampered and emasculated by a supreme respect for private possessions; yet socialism still. But, although you frequently use the ambiguous term “private property” when the context shows that you have in mind private property in land, the one thing clear on the surface and becoming clearer still with examination is that you insist that whatever else may be done, the private ownership of land shall be left untouched.

I have already referred generally to the defects that attach to all socialistic remedies for the evil condition of labor, but respect for your Holiness dictates that I should speak specifically, even though briefly, of the remedies proposed or suggested by you.

 

Of these, the widest and strongest are that the state should restrict the hours of labor, the employment of women and children, the unsanitary conditions of workshops, etc. Yet how little may in this way be accomplished.

A strong, absolute ruler might hope by such regulations to alleviate the conditions of chattel slaves. But the tendency of our times is toward democracy, and democratic states are necessarily weaker in paternalism, while in the industrial slavery, growing out of private ownership of land, that prevails in Christendom today, it is not the master who forces the slave to labor, but the slave who urges the master to let him labor. Thus the greatest difficulty in enforcing such regulations comes from those whom they are intended to benefit. It is not, for instance, the masters who make it difficult to enforce restrictions on child labor in factories, but the mothers, who, prompted by poverty, misrepresent the ages of their children even to the masters, and teach the children to misrepresent.

But while in large factories and mines regulations as to hours, ages, etc., though subject to evasion and offering opportunities for extortion and corruption, may be to some extent enforced, how can they have any effect in those far wider branches of industry where the laborer works for himself or for small employers?

All such remedies are of the nature of the remedy for overcrowding that is generally prescribed with them — the restriction under penalty of the number who may occupy a room and the demolition of unsanitary buildings. Since these measures have no tendency to increase house accommodation or to augment ability to pay for it, the overcrowding that is forced back in some places goes on in other places and to a worse degree. All such remedies begin at the wrong end. They are like putting on brake and bit to hold in quietness horses that are being lashed into frenzy; they are like trying to stop a locomotive by holding its wheels instead of shutting off steam; like attempting to cure smallpox by driving back its pustules. Men do not overwork themselves because they like it; it is not in the nature of the mother’s heart to send children to work when they ought to be at play; it is not of choice that laborers will work under dangerous and unsanitary conditions. These things, like overcrowding, come from the sting of poverty. And so long as the poverty of which they are the expression is left untouched, restrictions such as you indorse can have only partial and evanescent results. The cause remaining, repression in one place can only bring out its effects in other places, and the task you assign to the state is as hopeless as to ask it to lower the level of the ocean by bailing out the sea.

Nor can the state cure poverty by regulating wages. It is as much beyond the power of the state to regulate wages as it is to regulate the rates of interest. Usury laws have been tried again and again, but the only effect they have ever had has been to increase what the poorer borrowers must pay, and for the same reasons that all attempts to lower by regulation the price of goods have always resulted merely in increasing them. The general rate of wages is fixed by the ease or difficulty with which labor can obtain access to land, ranging from the full earnings of labor, where land is free, to the least on which laborers can live and reproduce, where land is fully monopolized. Thus, where it has been comparatively easy for laborers to get land, as in the United States and in Australasia, wages have been higher than in Europe and it has been impossible to get European laborers to work there for wages that they would gladly accept at home; while as monopolization goes on under the influence of private property in land, wages tend to fall, and the social conditions of Europe to appear. Thus, under the partial yet substantial recognition of common rights to land, of which I have spoken, the many attempts of the British Parliament to reduce wages by regulation failed utterly. And so, when the institution of private property in land had done its work in England, all attempts of Parliament to raise wages proved unavailing. In the beginning of this century it was even attempted to increase the earnings of laborers by grants in aid of wages. But the only result was to lower commensurately what wages employers paid.

The state could maintain wages above the tendency of the market (for as I have shown labor deprived of land becomes a commodity), only by offering employment to all who wish it; or by lending its sanction to strikes and supporting them with its funds. Thus it is, that the thoroughgoing socialists who want the state to take all industry into its hands are much more logical than those timid socialists who propose that the state should regulate private industry — but only a little.

 

The same hopelessness attends your suggestion that working-people should be encouraged by the state in obtaining a share of the land. It is evident that by this you mean that, as is now being attempted in Ireland, the state shall buy out large landowners in favor of small ones, establishing what are known as peasant proprietors. Supposing that this can be done even to a considerable extent, what will be accomplished save to substitute a larger privileged class for a smaller privileged class? What will be done for the still larger class that must remain, the laborers of the agricultural districts, the workmen of the towns, the proletarians of the cities? Is it not true, as Professor De Laveleye says, that in such countries as Belgium, where peasant proprietary exists, the tenants, for there still exist tenants, are rack-rented with a mercilessness unknown in Ireland? Is it not true that in such countries as Belgium the condition of the mere laborer is even worse than it is in Great Britain, where large ownerships obtain? And if the state attempts to buy up land for peasant proprietors will not the effect be, what is seen today in Ireland, to increase the market value of land and thus make it more difficult for those not so favored, and for those who will come after, to get land? How, moreover, on the principle which you declare (36), that “to the state the interests of all are equal, whether high or low,” will you justify state aid to one man to buy a bit of land without also insisting on state aid to another man to buy a donkey, to another to buy a shop, to another to buy the tools and materials of a trade — state aid in short to everybody who may be able to make good use of it or thinks that he could? And are you not thus landed in communism — not the communism of the early Christians and of the religious orders, but communism that uses the coercive power of the state to take rightful property by force from those who have, to give to those who have not? For the state has no purse of Fortunatus; the state cannot repeat the miracle of the loaves and fishes; all that the state can give, it must get by some form or other of the taxing power. And whether it gives or lends money, or gives or lends credit, it cannot give to those who have not, without taking from those who have.

But aside from all this, any scheme of dividing up land while maintaining private property in land is futile. Small holdings cannot coexist with the treatment of land as private property where civilization is materially advancing and wealth augments. We may see this in the economic tendencies that in ancient times were the main cause that transformed world-conquering Italy from a land of small farms to a land of great estates. We may see it in the fact that while two centuries ago the majority of English farmers were owners of the land they tilled, tenancy has been for a long time the all but universal condition of the English farmer. And now the mighty forces of steam and electricity have come to urge concentration. It is in the United States that we may see on the largest scale how their power is operating to turn a nation of landowners into a nation of tenants. The principle is clear and irresistible. Material progress makes land more valuable, and when this increasing value is left to private owners land must pass from the ownership of the poor into the ownership of the rich, just as diamonds so pass when poor men find them. What the British government is attempting in Ireland is to build snow-houses in the Arabian desert! to plant bananas in Labrador!

There is one way, and only one way, in which working-people in our civilization may be secured a share in the land of their country, and that is the way that we propose — the taking of the profits of landownership for the community.

 

As to working-men’s associations, what your Holiness seems to contemplate is the formation and encouragement of societies akin to the Catholic sodalities, and to the friendly and beneficial societies, like the Odd Fellows, which have had a large extension in English-speaking countries. Such associations may promote fraternity, extend social intercourse and provide assurance in case of sickness or death, but if they go no further they are powerless to affect wages even among their members. As to trades-unions proper, it is hard to define your position, which is, perhaps, best stated as one of warm approbation provided that they do not go too far. For while you object to strikes; while you reprehend societies that “do their best to get into their hands the whole field of labor and to force working-men either to join them or to starve;” while you discountenance the coercing of employers and seem to think that arbitration might take the place of strikes; yet you use expressions and assert principles that are all that the trades-unionist would ask, not merely to justify the strike and the boycott, but even the use of violence where only violence would suffice. For you speak of the insufficient wages of workmen as due to the greed of rich employers; you assume the moral right of the workman to obtain employment from others at wages greater than those others are willing freely to give; and you deny the right of any one to work for such wages as he pleases, in such a way as to lead Mr. Stead, in so widely read a journal as the Review of Reviews, approvingly to declare that you regard “blacklegging,” i.e., the working for less than union wages, as a crime.

To men conscious of bitter injustice, to men steeped in poverty yet mocked by flaunting wealth, such words mean more than I can think you realize.

When fire shall be cool and ice be warm, when armies shall throw away lead and iron, to try conclusions by the pelting of rose-leaves, such labor associations as you are thinking of may be possible. But not till then. For labor associations can do nothing to raise wages but by force. It may be force applied passively, or force applied actively, or force held in reserve, but it must be force. They must coerce or hold the power to coerce employers; they must coerce those among their own members disposed to straggle; they must do their best to get into their hands the whole field of labor they seek to occupy and to force other working-men either to join them or to starve. Those who tell you of trades-unions bent on raising wages by moral suasion alone are like those who would tell you of tigers that live on oranges.

The condition of the masses today is that of men pressed together in a hall where ingress is open and more are constantly coming, but where the doors for egress are closed. If forbidden to relieve the general pressure by throwing open those doors, whose bars and bolts are private property in land, they can only mitigate the pressure on themselves by forcing back others, and the weakest must be driven to the wall. This is the way of labor-unions and trade-guilds. Even those amiable societies that you recommend would in their efforts to find employment for their own members necessarily displace others.

For even the philanthropy which, recognizing the evil of trying to help labor by alms, seeks to help men to help themselves by finding them work, becomes aggressive in the blind and bitter struggle that private property in land entails, and in helping one set of men injures others. Thus, to minimize the bitter complaints of taking work from others and lessening the wages of others in providing their own beneficiaries with work and wages, benevolent societies are forced to devices akin to the digging of holes and filling them up again. Our American societies feel this difficulty, General Booth encounters it in England, and the Catholic societies which your Holiness recommends must find it, when they are formed.
Your Holiness knows of, and I am sure honors, the princely generosity of Baron Hirsch toward his suffering coreligionists. But, as I write, the New York newspapers contain accounts of an immense meeting held in Cooper Union, in this city, on the evening of Friday, September 4, in which a number of Hebrew trades-unions protested in the strongest manner against the loss of work and reduction of wages that are being effected by Baron Hirsch’s generosity in bringing their own countrymen here and teaching them to work. The resolution unanimously adopted at this great meeting thus concludes:

We now demand of Baron Hirsch himself that he release us from his “charity” and take back the millions, which, instead of a blessing, have proved a curse and a source of misery.

Nor does this show that the members of these Hebrew labor-unions — who are themselves immigrants of the same class as those Baron Hirsch is striving to help, for in the next generation they lose with us their distinctiveness — are a whit less generous than other men.

Labor associations of the nature of trade-guilds or unions are necessarily selfish; by the law of their being they must fight for their own hand, regardless of who is hurt; they ignore and must ignore the teaching of Christ that we should do to others as we would have them do to us, which a true political economy shows is the only way to the full emancipation of the masses. They must do their best to starve workmen who do not join them, they must by all means in their power force back the “blackleg” — as the soldier in battle must shoot down his mother’s son if in the opposing ranks. And who is the blackleg? A fellow-creature seeking work — a fellow-creature in all probability more pressed and starved than those who so bitterly denounce him, and often with the hungry pleading faces of wife and child behind him.

And, in so far as they succeed, what is it that trade-guilds and unions do but to impose more restrictions on natural rights; to create “trusts” in labor; to add to privileged classes other somewhat privileged classes; and to press the weaker closer to the wall?

I speak without prejudice against trades-unions, of which for years I was an active member. And in pointing out to your Holiness that their principle is selfish and incapable of large and permanent benefits, and that their methods violate natural rights and work hardship and injustice, I am only saying to you what, both in my books and by word of mouth, I have said over and over again to them. Nor is what I say capable of dispute. Intelligent trades-unionists know it, and the less intelligent vaguely feel it. And even those of the classes of wealth and leisure who, as if to head off the demand for natural rights, are preaching trades-unionism to working-men, must needs admit it.

Your Holiness will remember the great London dock strike of two years ago, which, with that of other influential men, received the moral support of that Prince of the Church whom we of the English speech hold higher and dearer than any prelate has been held by us since the blood of Thomas à Becket stained the Canterbury altar.

In a volume called “The Story of the Dockers’ Strike,” written by Messrs. H. Llewellyn Smith and Vaughan Nash, with an introduction by Sydney Buxton, M.P., which advocates trades-unionism as the solution of the labor question, and of which a large number were sent to Australia as a sort of official recognition of the generous aid received from there by the strikers, I find in the summing up, on pages 164-165, the following:

If the settlement lasts, work at the docks will be more regular, better paid, and carried on under better conditions than ever before. All this will be an unqualified gain to those who get the benefit from it. But another result will undoubtedly be to contract the field of employment and lessen the number of those for whom work can be found. The lower-class casual will, in the end, find his position more precarious than ever before, in proportion to the increased regularity of work which the “fitter” of the laborers will secure. The effect of the organization of dock labor, as of all classes of labor, will be to squeeze out the residuum. The loafer, the cadger, the failure in the industrial race — the members of “Class B” of Mr. Charles Booth’s hierarchy of social classes — will be no gainers by the change, but will rather find another door closed against them, and this in many cases the last door to employment.

I am far from wishing that your Holiness should join in that pharisaical denunciation of trades-unions common among those who, while quick to point out the injustice of trades-unions in denying to others the equal right to work, are themselves supporters of that more primary injustice that denies the equal right to the standing-place and natural material necessary to work. What I wish to point out is that trades-unionism, while it may be a partial palliative, is not a remedy; that it has not that moral character which could alone justify one in the position of your Holiness in urging it as good in itself. Yet, so long as you insist on private property in land what better can you do?

 

V.

In the beginning of the Encyclical you declare that the responsibility of the apostolical office urges your Holiness to treat the question of the condition of labor “expressly and at length in order that there may be no mistake as to the principles which truth and justice dictate for its settlement.” But, blinded by one false assumption, you do not see even fundamentals.

You assume that the labor question is a question between wage-workers and their employers. But working for wages is not the primary or exclusive occupation of labor. Primarily men work for themselves without the intervention of an employer. And the primary source of wages is in the earnings of labor, the man who works for himself and consumes his own products receiving his wages in the fruits of his labor. Are not fishermen, boatmen, cab-drivers, peddlers, working farmers — all, in short, of the many workers who get their wages directly by the sale of their services or products without the medium of an employer, as much laborers as those who work for the specific wages of an employer? In your consideration of remedies you do not seem even to have thought of them. Yet in reality the laborers who work for themselves are the first to be considered, since what men will be willing to accept from employers depends manifestly on what they can get by working for themselves.
You assume that all employers are rich men, who might raise wages much higher were they not so grasping. But is it not the fact that the great majority of employers are in reality as much pressed by competition as their workmen, many of them constantly on the verge of failure? Such employers could not possibly raise the wages they pay, however they might wish to, unless all others were compelled to do so.

You assume that there are in the natural order two classes, the rich and the poor, and that laborers naturally belong to the poor.

It is true as you say that there are differences in capacity, in diligence, in health and in strength, that may produce differences in fortune. These, however, are not the differences that divide men into rich and poor. The natural differences in powers and aptitudes are certainly not greater than are natural differences in stature. But while it is only by selecting giants and dwarfs that we can find men twice as tall as others, yet in the difference between rich and poor that exists today we find some men richer than other men by the thousandfold and the millionfold.

Nowhere do these differences between wealth and poverty coincide with differences in individual powers and aptitudes. The real difference between rich and poor is the difference between those who hold the tollgates and those who pay toll; between tribute-receivers and tribute-yielders.

In what way does nature justify such a difference? In the numberless varieties of animated nature we find some species that are evidently intended to live on other species. But their relations are always marked by unmistakable differences in size, shape or organs. To man has been given dominion over all the other living things that tenant the earth. But is not this mastery indicated even in externals, so that no one can fail on sight to distinguish between a man and one of the inferior animals? Our American apologists for slavery used to contend that the black skin and woolly hair of the negro indicated the intent of nature that the black should serve the white; but the difference that you assume to be natural is between men of the same race. What difference does nature show between such men as would indicate her intent that one should live idly yet be rich, and the other should work hard yet be poor? If I could bring you from the United States a man who has $200,000,000, and one who is glad to work for a few dollars a week, and place them side by side in your antechamber, would you be able to tell which was which, even were you to call in the most skilled anatomist? Is it not clear that God in no way countenances or condones the division of rich and poor that exists today, or in any way permits it, except as having given them free will he permits men to choose either good or evil, and to avoid heaven if they prefer hell. For is it not clear that the division of men into the classes rich and poor has invariably its origin in force and fraud; invariably involves violation of the moral law; and is really a division into those who get the profits of robbery and those who are robbed; those who hold in exclusive possession what God made for all, and those who are deprived of his bounty? Did not Christ in all his utterances and parables show that the gross difference between rich and poor is opposed to God’s law? Would he have condemned the rich so strongly as he did, if the class distinction between rich and poor did not involve injustice — was not opposed to God’s intent?

It seems to us that your Holiness misses its real significance in intimating that Christ, in becoming the son of a carpenter and himself working as a carpenter, showed merely that “there is nothing to be ashamed of in seeking one’s bread by labor.” To say that is almost like saying that by not robbing people he showed that there is nothing to be ashamed of in honesty. If you will consider how true in any large view is the classification of all men into working-men, beggar-men and thieves, you will see that it was morally impossible that Christ during his stay on earth should have been anything else than a working-man, since he who came to fulfil the law must by deed as well as word obey God’s law of labor.

See how fully and how beautifully Christ’s life on earth illustrated this law. Entering our earthly life in the weakness of infancy, as it is appointed that all should enter it, he lovingly took what in the natural order is lovingly rendered, the sustenance, secured by labor, that one generation owes to its immediate successors. Arrived at maturity, he earned his own subsistence by that common labor in which the majority of men must and do earn it. Then passing to a higher — to the very highest — sphere of labor, he earned his subsistence by the teaching of moral and spiritual truths, receiving its material wages in the love-offerings of grateful hearers, and not refusing the costly spikenard with which Mary anointed his feet. So, when he chose his disciples, he did not go to landowners or other monopolists who live on the labor of others, but to common laboring-men. And when he called them to a higher sphere of labor and sent them out to teach moral and spiritual truths, he told them to take, without condescension on the one hand or sense of degradation on the other, the loving return for such labor, saying to them that “the laborer is worthy of his hire,” thus showing, what we hold, that all labor does not consist in what is called manual labor, but that whoever helps to add to the material, intellectual, moral or spiritual fullness of life is also a laborer.*

* Nor should it be forgotten that the investigator, the philosopher, the teacher, the artist, the poet, the priest, though not engaged in the production of wealth, are not only engaged in the production of utilities and satisfactions to which the production of wealth is only a means, but by acquiring and diffusing knowledge, stimulating mental powers and elevating the moral sense, may greatly increase the ability to produce wealth. For man does not live by bread alone. . . . He who by any exertion of mind or body adds to the aggregate of enjoyable wealth, increases the sum of human knowledge, or gives to human life higher elevation or greater fullness — he is, in the large meaning of the words, a “producer,” a “working-man,” a “laborer,” and is honestly earning honest wages. But he who without doing aught to make mankind richer, wiser, better, happier, lives on the toil of others — he, no matter by what name of honor he may be called, or how lustily the priests of Mammon may swing their censers before him, is in the last analysis but a beggar-man or a thief. — Protection or Free Trade, pp. 74-75.

In assuming that laborers, even ordinary manual laborers, are naturally poor, you ignore the fact that labor is the producer of wealth, and attribute to the natural law of the Creator an injustice that comes from man’s impious violation of his benevolent intention. In the rudest stage of the arts it is possible, where justice prevails, for all well men to earn a living. With the labor-saving appliances of our time, it should be possible for all to earn much more. And so, in saying that poverty is no disgrace, you convey an unreasonable implication. For poverty ought to be a disgrace, since in a condition of social justice, it would, where unsought from religious motives or unimposed by unavoidable misfortune, imply recklessness or laziness.

 

The sympathy of your Holiness seems exclusively directed to the poor, the workers. Ought this to be so? Are not the rich, the idlers, to be pitied also? By the word of the gospel it is the rich rather than the poor who call for pity, for the presumption is that they will share the fate of Dives. And to any one who believes in a future life the condition of him who wakes to find his cherished millions left behind must seem pitiful. But even in this life, how really pitiable are the rich. The evil is not in wealth in itself — in its command over material things; it is in the possession of wealth while others are steeped in poverty; in being raised above touch with the life of humanity, from its work and its struggles, its hopes and its fears, and above all, from the love that sweetens life, and the kindly sympathies and generous acts that strengthen faith in man and trust in God.

Consider how the rich see the meaner side of human nature; how they are surrounded by flatterers and sycophants; how they find ready instruments not only to gratify vicious impulses, but to prompt and stimulate them; how they must constantly be on guard lest they be swindled; how often they must suspect an ulterior motive behind kindly deed or friendly word; how if they try to be generous they are beset by shameless beggars and scheming impostors; how often the family affections are chilled for them, and their deaths anticipated with the ill-concealed joy of expectant possession. The worst evil of poverty is not in the want of material things, but in the stunting and distortion of the higher qualities. So, though in another way, the possession of unearned wealth likewise stunts and distorts what is noblest in man.

God’s commands cannot be evaded with impunity. If it be God’s command that men shall earn their bread by labor, the idle rich must suffer. And they do. See the utter vacancy of the lives of those who live for pleasure; see the loathsome vices bred in a class who surrounded by poverty are sated with wealth. See that terrible punishment of ennui, of which the poor know so little that they cannot understand it; see the pessimism that grows among the wealthy classes — that shuts out God, that despises men, that deems existence in itself an evil, and fearing death yet longs for annihilation.

When Christ told the rich young man who sought him to sell all he had and to give it to the poor, he was not thinking of the poor, but of the young man. And I doubt not that among the rich, and especially among the self-made rich, there are many who at times at least feel keenly the folly of their riches and fear for the dangers and temptations to which these expose their children. But the strength of long habit, the prompting of pride, the excitement of making and holding what have become for them the counters in a game of cards, the family expectations that have assumed the character of rights, and the real difficulty they find in making any good use of their wealth, bind them to their burden, like a weary donkey to his pack, till they stumble on the precipice that bounds this life.

Men who are sure of getting food when they shall need it eat only what appetite dictates. But with the sparse tribes who exist on the verge of the habitable globe life is either a famine or a feast. Enduring hunger for days, the fear of it prompts them to gorge like anacondas when successful in their quest of game. And so, what gives wealth its curse is what drives men to seek it, what makes it so envied and admired — the fear of want. As the unduly rich are the corollary of the unduly poor, so is the soul-destroying quality of riches but the reflex of the want that embrutes and degrades. The real evil lies in the injustice from which unnatural possession and unnatural deprivation both spring.

But this injustice can hardly be charged on individuals or classes. The existence of private property in land is a great social wrong from which society at large suffers, and of which the very rich and the very poor are alike victims, though at the opposite extremes. Seeing this, it seems to us like a violation of Christian charity to speak of the rich as though they individually were responsible for the sufferings of the poor. Yet, while you do this, you insist that the cause of monstrous wealth and degrading poverty shall not be touched. Here is a man with a disfiguring and dangerous excrescence. One physician would kindly, gently, but firmly remove it. Another insists that it shall not be removed, but at the same time holds up the poor victim to hatred and ridicule. Which is right?

In seeking to restore all men to their equal and natural rights we do not seek the benefit of any class, but of all. For we both know by faith and see by fact that injustice can profit no one and that justice must benefit all.

Nor do we seek any “futile and ridiculous equality.” We recognize, with you, that there must always be differences and inequalities. In so far as these are in conformity with the moral law, in so far as they do not violate the command, “Thou shalt not steal,” we are content. We do not seek to better God’s work; we seek only to do his will. The equality we would bring about is not the equality of fortune, but the equality of natural opportunity; the equality that reason and religion alike proclaim — the equality in usufruct of all his children to the bounty of Our Father who art in Heaven.

And in taking for the uses of society what we clearly see is the great fund intended for society in the divine order, we would not levy the slightest tax on the possessors of wealth, no matter how rich they might be. Not only do we deem such taxes a violation of the right of property, but we see that by virtue of beautiful adaptations in the economic laws of the Creator, it is impossible for any one honestly to acquire wealth, without at the same time adding to the wealth of the world.

 

To persist in a wrong, to refuse to undo it, is always to become involved in other wrongs. Those who defend private property in land, and thereby deny the first and most important of all human rights, the equal right to the material substratum of life, are compelled to one of two courses. Either they must, as do those whose gospel is “Devil take the hindermost,” deny the equal right to life, and by some theory like that to which the English clergyman Malthus has given his name, assert that nature (they do not venture to say God) brings into the world more men than there is provision for; or, they must, as do the socialists, assert as rights what in themselves are wrongs.

Your Holiness in the Encyclical gives an example of this. Denying the equality of right to the material basis of life, and yet conscious that there is a right to live, you assert the right of laborers to employment and their right to receive from their employers a certain indefinite wage. No such rights exist. No one has a right to demand employment of another, or to demand higher wages than the other is willing to give, or in any way to put pressure on another to make him raise such wages against his will. There can be no better moral justification for such demands on employers by working-men than there would be for employers demanding that working-men shall be compelled to work for them when they do not want to and to accept wages lower than they are willing to take. Any seeming justification springs from a prior wrong, the denial to working-men of their natural rights, and can in the last analysis rest only on that supreme dictate of self-preservation that under extraordinary circumstances makes pardonable what in itself is theft, or sacrilege or even murder.

A fugitive slave with the bloodhounds of his pursuers baying at his heels would in true Christian morals be held blameless if he seized the first horse he came across, even though to take it he had to knock down the rider. But this is not to justify horse-stealing as an ordinary means of traveling.

When his disciples were hungry Christ permitted them to pluck corn on the Sabbath day. But he never denied the sanctity of the Sabbath by asserting that it was under ordinary circumstances a proper time to gather corn.

He justified David, who when pressed by hunger committed what ordinarily would be sacrilege, by taking from the temple the loaves of proposition. But in this he was far from saying that the robbing of temples was a proper way of getting a living.

In the Encyclical however you commend the application to the ordinary relations of life, under normal conditions, of principles that in ethics are only to be tolerated under extraordinary conditions. You are driven to this assertion of false rights by your denial of true rights. The natural right which each man has is not that of demanding employment or wages from another man; but that of employing himself — that of applying by his own labor to the inexhaustible storehouse which the Creator has in the land provided for all men. Were that storehouse open, as by the single tax we would open it, the natural demand for labor would keep pace with the supply, the man who sold labor and the man who bought it would become free exchangers for mutual advantage, and all cause for dispute between workman and employer would be gone. For then, all being free to employ themselves, the mere opportunity to labor would cease to seem a boon; and since no one would work for another for less, all things considered, than he could earn by working for himself, wages would necessarily rise to their full value, and the relations of workman and employer be regulated by mutual interest and convenience.

This is the only way in which they can be satisfactorily regulated.

Your Holiness seems to assume that there is some just rate of wages that employers ought to be willing to pay and that laborers should be content to receive, and to imagine that if this were secured there would be an end of strife. This rate you evidently think of as that which will give working-men a frugal living, and perhaps enable them by hard work and strict economy to lay by a little something.

But how can a just rate of wages be fixed without the “higgling of the market” any more than the just price of corn or pigs or ships or paintings can be so fixed? And would not arbitrary regulation in the one case as in the other check that interplay that most effectively promotes the economical adjustment of productive forces? Why should buyers of labor, any more than buyers of commodities, be called on to pay higher prices than in a free market they are compelled to pay? Why should the sellers of labor be content with anything less than in a free market they can obtain? Why should working-men be content with frugal fare when the world is so rich? Why should they be satisfied with a lifetime of toil and stinting, when the world is so beautiful? Why should not they also desire to gratify the higher instincts, the finer tastes? Why should they be forever content to travel in the steerage when others find the cabin more enjoyable?

Nor will they. The ferment of our time does not arise merely from the fact that working-men find it harder to live on the same scale of comfort. It is also and perhaps still more largely due to the increase of their desires with an improved scale of comfort. This increase of desire must continue. For working-men are men. And man is the unsatisfied animal.

He is not an ox, of whom it may be said, so much grass, so much grain, so much water, and a little salt, and he will be content. On the contrary, the more he gets the more he craves. When he has enough food then he wants better food. When he gets a shelter then he wants a more commodious and tasty one. When his animal needs are satisfied then mental and spiritual desires arise.

This restless discontent is of the nature of man — of that nobler nature that raises him above the animals by so immeasurable a gulf, and shows him to be indeed created in the likeness of God. It is not to be quarreled with, for it is the motor of all progress. It is this that has raised St. Peter’s dome and on dull, dead canvas made the angelic face of the Madonna to glow; it is this that has weighed suns and analyzed stars, and opened page after page of the wonderful works of creative intelligence; it is this that has narrowed the Atlantic to an ocean ferry and trained the lightning to carry our messages to the remotest lands; it is this that is opening to us possibilities beside which all that our modern civilization has as yet accomplished seem small. Nor can it be repressed save by degrading and embruting men; by reducing Europe to Asia.

Hence, short of what wages may be earned when all restrictions on labor are removed and access to natural opportunities on equal terms secured to all, it is impossible to fix any rate of wages that will be deemed just, or any rate of wages that can prevent working-men striving to get more. So far from it making working-men more contented to improve their condition a little, it is certain to make them more discontented.

Nor are you asking justice when you ask employers to pay their working-men more than they are compelled to pay — more than they could get others to do the work for. You are asking charity. For the surplus that the rich employer thus gives is not in reality wages, it is essentially alms.
In speaking of the practical measures for the improvement of the condition of labor which your Holiness suggests, I have not mentioned what you place much stress upon — charity. But there is nothing practical in such recommendations as a cure for poverty, nor will any one so consider them. If it were possible for the giving of alms to abolish poverty there would be no poverty in Christendom.

Charity is indeed a noble and beautiful virtue, grateful to man and approved by God. But charity must be built on justice. It cannot supersede justice.

What is wrong with the condition of labor through the Christian world is that labor is robbed. And while you justify the continuance of that robbery it is idle to urge charity. To do so — to commend charity as a substitute for justice, is indeed something akin in essence to those heresies, condemned by your predecessors, that taught that the gospel had superseded the law, and that the love of God exempted men from moral obligations.

All that charity can do where injustice exists is here and there to mollify somewhat the effects of injustice. It cannot cure them. Nor is even what little it can do to mollify the effects of injustice without evil. For what may be called the superimposed, and in this sense, secondary virtues, work evil where the fundamental or primary virtues are absent. Thus sobriety is a virtue and diligence is a virtue. But a sober and diligent thief is all the more dangerous. Thus patience is a virtue. But patience under wrong is the condoning of wrong. Thus it is a virtue to seek knowledge and to endeavor to cultivate the mental powers. But the wicked man becomes more capable of evil by reason of his intelligence. Devils we always think of as intelligent.

And thus that pseudo-charity that discards and denies justice works evil. On the one side, it demoralizes its recipients, outraging that human dignity which as you say “God himself treats with reverence,” and turning into beggars and paupers men who to become self-supporting, self-respecting citizens need only the restitution of what God has given them. On the other side, it acts as an anodyne to the consciences of those who are living on the robbery of their fellows, and fosters that moral delusion and spiritual pride that Christ doubtless had in mind when he said it was easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven. For it leads men steeped in injustice, and using their money and their influence to bolster up injustice, to think that in giving alms they are doing something more than their duty toward man and deserve to be very well thought of by God, and in a vague way to attribute to their own goodness what really belongs to God’s goodness. For consider: Who is the All-Provider? Who is it that as you say, “owes to man a storehouse that shall never fail,” and which “he finds only in the inexhaustible fertility of the earth.” Is it not God? And when, therefore, men, deprived of the bounty of their God, are made dependent on the bounty of their fellow-creatures, are not these creatures, as it were, put in the place of God, to take credit to themselves for paying obligations that you yourself say God owes?

But worse perhaps than all else is the way in which this substituting of vague injunctions to charity for the clear-cut demands of justice opens an easy means for the professed teachers of the Christian religion of all branches and communions to placate Mammon while persuading themselves that they are serving God. Had the English clergy not subordinated the teaching of justice to the teaching of charity — to go no further in illustrating a principle of which the whole history of Christendom from Constantine’s time to our own is witness — the Tudor tyranny would never have arisen, and the separation of the church been averted; had the clergy of France never substituted charity for justice, the monstrous iniquities of the ancient régime would never have brought the horrors of the Great Revolution; and in my own country had those who should have preached justice not satisfied themselves with preaching kindness, chattel slavery could never have demanded the holocaust of our civil war.

No, your Holiness; as faith without works is dead, as men cannot give to God his due while denying to their fellows the rights be gave them, so charity unsupported by justice can do nothing to solve the problem of the existing condition of labor. Though the rich were to “bestow all their goods to feed the poor and give their bodies to be burned,” poverty would continue while property in land continues.

Take the case of the rich man today who is honestly desirous of devoting his wealth to the improvement of the condition of labor. What can he do?

  • Bestow his wealth on those who need it? He may help some who deserve it, but will not improve general conditions. And against the good he may do will be the danger of doing harm.
  • Build churches? Under the shadow of churches poverty festers and the vice that is born of it breeds.
  • Build schools and colleges? Save as it may lead men to see the iniquity of private property in land, increased education can effect nothing for mere laborers, for as education is diffused the wages of education sink.
  • Establish hospitals? Why, already it seems to laborers that there are too many seeking work, and to save and prolong life is to add to the pressure.
  • Build model tenements? Unless he cheapens house accommodations he but drives further the class he would benefit, and as he cheapens house accommodations he brings more to seek employment and cheapens wages.
  • Institute laboratories, scientific schools, workshops for physical experiments? He but stimulates invention and discovery, the very forces that, acting on a society based on private property in land, are crushing labor as between the upper and the nether millstone.
  • Promote emigration from places where wages are low to places where they are somewhat higher? If he does, even those whom he at first helps to emigrate will soon turn on him to demand that such emigration shall be stopped as reducing their wages.
  • Give away what land he may have, or refuse to take rent for it, or let it at lower rents than the market price? He will simply make new landowners or partial landowners; he may make some individuals the richer, but he will do nothing to improve the general condition of labor.
  • Or, bethinking himself of those public-spirited citizens of classic times who spent great sums in improving their native cities, shall he try to beautify the city of his birth or adoption? Let him widen and straighten narrow and crooked streets, let him build parks and erect fountains, let him open tramways and bring in railroads, or in any way make beautiful and attractive his chosen city, and what will be the result? Must it not be that those who appropriate God’s bounty will take his also? Will it not be that the value of land will go up, and that the net result of his benefactions will be an increase of rents and a bounty to landowners? Why, even the mere announcement that he is going to do such things will start speculation and send up the value of land by leaps and bounds.

What, then, can the rich man do to improve the condition of labor?

He can do nothing at all except to use his strength for the abolition of the great primary wrong that robs men of their birthright. The justice of God laughs at the attempts of men to substitute anything else for it.

 

If when in speaking of the practical measures your Holiness proposes, I did not note the moral injunctions that the Encyclical contains, it is not because we do not think morality practical. On the contrary it seems to us that in the teachings of morality is to be found the highest practicality, and that the question, What is wise? may always safely be subordinated to the question, What is right? But your Holiness in the Encyclical expressly deprives the moral truths you state of all real bearing on the condition of labor, just as the American people, by their legalization of chattel slavery, used to deprive of all practical meaning the declaration they deem their fundamental charter, and were accustomed to read solemnly on every national anniversary. That declaration asserts that “We hold these truths to be self-evident — that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” But what did this truth mean on the lips of men who asserted that one man was the rightful property of another man who had bought him; who asserted that the slave was robbing the master in running away, and that the man or the woman who helped the fugitive to escape, or even gave him a cup of cold water in Christ’s name, was an accessory to theft, on whose head the penalties of the state should be visited?

Consider the moral teachings of the Encyclical:

  • You tell us that God owes to man an inexhaustible storehouse which he finds only in the land. Yet you support a system that denies to the great majority of men all right of recourse to this storehouse.
  • You tell us that the necessity of labor is a consequence of original sin. Yet you support a system that exempts a privileged class from the necessity for labor and enables them to shift their share and much more than their share of labor on others.
  • You tell us that God has not created us for the perishable and transitory things of earth, but has given us this world as a place of exile and not as our true country. Yet you tell us that some of the exiles have the exclusive right of ownership in this place of common exile, so that they may compel their fellow-exiles to pay them for sojourning here, and that this exclusive ownership they may transfer to other exiles yet to come, with the same right of excluding their fellows.
  • You tell us that virtue is the common inheritance of all; that all men are children of God the common Father; that all have the same last end; that all are redeemed by Jesus Christ; that the blessings of nature and the gifts of grace belong in common to all, and that to all except the unworthy is promised the inheritance of the Kingdom of Heaven! Yet in all this and through all this you insist as a moral duty on the maintenance of a system that makes the reservoir of all God’s material bounties and blessings to man the exclusive property of a few of their number — you give us equal rights in heaven, but deny us equal rights on earth!

It was said of a famous decision of the Supreme Court of the United States made just before the civil war, in a fugitive-slave case, that “it gave the law to the North and the nigger to the South.” It is thus that your Encyclical gives the gospel to laborers and the earth to the landlords. Is it really to be wondered at that there are those who sneeringly say, “The priests are ready enough to give the poor an equal share in all that is out of sight, but they take precious good care that the rich shall keep a tight grip on all that is within sight”?

 

Herein is the reason why the working masses all over the world are turning away from organized religion.

And why should they not? What is the office of religion if not to point out the principles that ought to govern the conduct of men toward each other; to furnish a clear, decisive rule of right which shall guide men in all the relations of life — in the workshop, in the mart, in the forum and in the senate, as well as in the church; to supply, as it were, a compass by which amid the blasts of passion, the aberrations of greed and the delusions of a short-sighted expediency men may safely steer? What is the use of a religion that stands palsied and paltering in the face of the most momentous problems? What is the use of a religion that whatever it may promise for the next world can do nothing to prevent injustice in this? Early Christianity was not such a religion, else it would never have encountered the Roman persecutions; else it would never have swept the Roman world. The skeptical masters of Rome, tolerant of all gods, careless of what they deemed vulgar superstitions, were keenly sensitive to a doctrine based on equal rights; they feared instinctively a religion that inspired slave and proletarian with a new hope; that took for its central figure a crucified carpenter; that taught the equal Fatherhood of God and the equal brotherhood of men; that looked for the speedy reign of justice, and that prayed, “Thy Kingdom come on Earth!

Today, the same perceptions, the same aspirations, exist among the masses. Man is, as he has been called, a religious animal, and can never quite rid himself of the feeling that there is some moral government of the world, some eternal distinction between wrong and right; can never quite abandon the yearning for a reign of righteousness. And today, men who, as they think, have cast off all belief in religion, will tell you, even though they know not what it is, that with regard to the condition of labor something is wrong! If theology be, as St. Thomas of Aquin held it, the sum and focus of the sciences, is it not the business of religion to say clearly and fearlessly what that wrong is? It was by a deep impulse that of old when threatened and perplexed by general disaster men came to the oracles to ask, In what have we offended the gods? today, menaced by growing evils that threaten the very existence of society, men, conscious that something is wrong, are putting the same question to the ministers of religion. What is the answer they get? Alas, with few exceptions, it is as vague, as inadequate, as the answers that used to come from heathen oracles.

Is it any wonder that the masses of men are losing faith?

 

Let me again state the case that your Encyclical presents:

What is that condition of labor which as you truly say is “the question of the hour,” and “fills every mind with painful apprehension”? Reduced to its lowest expression it is the poverty of men willing to work. And what is the lowest expression of this phrase? It is that they lack bread — for in that one word we most concisely and strongly express all the manifold material satisfactions needed by humanity, the absence of which constitutes poverty.

Now what is the prayer of Christendom — the universal prayer; the prayer that goes up daily and hourly wherever the name of Christ is honored; that ascends from your Holiness at the high altar of St. Peter’s, and that is repeated by the youngest child that the poorest Christian mother has taught to lisp a request to her Father in Heaven? It is, “Give us this day our daily bread!”

Yet where this prayer goes up, daily and hourly, men lack bread. Is it not the business of religion to say why? If it cannot do so, shall not scoffers mock its ministers as Elias mocked the prophets of Baal, saying, “Cry with a louder voice, for he is a god; and perhaps he is talking, or is in an inn, or on a journey, or perhaps be is asleep, and must be awaked!” What answer can those ministers give? Either there is no God, or he is asleep, or else he does give men their daily bread, and it is in some way intercepted.

Here is the answer, the only true answer: If men lack bread it is not that God has not done his part in providing it. If men willing to labor are cursed with poverty, it is not that the storehouse that God owes men has failed; that the daily supply he has promised for the daily wants of his children is not here in abundance. It is, that impiously violating the benevolent intentions of their Creator, men have made land private property, and thus given into the exclusive ownership of the few the provision that a bountiful Father has made for all.

Any other answer than that, no matter how it may be shrouded in the mere forms of religion, is practically an atheistical answer.

___________________

I have written this letter not alone for your Holiness, but for all whom I may hope it to reach. But in sending it to you personally, and in advance of publication, I trust that it may be by you personally read and weighed. In setting forth the grounds of our belief and in pointing out considerations which it seems to us you have unfortunately overlooked, I have written frankly, as was my duty on a matter of such momentous importance, and as I am sure you would have me write. But I trust I have done so without offense. For your office I have profound respect, for yourself personally the highest esteem. And while the views I have opposed seem to us erroneous and dangerous, we do not wish to be understood as in the slightest degree questioning either your sincerity or intelligence in adopting them. For they are views all but universally held by the professed religious teachers of Christendom, in all communions and creeds, and that have received the sanction of those looked to as the wise and learned. Under the conditions that have surrounded you, and under the pressure of so many high duties and responsibilities, culminating in those of your present exalted position, it is not to be expected that you should have hitherto thought to question them. But I trust that the considerations herein set forth may induce you to do so, and even if the burdens and cares that beset you shall now make impossible the careful consideration that should precede expression by one in your responsible position I trust that what I have written may not be without use to others.

And, as I have said, we are deeply grateful for your Encyclical. It is much that by so conspicuously calling attention to the condition of labor, you have recalled the fact forgotten by so many that the social evils and problems of our time directly and pressingly concern the church. It is much that you should thus have placed the stamp of your disapproval on that impious doctrine which directly and by implication has been so long and so widely preached in the name of Christianity, that the sufferings of the poor are due to mysterious decrees of Providence which men may lament but cannot alter. Your Encyclical will be seen by those who carefully analyze it to be directed not against socialism, which in moderate form you favor, but against what we in the United States call the single tax. Yet we have no solicitude for the truth save that it shall be brought into discussion, and we recognize in your Holiness’s Encyclical a most efficient means of promoting discussion, and of promoting discussion along the lines that we deem of the greatest importance — the lines of morality and religion. In this you deserve the gratitude of all who would follow truth, for it is of the nature of truth always to prevail over error where discussion goes on.

And the truth for which we stand has now made such progress in the minds of men that it must be heard; that it can never be stifled; that it must go on conquering and to conquer. Far-off Australia leads the van, and has already taken the first steps toward the single tax. In Great Britain, in the United States, and in Canada, the question is on the verge of practical politics and soon will be the burning issue of the time. Continental Europe cannot long linger behind. Faster than ever the world is moving.

Forty years ago slavery seemed stronger in the United States than ever before, and the market price of slaves — both working slaves and breeding slaves — was higher than it had ever been before, for the title of the owner seemed growing more secure. In the shadow of the Hall where the equal rights of man had been solemnly proclaimed, the manacled fugitive was dragged back to bondage, and on what to American tradition was our Marathon of freedom, the slave-master boasted that he would yet call the roll of his chattels.

Yet forty years ago, though the party that was to place Abraham Lincoln in the Presidential chair had not been formed, and nearly a decade was yet to pass ere the signal-gun was to ring out, slavery, as we may now see, was doomed.

today a wider, deeper, more beneficent revolution is brooding, not over one country, but over the world. God’s truth impels it, and forces mightier than he has ever before given to man urge it on. It is no more in the power of vested wrongs to stay it than it is in man’s power to stay the sun. The stars in their courses fight against Sisera, and in the ferment of today, to him who hath ears to hear, the doom of industrial slavery is sealed.

Where shall the dignitaries of the church be in the struggle that is coming, nay that is already here? On the side of justice and liberty, or on the side of wrong and slavery? with the delivered when the timbrels shall sound again, or with the chariots and the horsemen that again shall be engulfed in the sea?

As to the masses, there is little fear where they will be. Already, among those who hold it with religious fervor, the single tax counts great numbers of Catholics, many priests, secular and regular, and at least some bishops, while there is no communion or denomination of the many into which English-speaking Christians are divided where its advocates are not to be found.

Last Sunday evening in the New York church that of all churches in the world is most richly endowed, I saw the cross carried through its aisles by a hundred choristers, and heard a priest of that English branch of the church that three hundred years since was separated from your obedience, declare to a great congregation that the labor question was at bottom a religious question; that it could only be settled on the basis of moral right; that the first and clearest of rights is the equal right to the use of the physical basis of all life; and that no human titles could set aside God’s gift of the land to all men.

And as the cross moved by, and the choristers sang,

Raise ye the Christian’s war-cry —
The Cross of Christ the Lord!

men to whom it was a new thing bowed their heads, and in hearts long steeled against the church, as the willing handmaid of oppression, rose the “God wills it!” of the grandest and mightiest of crusades.

Servant of the Servants of God! I call you by the strongest and sweetest of your titles. In your hands more than in those of any living man lies the power to say the word and make the sign that shall end an unnatural divorce, and marry again to religion all that is pure and high in social aspiration.

Wishing for your Holiness the chiefest of all blessings, that you may know the truth and be freed by the truth; wishing for you the days and the strength that may enable you by the great service you may render to humanity to make your pontificate through all coming time most glorious; and with the profound respect due to your personal character and to your exalted office, I am,

Yours sincerely,
HENRY GEORGE
NEW YORK, September 11, 1891.